Supreme Court: In cases involving a child who has suffered injury or died, the loss of income must be computed on the basis of the minimum wages payable to a skilled worker in the concerned State

For the purpose of emphasis, it is again clarified here that when a Tribunal or the High Court in appeal, is concerned with the case involving a child having suffered injury or having passed away, the calculation of loss of income necessarily has to be made on the matric of minimum wages payable to a skilled worker in the respective State at the relevant point of time. It is our hope that this restatement helps avoiding such errors and thereby obviates the necessity of this Court's interference, applying well-established principles of law. {Para 15}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 10278 of 2025 

Decided On: 08.08.2025

Hitesh Nagjibhai Patel Vs. Bababhai Nagjibhai Rabari and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sanjay Karol and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.

Citation: 2025INSC 1070,MANU/SC/1796/2025.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme Court: Motor Accident Claims | If Claimant Doesn't Produce Income Proof, Insurer Must Furnish Applicable Minimum Wages Notification

 We may also observe that, in general, i.e., accidents involving adults, we are often confronted with situations where the Minimum Wage Data is not readily available and every so often, the question that has been made up to this Court hinges only on the calculation of income. In that view of the matter and in the hope of reducing the claimants need to file appeals to this Court or even the High Court, we deem it appropriate to direct that in cases where the claimant has failed to furnish appropriate details of income or adequate proof thereof, it shall be the responsibility and obligation of the contesting party, more particularly the insurance company to furnish before the Tribunal the applicable minimum wage as duly issued by the concerned government.{Para 16}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 10278 of 2025 

Decided On: 08.08.2025

Hitesh Nagjibhai Patel Vs. Bababhai Nagjibhai Rabari and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sanjay Karol and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.

Citation: 2025INSC 1070,MANU/SC/1796/2025.

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Bombay HC: Wife can claim maintenance from her father in law after the death of her husband from estate inherited by him

 At the outset, it is required to be submitted that the plain

reading of Section 19 of the Act contemplates that the respondents

have every right to claim the maintenance after the death of husband

from the estate inherited by her father-in-law i.e. the present petitioner.

That proviso to Sub-Section (1) of Section 19 contemplates that the

respondent has to demonstrate that she on her is unable to maintain

herself. It is in this eventuality she can claim maintenance from the

estate of her husband, still fact remains that the said burden can be

discharged by respondent no.1 at an appropriate stage. The object with

which the provision is made in the statute book for grant of interim

maintenance cannot be ignored.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (ST.) NO.4054 OF 2020

Sardool Singh Sucha Singh Matharoo Vs.  Harneet Kaur widow of Bhupinder Singh Matharoo & Anr. 

Coram : NITIN W. SAMBRE, J.

Date : 7th September, 2020

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What procedure Magistrate should follow if the son is seeking the death certificate of his father belatedly?

 Neither the Act nor the Rules provide for the procedure for conducting the proceedings when an application is made under this provision. It is true that an entry in the register of births or death is not conclusive evidence of the disputed date of birth or death so also an entry pursuant to the directions of the Magistrate under Section 13(3). The order of the Magistrate binds only the Registrar and not others. (See H. Subba Rao v. The Life Insurance Corporation of India, Bangalore & Another -MANU/KA/0037/1976 : AIR 1976 KAR 231).

12. An order passed under this provision consequent to the suppression of material facts may visit with serious civil consequences. Let us take the present case for instance. According to the petitioners, Devaiah had died in the year 1979 and that before his death, he had executed several sale deeds. The petitioners are claiming title to the properties under those sale deeds. The death certificate has been issued pursuant to the order of the Magistrate dated 29.3.2012. It is no doubt true that a contention can be raised by the petitioners in the suit that the death certificate is a fabricated one. But if an appropriate procedure is followed by the Magistrate, the mischief it may cause can be prevented to a large extent. The language contained in Section 13(3) mandates the Magistrate to pass an order after verification of date of death. Verification involves determination or testing the truth or the accuracy of the statements made in the petition. Therefore, the Magistrate cannot blindly direct entry of date of death as sought for in the petition.

13. In the case of issuance of probate or letters of administration, a procedure has been provided under the Rules governing Probate and Succession matters, 1966. Similar Rules have to be framed under the Act. Till such Rules are framed, it is necessary to give certain directions which have to be followed by the Magistrates before whom applications are filed for registration of date of death.

