Whether a person can not claim the title in the property even if the revenue record shows his name in respect of said immovable property?

 The contention raised by the Appellants is that since Mangal

Kumhar was the recorded tenant in the suit property as per

the Survey Settlement of 1964, the suit property was his self acquired  property.

The said contention is legally misconceived since entries

in the revenue records do not confer title to a property, nor

do they have any presumptive value on the title. They only

enable the person in whose favour mutation is recorded, to

pay the land revenue in respect of the land in question.

As a consequence, merely because Mangal Kumhar’s

name was recorded in the Survey Settlement of 1964 as a

recorded tenant in the suit property, it would not make him

the sole and exclusive owner of the suit property.

NONREPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5919 OF 2011

Prahlad Pradhan Vs  Sonu Kumhar

Dated: October 16, 2019

Author: INDU MALHOTRA, J.

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Whether co-owner of property can be denied title to property by invoking principle of estoppel?

The answer to issue no.3 is straight and simple No one can be said to have lost its title in the immovable property only because they have not contested the recovery of the rent exclusively by other co-owner. Even if one co-owner is managing the property and has raised any construction, if any, that would not take away the rights of a co-owner in the property. Principle of estoppel can only be invoked if the party invoking it proves that because of a representation made by the other party he has changed his position to his disadvantage. This is not even pleaded case of the defendant. The title in an immovable property normally cannot be said to have vanished by invoking principle of estoppel .

Punjab-Haryana High Court

Kamal Kumar Malhotra vs Roshan Lal Monga on 8 February, 2019

RSA No.5251 of 2003 (O&M)                                           

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL 

Citation: AIR 2019 (P & H) 64

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Whether collector can partition any property if there is dispute as to title to property?

Once a dispute was raised to the title, the Deputy Collector had to lay off his hands to the partition and could not order the partition on the specious premise that the area purchased by the respondent No. 1 from the larger property stood identified on the basis of the plans annexed to the Deed. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA

Writ Petition No. 303 of 2016

Decided On: 11.01.2018

Ramkrishna Janardan Bhat Vs.  Gold Resorts and Hotels Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Nutan D. Sardessai, J.

Citation: (2018) 3 MHLJ 706

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Whether tenant claiming title by adverse possession can get title to property after dismissal of his suit?

A reading of the orders of the High Court would go to show that the primary ground on which the High court thought it proper to reverse the decrees passed by the two courts below is that though possession of the respondents may have been permissive initially, after 30th March, 1984 i.e. the date on which the decree in O.S. No.295 of 1981 became final, the possession of the respondents, which continued, was adverse to the appellant and as the suits were filed on 5th September, 1996 i.e. after expiry of period of 12 years from 30th March, 1984 the respondents have perfected their title by adverse possession. Accordingly, the reversal orders were passed by the High Court.

8. To counter the submissions advanced by Shri Vijay Hansaria, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant – plaintiff that there is no material on record to show that the initial permissive possession of the respondents has become hostile to the appellant – plaintiff after 30th March, 1984 and that the conclusions recorded in this regard by the High Court are plainly wrong, Shri V. Prabhakar, learned counsel for the respondents defendants has urged that the finding of the learned trial Court in O.S. No.295 of 1981 and of the appeal Court in the appeal arising therefrom is that the respondent in Civil Appeal No.2261 of 2012, who was the plaintiff No.6 in the said suit, was a licensee. Pointing out to the essential difference between a lease and a licence and the rights of a lessor and those of a licensee and relying on a decision of this Court in Associated Hotels of India Ltd. Vs. R.N. Kapoor (1960) 1 SCR 368, Shri Prabhakar has urged that post 30th March, 1984 the possession of the said respondent (plaintiff No.6 in O.S. No.295 of 1981) was in respect of the property as distinguished from the earlier possession which merely conveyed a right to enjoy the property.

9. While the distinction between the lease and the licence need not detain a Court, we find no material to accept the aforesaid distinction made by Shri Prabhakar. There is no material to hold that post 30th March, 1984, the nature of possession of the respondent was, in any way, different from the earlier possession or that such possession was adverse. It also relevant to be noticed that insofar as the respondent in Civil Appeal No.2262 of 2012 is concerned (plaintiff No.5 in O.S No.295 of 1981) the finding of the learned Courts is that said respondent was a tenant under the appellant-plaintiff.

