Supreme Court: Under which circumstances the court can convict accused based on call detail records and location data of the mobile numbers used by accused?

 The call detail records further amplify the incriminating previous conduct of A1 on the date of incident. The records reveal that A1 was in constant touch with A2, A3 and A5 before the incident. Further, A3, A4 and A5 were in constant touch with each other. The prosecution has relied upon a chart prepared on the basis of the call detail records of the accused persons and it indicates that all the accused persons were in contact with each other. Even without this chart, the call records are quite clear. To add to it, the location data of the mobile numbers used by the accused persons reveals that all the accused persons were present around the restaurant at the time of the incident. Furthermore, the location of A3 to A6 was also traceable at the same spot where the deceased was found in the Honda Accord car at around 12:05 AM after the incident. In such circumstances, the courts have drawn a reasonable inference that the accused persons were acting in a coordinated manner and had an overwhelming nexus with the offence. 

{Para 17}

 In the Supreme Court of India

(Before Dipankar Datta and Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ.)

Criminal Appeal No(s). 3866 of 2025

Piyush Shyamdasani  Vs State of Uttar Pradesh 

Decided on July 20, 2026

Citation: 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1357. Read full judgment here: Click here.

Print Page

Supreme Court: Whether the court can convict the accused if Mobile numbers relied upon by the prosecution were not in the name of the accused persons?

 The appellants herein seek to question the findings on the ground that the mobile numbers reflected in the call detail records did not belong to the accused persons. This, in fact, is another incriminating circumstance because the numbers did not belong to the accused persons, but they were found running in the mobile devices recovered from the possession or at the instance of the accused persons. Thus, they were using fake numbers to conceal their identities and to evade surveillance. Notably, A1 was admittedly using two numbers - one registered in his own name and one in the name of his employee (a worker in his factory). Both the numbers were mentioned by him in his original complaint after the incident. The number used by A4 was found running in the mobile phone recovered from him, and the number used by A5 was installed in his phone, which was left by him at his home when he fled away after the incident. When called by the investigators, the call was picked up by the mother of A5 and she disclosed that it was used by A5 only. Again, no rebuttal has been advanced to dispute these facts. {Para 19}

20. The call details reveal that the accused persons were in constant touch with each other using these numbers, irrespective of the persons in whose names the numbers were officially registered. The evidence on record has indicated sufficient nexus between the numbers reflected in the call detail records and the accused persons. If there was any discrepancy in this evidence, the accused persons could have led counter evidence to that effect. However, they failed to rebut this crucial technical evidence. The Court cannot set aside consistent evidentiary findings on bare assertions, without any cogent evidence to support the assertions.

 In the Supreme Court of India

(Before Dipankar Datta and Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ.)

Criminal Appeal No(s). 3866 of 2025

Piyush Shyamdasani  Vs State of Uttar Pradesh 

Decided on July 20, 2026

Citation: 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1357

Print Page

Supreme Court: Appellate court may not order deposit of 20% of compensation in appeal against conviction in checque dishonour case