14. In a case relating to date of birth, the High Court of Gujarat in Karimabibi W/o Gulam Mohammad Mustufa Karodiawad and Others v. Ankleshwar Municipality and Others-MANU/GJ/0142/1997 : AIR 1998 Guj. 42 has issued the following directions.

Admittedly, the application filed by the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 was under sub-section (3) of Section 13 of the said Act. If the above provision of sub-section (3) of Section 13 are considered, then it would be quite clear that it is the duty of the learned Judicial Magistrate to verify the correctness of the date of birth before allowing the application filed before him. When the law expects that he has to verify correctness of the birth, it is expected from him that he must hear the persons who would be interested in disputing or supporting the said application. No doubt the said Act of 1969 does not lay down any procedure as to how and in what manner the application is to be presented by the petitioner to the learned Judicial Magistrate. Not only that, the said Act of 1969 is not making any provision for the proceeding for filing such an application, but no procedure is also laid down by any rules framed under the said Act or by any other specific provisions of any Act. Therefore, in these circumstances, when any application is presented under Section 13 of the said Act after a period of 1 year from the date of birth or date of death, it would be incumbent on the applicant to state the reasons/grounds in his application as to why the earlier entry in the death or birth register could not be made and why he could not give the information regarding the same to the competent authority. He must justify his late action in filing such an application by making necessary averments in his petition. It is also further necessary for him to state the purpose of which he wants the entry in the birth register or the death register. He must also state in the said application as who are likely to be affected by the said entry in the birth register or death register....

It has been further held as under:

10. When all the above stated details are given in the application, it is also incumbent on the Magistrate to issue notice to those persons who are likely to be affected by his order. He should also insist on issuing a proclamation as is required while issuing a succession certificate. Without following the above stated procedure, the Magistrate should not proceed to dispose of such an application because the granting of such relief is going to create a right in favour of the applicant and obligation against certain persons. When the obligations are created against such persons, they must have a reasonable opportunity to challenge the said act of the petitioner.

15. A Division Bench of Orissa High Court in Sk. Rahimuddin v. Ojifa Bibi and Others - MANU/OR/0016/1989 : AIR 1989 Ori. 56 has held as under:

Section 13(3) casts an onerous duty on the Magistrate to verify the correctness of the birth or death and thereafter, pass an order. There cannot be any manner of doubt that an entry with regard to the date of birth of a person confers a valuable right and when such an entry was not contemporaneously made for some reason or the other and can be made only after a Magistrate passes an order after verifying the correctness of the same, the Magistrate must make an inquiry in that respect. Without any inquiry worth the name, and passing an order mechanically on the basis of affidavit filed, would tantamount to passing an order on total non-application of mind and in the eye of law, it would not be a verification as contemplated under Section 13(3). Such an order cannot be sustained in law.

16. Therefore, the applicant has to state atleast the following particulars in the application filed under Section 13(3) of the Act for entering the date of death:

(i) The reasons/grounds as to why entry in the death register could not be made earlier and why he could not give information regarding the same to the competent authority.

(ii) The purpose for which he wants entry in the death register.

(iii) Wife and children of the deceased have to be made parties in the application as also the Jurisdictional Registrar of Births and Deaths.

(iv) The particulars of the person/persons, who are likely to be affected by the entry in the death register.

(v) The Magistrate can also direct the applicant to furnish such other particulars as he may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case.

17. If the application contains the above particulars, the Magistrate should not only issue notice to the respondents but also to those persons who are likely to be affected by the order. He should also direct the issue of notice in two local daily newspapers, one of them should be in vernacular language, having wide circulation. The Magistrate may also issue such other directions as he may deem fit and proper depending upon the facts of the case. He should hold an enquiry and pass appropriate orders thereon in accordance with law. If there is a serious dispute with regard to the date of death, the Magistrate has to dismiss the petition with liberty to the parties to approach the Civil Court for appropriate reliefs.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BANGALORE

Writ Petition Nos. 50331 to 50334/2012 (GM-RES)

Decided On: 26.06.2013

 Muniyamma and Ors.  Vs Devegowda and Ors.

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Whether Magistrate can issue direction for registration of death under The Registration of Births and Deaths Act?