10. Shri Prabhakar has also urged that the finding of the learned trial court and the first appellate Court with regard to the title of the plaintiff is without any basis. It is also pointed out that the first appellate Court had verbatim reproduced the findings of the learned trial Court in this regard. The reading of the judgments in question cannot sustain the above contention. We have also noticed that the High Court had not discussed the aforesaid aspect of the case in the impugned judgments, notwithstanding which no grievance has been raised by the respondents defendants by filing a separate appeal or even by filing a cross objections in the present appeals.

11. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the view that the High Court was not correct in reversing the decrees passed by the learned trial Court which decrees were affirmed by the first appellate Court. We, therefore, set aside the orders of the High Court and restore the orders of the courts below decreeing the suits (O.S. Nos.760 and 761 of 1996).

NON-Reportable

Supreme Court of India

Mohammed Yassin vs Ramizabi Etc. Etc on 29 October, 2015

Bench: Ranjan Gogoi, N.V. Ramana

Citation:(2016) 16 SCC 618

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Whether finding as to title to immovable property given by small causes court will operate as res judicata?

It seems to us that when a finding as to title to immovable property is rendered by a Court of Small Causes res judicata cannot be pleaded as a bar in a subsequent regular civil suit for the determination or enforcement of any right or interest in immovable property. In order to operate as res judicata the finding must be one disposing of a matter directly and substantially in issue in the former suit and the issue should have been heard and finally decided by the court trying such suit. A matter which is collaterally or incidentally in issue for the purposes of deciding the matter which is directly in issue in the case cannot be made the basis of a plea of res judicata. It has long been held that a question of title in a Small Cause suit can be regarded as incidental only to the substantial issue in the suit and cannot operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit in which the question of title is directly raised.

Supreme Court of India

Gangabai W/O Rambilas Gilda vs Chhabubai W/O Pukharajji Gandhi on 6 November, 1981

Equivalent citations: 1982 AIR 20, 1982 SCR (1)1176

BENCH:
PATHAK, R.S.
DESAI, D.A.

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Whether it is permissible for High court to dismiss civil suit at appellate stage?

 By impugned judgment dated 24.01.2005, the High Court not only dismissed the appeal of the Plaintiff but proceeded to dismiss the entire suit including the finding of the Trial Court regarding ownership of the Appellant over the suit land.

16. Against the said judgment, the Appellant has filed this appeal by way of special leave petition before this Court.

17. Heard Mr. C.L. Sahu, learned Counsel for the Appellant and Mr. Harshvardhan Jha, learned Counsel for the State.

18. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we are inclined to allow the appeal and while setting aside of the impugned order restore the suit to its file and remand the case to the Trial Court for deciding the suit afresh on merits.

19. The need to remand the case is called for because we find that the High Court while dismissing the Appellant's first appeal recorded a finding that since the Appellant (plaintiff) failed to prove his ownership over the suit land inasmuch as the Plaintiff did not examine his vendor to prove his sale deed, the Trial Court was not justified in decreeing the Appellant's suit and granting declaration of ownership in his favour in relation to the suit land. In other words, the High Court was of the view that it was obligatory upon the Appellant (plaintiff) to prove his title by examining his vendor and since it was not done, the decree passed by the Trial Court in Plaintiff's favour was not legally sustainable. This finding of the High Court, as mentioned above, resulted in dismissal of the appeal and the suit as well.

20. In our considered opinion, assuming that the High Court was right in its view, it should have given an opportunity to the Appellant to prove his title by allowing him to adduce proper evidence in support of his case and for that, the High Court should have remanded the case to the Trial Court for retrial of the suit. It was more so because we find that the Appellant suffered more damage to his case in prosecuting his own appeal. In the absence of any challenge laid by the Defendants to the part of the decree passed in Plaintiff's favour by the Trial Court, the appellate Court virtually passed the order in Respondents' (defendants) favour in Appellant's appeal.