We may take the discussion a little forward to emphasize

our point of view. There could arise a case before the Appellate

Court where such court is capable of forming an opinion, even in

course of considering as to what would be the appropriate

quantum of fine or compensation to be kept in deposit, that the

impugned conviction and the consequent sentence

recorded/imposed by the trial court is so wholly incorrect and

erroneous that it is only a matter of time for the same to be set

aside and that ordering a deposit would be unnecessarily

burdensome for the appellant. Such firm opinion could be formed

on a plain reading of the order, such as, the conviction might have

been recorded and sentence imposed without adherence to the

mandatory procedural requirements of the N.I. Act prior to/at the

time lodging of the complaint by the complainant rendering the

proceedings vitiated, or the trial court might have rejected

admissible evidence from being led and/or relied on inadmissible

evidence which was permitted to be led, or the trial court might

have recorded an order of conviction which is its ipse dixit, without

any assessment/analysis of the evidence and/or totally

misappreciating the evidence on record, or the trial court might

have passed an order failing to disclose application of mind and/or

sufficient reasons thereby establishing the link between the

appellant and the offence, alleged and found to be proved, or that

the compensation awarded is so excessive and outrageous that it

fails to meet the proportionality test : all that, which would evince

an order to be in defiance of the applicable law and, thus, liable to

be labelled as perverse. These instances, which are merely

illustrative and not exhaustive, may not arise too frequently but its

possibility cannot be completely ruled out. It would amount to a

travesty of justice if exercise of discretion, which is permitted by

the legislature and could indeed be called for in situations such as

these pointed out above, or in any other appropriate situation, is

not permitted to be exercised by the Appellate Court by a judicial interpretation of ‘may’ being read as ‘shall’ in sub-section (1) of Section 148 and the aggrieved appellant is compelled to make a deposit of minimum 20% of the fine or compensation awarded by the trial court, notwithstanding any opinion that the Appellate Court might have formed at the stage of ordering deposit as regards invalidity of the conviction and sentence under challenge on any valid ground. Reading ‘may’ as ‘may’ leads to the text matching the context and, therefore, it seems to be just and proper not to denude the Appellate Court of a limited discretion conferred by the legislature and that is, exercise of the power of not ordering deposit altogether albeit in a rare, fit and appropriate case which commends to the Appellate Court as exceptional. While there can be no gainsaying that normally the discretion of the Appellate Court should lean towards requiring a deposit to be made with the quantum of such deposit depending upon the factual situation in every individual case, more so because an

order under challenge does not bear the mark of invalidity on its

forehead, retention of the power of such court not to order any

deposit in a given case (which in its view and for the recorded

reasons is exceptional) and calling for exercise of the discretion to

not order deposit, has to be conceded. If indeed the legislative

intent were not to leave any discretion to the Appellate Court,

there is little reason as to why the legislature did not also use

‘shall’ instead of ‘may’ in sub-section (1). Since the self-same

section, read as a whole, reveals that ‘may’ has been used twice

and ‘shall’ thrice, it must be presumed that the legislature was

well and truly aware of the words used which form the skin of the

language. Reading and understanding the words used by the

legislature in the literal sense does not also result in manifest

absurdity and hence tinkering with the same ought to be avoided

at all costs. We would, therefore, read ‘may’ as ‘may’ and ‘shall’ as ‘shall’, wherever they are used in Section 148. This is because, the words mean what they say. {Para 27}

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 5491/2024

MUSKAN ENTERPRISES & ANR. Vs THE STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. 

DIPANKAR DATTA, J.

Citation: 2024 INSC 1046.

Print Page

Supreme Court: 20% deposit of compensation amount in appeal against conviction for offence U/S 138 of NI Act is not an absolute rule and can be relaxed in exceptional cases

What is held by this Court is that a purposive interpretation should be made of Section 148 of the N.I. Act. Hence, normally, Appellate Court will be justified in imposing the condition of deposit as provided in Section 148. However, in a case where the Appellate Court is satisfied that the condition of deposit of 20% will be unjust or imposing such a condition will amount to deprivation of the right of appeal of the Appellant, exception can be made for the reasons specifically recorded. {Para 6}

7. Therefore, when Appellate Court considers the prayer Under Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of an Accused who has been convicted for offence Under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, it is always open for the Appellate Court to consider whether it is an exceptional case which warrants grant of suspension of sentence without imposing the condition of deposit of 20% of the fine/compensation amount. As stated earlier, if the Appellate Court comes to the conclusion that it is an exceptional case, the reasons for coming to the said conclusion must be recorded.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 2741 of 2023 

Decided On: 04.09.2023

Jamboo Bhandari Vs. M.P. State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. and Ors

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Abhay Shreeniwas Oka and Pankaj Mithal, JJ.

Author: Abhay Shreeniwas Oka, J.

Citation: 2023 INSC 822, MANU/SC/1005/2023.

Print Page

What is difference between standard of proof in deciding criminal appeal against acquittal and conviction?

 In criminal law, appellate courts apply distinct standards when deciding appeals against conviction versus appeals against acquittal, primarily because an acquittal reinforces the fundamental presumption of innocence. While both appeals allow for a review of evidence, an appeal against acquittal faces a higher threshold for interference compared to a standard appeal against conviction. 

Here is the detailed difference:

1. Appeal Against Conviction 

Print Page

Can appellate court suspend the sentence upon dismissing the appeal against conviction upto three years?

 No, an appellate court cannot suspend the sentence upon dismissing an appeal against conviction, regardless of whether the sentence is up to three years or any other duration.

