Bombay HC (DB): Judgment passed in Moinoddin s/o.Khodboddin vs.State of Maharashtra is not good law

 In our view, the said proviso carves out

an exception to the general rule which is

provided under Section 353(5) and (6) of the

Code. We, therefore, disagree with the view

expressed by the learned single judge Shri.

N.V. Dabholkar, J. recorded in the case of

Moinoddin s/o.Khodboddin vs. State of

Maharashtra(supra). The said issue is answered

accordingly. {Para 8}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO.1455 OF 2008

Kanji R. Barot V The State of Maharashtra & Ors.

CORAM : V.M. KANADE & P.D. KODE JJ.

JUNE 12, 2014.

Citation: 2008 BCR CRI 2 881, 2008 BOMCR CRI 2 881

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Bombay HC: Sessions Judge shall pronounce Judgment in appeal against conviction in presence of the accused except as provided under S 353(6) of CRPC

Thus, taking note of all these pronouncements would make it clear that in fact, there is a duty on the Appellate Court i.e. Sessions Judge (including Additional Sessions Judge) to see that the Judgment in appeal against conviction should be pronounced in presence of the accused (only exception as enumerated in Section 353(6) of the Code) and to take such appellant in custody upon the confirmation of the conviction. The practice of pronouncing Judgments in appeal against conviction in absence of the accused, thereby dismissing the appeal and then directing the trial Court to issue warrant, requires to be deprecated. This is the practice adopted in the present case also and therefore, the point has been considered in detail.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Criminal Application No. 2743 of 2019 in Criminal Revision Application No. 323 of 2019

Decided On: 12.06.2020

Fazal Khalil Ahemad Shaikh Vs. Nandkishor Ramnivasji Agrawal and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Vibha Kankanwadi, J.

Citation: 2020 PLR IJ 198 40, 2020 SCC ONLINE BOM 706 ,2021 BC 3 52, 2020 AIR BOM R CRI 2 636, MANU/MH/0637/2020

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Bombay HC: First appellate Court after confirming the conviction, has no power to suspend the sentence, even if appellant may express his desire to prefer revision against the said conviction

 On reference to operative order of learned Sessions Judge, it is evident that while delivering the judgment on February 3, 2003, learned Sessions Judge ordered the petitioner to surrender his bail bond before the Trial Court- COM Nanded, on February 10, 2003 to undergo remaining part of the sentence. {Para 12}

13. In this context, a reference may be made to a judgment of this High Court (Coram R.M. LODHA, J.) in Dilip v. State of Maharashtra MANU/MH/0110/1995 : 1996(2)MhLj1004 , and more particularly contents in Paras. 5 and 7 of the judgment. It is evident that lower appellate Court after confirming the conviction, has no power to suspend the sentence, even if appellant may express his desire to prefer revision against the said conviction. The order directing the appellant accused to surrender after a week, in effect, resulted into suspension of sentence, by granting him some time to surrender.

14. Reading proviso to Section 387 of the Criminal Procedure Code, it may be argued that, it is not mandatory upon the appellate Court to direct the accused to be brought up or required to attend, to hear the judgment delivered because of the words "shall not" incorporated in the proviso. However, this proviso is required to be read in the light of Section 387 read with Sections 353(5) and 353(6). Provisions regarding the judgment, as contained in Chapter XXVII of the Criminal Procedure Code are applicable to the judgment of subordinate appellate Court and in Section 387 also the words used are "shall apply". The proviso to Section 387, therefore, shall stand controlled by the provisions contained in Sections 353(5) and 353(6) and, therefore, the subordinate appellate Court will be obliged to secure the presence of accused/appellant before it for pronouncement of judgment except in the cases wherein the judgment is of acquittal or one of fine only. Once the presence of appellant-accused is secured or the purpose of pronouncement of judgment confirming the conviction with substantive sentence, as: observed in the matter of Dilip v. State of Maharashtra (supra), the Subordinate Appellate Court would become functus officio and cannot suspend the sentence or grant bail in order to enable the accused to prefer revision before the High Court. The only course available, therefore, would be to execute the order of conviction confirmed by it, leaving the accused to obtain suspension of sentence and bail from the High Court by preferring appropriate revision.

15. On reference to criminal manual of instructions issued by the High Court of Judicature, Appellate Side, Bombay, for the guidance of criminal Courts and officers subordinate to it, the same contains Form XV regarding "warrant to jailor, in the case of a prisoner at first released on bail pending the f disposal of appeal to the Appellate Court, but subsequently rearrested in Court on the dismissal of the appeal or reduction or alteration of sentence, and forwarded to jail to undergo the remaining portion of the sentence". The contents of the warrant clearly indicate that the warrant is to be issued by the Court confirming the conviction and accused appellant cannot be directed to surrender to the trial Court for issuance of conviction warrant.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Cr. R.A. No. 57/2003

Decided On: 14.02.2003

Moinoddin Vs. State of Maharashtra

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

N.V. Dabholkar, J.

Citation: 2003 LLJ BOM 2 1040, 2003 BLR 2 296, 2003 SCC ONLINE BOM 170, 2003 LLN 2 479, 2003 FLR 98 634,MANU/MH/0394/2003.