21. In other words, the High Court having held that the Plaintiff was not able to prove his title to the land in the suit due to non-examination of his vendor, all that the High Court, in such circumstances, should have done was to remand the case to the Trial Court by affording an opportunity to the Appellant to prove his case (title to the land) and adduce proper evidence in addition to what he had already adduced. This, the High Court could do by taking recourse to powers under Order 41 Rule 23A of the Code of Civil Procedure.

22. Since we are inclined to remand the case by taking recourse to the powers available under Order 41 Rule 23A Code of Civil Procedure, it is not considered necessary to examine any other question arising in the case.

23. We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that instead of now remanding the case to the first Appellate Court, it would be just and proper to remand the case to the Trial Court to retry the suit on merits by affording an opportunity to the parties to adduce additional evidence in support of their case.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 1412 of 2008

Decided On: 07.03.2017

 Mohan Kumar Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.K. Agrawal and Abhay Manohar Sapre, JJ.

Citation:(2017) 4 SCC92

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Whether purchaser of property can be denied title in property on ground that his name is not mutated in revenue record?

 In addition to the abovementioned reason, the contention advanced by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondents that the Appellants failed to get the mutation of entries of the suit land incorporated in record shows that there was no intention on their part to act upon the contents of the two sale deeds, cannot be accepted as mere mutation of entries does not confer title upon the deceased Respondent No. 1 in the immovable property. In the case of Sawarni v. Index Kaur and Ors.MANU/SC/0730/1996 : (1996) 6 SCC 223, this Court held as under:

7...Mutation of a property in the revenue record does not create or extinguish title nor has it any presumptive value on title. It only enables the person in whose favour mutation is ordered to pay the land revenue in question. The learned Additional District Judge was wholly in error in coming to a conclusion that mutation in favour of Inder Kaur conveys title in her favour. This erroneous conclusion has vitiated the entire judgment....

22. In the case of Guru Amarjit Singh v. Rattan Chand and Ors. MANU/SC/0065/1994 : (1993) 4 SCC 349, this Court held that the entries in jamabandi are not proof of title in respect of an immoveable property. In the case of Jattu Ram v. Hakam Singh and Ors.MANU/SC/0399/1994 : (1993) 4 SCC 403, this Court observed that entries made by patwari in official record are only for the purpose of records and do not by itself prove the correctness of the same nor can statutory presumption be drawn on the same, particularly, in the absence of corroborative evidence. The Respondent cannot claim to have acquired title over the suit property by pleading adverse possession only in the absence of the name of the Appellants in the revenue records. In the case of Thakur Kishan Singh (Dead) v. Arvind Kumar MANU/SC/0015/1995 : (1994) 6 SCC 591 andP.T. Munichikkanna Reddy and Ors. v. Revamma and Ors. MANU/SC/7325/2007 : (2007) 6 SCC 59, this Court held that in cases where the possession was initially permissive, the burden lies heavily on that person alleging adverse possession to prove that the possession has become adverse. Mere possession for long time does not convert permissive possession into adverse possession.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 2151 of 2016 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 2489 of 2011)

Decided On: 01.03.2016

 Prem Nath Khanna  Vs. Narinder Nath Kapoor and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

V. Gopala Gowda and U.U. Lalit, JJ.

Citation:(2016) 12 SCC 235,AIR 2016 SC 1433.

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Whether finding as to title to property given by small cause court will operate as res judicata in subsequent suit?

 It seems to us that when a finding as to title to immovable property is rendered by a Court of Small Causes res judicata cannot be pleaded as a bar in a subsequent regular civil suit for the determination or enforcement of any right or interest in immovable property. In order to operate as res judicata the finding must be one disposing of a matter directly and substantially in issue in the former suit and the issue should have been heard and finally decided by the court trying such suit. A matter which is collaterally or incidentally in issue for the purposes of deciding the matter which is directly in issue in the case cannot be made the basis of a plea of res judicata. It has long been held that a question of title in a Small Cause suit can be regarded as incidental only to the substantial issue in the suit and cannot operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit in which the question of title is directly raised. Poholi Mullick v. Pukeer Chunder Patnaik[1874] 22 Suth W.R. 349, Chet Ram and Ors. v. Ganga, 1886 Allahabad Weekly Notes.Anwar Ali v. Nur-Ul-Haq and Anr. [1907] 4 ALJ 517. Khandu valad Keru v. Tatia valad Vithoba [1971] 8 Bombay H.C.R.A.C. 23. See also Mohd. Yusuf and Anr. v. Abdul Wahid MANU/UP/0269/1948 : AIR1948All296 and S. A.A. Annamalai Chettiar v. Molaiyan and Ors. MANU/TN/0185/1970 : AIR1970Mad396 . Our attention has been drawn to Explanation VIII to Section 11 in the CPC recently inserted by the CPC (Amendment) t; Act, 1976. Section 97(3) of the Amendment Act declares that the new provision applies to pending suits, proceedings, appeals and applications. In our opinion the Explanation can be of no assistance, because it operates only where an issue has been heard and finally decided in the earlier suit.