Legal Framework Under Section 389 CrPC

Section 389 of the Criminal Procedure Code specifically provides for suspension of sentence pending the appeal, not after its disposal. The provision states that "Pending any appeal by a convicted person, the Appellate Court may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, order that the execution of the sentence or order appealed against be suspended".

Print Page

Whether session court can decide criminal appeal or criminal revision in absence of accused?

 Sessions courts in India have specific limitations regarding deciding criminal appeals and revisions in the absence of the accused, with established legal principles that prioritize fair trial and due process.

General Principle Against Deciding in Absence

Criminal cases, whether trials, appeals, or revisions, should generally not be decided against an accused in their absence. The Supreme Court has consistently held that "criminal case, whether trial, appeal or revision should not be decided against accused in absence of his counsel". This principle stems from Article 21 of the Constitution, which guarantees protection to life and personal liberty.

Print Page

Gujarat HC: Factor to be considered by the Appellate court before suspending sentence of convict

 Before adverting to the submissions and to

ascertain, whether the applicant has made out a case

for suspension of sentence, it is necessary to see the

legal position.

(i) Section 389(1) of the Cr.P.C., enjoins upon the

Appellate Court the power to pass an order for the

suspension of sentence or order of conviction during

the pendency of an Appeal. The statutory provision

says that, pending any appeal by convicted persons,

the appellate Court may reasons to be recorded by it

in writing, order that the execution of the sentence or

order appealed against, be suspended and also if he

is in confinement, that he be released on bail or on

his own bond. The Apex Court in Rajesh Ranjan

Yadav Vs. CBI (2007 (1) SCC 70), after referring

its earlier decisions, [Kashmira Singh Vs. State of

Punjab (1977 4 SCC 291) and Bhagirathsing Vs. State

of Gujarat (1984 (1) SCC 284)] in para-10, observed

that, there is no absolute and unconditional rule

about when bail should be granted. The observations

made in para-10 reads as under:

“Para-10: “In our opinion, none of the

aforesaid decisions can be said to have been

laid down any absolute and unconditional rule

about when bail should be granted by the

court and when it should not. It all depends

upon the facts and circumstances of each

case and it cannot be said that, there is any

absolute rule that, because of long period of

imprisonment has expired, bail must

necessarily be granted.”

(ii) In the case of Ash Mohammad Vs.

Shivrajsinh @ Lalla Babu and another, (2012) 9

SCC 446, the Supreme Court in para-30, while

examining the societal interest and considering the

antecedents examined the post conviction bail and

discussed on the issue of desirability to suspend the

sentence and grant of bail. Para-30 reads as under :

“30. We may usefully state that when the

citizens are scared to lead a peaceful life and

this kind of offences usher in an impediment in

establishment orderly society, the duty of the

court becomes more pronounced and the

burden is heavy. There should have been

properly analysis is criminal antecedents.

Needless to say, imposition of condition is

subsequent to the order admitting an accused

to bail. The question should be paused whether

the accused deserves to be enlarged on bail or

nor and only thereafter, imposing conditions

would arise. We do not deny for a moment that

period of custody is relevant factor but

simultaneously the totality of circumstance and

criminal antecedents are also to be weighed.

They are to be weighed in the scale of collective

crime and desire. The societal concerned has to

be kept in view in juxtaposition of individual

liberty. Regard being head to the said

parameter, we are inclined to think that the

social concerned in the case at hand, deserves

to be given priority over-lifting the restriction on

liberty of the accused.”

[emphasis supplied]

(iii) In Sidhartha Vashisht @ Manu Sharma Vs.

State (NCT of Delhi) reported in (2008) 5 SCC 230,

referring the decision of Vijaykumar (2002) 9 SCC 364,

the Supreme Court while examining the prayer of

suspension of sentence emphasized that, in a case of

involved in a serious offence, the court should

consider all relevant factors like the nature of

accusation made against the accused, the manner in

which the crime is alleged to have committed, the

gravity of offence, the desirability of releasing the

accused on bail after he has been convicting for

committing serious offence and also bearing in mind

that, when the accused has been found guilty then,

initial presumption of innocence in his favour is no

more available to the applicant and therefore, the

appellate Court shall not suspend the sentence except

only in an exceptional case and that too, in a case of

existence of reasons to suspend the sentence.