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Supreme Court Issues Directions To Ensure Same/Next-Day Release Of Prisoners Granted Bail, Acquittal Or Sentence Suspension

To that end, and in exercise of the jurisdiction vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, we hereby issue the following comprehensive guidelines, which shall hereafter operate as binding directions upon all High Courts across the country:

A. Procedural Timelines re Pronouncement of  Judgements/Orders

3 Ravindra Pratap Shahi v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1813; Rajan v. The State of

Haryana, Criminal Appeal No. 3904/2025.

4 Section 353(1), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 392, Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha

Sanhita, 2023; Order XX Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

I. Timelines

a. In a matter where the judgement is reserved, the High

Court shall endeavour to pronounce a reasoned

judgement promptly, within a maximum period of 3

months from the date of reserving such judgement.

b. The High Courts shall display extra promptitude in

pronouncing judgements and orders in matters of

personal liberty, e.g. regular bail, anticipatory bail,

criminal appeals (where the convict is in custody), death

references, etc.

c. As soon as the bail application is heard, the order should

preferably be pronounced and uploaded on the same day.

In the event the order is reserved, it is expected to be

pronounced on the next day and uploaded to the website.

d. Orders granting regular bail, suspending sentence, or

acquitting a convict in custody should be communicated

to the jail authorities and the Trial Court on the date it is

pronounced.

e. Consequent upon the outcome of serial number (d) above,

the undertrial/convict must be released on the same day

or, at most, on the next day, unless they are required to

be taken in custody in another case, or there is a delay in

complying with the bail conditions, etc.

f. The compliance with the order must be reported by the

Trial Court to the Bench of the High Court that passed the

order. {Para 16}

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL / CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 169 / 2025

Pila Pahan @ Peela Pahan and others Vs State of Jharkhand and another 

Author: SURYA KANT, CJI.

Citation:  2026 INSC 604

Dated: MAY 29, 2026

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Supreme Court: Appellate court may not order deposit of 20% of compensation in appeal against conviction in checque dishonour case

We may take the discussion a little forward to emphasize

our point of view. There could arise a case before the Appellate

Court where such court is capable of forming an opinion, even in

course of considering as to what would be the appropriate

quantum of fine or compensation to be kept in deposit, that the

impugned conviction and the consequent sentence

recorded/imposed by the trial court is so wholly incorrect and

erroneous that it is only a matter of time for the same to be set

aside and that ordering a deposit would be unnecessarily

burdensome for the appellant. Such firm opinion could be formed

on a plain reading of the order, such as, the conviction might have

been recorded and sentence imposed without adherence to the

mandatory procedural requirements of the N.I. Act prior to/at the

time lodging of the complaint by the complainant rendering the

proceedings vitiated, or the trial court might have rejected

admissible evidence from being led and/or relied on inadmissible

evidence which was permitted to be led, or the trial court might

have recorded an order of conviction which is its ipse dixit, without

any assessment/analysis of the evidence and/or totally

misappreciating the evidence on record, or the trial court might

have passed an order failing to disclose application of mind and/or

sufficient reasons thereby establishing the link between the

appellant and the offence, alleged and found to be proved, or that

the compensation awarded is so excessive and outrageous that it

fails to meet the proportionality test : all that, which would evince

an order to be in defiance of the applicable law and, thus, liable to

be labelled as perverse. These instances, which are merely

illustrative and not exhaustive, may not arise too frequently but its

possibility cannot be completely ruled out. It would amount to a

travesty of justice if exercise of discretion, which is permitted by

the legislature and could indeed be called for in situations such as

these pointed out above, or in any other appropriate situation, is

not permitted to be exercised by the Appellate Court by a judicial interpretation of ‘may’ being read as ‘shall’ in sub-section (1) of Section 148 and the aggrieved appellant is compelled to make a deposit of minimum 20% of the fine or compensation awarded by the trial court, notwithstanding any opinion that the Appellate Court might have formed at the stage of ordering deposit as regards invalidity of the conviction and sentence under challenge on any valid ground. Reading ‘may’ as ‘may’ leads to the text matching the context and, therefore, it seems to be just and proper not to denude the Appellate Court of a limited discretion conferred by the legislature and that is, exercise of the power of not ordering deposit altogether albeit in a rare, fit and appropriate case which commends to the Appellate Court as exceptional. While there can be no gainsaying that normally the discretion of the Appellate Court should lean towards requiring a deposit to be made with the quantum of such deposit depending upon the factual situation in every individual case, more so because an

order under challenge does not bear the mark of invalidity on its

forehead, retention of the power of such court not to order any

deposit in a given case (which in its view and for the recorded

reasons is exceptional) and calling for exercise of the discretion to

not order deposit, has to be conceded. If indeed the legislative

intent were not to leave any discretion to the Appellate Court,

there is little reason as to why the legislature did not also use

‘shall’ instead of ‘may’ in sub-section (1). Since the self-same

section, read as a whole, reveals that ‘may’ has been used twice

and ‘shall’ thrice, it must be presumed that the legislature was

well and truly aware of the words used which form the skin of the

language. Reading and understanding the words used by the

legislature in the literal sense does not also result in manifest

absurdity and hence tinkering with the same ought to be avoided

at all costs. We would, therefore, read ‘may’ as ‘may’ and ‘shall’ as ‘shall’, wherever they are used in Section 148. This is because, the words mean what they say. {Para 27}

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 5491/2024

MUSKAN ENTERPRISES & ANR. Vs THE STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. 

DIPANKAR DATTA, J.

Citation: 2024 INSC 1046.

