Punjab and Haryana HC: Domestic violence Act proceeding against persons not residing in shared household is not maintainable

Respondent has filed the complaint under the Act. Admittedly, petitioners are not residing in the matrimonial home of the respondent. {Para 4}

6. A combined reading of the above definitions reveals that an 'aggrieved person' is a woman, who is in a domestic relationship with the respondent and has been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent. 'Domestic relationship' would mean a relationship between two persons, who live or have at any point of time lived together in a shared household. 'Shared household' means a household where the person aggrieved lives at any stage in a domestic relationship either singly or along with respondent. The respondent has, thus, never resided with the petitioners in the household along with her husband to constitute an offence under the Act against the petitioners.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

Criminal Misc. No. M-22385 of 2011 (O&M)

Decided On: 11.10.2012

Girish and Ors. Vs. Poonam

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sabina, J.

Citation:  MANU/PH/2999/2012.

Print Page

Supreme Court: Whether applicant in domestic violence Act proceeding can add any person as party to the petition if they are not residing with her in shared household?

The High Court has rightly found in effect that the ingredients of domestic violence are wholly absent in this case. The Petitioner and the Respondents are not persons living together in a shared household. There is a vague allegation that the Respondents are family members. There is not a whisper of the Respondents with the Petitioner. They appear to be neighbours.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Special Leave Petition (Criminal)... Diary No. 34053/2019

Date of Order: 04.10.2019

Kamlesh Devi Vs. Jaipal and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Indira Banerjee and M.R. Shah, JJ.

Citation:  MANU/SCOR/36609/2019.

Print Page

Bombay HC: Married Sister-In-Law Who Frequently Visits maternal House is Not In Domestic Relationship With the petitioner

 The law laid down by the Apex Court in Prabha Tyagi

(supra) will not assist the case of Respondent No 1 as the

Petitioner is the married sister-in-law residing in her own

matrimonial house and it cannot be said that the right of the

aggrieved person to reside in the shared household would

constitute a subsisting domestic relationship with the Petitioner. It  would have been a different matter if the Petitioner was unmarried and was residing in the shared household in which case considering the right to reside conferred by Section 17(1) of the D.V. Act, the aggrieved person could have been said to be in

subsisting domestic relationship with the Petitioner even if the

parties had never resided together in the shared household. It is

the right of the aggrieved person to reside in the shared household which constitutes domestic relationship between the aggrieved person and persons residing in the shared household. However, such are not the facts in the instant case as Petitioner is residing separately in her matrimonial house. {Para 20}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION (ST.) NO.18350 OF 2023

Nil V  2. State of Maharashtra 

CORAM : SHARMILA U. DESHMUKH, J.

Pronounced on : FEBRUARY 14, 2024

Print Page

Whether woman can claim relief against her in laws even if she has never resided with them?

 (ii) Whether it is mandatory for the aggrieved person to reside with those persons against whom the allegations have been levied at the point of commission of violence?

It is held that it is not mandatory for the aggrieved person, when she is related by consanguinity, marriage or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family, to actually reside with those persons against whom the allegations have been levelled at the time of commission of domestic violence. If a woman has the right to reside in the shared household Under Section 17 of the D.V. Act and such a woman becomes an aggrieved person or victim of domestic violence, she can seek reliefs under the provisions of D.V. Act including enforcement of her right to live in a shared household.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 511 of 2022

Decided On: 12.05.2022

Prabha Tyagi Vs. Kamlesh Devi

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

M.R. Shah and B.V. Nagarathna, JJ.

Author:B.V. Nagarathna, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0631/2022,2022/INSC/563.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

Print Page

Whether a woman can claim right of residence in shared household even if she is not in domestic relationship at the time of filing of application?

(iii) Whether there should be a subsisting domestic relationship between the aggrieved person and the person against whom the relief is claimed?