(iv) Recently, Supreme Court while considering the

scope of Section 389(1) of the Cr.P.C. in the case of

Omprakash Sahani Vs. Jayshankar Chaudhary

(2023) 6 SCC 123, after referring the earlier all

decisions on this aspect, observed and held that, while

dealing with the case of suspension of sentence and

grant of bail, the appellate Court before allowing the

prayer, should prima-facie come to a conclusion that,

the conviction may not be sustainable. Para-33 is

relevant to refer and same is reproduced hereunder:

“Para-33: Bearing in mind the aforesaid

principles of law, the endeavour on the part of

the Court, therefore, should be to see as to

whether the case presented by the

prosecution and accepted by the Trial Court

can be said to be a case in which, ultimately

the convict stands for fair chances of

acquittal. If the answer to the above said

question is to be in the affirmative, as a

necessary corollary, we shall have to say that,

if ultimately the convict appears to be entitled

to have an acquittal at the hands of this Court,

he should not be kept behind the bars for a

pretty long time till the conclusion of the

appeal, which usually take very long for

decision and disposal. However, while

undertaking the exercise to ascertain whether

the convict has fair chances of acquittal, what

is to be looked into is something palpable. To

put it in other words, something which is very

apparent or gross on the face of the record, on

the basis of which, the Court can arrive at a

prima facie satisfaction that the conviction

may not be sustainable. The Appellate Court

should not reappreciate the evidence at the

stage of Section 389 of the CrPC and try to

pick up few lacuna or loopholes here or there

in the case of the prosecution. Such would not

be a correct approach.” {Para 16}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION (FOR SUSPENSION OF SENTENCE) NO. 1 of 2023.

R/CR.A/607/2023 IA 

 ASHUMAL @ ASHARAM S/O THAUMAL SINDHI (HARPALANI) Vs STATE OF GUJARAT

CORAM: MR. JUSTICE ILESH J. VORA and  MR. JUSTICE VIMAL K. VYAS.

Author:  MR. JUSTICE ILESH J. VORA.

JUDGMENT DATED: 29/08/2024.

Print Page

Supreme Court Judgment writing tip: A judgment of the Court must not contain the Judge's personal opinions or his advise

JUDGMENT

13. When a Court deals with an appeal against an order of conviction, the judgment must contain (i) a concise statement of the facts of the case, (ii) the nature of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and the defence, if any, (iii) the submissions made by the parties, (iv) the analysis based on the reappreciation of evidence, and (v) the reasons for either confirming the guilt of the Accused or for acquitting the Accused. The appellate court must scan through the evidence, both oral and documentary, and reappreciate it. After reappreciating the evidence, the appellate court must record reasons for either accepting the evidence of the prosecution or for disbelieving the evidence of the prosecution. The Court must record reasons for deciding whether the charges against the Accused have been proved. In a given case, if the conviction is confirmed, the Court will have to deal with the legality and adequacy of the sentence. In such a case, there must be a finding recorded on the legality and adequacy of the sentence with reasons. The ultimate object of writing a judgment is to ensure that the parties before the Court know why the case is decided in their favour or against them. Therefore, judgment must be in a simple language. The conclusions recorded by the Court in the judgment on legal or factual issues must be supported by cogent reasons.

14. No doubt, the Court can always comment upon the conduct of the parties. However, the findings regarding the conduct of the parties must be confined only to such conduct which has a bearing on the decision-making. A judgment of the Court cannot contain the Judge's personal opinions on various subjects. Similarly, advisory jurisdiction cannot be exercised by the Court by incorporating advice to the parties or advice in general. The Judge has to decide a case and not preach. The judgment cannot contain irrelevant and unnecessary material. A judgment must be in simple language and should not be verbose. Brevity is the hallmark of quality judgment. We must remember that judgment is neither a thesis nor a piece of literature. However, we find that the impugned judgment contains personal opinion of the Judges advice to the younger generation and advice to the legislature.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) No. 3 of 2023 and Criminal Appeal No. 1451 of 2024

Decided On: 20.08.2024

In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Abhay Shreeniwas Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.

Author: Abhay Shreeniwas Oka, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0904/2024.

Print Page

Supreme Court: What factors Appellate court should consider while deciding application for grant of interim compensation U/S 143A of N I Act?

 FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED WHILE EXERCISING DISCRETION

16. When the court deals with an application Under Section 143A of the N.I. Act, the Court will have to prima facie evaluate the merits of the case made out by the complainant and the merits of the defence pleaded by the Accused in the reply to the application Under Sub-section (1) of Section 143A. The presumption Under Section 139 of the N.I. Act, by itself, is no ground to direct the payment of interim compensation. The reason is that the presumption is rebuttable. The question of applying the presumption will arise at the trial. Only if the complainant makes out a prima facie case, a direction can be issued to pay interim compensation. At this stage, the fact that the Accused is in financial distress can also be a consideration. Even if the Court concludes that a case is made out for grant of interim compensation, the Court will have to apply its mind to the quantum of interim compensation to be granted. Even at this stage, the Court will have to consider various factors such as the nature of the transaction, the relationship, if any, between the Accused and the complainant and the paying capacity of the Accused. If the defence of the Accused is found to be prima facie a plausible defence, the Court may exercise discretion in refusing to grant interim compensation. We may note that the factors required to be considered, which we have set out above, are not exhaustive. There could be several other factors in the facts of a given case, such as, the pendency of a civil suit, etc. While deciding the prayer made Under Section 143A, the Court must record brief reasons indicating consideration of all the relevant factors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 741 of 2024

Decided On: 15.03.2024

Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava Vs. The State of Jharkhand and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Abhay Shreeniwas Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.

Author: Abhay Shreeniwas Oka, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0204/2024,2024 SCC OnLine SC 309.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

Print Page

Supreme Court: Appellate court has discretion to grant interim compensation U/S 143A of negotiable instruments Act

At this stage, we may note Sub-section (1) of Section 148. Section 148 reads thus:

148. Power of Appellate Court to order payment pending appeal against conviction.-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), in an appeal by the drawer against conviction Under Section 138, the Appellate Court may order the Appellant to deposit such sum which shall be a minimum of twenty per cent of the fine or compensation awarded by the trial Court:

Provided that the amount payable under this Sub-section shall be in addition to any interim compensation paid by the Appellant Under Section 143A.

(2) The amount referred to in Sub-section (1) shall be deposited within sixty days from the date of the order, or within such further period not exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown by the Appellant.

(3) The Appellate Court may direct the release of the amount deposited by the Appellant to the complainant at any time during the pendency of the appeal:

Provided that if the Appellant is acquitted, the Court shall direct the complainant to repay to the Appellant the amount so released, with interest at the bank rate as published by the Reserve Bank of India, prevalent at the beginning of the relevant financial year, within sixty days from the date of the order, or within such further period not exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown by the complainant.

Sub-section (1) of Section 148 confers on the Appellate Court a power to direct the Appellant/Accused to deposit 20 per cent of the compensation amount. It operates at a different level as the power thereunder can be exercised only after the Appellant/Accused is convicted after a full trial. {Para 13}

14. In the case of Section 143A, the power can be exercised even before the Accused is held guilty. Sub-section (1) of Section 143A provides for passing a drastic order for payment of interim compensation against the Accused in a complaint Under Section 138, even before any adjudication is made on the guilt of the Accused. The power can be exercised at the threshold even before the evidence is recorded. If the word 'may' is interpreted as 'shall', it will have drastic consequences as in every complaint Under Section 138, the Accused will have to pay interim compensation up to 20 per cent of the cheque amount. Such an interpretation will be unjust and contrary to the well-settled concept of fairness and justice. If such an interpretation is made, the provision may expose itself to the vice of manifest arbitrariness. The provision can be held to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. In a sense, Sub-section (1) of Section 143A provides for penalising an Accused even before his guilt is established. Considering the drastic consequences of exercising the power Under Section 143A and that also before the finding of the guilt is recorded in the trial, the word "may" used in the provision cannot be construed as "shall". The provision will have to be held as a directory and not mandatory. Hence, we have no manner of doubt that the word "may" used in Section 143A, cannot be construed or interpreted as "shall". Therefore, the power Under Sub-section (1) of Section 143A is discretionary.