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Supreme Court: 20% deposit of compensation amount in appeal against conviction for offence U/S 138 of NI Act is not an absolute rule and can be relaxed in exceptional cases

What is held by this Court is that a purposive interpretation should be made of Section 148 of the N.I. Act. Hence, normally, Appellate Court will be justified in imposing the condition of deposit as provided in Section 148. However, in a case where the Appellate Court is satisfied that the condition of deposit of 20% will be unjust or imposing such a condition will amount to deprivation of the right of appeal of the Appellant, exception can be made for the reasons specifically recorded. {Para 6}

7. Therefore, when Appellate Court considers the prayer Under Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of an Accused who has been convicted for offence Under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, it is always open for the Appellate Court to consider whether it is an exceptional case which warrants grant of suspension of sentence without imposing the condition of deposit of 20% of the fine/compensation amount. As stated earlier, if the Appellate Court comes to the conclusion that it is an exceptional case, the reasons for coming to the said conclusion must be recorded.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 2741 of 2023 

Decided On: 04.09.2023

Jamboo Bhandari Vs. M.P. State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. and Ors

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Abhay Shreeniwas Oka and Pankaj Mithal, JJ.

Author: Abhay Shreeniwas Oka, J.

Citation: 2023 INSC 822, MANU/SC/1005/2023.

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Supreme Court: How criminal antecedents of convict are relevant while deciding his application for suspension of sentence?

 The criminal antecedents of Respondent No. 2 also assume significance. The prosecution has brought on record multiple prior cases registered against him, including offences involving violence and use of arms. Though it has been contended that such cases arose out of political rivalry and have culminated in acquittal, such a contention cannot, at this stage, efface the relevance of antecedents as a factor in assessing the propriety of granting suspension of sentence. {Para 22}

NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1864 OF 2026

DHAN JEE PANDEY Vs THE STATE OF BIHAR & ANOTHER 

Author: R. MAHADEVAN, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 349.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme Court: Appellate Court Cannot Dilute Liability Of Convict U/S 34 IPC At Interlocutory Stage Due To Absence Of Overt Act

The reliance placed by the High Court on the circumstance that the fatal shot was attributed to a co-accused, while Respondent No. 2 has been convicted with the aid of Section 34 IPC, is wholly misconceived. The doctrine of constructive liability under Section 34 IPC is well settled; where an offence is committed in furtherance of a common intention, each participant is equally liable for the act done in execution thereof. The absence of a specific overt act cannot, at this stage, dilute the culpability of the convict, particularly in the face of a finding of common intention. {Para 19}

NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1864 OF 2026

DHAN JEE PANDEY Vs THE STATE OF BIHAR & ANOTHER 

Author: R. MAHADEVAN, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 349

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Supreme Court: Procedure the appellate court should follow if they appoints amicus in any criminal appeal

 Having regard to the dictum of the three-Judge Bench in

Anokhi Lal (supra) and in order to curb the tendency of convicts to

raise technical pleas of the nature which were advanced before us,

we observe that, henceforth, whenever an appellate court considers

it desirable to appoint an amicus to represent a convict whose

counsel is absent, such court may also consider the desirability of

issuing a notice from the registry to the address of the convict

mentioned in the memorandum of appeal, for such notice to be

served on him through the jurisdictional police station, with an

intimation that the convict may contact the learned amicus and

provide him necessary instructions so that his case is argued before

the court effectively and meaningfully. In the event the convict

contacts the amicus and provides instructions, there would

ordinarily be no impediment in proceeding with hearing of the

appeal. If, indeed, the convict desires to have his own counsel argue

the appeal on his behalf and not the amicus, the court may hear

such counsel in addition to the amicus. However, if the service

report indicates that the convict was not found at the address or

that he refused to accept notice despite being present, it would

amount to sufficient compliance if the notice is pasted on the outer

wall of the premises, address whereof is mentioned in the cause title

of the memorandum of appeal. Should the convict still remain

dormant, and it is so reported, the High Court may proceed to

decide the appeal without waiting for the convict to turn up either in

person or through the counsel of his choice engaged by him. This

process, in our view, would substantially serve the purpose of

eliminating any plea of unfairness being raised before this Court if

an appeal is disposed of upon hearing the amicus appointed by the

court. Additionally, in a case of like nature where the appeal is listed two decades after grant of bail, this process would ensure obtaining of information as to whether the appeal survives for decision or stands abated.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2026

BHOLA MAHTO   VS. THE STATE OF JHARKHAND 

Citation: 2026 INSC 257 .

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme Court: Convicts who misuse sentence suspension must be firmly dealt with

 In continuation of the above and in the light of what has transpired in course of the present proceedings, we wish to make an additional observation. It is a matter of common knowledge that once a convict obtains an order from the appellate court suspending the sentence of imprisonment and is, consequently, released on bail, more often than not, he neglects and/or fails to cooperate with the court and impedes an expeditious decision on his appeal by staying away from the proceedings with a view to ensure that his liberty is not curtailed, if the appeal were to fail. Drawing from experience, we can record that on many an occasion, such convicts become untraceable. These convicts, enjoying the concession of bail and misusing it, need to be dealt with firm and strong hands by the courts. {Para 23}

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2026

BHOLA MAHTO   VS. THE STATE OF JHARKHAND 

Citation: 2026 INSC 257 

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Supreme Court: What factors the court should consider while suspending sentence and releasing convict prosecuted for offence under S 302 of IPC?