It is held that there should be a subsisting domestic relationship between the aggrieved person and the person against whom the relief is claimed vis-à-vis allegation of domestic violence. However, it is not necessary that at the time of filing of an application by an aggrieved person, the domestic relationship should be subsisting. In other words, even if an aggrieved person is not in a domestic relationship with the Respondent in a shared household at the time of filing of an application Under Section 12 of the D.V. Act but has at any point of time lived so or had the right to live and has been subjected to domestic violence or is later subjected to domestic violence on account of the domestic relationship, is entitled to file an application Under Section 12 of the D.V. Act.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 511 of 2022

Decided On: 12.05.2022

Prabha Tyagi Vs. Kamlesh Devi

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

M.R. Shah and B.V. Nagarathna, JJ.

Author:B.V. Nagarathna, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0631/2022,2022/INSC/563

Print Page

What is basic concept of matrimonial home and what is the difference between matrimonial home and shared-household?

In Indian law, the concepts of "matrimonial home" and "shared household" are closely related but have distinct meanings and implications.

Matrimonial Home:-

The matrimonial home is the primary residence where a married couple resides during their marriage. It is the place where they establish their marital life, raise their children, and build a shared future. The matrimonial home holds significant emotional and symbolic value, representing the foundation of their marital relationship.

While the matrimonial home is typically owned or rented by one or both spouses, the concept of matrimonial home extends beyond legal ownership. It is the place where the couple has established a joint household, irrespective of their individual property rights.

Print Page

Under which circumstances the Court Can Order Husband To Pay Wife Monetary Expenses In Lieu Of Shared House?

 Admittedly, the Revision Petitioner No.1 is the

husband of the respondent. However, the Revision Petitioner is

living with first wife. Taking note of these aspects of the matter

directing the respondent to stay in the same house in a

separate room would not be feasible practically and it may give

rise to further displeasure among the parties resulting in

civil/criminal litigation. {Para 5}

6. Accordingly, this Court exercising its power as is

contemplated under Section 19(1)(f) of the DV Act, a sum of

Rs.5,000/- be paid instead of the room be provided as the

shared house. If a sum of Rs.5,000/- is being ordered, the

respondent can find out a suitable alternate premises more

than the room that would be provided in the shared house hold

as ordered by the Trial Court, it would meet the ends of justice.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, KALABURAGI BENCH

CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION NO. 200071 OF 2016 (397)

SUNIL KUMAR S/O SAMUEL AND ORS Vs ELIZABETH W/O SUNIL KUMAR

BEFORE

 MR JUSTICE V SRISHANANDA

DATED: 7TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2023

Print Page

Supreme Court: Summary Eviction Procedure Under Senior Citizens Act Cannot Be Invoked To Defeat Right Of Residence Of Woman In A Shared Household As Per DV Act

This Court is cognizant that the Senior Citizens Act 2007 was promulgated with a view to provide a speedy and inexpensive remedy to senior citizens. Accordingly, Tribunals were constituted Under Section 7. These Tribunals have the power to conduct summary procedures for inquiry, with all powers of the Civil Courts, Under Section 8. The jurisdiction of the Civil Courts has been explicitly barred Under Section 27 of the Senior Citizens Act 2007. However, the over-riding effect for remedies sought by the applicants under the Senior Citizens Act 2007 Under Section 3, cannot be interpreted to preclude all other competing remedies and protections that are sought to be conferred by the PWDV Act 2005. The PWDV Act 2005 is also in the nature of a special legislation, that is enacted with the purpose of correcting gender discrimination that pans out in the form of social and economic inequities in a largely patriarchal society. In deference to the dominant purpose of both the legislations, it would be appropriate for a Tribunal under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 to grant such remedies of maintenance, as envisaged Under Section 2(b) of the Senior Citizens Act 2007 that do not result in obviating competing remedies under other special statutes, such as the PWDV Act 2005. Section 2625 of the PWDV Act empowers certain reliefs, including relief for a residence order, to be obtained from any civil court in any legal proceedings. Therefore, in the event that a composite dispute is alleged, such as in the present case where the suit premises are a site of contestation between two groups protected by the law, it would be appropriate for the Tribunal constituted under the Senior Citizens Act 2007 to appropriately mould reliefs, after noticing the competing claims of the parties claiming under the PWDV Act 2005 and Senior Citizens Act 2007. Section 3 of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 cannot be deployed to over-ride and nullify other protections in law, particularly that of a woman's right to a 'shared household' Under Section 17 of the PWDV Act 2005. In the event that the "aggrieved woman" obtains a relief from a Tribunal constituted under the Senior Citizens Act 2007, she shall duty-bound to inform the Magistrate under the PWDV Act 2005, as per Sub-section (3) of Section 26 of the PWDV Act 2005. This course of action would ensure that the common intent of the Senior Citizens Act 2007 and the PWDV Act 2005- of ensuring speedy relief to its protected groups who are both vulnerable members of the society, is effectively realized. Rights in law can translate to rights in life, only if there is an equitable ease in obtaining their realization.