15. Even Sub-section (1) of Section 148 uses the word "may". In the case of Surinder Singh Deswal v. Virender Gandhi   MANU/SC/0793/2019 : 2019:INSC:688 : 2019:INSC:688 : (2019) 11 SCC 341, this Court, after considering the provisions of Section 148, held that the word "may" used therein will have to be generally construed as "rule" or "shall". It was further observed that when the Appellate Court decides not to direct the deposit by the Accused, it must record the reasons. After considering the said decision in the case of Surinder Singh Deswal   MANU/SC/0793/2019 : 2019:INSC:688 : 2019:INSC:688 : (2019) 11 SCC 341, this Court, in the case of Jamboo Bhandari v. Madhya Pradesh State Industrial Development Corporation Limited and Ors. MANU/SC/1005/2023 : 2023:INSC:822 : (2023) 10 SCC 446, in paragraph 6, held thus:

6. What is held by this Court is that a purposive interpretation should be made of Section 148 NI Act. Hence, normally, the appellate court will be justified in imposing the condition of deposit as provided in Section 148. However, in a case where the appellate court is satisfied that the condition of deposit of 20% will be unjust or imposing such a condition will amount to deprivation of the right of appeal of the Appellant, exception can be made for the reasons specifically recorded.

(Emphasis added)

15.1. As held earlier, Section 143A can be invoked before the conviction of the Accused, and therefore, the word "may" used therein can never be construed as "shall". The tests applicable for the exercise of jurisdiction Under Sub-section (1) of Section 148 can never apply to the exercise of jurisdiction Under Sub-section (1) of Section 143A of the N.I. Act.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 741 of 2024

Decided On: 15.03.2024

Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava Vs. The State of Jharkhand and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Abhay Shreeniwas Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.

Author: Abhay Shreeniwas Oka, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0204/2024,2024 SCC OnLine SC 309.

Print Page

What are rights of legal heirs of deceased convicted accused of dishonour of cheque?

The legal heirs, in such a case, are neither liable to pay the fine or to undergo imprisonment. However, they have a right to challenge the conviction of their predecessor only for the purpose that he was not guilty of any offence. We have, therefore, allowed the application filed by the legal heirs to prosecute this appeal.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 664 of 2012

Decided On: 19.09.2019

M. Abbas Haji  Vs.  T.N. Channakeshava

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Deepak Gupta and Aniruddha Bose, JJ.

Citation: (2019) 9 SCC 606

Print Page

Supreme Court reiterates that S 148 of NI Act is retrospective in nature

 Learned counsel for the appellant has placed

reliance on the judgment of this Court dated

30.07.2019 in Criminal Appeal No.1160 of 2019 (G.J.

Raja vs. Tejraj Surana). This Court in the above case

was considering provisions of Section 143A of the

N.I. Act which was inserted by the same Amendment Act

20 of 2018 by which Section 148 of the N.I. Act has

been inserted. This Court took the view that Section

143A is prospective in nature and confined to cases

where offences were committed after the introduction

of Section 143A i.e. after 01.09.2018. In paragraph

22 of the judgment following has been held:

“22. In our view, the applicability of

Section 143A of the Act must, therefore, be

held to be prospective in nature and

confined to cases where offences were

committed after the introduction of Section

143A, in order to force an accused to pay

such interim compensation.”

15. The judgment of this Court which was delivered in

the case of the present appellants i.e. Criminal

Appeal Nos.917-944 of 2019 (Surinder Singh Deswal @

Col. S.S. Deswal and others vs. Virender Gandhi) (in

which one of us M.R.Shah, J was also a member) was

also cited before the Bench deciding the case of G.J.

Raja. This Court in its judgment dated 29.05.2019 has

rejected the submission of the appellants that

Section 148 of N.I. Act shall not be made applicable

retrospectively. This Court held that considering the

Statement of Objects and Reasons of the amendment in

Section 148 of the N.I. Act, on purposive

interpretation of Section 148 of the N.I. Act as

amended, shall be applicable in respect of the

appeals against the order of conviction and sentence

for the offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act,

even in a case where the criminal complaints for the

offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act were filed

prior to amendment Act No.20/2018 i.e. prior to

01.09.2018.