The principle is well-settled that in considering the prayer for bail in a case involving serious offence like murder, punishable under Section 302 IPC, the court should consider the relevant factors like the nature of the accusation made against the accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, and the desirability of releasing the accused on bail after they have been convicted for committing the serious offence of murder. 

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 353 of 2002

Decided On: 05.03.2002

Vinay Kumar Vs. Narendra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

D.P. Mohapatra and Brijesh Kumar, JJ.

Citation: ( 2002 ) 9 SCC 364, MANU/SC/0477/2002.

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Supreme court: What is distinction in approaches to be adopted by Appellate court for suspension of sentence if sentence is for fixed term or when sentence is of life imprisonment?

There are two types of sentence that the Trial Court can impose depending on the nature of the offence. Some orders of sentence are for a fixed term, unlike the order of sentence of life imprisonment. {Para 10}

11. The case in hand is one of a fixed term of sentence. The maximum punishment that has been imposed is 4 years.

12. Way back in 1999, this Court in "Bhagwan Rama Shinde Gosai and Ors. v. State of Gujarat" reported in   MANU/SC/0347/1999 : 1999:INSC:246 : (1999) 4 SCC 421 stated that when a convicted person is sentenced to a fixed period of sentence and when he files an appeal under any statutory right, suspension of sentence should be considered by the Appellate Court liberally unless there are exceptional circumstances.

13. Of course, if there is any statutory restriction against suspension of sentence, it is a different matter.

14. Similarly, when the sentence is life imprisonment, the consideration for suspension of sentence could be of a different approach.

15. But if for any reason the sentence of a limited duration cannot be suspended, every endeavour should be made to dispose of the appeal on merits, more so when a motion for expeditious hearing of the appeal is made in such cases.

16. This Court said in so many words that otherwise the very valuable right of the Appellant would be an exercise in futility by afflux of time.

17. When the Appellate Court finds that due to practical reasons, such appeals cannot be disposed of expeditiously, the Appellate Court must show special concern in the matter of suspending the sentence so as to make the appeal right, meaningful and effective. At the same time, the appellate courts can impose similar conditions when appeal is granted.

18. In "Omprakash Sahni v. Jai Shankar Chaudhary and Anr.   MANU/SC/0511/2023 : 2023:INSC:478 : (2023) 6 SCC 123, this Court while considering the scope of 389 Code of Criminal Procedure in cases of life imprisonment held as under:

30. In Kishori Lal v. Rupa [Kishori Lal v. Rupa,   MANU/SC/0791/2004 : 2004:INSC:541 : (2004) 7 SCC 638 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 2021], this Court has indicated the factors that require to be considered by the courts while granting benefit Under Section 389 Criminal Procedure Code in cases involving serious offences like murder, etc. Thus, it is useful to refer to the observations made therein, which are as follows : (SCC pp. 639-40, paras 4-6)

4. Section 389 of the Code deals with suspension of execution of sentence pending the appeal and release of the Appellant on bail. There is a distinction between bail and suspension of sentence. One of the essential ingredients of Section 389 is the requirement for the appellate court to record reasons in writing for ordering suspension of execution of the sentence or order appealed against. If he is in confinement, the said court can direct that he be released on bail or on his own bond. The requirement of recording reasons in writing clearly indicates that there has to be careful consideration of the relevant aspects and the order directing suspension of sentence and grant of bail should not be passed as a matter of routine.

5. The appellate court is duty-bound to objectively assess the matter and to record reasons for the conclusion that the case warrants suspension of execution of sentence and grant of bail. In the instant case, the only factor which seems to have weighed with the High Court for directing suspension of sentence and grant of bail is the absence of allegation of misuse of liberty during the earlier period when the Accused- Respondents were on bail.

6. The mere fact that during the trial, they were granted bail and there was no allegation of misuse of liberty, is really not of much significance. The effect of bail granted during trial loses significance when on completion of trial, the Accused persons have been found guilty. The mere fact that during the period when the Accused persons were on bail during trial there was no misuse of liberties, does not per se warrant suspension of execution of sentence and grant of bail. What really was necessary to be considered by the High Court is whether reasons existed to suspend the execution of sentence and thereafter grant bail. The High Court does not seem to have kept the correct principle in view.

31. In Vijay Kumar v. Narendra [Vijay Kumar v. Narendra,   MANU/SC/0477/2002 : (2002) 9 SCC 364 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1195] and Ramji Prasad v. Rattan Kumar Jaiswal [Ramji Prasad v. Rattan Kumar Jaiswal,   MANU/SC/0959/2000 : (2002) 9 SCC 366 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1197], it was held by this Court that in cases involving conviction Under Section 302 Indian Penal Code, it is only in exceptional cases that the benefit of suspension of sentence can be granted. In Vijay Kumar [Vijay Kumar v. Narendra,   MANU/SC/0477/2002 : (2002) 9 SCC 364 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1195], it was held that in considering the prayer for bail in a case involving a serious offence like murder punishable Under Section 302 Indian Penal Code, the court should consider the relevant factors like the nature of accusation made against the Accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, and the desirability of releasing the Accused on bail after they have been convicted for committing the serious offence of murder.

33. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principles of law, the endeavour on the part of the court, therefore, should be to see as to whether the case presented by the prosecution and accepted by the trial court can be said to be a case in which, ultimately the convict stands for fair chances of acquittal. If the answer to the abovesaid question is to be in the affirmative, as a necessary corollary, we shall have to say that, if ultimately the convict appears to be entitled to have an acquittal at the hands of this Court, he should not be kept behind the bars for a pretty long time till the conclusion of the appeal, which usually takes very long for decision and disposal. However, while undertaking the exercise to ascertain whether the convict has fair chances of acquittal, what is to be looked into is something palpable. To put it in other words, something which is very apparent or gross on the face of the record, on the basis of which, the court can arrive at a prima facie satisfaction that the conviction may not be sustainable. The appellate court should not reappreciate the evidence at the stage of Section 389 Code of Criminal Procedure and try to pick up a few lacunae or loopholes here or there in the case of the prosecution. Such would not be a correct approach.

21. The High Court should have been mindful of the fact that the appeal is of the year 2024. Appeal of 2024 is not likely to be taken up in near future. Ultimately, if 4 years are to elapse in jail the same would render the appeal infructuous and that would be travesty of justice.

22. In such circumstances, referred to above, we set aside the impugned order and remand the matter to the High Court for fresh consideration of the plea of the Appellant herein for suspension of the substantive order of sentence keeping in mind the principles of law as explained by us aforesaid. The High Court shall keep in mind that the sentence is for a fixed term, i.e. 4 years and it is only if there are any compelling circumstances on record to indicate that the release of the Appellant would not be in public interest that the Court may order accordingly.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 3409/2025

Decided On: 06.08.2025

Aasif Vs. The State of U.P. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

Citation: 2025 INSC 944, MANU/SC/1048/2025.

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Bombay HC: What precaution the convicting court should take after suspending sentence of convict?

 Thus, the Cr.P.C. and BNSS have exhaustive provisions

for ensuring the presence of the accused including the convicted

accused so that the orders passed by the Trial Courts are

effective. In the present case, as can be seen the Appeal was filed

after a delay of 538 days. It was a long period. Till then, no steps

were taken either by the Trial Court or by the Police Officers in

committing the Applicant to the prison so that he served out the

sentence imposed on him. This is happening in many cases,

which needs to be avoided. Therefore, the Trial Courts will have

to follow a disciplined procedure so that this is not repeated and

the order of conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court

could be given effect to. {Para 14}

15. In such a situation, when an order is passed u/s 389

(3) of Cr.P.C. (corresponding section 430 of BNSS), the Trial

Courts shall place the application on a particular date, after the

period for which the sentence is suspended in a case gets over,

for compliance. The Trial Courts shall specify that the bond shall

be executed for his appearance on that particular date. The

application u/s 389 of Cr.P.C. (corresponding section 430 of

BNSS) shall be placed on that date for compliance and unless

the Applicant in such case produces, the order of the Appellate

Court suspending the sentence for a further period, the Trial

Court shall take steps to issue conviction warrant for execution

of sentence u/s 418 of Cr.P.C. (corresponding section 458 of

BNSS); unless, the Applicant shows sufficient reasons for

extending that period for a reasonably sufficient time. 

16. If the Applicant is not present before the Court, then

the Trial Court can take recourse to section 89 of Cr.P.C.

(corresponding section 92 of BNSS) by issuing warrant for

breach of the bond. This procedure will ensure that the orders

passed granting bail post conviction for a limited period are not

misused by the convicted accused unless the sentence is

suspended by the Appellate Court. All these practices and

procedure can be based on the above provisions of Cr.P.C. and

the corresponding provisions from BNSS, which shall be

followed by the Trial Courts. Even the investigating agency has

a role to play. It is their duty to see that the convicted accused

undergoes his sentence. The investigation has to be taken to its

ultimate logical end.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

INTERIM APPLICATION NO.2746 OF 2025

IN

CRIMINAL APPEAL (ST) NO.15106 OF 2025

Rajendra Padmakar Tayade Vs The State of Maharashtra .

CORAM : SARANG V. KOTWAL, J.

DATE : 04th AUGUST, 2025

Citation: 2025:BHC-AS:34391

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Supreme Court: The court should suspend sentence under S 302 of IPC in exceptional circumstances

In Vijay Kumar v. Narendra [Vijay Kumar v. Narendra,

(2002) 9 SCC 364] and Ramji Prasad v. Rattan Kumar Jaiswal

[Ramji Prasad v. Rattan Kumar Jaiswal, (2002) 9 SCC 366],

it was held by this Court that in cases involving

conviction under Section 302 IPC, it is only in

exceptional cases that the benefit of suspension of

sentence can be granted. In Vijay Kumar [Vijay Kumar v.

Narendra, (2002) 9 SCC 364], it was held that in

considering the prayer for bail in a case involving a

serious offence like murder punishable under Section

302IPC, the court should consider the relevant factors

like the nature of accusation made against the accused,

the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been

committed, the gravity of the offence, and the

desirability of releasing the accused on bail after they

have been convicted for committing the serious offence of

murder. {Para 31}

33. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principles of law, the

endeavour on the part of the court, therefore, should be

to see as to whether the case presented by the prosecution

and accepted by the trial court can be said to be a case

in which, ultimately the convict stands for fair chances

of acquittal. If the answer to the abovesaid question is

to be in the affirmative, as a necessary corollary, we

shall have to say that, if ultimately the convict appears

to be entitled to have an acquittal at the hands of this

Court, he should not be kept behind the bars for a pretty

long time till the conclusion of the appeal, which usually

takes very long for decision and disposal. However, while

undertaking the exercise to ascertain whether the convict

has fair chances of acquittal, what is to be looked into

is something palpable. To put it in other words, something

which is very apparent or gross on the face of the record,

on the basis of which, the court can arrive at a prima

facie satisfaction that the conviction may not be

sustainable. The appellate court should not reappreciate

the evidence at the stage of Section 389 CrPC and try to

pick up a few lacunae or loopholes here or there in the

case of the prosecution. Such would not be a correct

approach.”