10. Accordingly, we hold that the finding rendered by the Court of Small Causes in the two suits filed by the appellant that the document executed by the respondent is a sale deed cannot operate as res judicata in the present suit.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 1537 of 1970

Decided On: 06.11.1981

Smt. Gangabai Rambilas Gilda

Vs.

Smt. Chhabubai Pukharajji Gandhi

Coram:

D.A. Desai and R.S. Pathak, JJ.

Citation:AIR 1982 SC 20

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When subsequent purchaser will not get title to property?

 This issue is as to whether defendant nos. 3 to 5 can claim to have title to the suit property as bona fide purchasers without notice in spite of the plaintiffs having title rights in the suit property by virtue of the documents dated 12.5.2004 and 16.6.2004. This issue also will have to be answered in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants for the reasons as given hereinafter.

25(i). A claim of bona fide purchaser for value without notice is in terms of Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act. This provision of Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act requires that before rights are claimed under this particular principle, it is necessary for the subsequent purchasers have to plead and prove that their actions are firstly bona fide and secondly that they do not have any notice of a previous transaction of transfer of title with respect to the suit property.

(ii) It is noted that in the written statement of the defendant nos. 3 to 5 they have not even whispered about their purchase of rights as being bona fide and that they purchased the rights in the suit property without notice of the earlier title in favour of the plaintiff no.1. Not only there is no pleading but even in the evidence led on behalf of defendant nos. 3 to 6 there is not even a whisper that defendant nos. 3 to 6 have purchased rights in the suit property without having notice of the title created in favour of plaintiff no.1 by the documentation dated 12.5.2004 and 16.6.2004. It is also seen that once the Agreement to Sell dated 16.6.2004 in favour of the plaintiff no.1 was a registered document, defendant nos. 3 to 6 are deemed to have notice of this agreement by virtue of Explanation I to Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act which provides that registration of a document operates as a notice. Therefore, neither there is any pleading nor any evidence that defendant nos.3 to 6 have purchased the rights in the suit property without notice of the prior title in favour of the plaintiff no.1 and which pleading the defendant nos. 3 to 6 cannot legally take up in view of Explanation I to Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act.

(iii) Though learned counsel for the defendant nos. 3 to 6 argued that in the affidavit by way of evidence filed on behalf of defendant nos. 3 to 6, they have used the expression 'bona fide', however, not only no amount of evidence can be looked into on the plea of bona fide action of the defendant nos. 3 to 6 which is not pleaded in the written statement, but also that even assuming there is a plea of bona fides, the same is not sufficient because the same had to be accompanied by pleadings and proof of defendant nos. 3 to 6 having purchased rights in the suit property without having notice of the title of plaintiff no.1, and which the defendant nos. 3 to 6 have miserably failed to plead and prove as so discussed above.

(iv). Also, in law, once title rights are transferred pursuant to Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, there does not arise application of Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act and which applies if there is only an ordinary agreement to sell which requires specific performance and not an agreement to sell under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. Object of Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act is to give precedence to a later sale deed of bona fide purchases for value without notice and not for giving precedence to transfer of later rights although rights in an immovable property has earlier already been validly transferred and in such a case it is theSection 48 of the Transfer of Property Act that will apply and not Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act.

Delhi High Court

Mrs. Vaneeta Khanna And Anr. vs Mr. Rajiv Gupta And Ors. on 1 October, 2015

Author: Valmiki J. Mehta

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Whether title to property is not proved?