16. The Bench deciding G.J. Raja’s case has noticed

the judgment of this Court in the appellants’ case

i.e. Surinder Singh Deswal’s case and has opined that

the decision of this Court in Surinder Singh Deswal’s

case was on Section 148 of the N.I. Act which is a

stage after conviction of the accused and

distinguishable from the stage in which the interim

compensation was awarded under Section 143A of the

N.I.Act. When the Bench deciding G.J. Raja’s

case(supra) itself has considered and distinguished

the judgment of this Court in appellants’ own case

i.e. Surinder Singh Deswal’s, reliance by the learned

counsel for the appellants on the judgment of this

Court in G.J. Raja’s case is misplaced. It is useful

to refer to paragraph 23 of the judgment in G.J.

Raja’s case which is to the following effect:

“23. We must, however, advert to a

decision of this Court in Surinder Singh

Deswal and Ors. v. Virender Gandhi (2019) 8

SCALE 445 where Section 148 of the Act

which was also introduced by the same

Amendment Act 20 of 2018 from 01.09.2018

was held by this Court to be retrospective

in operation. As against Section 143A of

the Act which applies at the trial stage

that is even before the pronouncement of

guilt or order of conviction, Section 148

of the Act applies at the appellate stage

where the Accused is already found guilty

of the offence Under Section 138 of the

Act. It may be stated that there is no

provision in Section 148 of the Act which

is similar to Sub-Section (5) of Section

143A of the Act. However, as a matter of

fact, no such provision akin to Sub-section

(5) of Section 143A was required as

Sections 421 and 357 of the Code, which

apply post-conviction, are adequate to take

care of such requirements. In that sense

said Section 148 depends upon the existing

machinery and principles already in

existence and does not create any fresh

disability of the nature similar to that

created by Section 143A of the Act.

Therefore, the decision of this Court in

Surinder Singh Deswal (2007) 13 SCC 492

stands on a different footing.”

In view of the above, the judgment of this Court in

the case of G.J. Raja does not help the appellants.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.1936-1963 OF 2019

SURINDER SINGH DESWAL @ COL. S.S. DESWAL Vs  VIRENDER GANDHI & ANR. 

ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.

Dated:January 08, 2020.

Print Page

Whether conviction of accused is suspended if his sentence is suspended?

In the light of the admitted position that it is only the

petitioner’s sentence which had been stayed by the High Court and

that there is no stay of the petitioner’s conviction under Section 363,

366, 368, 376 IPC, I find absolutely no merit in the petitioners’

contention. It is the settled legal position that mere suspension of

sentence or grant of bail to the accused in criminal proceedings,

cannot imply that the conviction ceases to operate. The only effect of

such suspension, during the pendency of an appeal, is that the accused

is protected from incarceration, and the same does not in any manner

affect the conviction order.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Date of Decision:- 15.10.2019

W.P.(C) 10100/2017 & CM No.41286/2017

SANTOSH KUMAR Vs  DELHI JAL BOARD

CORAM:

HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE REKHA PALLI

Print Page

Supreme Court: Legal heirs of deceased convict U/S 138 of NI Act can challenge conviction

This appeal is directed against the order dated

22.10.2008, whereby the High Court allowed the appeal of

the complainant and held the original appellant before us

(since deceased), whose legal representatives are on

record, liable for conviction under Section 138 of the

Negotiable Instruments Act (hereafter referred to as the

"Act"). He was sentenced to pay fine of Rs.5,10,000/- and

in default to undergo simple imprisonment for one year.

The legal heirs, in such a case, are neither liable

to pay the fine or to undergo imprisonment. However, they

have a right to challenge the conviction of their

predecessor only for the purpose that he was not guilty

of any offence. We have, therefore, allowed the

application filed by the legal heirs to prosecute this

appeal.

NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.664 OF 2012

M. ABBAS HAJI Vs  T.N. CHANNAKESHAVA 

DEEPAK GUPTA, J.

Dated:September 19, 2019

Print Page

Whether Criminal Appeal can be dismissed for non compliance of interim order passed in said proceeding?