Since these were cases of conviction under

Section 302 IPC, the initial presumption available to the

respondents - accused before conviction, would not be

available to them. The High Court could not have

suspended the sentence, re-appreciating the evidence at

the stage of Section 389 and trying to pick up a few

lacunae or loopholes here or there in the case of

prosecution. The reason that the Appeals were not likely

to be heard in near future also would not be a valid

ground for suspending the sentence of the respondents -

accused, who have been convicted for the serious offence

under Section 302, IPC. It is only in rare and

exceptional circumstances, the benefit of suspension of

sentence should be granted by the Appellate Court to the

accused convicted for the serious offence under section

302, IPC.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2000 OF 2025

BALRAM DANGI Vs VEER SINGH DANGI & ORS. 

Dated: 16TH APRIL, 2025.

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Can appellate court suspend the sentence upon dismissing the appeal against conviction upto three years?

 No, an appellate court cannot suspend the sentence upon dismissing an appeal against conviction, regardless of whether the sentence is up to three years or any other duration.

Legal Framework Under Section 389 CrPC

Section 389 of the Criminal Procedure Code specifically provides for suspension of sentence pending the appeal, not after its disposal. The provision states that "Pending any appeal by a convicted person, the Appellate Court may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, order that the execution of the sentence or order appealed against be suspended".

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Gujarat HC: Factor to be considered by the Appellate court before suspending sentence of convict

 Before adverting to the submissions and to

ascertain, whether the applicant has made out a case

for suspension of sentence, it is necessary to see the

legal position.

(i) Section 389(1) of the Cr.P.C., enjoins upon the

Appellate Court the power to pass an order for the

suspension of sentence or order of conviction during

the pendency of an Appeal. The statutory provision

says that, pending any appeal by convicted persons,

the appellate Court may reasons to be recorded by it

in writing, order that the execution of the sentence or

order appealed against, be suspended and also if he

is in confinement, that he be released on bail or on

his own bond. The Apex Court in Rajesh Ranjan

Yadav Vs. CBI (2007 (1) SCC 70), after referring

its earlier decisions, [Kashmira Singh Vs. State of

Punjab (1977 4 SCC 291) and Bhagirathsing Vs. State

of Gujarat (1984 (1) SCC 284)] in para-10, observed

that, there is no absolute and unconditional rule

about when bail should be granted. The observations

made in para-10 reads as under:

“Para-10: “In our opinion, none of the

aforesaid decisions can be said to have been

laid down any absolute and unconditional rule

about when bail should be granted by the

court and when it should not. It all depends

upon the facts and circumstances of each

case and it cannot be said that, there is any

absolute rule that, because of long period of

imprisonment has expired, bail must

necessarily be granted.”

(ii) In the case of Ash Mohammad Vs.

Shivrajsinh @ Lalla Babu and another, (2012) 9

SCC 446, the Supreme Court in para-30, while

examining the societal interest and considering the

antecedents examined the post conviction bail and

discussed on the issue of desirability to suspend the

sentence and grant of bail. Para-30 reads as under :

“30. We may usefully state that when the

citizens are scared to lead a peaceful life and

this kind of offences usher in an impediment in

establishment orderly society, the duty of the

court becomes more pronounced and the

burden is heavy. There should have been

properly analysis is criminal antecedents.

Needless to say, imposition of condition is

subsequent to the order admitting an accused

to bail. The question should be paused whether

the accused deserves to be enlarged on bail or

nor and only thereafter, imposing conditions

would arise. We do not deny for a moment that

period of custody is relevant factor but

simultaneously the totality of circumstance and

criminal antecedents are also to be weighed.

They are to be weighed in the scale of collective

crime and desire. The societal concerned has to

be kept in view in juxtaposition of individual

liberty. Regard being head to the said

parameter, we are inclined to think that the

social concerned in the case at hand, deserves

to be given priority over-lifting the restriction on

liberty of the accused.”

[emphasis supplied]

(iii) In Sidhartha Vashisht @ Manu Sharma Vs.

State (NCT of Delhi) reported in (2008) 5 SCC 230,

referring the decision of Vijaykumar (2002) 9 SCC 364,

the Supreme Court while examining the prayer of

suspension of sentence emphasized that, in a case of

involved in a serious offence, the court should

consider all relevant factors like the nature of

accusation made against the accused, the manner in

which the crime is alleged to have committed, the

gravity of offence, the desirability of releasing the

accused on bail after he has been convicting for

committing serious offence and also bearing in mind

that, when the accused has been found guilty then,

initial presumption of innocence in his favour is no

more available to the applicant and therefore, the

appellate Court shall not suspend the sentence except

only in an exceptional case and that too, in a case of

existence of reasons to suspend the sentence.