23. Adverting to the factual situation at hand, on construing the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 23 of the Senior Citizen Act 2007, it is evident that it applies to a situation where a senior citizen has a right to receive maintenance out of an estate and such estate or part thereof is transferred. On the other hand, the Appellant's simple plea is that the suit premises constitute her 'shared household' within the meaning of Section 2 of the PWDV Act 2005. We have also seen the series of transactions which took place in respect of the property: the spouse of the Appellant purchased it in his own name a few months before the marriage but subsequently sold it, after a few years, under a registered sale deed at the same price to his father (the father-in-law of the Appellant), who in turn gifted it to his spouse i.e. the mother-in-law of the Appellant after divorce proceedings were instituted by the Fourth Respondent. Parallel to this, the Appellant had instituted proceedings of dowry harassment against her mother-in-law and her estranged spouse; and her spouse had instituted divorce proceedings. The Appellant had also filed proceedings for maintenance against the Fourth Respondent and the divorce proceedings are pending. It is subsequent to these events, that the Second and Third Respondents instituted an application under the Senior Citizens Act 2007. The fact that specific proceedings under the PWDV Act 2005 had not been instituted when the application under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 was filed, should not lead to a situation where the enforcement of an order of eviction deprives her from pursuing her claim of entitlement under the law. The inability of a woman to access judicial remedies may, as this case exemplifies, be a consequence of destitution, ignorance or lack of resources. Even otherwise, we are clearly of the view that recourse to the summary procedure contemplated by the Senior Citizen Act 2007 was not available for the purpose of facilitating strategies that are designed to defeat the claim of the Appellant in respect of a shared household. A shared household would have to be interpreted to include the residence where the Appellant had been jointly residing with her husband. Merely because the ownership of the property has been subsequently transferred to her in-laws (Second and Third Respondents) or that her estranged spouse (Fourth Respondent) is now residing separately, is no ground to deprive the Appellant of the protection that was envisaged under the PWDV Act 2005

F Summation

24. For the above reasons, we have come to the conclusion that the claim of the Appellant that the premises constitute a shared household within the meaning of the PWDV Act 2005 would have to be determined by the appropriate forum. The claim cannot simply be obviated by evicting the Appellant in exercise of the summary powers entrusted by the Senior Citizens Act 2007. 

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 3822 of 2020 

Decided On: 15.12.2020

 S. Vanitha  Vs.  The Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, Indu Malhotra and Indira Banerjee, JJ.

Author: Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0943/2020

Print Page

Whether relatives of husband can evict wife, who has secured the right of residence in their house under the Domestic Violence Act?