Since the applicant did not deposit the amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- within the stipulated period, subject to which the execution of the sentence imposed upon him by the trial Court was suspended, the said interim order stood automatically vacated as a result of which the applicant was liable to be taken in custody so as to serve the sentence imposed upon him by the trial Court. Nevertheless, the applicant was having every right to prosecute his appeal on merits even by remaining behind the bars. The right of the applicant to agitate the points raised by him in the appeal, in exception to the impugned judgment, was intact, and could not have been taken away by the Court for non fulfillment of the condition imposed while suspending the execution of the sentence imposed upon him by the trial Court. The condition so imposed by the Court was only for suspension of execution of the sentence during pendency of the said appeal, and not for hearing the appeal. The learned Sessions Judge, thus, must have heard the appeal on merits and could not have dismissed the same for non compliance of the interim order by the appellant before him. The impugned order, therefore, deserves to be set aside.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Criminal Revision Application No. 251 of 2017 and Criminal Application No. 5513/2017 in Cri. R.A. No. 251/2017

Decided On: 17.11.2017

 Motiram Deoram Patil Vs. Gulabrao Jagannath Patil and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

P.R. Bora, J.

Citation: 2018(5) MHLJ 345

Print Page

Notes on appeal to Session court

The term appeal signifies the right of carrying a particular case from an inferior to a superior court with a view to ascertaining whether judgment of lower court is sustainable.

S 372 of CRPC{S 413 of BNNS}. No appeal to lie unless otherwise provided :-No appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a criminal court except as provided for by this code or by any other law for the time being in force:

Provided that the victim shall have a right to prefer an appeal against any order passed by the court acquitting the accused or convicting for a lesser offence or imposing inadequate compensation,and such appeal shall lie to the court to which an appeal ordinarily lies against the order of conviction of such court.[ Inserted by Amendment Act 2008]

Read important judgments on appeal to session court:
Click here

Print Page

When accused who has not filed appeal against conviction can be given benefit of acquittal?

It   is   well   settled   that   the   benefit   of   the   conclusion
arrived by an appellate Court can be extended even to an accused,
who has not appealed.  In the instant case, I find that the accused
No.1   Ranjana   has   been   rather   unfortunate   as   though   she   was
ordered to be released on bail by the appellate Court, she could
not avail of the same, apparently because of poverty, and perhaps,
has already undergone the sentence.  However, since I have come
to a conclusion that she should have been given benefit of doubt
and acquitted, it would be proper to interfere with her conviction
also.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
APPELLATE SIDE
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.863 OF 2012
Manjur Samsuddin Shaikh

V/s.
The State of Maharashtra

CORAM : ABHAY M. THIPSAY J.
DATED  : 30TH  JANUARY, 2015
Citation; 2015 ALLMR(cri) 4274

Print Page

Whether session court can insist for presence of complainant for hearing of stay application after admitting appeal against conviction in cheque dishonour case?

 Be that as it may, this is a case where the learned Sessions Judge on July 28, 2014

passed an order in connection with Criminal Appeal No. 29/2014 and on that date, the

appeal has been admitted. However, he did not pass any order staying the operation of the

order of sentence and compensation. In all likely, the learned Sessions Judge has

overlooked the provision of sub-Section (2) of Section 357 Cr. P.C. According to the said

provision, if fine is imposed in a case which is subject to an appeal, no such payment shall

be made before the period allowed for presenting the appeal has elapsed, if an appeal be

presented, before the decision of the appeal. Therefore, according to the mandate of law,

since the appeal is admitted, the learned Sessions Judge was bound to stay the realization

of fine. Furthermore, the learned Judge might direct the petitioners to deposit a portion of

the compensation amount in the Trial Court but his approach in non-considering the

question of stay of the order of payment of fine and compensation, unless the complainant

appeared in court, is totally erroneous, improper and not in accordance with law. Judicial

discretion must always be supported by reason and justification and same cannot be

arbitrary and fanciful. When the learned Judge found merits in the appeal and categorically

recorded that there are grounds for admission and admitted the appeal, it is totally unjust

not to consider the question of stay of fine and compensation, more particularly, on the

face of provisions of sub-section 4 of section 357 CrPC. In any event, the learned Judge

should have taken up the matter for consideration of stay of fine and compensation, when

from the postal records, it is found that the complainant was avoiding the court process. 3

 Having regard to above, it is directed within a week from the date of communication

of this order the Appeal court shall dispose of the question of stay of fine and

compensation without insisting presence of the complainant.

In the High Court at Calcutta

Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction

Appellate Side

Present

The Hon’ble Justice Ashim Kumar Roy

CRR No. 3685 of 2014

Nand Kishore Bhagat @ N. K. Bhagat & Anr.

Versus

Biswakantha Dey & Anr.

Judgment on : 16-01-2015

Citation;2015(3)crimes 623 cal

Print Page