(iv) Recently, Supreme Court while considering the

scope of Section 389(1) of the Cr.P.C. in the case of

Omprakash Sahani Vs. Jayshankar Chaudhary

(2023) 6 SCC 123, after referring the earlier all

decisions on this aspect, observed and held that, while

dealing with the case of suspension of sentence and

grant of bail, the appellate Court before allowing the

prayer, should prima-facie come to a conclusion that,

the conviction may not be sustainable. Para-33 is

relevant to refer and same is reproduced hereunder:

“Para-33: Bearing in mind the aforesaid

principles of law, the endeavour on the part of

the Court, therefore, should be to see as to

whether the case presented by the

prosecution and accepted by the Trial Court

can be said to be a case in which, ultimately

the convict stands for fair chances of

acquittal. If the answer to the above said

question is to be in the affirmative, as a

necessary corollary, we shall have to say that,

if ultimately the convict appears to be entitled

to have an acquittal at the hands of this Court,

he should not be kept behind the bars for a

pretty long time till the conclusion of the

appeal, which usually take very long for

decision and disposal. However, while

undertaking the exercise to ascertain whether

the convict has fair chances of acquittal, what

is to be looked into is something palpable. To

put it in other words, something which is very

apparent or gross on the face of the record, on

the basis of which, the Court can arrive at a

prima facie satisfaction that the conviction

may not be sustainable. The Appellate Court

should not reappreciate the evidence at the

stage of Section 389 of the CrPC and try to

pick up few lacuna or loopholes here or there

in the case of the prosecution. Such would not

be a correct approach.” {Para 16}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION (FOR SUSPENSION OF SENTENCE) NO. 1 of 2023.

R/CR.A/607/2023 IA 

 ASHUMAL @ ASHARAM S/O THAUMAL SINDHI (HARPALANI) Vs STATE OF GUJARAT

CORAM: MR. JUSTICE ILESH J. VORA and  MR. JUSTICE VIMAL K. VYAS.

Author:  MR. JUSTICE ILESH J. VORA.

JUDGMENT DATED: 29/08/2024.

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Supreme Court: Appellate court should impose reasonable conditions while suspending sentence of convict

 It is also of some significance to note that whereas under Section 357(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure a fine of Rs. 5000/- can be imposed; fine in terms of Section 357(2) thereof can be twice the amount of cheque whereas there is no upper limit for award of a compensation. But the same would be subject to other provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure which mandates that the amount of fine imposed on an accused cannot be more than Rs. 5000/-. The very fact that the Parliament did not think it fit to put a ceiling limit in regard to the amount of compensation leviable upon an accused, the discretionary jurisdiction thereto must be exercised judiciously. Ordinarily, an accused shall not be taken in custody during trial. Thus, while exercising the appellate power, ordinarily, a person should not suffer imprisonment only because the conditions imposed for suspending the sentence are harsh.{Para 68}

69. We are of the opinion that having regard to the aforementioned factors the amount of compensation not only must be reasonable one, the conditions for suspending the sentence should also be reasonable. It is only with that intent in view, the doctrine of purposive construction should be applied.

70. We would, however, like to put a note of caution that the right of an accused unnecessarily need not be enlarged but it is the court's duty to duly protect his right.

72. We, therefore, are of the opinion:

i) In a case of this nature, Sub-section (2) of Section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would be attracted even when Appellant was directed to pay compensation;

ii) The Appellate Court, however, while suspending the sentence, was entitled to put the appellant on terms. However, no such term could be put as a condition precedent for entertaining the appeal which is a constitutional and statutory right;

iii) The amount of compensation must be a reasonable sum;

iv) The Court, while fixing such amount, must have regard to all relevant factors including the one referred to in Sub-section (5) of 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure;

v) No unreasonable amount of compensation can be directed to be paid.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 521 of 2007 

Decided On: 10.04.2007

Dilip S. Dahanukar Vs. Kotak Mahindra Co. Ltd. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.B. Sinha and Dalveer Bhandari, JJ.

Author: S.B. Sinha, J.

Citation: [2007 (6) SCC 528],MANU/SC/1803/2007.

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Supreme Court: Condition To Deposit 50% Of Compensation Ordered Under S.357 CrPC To Suspend Sentence Unjustified

We have heard Mr. Ishaan George, learned counsel for

the Appellant accused and Mr. Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, learned

counsel for the State. Having considered the matter in detail,

we are of the opinion that taking into account the purpose and

object of Section 357, read with its enunciation in Dilip S.

Dahanukar vs. Mahindra Co. Ltd. [2007 (6) SCC 528], the

direction of the High Court granting suspension of sentence

subject to the condition of depositing 50% of compensation is

not justified.{Para 6}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2024

(@ Out of SLP(Crl.) No.10302/2023)

NIKHIL Vs STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 

Dated: July 11, 2024.

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Supreme Court: Appellate court has discretion to grant interim compensation U/S 143A of negotiable instruments Act

At this stage, we may note Sub-section (1) of Section 148. Section 148 reads thus:

148. Power of Appellate Court to order payment pending appeal against conviction.-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), in an appeal by the drawer against conviction Under Section 138, the Appellate Court may order the Appellant to deposit such sum which shall be a minimum of twenty per cent of the fine or compensation awarded by the trial Court:

Provided that the amount payable under this Sub-section shall be in addition to any interim compensation paid by the Appellant Under Section 143A.

(2) The amount referred to in Sub-section (1) shall be deposited within sixty days from the date of the order, or within such further period not exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown by the Appellant.

(3) The Appellate Court may direct the release of the amount deposited by the Appellant to the complainant at any time during the pendency of the appeal:

Provided that if the Appellant is acquitted, the Court shall direct the complainant to repay to the Appellant the amount so released, with interest at the bank rate as published by the Reserve Bank of India, prevalent at the beginning of the relevant financial year, within sixty days from the date of the order, or within such further period not exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown by the complainant.