 

The right to reside in shared household as granted

by Section 17 of Domestic violence Act itself 

contemplates an exception in

express words, i.e., “save in accordance with the

procedure established by law”.{Para 109}

116. Drawing the analogy from the above case, we are of

the opinion that the expression “save in accordance

with the procedure established by law”, in Section

17(2) of the Act, 2005 contemplates the proceedings in

court of competent jurisdiction. Thus, suit for

mandatory and permanent injunction/eviction or

possession by the owner of the property is maintainable

before a Competent Court. We may further notice that in

sub-section (2) the injunction is “shall not be evicted

or excluded from the shared household save in

accordance with procedure established by law”. Thus,

the provision itself contemplates adopting of any

procedure established by law by the respondent for

eviction or exclusion of the aggrieved person from the

shared household. Thus, in appropriate case, the

competent court can decide the claim in a properly

instituted suit by the owner as to whether the women

need to be excluded or evicted from the shared

household. One most common example for eviction and

exclusion may be when the aggrieved person is provided

same level of alternate accommodation or payment of

rent as contemplated by Section 19 sub-section (f)

itself. There may be cases where plaintiff can

successfully prove before the Competent Court that the

claim of plaintiff for eviction of respondent is

accepted. We need not ponder for cases and

circumstances where eviction or exclusion can be

allowed or refused. It depends on facts of each case

for which no further discussion is necessary in the

facts of the present case. The High Court in the

impugned judgment has also expressed opinion that suit

filed by the plaintiff cannot be held to be nonmaintainable

with which conclusion we are in agreement.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.2483 of 2020

SATISH CHANDER AHUJA Vs  SNEHA AHUJA 

Print Page

What are the rights of wife if landlord/lessor/licensor is seeking to evict her from a shared household obtained under Domestic violence Act?

  In case, the shared household of a woman is a

tenanted/allotted/licensed accommodation where tenancy/

allotment/license is in the name of husband, father-in

law or any other relative, the Act, 2005 does not

operate against the landlord/lessor/licensor in

initiating an appropriate proceedings for eviction of

the tenant/allottee/licensee qua the shared household.

However, in case the proceedings are due to any

collusion between the two, the woman, who is living in

the shared household has right to resist the

proceedings on all grounds which the

tenant/lessee/licensee could have taken in the

proceedings. The embargo under Section 17(2) of Act,

2005 of not to be evicted or excluded save in

accordance with the procedure established by law

operates only against the “respondent”, i.e., one who

is respondent within the meaning of Section 2(q) of

Act, 2005.{Para 117}

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.2483 of 2020

SATISH CHANDER AHUJA Vs  SNEHA AHUJA 

Print Page

Whether the husband is a necessary party to suit filed by father-in-law against daughter-in-law for her eviction from his house?

 Question No.7

118. Learned counsel for the appellant challenging the

direction issued by the High Court that the husband of

respondent be impleaded by the Trial Court by invoking

suo moto powers under Order I Rule 10 CPC, submits that

no relief having been claimed against the son of the

appellant, he (son) was neither necessary nor proper

party. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied on

the judgments of this Court in Razia Begum Vs.

Sahebzadi Anwar Begum and others, AIR 1958 SC 886 and

Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal Vs. Municipal Corporation of

Greater Bombay and others, (1992) 2 SCC 524. Latter

judgment of this Court discussing judgment of Razia

Begum has laid down following in paragraphs 10 and 12:

“10. The power of the Court to add parties

under Order I Rule 10, CPC, came up for

consideration before this Court in Razia Begum

(supra). In that case it was pointed out that

the Courts in India have not treated the matter

of addition of parties as raising any question

of the initial jurisdiction of the Court and

that it is firmly established as a result of

judicial decisions that in order that a person

may be added as a party to a suit, he should

have a direct interest in the subject-matter of

the litigation whether it be the questions

relating to moveable or Immovable property.