The object of the Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1969, is to give legal status to the registration of births and deaths by judicial machinery. A legal duty is cast upon the persons specified in Section 8 to give information to the Registrar of such Births and Deaths. Section 13 lays down the procedure for delayed registration of births and deaths. In case of non-registration within one year of the occurrence of birth or death, the registration could take place under Section 13(3) only on an order made by the Magistrate after verifying the correctness of the birth or death. Section 13(3) of the Act reads as under:

13. Delayed registration of births and deaths:

(1) xxxx

(2) xxxx

(3) Any birth or death which has not been registered within one year of its occurrence, shall be registered only on an order made by a magistrate of the first class or a Presidency Magistrate after verifying the correctness of the birth or death and on payment of the prescribed fee.

(4) xxxx

9. Thus, Section 13(3) authorises the Magistrate to pass an order on an application after verification of the correctness of the birth and death.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BANGALORE

Writ Petition Nos. 50331 to 50334/2012 (GM-RES)

Decided On: 26.06.2013

 Muniyamma and Ors.  Vs Devegowda and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S. Abdul Nazeer, J.

Citation:  MANU/KA/2256/2013

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Landmark Judgment on appreciation of evidence of witness whose cross-examination could not be conducted due to death or illness

 I have given the matter my consideration and am of the view that the statement of a witness in examination-in-chief, which was admissible at the time it was recorded, cannot become inadmissible by reason of the subsequent death of the witness before cross-examination. The absence of cross-examination would undoubtedly affect the value and weight to be attached to the statement of the witness, but it would not render the statement inadmissible or result in its effacement. So far as the question is concerned as to what weight should be attached to such statement made in examination-in-chief the Court has to keep in view the facts and circumstances of each individual case. Some of the factors which may be borne in mind are the nature of the testimony, its probative value, the status of the witness, his relationship or connection with the parties to the case, a likely animus which may colour his statement and any other factor touching the credibility of the witness which may emerge on the record. Regard must also be had to the fact that the witness has not been subjected to cross-examination. The Court should see whether there are indications on the record that as a result of cross-examination his testimony was likely to be seriously shaken or his good faith or credit to be successfully impeached. The Court may also adopt a rule not to act upon such testimony unless it is materially corroborated or is supported by the surrounding circumstances. If after applying that rule of caution, the Court decides to rely upon the statement of a witness who was examined in chief, but who died before cross-examination, the decision of the Court in this respect would not suffer from any infirmity.

In the High Court of Delhi

Appellate Civil

(Before H.R. Khanna, J.)

Krishan Dayal Vs  Chandu Ram

R.S.A. No. 28 of 1962

Decided on July 8, 1969

Citation: 1969 SCC OnLine Del 134 : ILR (1969) Del 1090

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Whether it is necessary to prove that accused caused death of Rape victim with mensrea for applicability of S 376A of IPC?

The above cited principles have been minutely observed by us,

taking into consideration the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case

in hand. At the outset, we would highlight that the High Court while

confirming death has observed that the girl was found bleeding due to

forcible sexual intercourse — which fact, however, is not supported by

medical evidence. However, such erroneous finding has no impact on

conviction under Section 376A of the I.P.C. for a bare perusal of the section

shows that only the factum of death of the victim during the offence of rape is required, and such death need not be with any guilty intention or be a

natural consequence of the act of rape only. It is worded broadly enough to

include death by any act committed by the accused if done

contemporaneously with the crime of rape. Any other interpretation would

defeat the object of ensuring safety of women and would perpetuate the

earlier loophole of the rapists claiming lack of intention to cause death to

seek a reduced charge under Section 304 of I.P.C. as noted in the Report

of the Committee on Amendments to Criminal Law, headed by Justice

J.S. Verma, former Chief Justice of India:

“22. While we believe that enhanced penalties in a substantial

number of sexual assault cases can be adjudged on the basis of

the law laid down in the aforesaid cases, certain situations

warrant a specific treatment. We believe that where the offence

of sexual assault, particularly ‘gang rapes’, is accompanied by

such brutality and violence that it leads to death or a Persistent

Vegetative State (or ‘PVS’ in medical terminology), punishment

must be severe – with the minimum punishment being life

imprisonment. While we appreciate the argument that where

such offences result in death, the case may also be tried under

Section 302 of the IPC as a ‘rarest of the rare’ case, we must

acknowledge that many such cases may actually fall within the

ambit of Section 304 (Part II) since the ‘intention to kill’ may

often not be established. In the case of violence resulting in

Persistent Vegetative State is concerned, we are reminded of

the moving story of Aruna Shanbagh, the young nurse who was

brutally raped and lived the rest of her life (i.e. almost 36 years)

in a Persistent Vegetative State.