Sub-section (1) of Section 148 confers on the Appellate Court a power to direct the Appellant/Accused to deposit 20 per cent of the compensation amount. It operates at a different level as the power thereunder can be exercised only after the Appellant/Accused is convicted after a full trial. {Para 13}

14. In the case of Section 143A, the power can be exercised even before the Accused is held guilty. Sub-section (1) of Section 143A provides for passing a drastic order for payment of interim compensation against the Accused in a complaint Under Section 138, even before any adjudication is made on the guilt of the Accused. The power can be exercised at the threshold even before the evidence is recorded. If the word 'may' is interpreted as 'shall', it will have drastic consequences as in every complaint Under Section 138, the Accused will have to pay interim compensation up to 20 per cent of the cheque amount. Such an interpretation will be unjust and contrary to the well-settled concept of fairness and justice. If such an interpretation is made, the provision may expose itself to the vice of manifest arbitrariness. The provision can be held to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. In a sense, Sub-section (1) of Section 143A provides for penalising an Accused even before his guilt is established. Considering the drastic consequences of exercising the power Under Section 143A and that also before the finding of the guilt is recorded in the trial, the word "may" used in the provision cannot be construed as "shall". The provision will have to be held as a directory and not mandatory. Hence, we have no manner of doubt that the word "may" used in Section 143A, cannot be construed or interpreted as "shall". Therefore, the power Under Sub-section (1) of Section 143A is discretionary.

15. Even Sub-section (1) of Section 148 uses the word "may". In the case of Surinder Singh Deswal v. Virender Gandhi   MANU/SC/0793/2019 : 2019:INSC:688 : 2019:INSC:688 : (2019) 11 SCC 341, this Court, after considering the provisions of Section 148, held that the word "may" used therein will have to be generally construed as "rule" or "shall". It was further observed that when the Appellate Court decides not to direct the deposit by the Accused, it must record the reasons. After considering the said decision in the case of Surinder Singh Deswal   MANU/SC/0793/2019 : 2019:INSC:688 : 2019:INSC:688 : (2019) 11 SCC 341, this Court, in the case of Jamboo Bhandari v. Madhya Pradesh State Industrial Development Corporation Limited and Ors. MANU/SC/1005/2023 : 2023:INSC:822 : (2023) 10 SCC 446, in paragraph 6, held thus:

6. What is held by this Court is that a purposive interpretation should be made of Section 148 NI Act. Hence, normally, the appellate court will be justified in imposing the condition of deposit as provided in Section 148. However, in a case where the appellate court is satisfied that the condition of deposit of 20% will be unjust or imposing such a condition will amount to deprivation of the right of appeal of the Appellant, exception can be made for the reasons specifically recorded.

(Emphasis added)

15.1. As held earlier, Section 143A can be invoked before the conviction of the Accused, and therefore, the word "may" used therein can never be construed as "shall". The tests applicable for the exercise of jurisdiction Under Sub-section (1) of Section 148 can never apply to the exercise of jurisdiction Under Sub-section (1) of Section 143A of the N.I. Act.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 741 of 2024

Decided On: 15.03.2024

Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava Vs. The State of Jharkhand and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Abhay Shreeniwas Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.

Author: Abhay Shreeniwas Oka, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0204/2024,2024 SCC OnLine SC 309.

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Whether the court can suspend the sentence of convict if he is ready to pay compensation to victim?

Having observed and held as above, we are deeply peeved on perusing the impugned judgment, for the same reflects only non-application of mind and non-consideration of the relevant factors despite the fact that the case involved an acid attack on a young woman resulting into permanent disfiguration. In the case on hand, a scanning of the impugned order would reveal that what mainly weighed with the Court is the offer made on behalf of the convicts that they would give a payment of Rs. 25 lakhs through demand drafts, taking into account the evidence that the victim had incurred an amount of Rs. 21 lakhs for her treatment. Paragraph 10 of the impugned order would reveal that taking note of the said offer besides the period of incarceration and also the delay likely to occur in the consideration of appeal, sentence imposed was suspended and the private Respondents were enlarged on bail. 

11. We have no hesitation to hold that the impugned order is infected with non-application of mind and non-consideration of the relevant factors required for invocation of power Under Section 389 in the light of the settled position of law. An acid attack may completely strip off the victim of her basic human right to live a decent human life owing to permanent disfiguration. We have no hesitation to hold that in appeals involving such serious offence(s), serious consideration of all parameters should be made. Even a cursory glance of the impugned order would reveal the consideration thereunder was made ineptly. The serious nature of the offence involved was not taken into account besides the other relevant parameters for the exercise of power Under Section 389, Code of Criminal Procedure.

 13. The impugned order passed by the High Court is perused.

Specifically the order dated 21.02.2024 passed in the Correction

Application. The order does not suggest that there was any

consideration of the parameters laid down by this court for grant of bail or suspension of sentence. Instead, the High Court had noticed and directed that the convicts have offered to pay compensation to the victim for grant of suspension of sentence, which when she refused to accept, was directed to be deposited in the court. It was in a way kind of “Blood Money” offered by the convicts to the victim for which there is no acceptability in our criminal justice system.

Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Criminal Appeal Nos.1957-1961 of 2024

Shivani Tyagi  Vs  State of U.P. & Anr. 

Citation: MANU/SC/0353/2024, 2024 INSC 343.

Dated: April 5, 2024.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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