12. Sinha, J. speaking for the majority

said that a declaratory judgment in respect of

a disputed status will be binding not only upon

parties actually before the Court but also upon

persons claiming through them respectively. The

Court laid down the law that in a suit relating

to property in order that a person may be added

as a party, he should have a direct interest as

distinguished from a commercial interest in the

subject-matter of the litigation. Where the

subject-matter of a litigation is a declaration

as regards status or a legal character, the

rule of presence of direct interest may be

relaxed in a suitable case where the Court is

of the opinion that by adding that party it

would be in a better position effectually and

completely to adjudicate upon the controversy.

…………”

119. There can be no dispute with the preposition of

law as laid down by this Court in the above two cases.

In the present case, although plaintiff has not claimed

any relief against his son, Raveen Ahuja, the husband

of the respondent, hence, he was not a necessary party

but in view of the fact that respondent has pleaded her

right of residence in shared household relying on

Sections 17 and 19 of the Act, 2005 and one of the

rights which can be granted under Section 19 is right

of alternate accommodation, the husband is a proper

party. The right of maintenance as per the provisions

of Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 is that of

the husband, hence he may be a proper party in cases

when the Court is to consider the claim of respondent

under Sections 17 and 19 read with Section 26 of the

Act, 2005.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.2483 of 2020

SATISH CHANDER AHUJA Vs  SNEHA AHUJA 

Print Page

Whether the father can seek eviction of the daughter in law from his house without seeking eviction of his son?

 Coming back to the facts of the present case, I find that in view of the specific assertion made in the plaint that the plaintiff is the exclusive owner of the suit property, the contents of paragraph 1 of the written statement clearly indicates that it is an admitted case of the defendant-appellant in his written statement that the suit property is the exclusive property of the plaintiff. It is also not in dispute that the plaintiff is an old person and his wife, the mother-in-law of the defendant, is a handicapped person with one amputated leg. It is also not in dispute that a divorce petition is pending between the son (husband) and the defendant and the assertion/pleadings of the plaintiff that his son has left the house and is living elsewhere could not be dislodged by the defendant-appellant and there is a concurrent finding of fact by both the courts below, which do not appear to be perverse in nature so as to require any interference by this court. No objection was ever raised before the trial court that husband is a necessary party. This was not even the ground before the lower appellate court. As such this cannot be raised at this stage. As already observed a substantial question of law arises out of pleadings and the judgments of the lower court. As such, on this ground no such substantial question of law can be raised at this stage in the present appeal. Even otherwise, the answer to the substantial question of law framed in the present case is that even considering the definition of shared household as provided under Section 2 (s) of the Act, 2005, the appellant daughter-in-law can be evicted without seeking decree of eviction against son with whom she had moved on the 1st floor of the suit property after marriage of the son of the plaintiff with the appellant.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD

Second Appeal No. 1079 of 2019

Decided On: 12.06.2020

Sujata Gandhi  Vs.   S.B. Gandhi

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

V.K. Birla, J.

Citation: MANU/UP/1183/2020

Print Page

Whether a wife can file domestic violence proceedings against parents in law if they were residing separately from her in distinct accommodation in physical proximity to their house?

 It is evident from the complaint that the petitioner was not sharing the household with the respondent No. 1 and 2 for a long time and she was living with respondent No. 3, her husband separately. As far as, house No. B-166 is concerned, it cannot be said that it became the shared household as the respondents No 1 and 2 were living separately in house No. B-121. It is also not the case of the petitioner that respondent No. 1 and 2 ever shifted to B-166 to live with their son and the petitioner. 

15. Therefore, in my opinion, there is no infirmity in the impugned order dated 03-01-2015 wherein it has been observed by the Ld. Trial Court that no case of domestic violence, in view of the facts mentioned in the complaint is made out against respondents No. 1 and 2. 

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI 

 Pronounced on : 01.06.2020 

 CRL.REV.P. 558/2015 

AMANPREET SANDHU Vs U.K. SHANDILYA 

 CORAM:  MR. JUSTICE RAJNISH BHATNAGAR

Print Page

Supreme Court: Complaint for Domestic violence not maintainable if parties are not residing in shared household

The High Court has rightly found in effect that the

ingredients of domestic violence are wholly absent in this

case. The petitioner and the respondents are not persons

living together in a shared household. There is a vague

allegation that the respondents are family members. There

is not a whisper of the respondents with the petitioner.