The next objection raised by the learned counsel for the
appellant that there was no pleading for disputing identity of the
property which is under Exh.­45 to the appellant­plaintiff.  I have,
therefore,   with   the   assistance   of   learned   counsel   for   the   rival
parties perused the specific pleadings taken by Kamlabai in her
written statement.   True it is that in the pleading, there are no
specific words about the dispute as to the identity of the property
but then careful reading of the pleadings shows that the pleading

is that the property sold by Motiram did not even belong to him
but it belonged to Mahadeo after partition was effected and that
Mahadeo bequeathed the property to his granddaughter.  I think,
no party is expected to plead evidence in the written statement
and above pleading should be sufficient in the present case.   I,
therefore, do not agree with Mr. Mishra, learned counsel for the
appellant   that   there   was   total   absence   of   pleadings.     The
appellant­plaintiff, at any rate made   a   very serious mistake in
conducting the suit and the mistake is not curable.  The appellantplaintiff
  did   not   produce   before   the   Court   primary   evidence
namely; Exh.­45 the sale deed but she produced certified copy of
the registered sale deed before the Court.   There is noting on
record to show as to the whereabouts of the original documents of
sale deed or rather primary evidence.   There was no application
for leading secondary evidence for production of the certified copy
of the registered sale deed and/or for proving the same.  I do not
think that the certified copy of the registered sale deed could be
taken as admissible evidence in the absence of any explanation for
loss of primary evidence  or  after  obtaining permission  to  lead
secondary evidence.  Nothing was done.  I think, this is the defect
left by the plaintiff by not proving the sale deed.  When the sale

deed itself was not proved, the title could not be held to be proved
by the appellant­plaintiff and, therefore, the above question will
have to be answered in the negative.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH AT NAGPUR
SECOND APPEAL NO.47/2000
Smt. Leelabai wd/o Tulshiram Ingole,

V
Sau. Kamlabai w/o Motiram Budh,

­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­
CORAM:­ A. B. CHAUDHARI, J.
DATED :­ 23.02.2016
Citation:2016(5) ALLMR17

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When plaintiff is not entitled to get decree for possession of shop?

Assuming for the sake of argument that the defendant is a
trespasser,   one   cannot   overlook   the   fact   that   he   is   in   actual
physical possession of the suit shop holding electricity connection
in respect of the shop conducted in the name as “Bhavna Hair
Dressers”. He claims that he was tenant of one Mallubai who is no
more living.   These are the facts and circumstances which can
surely enable the defendant as possessor of the suit shop to resist
the   suit   filed   by   the   plaintiffs   on   the   ground   of   their   alleged
ownership of the suit shop.  Since, according to the defendant, he
was tenant and paid rent in advance to Mallubai ­ land lady who is
no longer living, a person or persons through her could have on
the pretext of ownership of the shop and claim as land lord have
instituted the suit according to law to evict the defendant. It was
not   such   a   case   before   the   trial   Court   as   well   as   in   the   first
Appellate Court.  Bearing in mind the basic principle of law in civil
jurisprudence   that   even   trespasser   cannot   be   evicted   without
following due process of law and no one can be allowed to take
law   into   his   own  hands   to   recover   possession   of   the  property
without  following due process of law and without proving title to
the immovable property in possession of a person holding actual

physical possession thereof.   Suffice it to say that there was no
evidence whatsoever in favour of the plaintiffs to establish their
title   to   the   suit   property   and   therefore,   the   suit   was   rightly
dismissed   by   the   trial   Court   by   a   well   reasoned   Judgment.
Interference   by   the   first   Appellate   Court   with   the   finding   of
dismissal of the suit was unwarranted and contrary to law for
abovesaid reasons.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR
SECOND APPEAL NO.452 OF 2014
Suresh s/o. Pundalikrao Mirase,

Vs
 Ashok Girdharilal Chandak,
  
      CORAM     :  A.P.BHANGALE,  J.
      DATE         :  3.7.2015. 
Citation: 2016(4) ALLMR207

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Whether title in property can be created or extinguished on the basis of mutation entries?