They appear to be neighbours.

The special leave petition is dismissed.

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL)..... Diary No(s).34053/2019

KAMLESH DEVI Vs JAIPAL

Date : 04-10-2019 This petition was called on for hearing today.

CORAM :

HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE INDIRA BANERJEE

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.R. SHAH

Print Page

Whether wife can claim right of residence in property in the name of her father in law?

Against the above backdrop, the contentions raised by the
petitioner that she has a right to continue to live in a portion of the
above-mentioned property cannot survive. The claim of her husband
through whom she claims the right of residence in his property has
already been repelled by the civil court twice, once in the partition suit
and second time in the suit for partition brought by the first respondent
himself. The claim brought through her son has already been rejected,
the suit for partition having already been dismissed.
12. It is clear from the averments of the petitioner herself, she has
been permitted to use a portion of the property by the second
respondent. This averment may be assumed to be correct. But, then it
is clear from the averment itself that what was allowed was only a
permissive user. The petitioner cannot force herself on the owner of

the property, particularly when she has no vested or legal right to claim residence in his property.
13. The judgments reported as Navneet Arora vs. Surender Kaur & Ors. in FAO (OS 196/2014, decided by a division bench of this Court on 10.09.2014, and Smt. Preeti Satija vs. Smt. Raj Kumari & Anr. in RFA (OS) 24/2012, decided by another division bench of this Court on 15.01.2014, do not assist the petitioner in the present case in view of the ruling of the Supreme Court in S.R. Batra vs. Taruna Batra (2007) 3 SCC 169, particularly, the observations in para 29 of which read as under:-
“As regards Sec. 17 (1) of the Act, in our opinion the wife is only entitled to claim a right to residence in a shared household, and a shared household’ would only mean the house belonging to or taken on rent by the husband, or the house which belongs to the joint family of which the husband is a member. The property in question in the present case neither belongs to Amit Batra nor was it taken on rent by him nor is it a joint family property of which the husband Amit Batra is a member. It is the exclusive property of appellant no.2, mother of Amit Batra. Hence it cannot be called a ‘shared household’.”
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Decided on: 30th August, 2018
 Crl.M.C. 2082/2016 & Crl.M.A. 8823-24/2016

MANJU GUPTA  Vs  PANKAJ GUPTA 

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R.K.GAUBA

Print Page

Whether commission of acts of violence while residing separate will amount to domestic violence?

Section 2(f) of the Domestic Violence Act reads as

under:-
"(f) „domestic relationship‟ means a relationship between
two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived
together in a shared household, when they are related by
consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the
nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living
together as a joint family."
A perusal of this provision makes it clear that domestic
relationship arises in respect of an aggrieved person if the aggrieved
person had lived together with the respondent in a shared household.
The living together can be either soon before filing of petition or 'at
any point of time'.
 The purpose of the Act is to give remedy to the aggrieved
persons against domestic violence. Domestic violence can take place
only when one is living in shared household with the respondents.
The acts of abuses, emotional or economic, physical or sexual,
verbal or nonverbal if committed when one is living in the same
shared household constitute domestic violence. However, such acts
of violence can be committed even otherwise also when one is living
separate. When such acts of violence take place when one is living
separate, these may be punishable under different provisions of IPC
or other penal laws, but, they cannot be covered under Domestic
Violence Act. One has to make a distinction between violence
committed on a person living separate in a separate household and
the violence committed on a person living in the shared household.
Only violence committed by a person while living in the shared

household can constitute domestic violence. The totality of the
circumstances of the case show that the case is not covered within
the meaning of the term 'Domestic Violence' as defined under
Section 3 of the Act 2005.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
Crl. Misc. No. M-26327 of 2014

Om Parkash Syngal and others

versus
Aditi Garg

Date of decision : 01.12.2015
CORAM:- HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANITA CHAUDHRY
Citation:2016 ALLMR(CRI)JOURNAL 244

Print Page

Whether wife is entitled to reside in house jointly owned by her husband and mother in law?

There can be no quarrel with the aforesaid exposition of law. But, then the petitioner has failed to prove on record that the house belongs exclusively to his mother. Rather, it has come on record that he alongwith his mother had taken a loan for building the house and he was repaying the loan amount in monthly installment of ` 7,000/-. He also admitted that his salary was ` 25,000/- per month, whereas, his mother had retired from a government job in the year 2010 and his father was handicapped. The petitioner himself has admitted that there are 9-10 rooms in the old and new houses and once this is the position, the petitioner cannot back out from his legal obligation of providing residence to the respondent in the shared household.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA

Cr.M.M.O. No. 248 of 2014

Decided On: 21.05.2015

Sandeep Gupta  Vs.  Indu Gupta

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J.

Citation: 2016 ALLMR(CRI)JOURNAL225

Print Page

Whether sister of husband can be denied right in property of her father on ground of right of wife to get shared household as per DV Act?

Of course, an order under Section 19(1)(f) is permissible only on

satisfaction that domestic violence had taken place. In this case, even

according to the first respondent, she left her matrimonial home as early

as in the year 1998 and filed the petition under Section 12 of the D.V.

Act only in the year 2009. In this case, the revision petitioner is the

sister of the third respondent and she along with the third respondent

inherited the properties of their parents on their death. It is to obtain

her share that the aforementioned partition suit was filed and pursuant

to the decree it was partitioned in between the revision petitioner and


the third respondent in tune with Ext.D1 decree, referred as such in the

order in M.C.No.38 of 2009. The impugned orders would reveal that

pursuant to the preliminary decree a partition was effected and a final

decree was also passed by a competent Civil Court.                  In such

circumstances, on the strength of a decree of a competent Civil Court

and the partition the revision petitioner became entitled to enjoy her

share in the said property. There is nothing on record before the court

to suggest that the house in question was partiable and, even otherwise

essentially, the question whether a property scheduled in a suit for

partition is partiable or not is not a matter to be considered in a collateral

proceedings and that too, in a criminal proceedings. When the court of

competent jurisdiction passed a preliminary decree permitting the parties

to the suit to effect partition amicably after declaring the share and

thereafter passed a final decree the partition and the decree cannot be

set at naught in a criminal proceedings. Respondents 1 and 2 cannot be

heard to contend that they were not aware about the suit for partition

and also regarding the passing of a preliminary decree in the said suit for

partition and in fact, the preliminary decree was produced in the

proceedings in M.C.No.38 of 2009 and the order thereon was passed

taking into account the same. In such circumstances, respondents 1 and

2 cannot be heard to say that they were not aware that in terms of the


preliminary decree a partition might take place adverse to their interest

based on an amicable settlement between the revision petitioner and the

third respondent and that the order in M.C.No.38 of 2009 also restricted

their right to reside only in the share alloted to the third respondent.