 In addition to the abovementioned reason, the contention advanced by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondents that the Appellants failed to get the mutation of entries of the suit land incorporated in record shows that there was no intention on their part to act upon the contents of the two sale deeds, cannot be accepted as mere mutation of entries does not confer title upon the deceased Respondent No. 1 in the immovable property. In the case of Sawarni v. Index Kaur and Ors. MANU/SC/0730/1996 : (1996) 6 SCC 223, this Court held as under:

7...Mutation of a property in the revenue record does not create or extinguish title nor has it any presumptive value on title. It only enables the person in whose favour mutation is ordered to pay the land revenue in question. The learned Additional District Judge was wholly in error in coming to a conclusion that mutation in favour of Inder Kaur conveys title in her favour. This erroneous conclusion has vitiated the entire judgment....

22. In the case of Guru Amarjit Singh v. Rattan Chand and Ors.MANU/SC/0065/1994 : (1993) 4 SCC 349, this Court held that the entries in jamabandi are not proof of title in respect of an immoveable property. In the case of Jattu Ram v.Hakam Singh and Ors. MANU/SC/0399/1994 : (1993) 4 SCC 403, this Court observed that entries made by patwari in official record are only for the purpose of records and do not by itself prove the correctness of the same nor can statutory presumption be drawn on the same, particularly, in the absence of corroborative evidence. The Respondent cannot claim to have acquired title over the suit property by pleading adverse possession only in the absence of the name of the Appellants in the revenue records. In the case of Thakur Kishan Singh (Dead) v. Arvind Kumar MANU/SC/0015/1995 : (1994) 6 SCC 591 and P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy and Ors. v. Revamma and Ors.MANU/SC/7325/2007 : (2007) 6 SCC 59, this Court held that in cases where the possession was initially permissive, the burden lies heavily on that person alleging adverse possession to prove that the possession has become adverse. Mere possession for long time does not convert permissive possession into adverse possession.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 2151 of 2016 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 2489 of 2011)

Decided On: 01.03.2016

Prem Nath Khanna  Vs.  Narinder Nath Kapoor and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:V. Gopala Gowda and U.U. Lalit, JJ.

Citation; AIR 2016 SC1433

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Bombay HC: Guidelines for proving possession over suit property

In the case of "Maria Margarida Sequeria Fernandes and Ors. Vs. Erasmo Jack de Sequeria (Dead) through L.R.s" (supra), it has been held by the Apex Court that truth must be foundation of justice and Judges should not sit as mere umpire during trial but should play an active role to find out truth. It has been held that in an action for recovery of possession of immovable property, or for protecting possession thereof, upon legal title to the property being established, the possession or occupation of the property by a person other than the holder of the legal title will be presumed to have been under and in subordination to the legal title, and it will be for the person resisting a claim for recovery of possession or claiming a right to continue in possession, to establish that he has such a right. It has been further held that wherever pleadings and documents establish title to a particular property and possession is in question, it will be for the person in possession to give sufficiently detailed pleadings, particulars and documents to support his claim in order to continue in possession. It would be imperative that one who claims possession must give the following below:

(a) Who is or are the owner or owners of the property;

(b) Title of the property;

(c) Who is in possession of the title documents;

(d) Identity of the claimant or claimants to possession;

(e) The date of entry into possession;

(f) How he came into possession whether he purchased the property or inherited or got the same in gift or by any other method;

(g) In case he purchased the property, what is the consideration, if he has taken it on rent, how much is rent, license fee or lease amount;

(h) If taken on rent, license fee or lease then insist on rent deed, license deed or lease deed;

(i) Who are the persons in possession/occupation or otherwise living within him, in what capacity; as family members, friends or servants etc.;

(j) Subsequent conduct, i.e., any event which might have extinguished his entitlement to possessions or caused shift therein; and

(k) Basis of his claim not to deliver possession but continue in possession.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA

First Appeal No. 265 of 2005 and M.C.A. No. 669 of 2011

Decided On: 08.03.2013

Francisco Xavier Ferrao

Vs.  Filomeno Bonifacio de Viera Menezes and Ors.

Coram:U.V. Bakre, J.

Citation:2013(3)ABR412,MANU/MH/0226/2013

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