Certainly, in the light of the settled position of law an endeavour to

challenge the partition and decree would not have been made by

respondents 1 and 2 in a collateral proceedings and at any time, it could

not have been accepted in a criminal proceedings.      Section 19(1)(f) of

the D.V. Act provides for issuing directions to the `respondent', which

term has been defined under Section 2(q) of D.V. Act, to secure same

level of alternate accommodation for the aggrieved person as enjoyed by

her in the shared household or to pay rent for the same, if the

circumstances so require. Considering the right which is available under

Section 17 and especially, taking into account the circumstances it

cannot be said that respondents 1 and 2 could insist for direction to

continue residence in the shared household itself ignoring the judgment

and decree passed by competent Civil Court whilst the first respondent

could only insist for protection of her right guaranteed under Section 17

of D.V. Act taking note of the provisions under Section 19(1)(f) of the

said Act. A combined reading of Section 17(2) and Sections 19(1)(f) and

19(6) of the D.V.Act would reveal that while giving utmost care and


protection to an aggrieved party especially, in respect of protection

orders, the D.V. Act does not intend to defeat or deny the rights of

others available in respect of a shared household lest the provisions

under Sections 19(1)(f) and 19(6) would not have been incorporated to

ensure protection of right to reside available under Section 17(1), of the

D.V. Act. A close scrutiny of the common order of the learned Magistrate

would reveal that even while dismissing the Miscellaneous Petitions the

learned Magistrate has specifically found that the first respondent herein

would have the right to demand alternate accommodation (Is it not

alternative accommodation?) from the third respondent herein taking

into account the fact that her right to reside in the shared household was

made impossible due to the execution of the partition deed.           This

certainly is the right and protection available in such circumstances, in

terms of Sections 19(1)(f) and 19(6) of the D.V. Act.         This position

makes the impugned common judgment all the more, unsustainable.

The first respondent was residing separately from her husband since

1998 and thereafter she did not stay with him in the shared household

and she along with the second respondent is residing at Ernakulam. All

these circumstances would indicate that it is a fit case for the first

respondent to work out her claim for alternate accommodation

(alternative accommodation) as against the third respondent, in



accordance with law.   
  IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

                                        PRESENT:

                  MR.JUSTICE C.T.RAVIKUMAR

          THURSDAY, THE 2ND DAY OF JULY 2015

                            Crl.Rev.Pet.No. 102 of 2014 ()
                          
         MARY JACOB (MARY KURIAKOSE) Vs  ELIZABETH JACOB, 



                         Dated 2nd July, 2015

                            

Print Page

When woman should not be denied right of residence in house owned by her mother-in-law?

  If, as a matter of fact, a girl is brought to the house

by the bridegroom on his own without the junction of his

parents, of course, the girl cannot forward a claim on such a

house belonging to the father-in-law or the mother-in-law as

the shared household. In this particular case, the husband

of the woman is no where in the picture. He has virtually

abandoned the girl and has gone abroad. It seems that his

parents are hand in gloves with him and they want to see


that the girl is thrown to the street. The marriage of the girl

was an arranged marriage, and she was brought not to the

street after marriage, whereas she was brought to the house

in question. Party respondents have no case that her

husband has another house of his own wherein they were

living together. Had she been made aware before the

marriage that she would not be permitted to reside in that

house and she would not be permitted to treat that house as

shared household, she would not have agreed for such a

marriage. In such a case, no sensible parents of a girl will

give their daughter in marriage to such a person. Therefore,

having accepted the girl as their daughter-in-law and

permitted to be taken to that house for her stay there, they

cannot be permitted to show the doors to her, on a mere

claim that the house belongs to the mother-in-law.
 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

                                          PRESENT:

                    MR. JUSTICE B.KEMAL PASHA

               TUESDAY, THE 10TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2015
                                 OP(Crl.).No. 23 of 2015 (Q)
                                  

        SHIMA, V   NAVAS
           

Print Page

How to determine whether a relationship is in nature of live-in relationship?

New Delhi: Duration of relation, shared household and pooling of resources are some of the guidelines the Supreme Court has framed for bringing live-in relationship within the expression 'relationship in the nature of marriage' for protection of women under Domestic Violence (DV) Act. 

A bench of justices K S Radhakrishnan and Pinaki Chandra Ghose said though the eight guidelines are not exhaustive, these will definitely give some insight to such relationships. 

Framing guidelines for determining live-in relations, the bench said that pooling of financial and domestic arrangements, entrusting the responsibility, sexual relationship, bearing children, socialization in public and intention and conduct of the parties are some of the other criteria to be considered for determining the nature of relations between parties. 

Print Page