23. In our opinion, such situations must be treated differently

because the concerted effort to rape and to inflict violence may

disclose an intention deserving an enhanced punishment. We

have therefore recommended that a specific provision, namely,

Section 376 (3) should be inserted in the Indian Penal Code to

deal with the offence of “rape followed by death or resulting in a

Persistent Vegetative State”.”

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1523-1524 OF 2019

Ravishankar @ Baba Vishwakarma Vs The State of Madhya Pradesh 

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Whether representative suit abate on death of one of plaintiff?

The last two points may be shortly disposed of as they have to be stated merely to be rejected. Point No. (2) was eventually given up as it was completely devoid of substance. Since the suit had been filed in a representative capacity, it is clear that on the death of one of the plaintiffs it did not abate. In Raja Anand Rao v. Ramdas Daduram and Ors. 48 I.A.R. 12 it has been said Lord Dunadin at page 16" There was also a point that the person who originally raised the suit and got the sanction having died the suit could not go on, but there does not seem any force in that point either, it being a suit which is not prosecuted by individuals for their own interests, but as representatives of the general public. It is plain that the second appeal did not lose its competency on the death of one of the plaintiffs appellants. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 505 of 1974

Decided On: 17.12.1974

Charan Singh  Vs. Darshan Singh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

K.K. Mathew, N.L. Untwalia and P.N. Bhagwati, JJ.

Citation : AIR 1975 SC 371

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Whether brother of deceased tenant is her family member entitled to get tenancy rights after her death?

 Section 3(g) defines 'family', in relation to landlord which includes the spouse that is husband or wife of a person, male lineal descendants which means his or her son, son's son, son's son's son and so on, parents, grandparents, unmarried, widowed, divorced daughter or granddaughter, etc. The definition given in the Clause is an inclusive one and is supposed to be construed in its technical meaning which implies what is not given has to be excluded as not forming part of the family of landlord or tenant. Therefore, sisters and brothers of landlord and tenant are excluded from his/her family. In the facts of present case, the Appellant being brother of deceased tenant cannot be held to be the 'family' as the inclusive list given under the Act clearly omits "brother and sister" and the same cannot be read therein as the list has to be read and interpreted strictly.

14. Assuming, for the sake of arguments that the Appellant is an heir of Lalita, for devolution of tenancy, on the death of Lalita, the Appellant has to be a 'tenant' within the meaning of Section 3(a) of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972. As per Section 3(a)(1), in the case of residential building, in the event of death of a tenant, for heirs to be treated as tenant, the statute requires them to prove that they have been normally residing with the deceased tenant at the time of his/her death. The term used in the Section is 'heir' which implies that not any of the family member residing with the tenant would succeed to the tenancy, but only the heirs of tenant normally residing with him/her. The words "normally residing with him" suggests that only those heirs would inherit the tenancy rights of deceased tenant who resided with him ordinarily in normal course and not temporarily. The legislative intent appears to be that only those heirs would inherit tenancy who normally resided with the tenant and not occasionally. In the present case, the Appellant claims that he has been carrying on business in the property along with his deceased sister Lalita and had been ordinarily living with her because of the medical business they were running. The Appellant being the brother of deceased-Lalita had no reason to normally reside with his married sister. Be it noted, in her written statement filed in the release application, Lalita has not averred that her brother-Appellant Durga Prasad was living with her and that he was taking care of her. As rightly held by the Courts below, Durga Prasad is neither a 'heir' within the meaning of Section 3(a) nor fall under the definition of 'family' as per Section 3(g) of the Act.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 1305-06 of 2017

Decided On: 07.02.2017

 Durga Prasad  Vs. Narayan Ramchandaani (D) thr. L.Rs.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dipak Misra and R. Banumathi, JJ.

Citation: 2017(5) All MR 468(SC), AIR 2017 SC 915,(2017) 5 SCC69

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Whether insurance claim can be recovered if death is due to heart attack?

A plain reading of the cover Clause in the M.O.U. would make it clear that it is intended to impose a twofold limitation. A death in order to qualify for the insurance cover must not only be accidental but the accident causing death must itself result from some external, violent and other visible means. This two fold limitation is based on what is called, in the Law of Insurance, the distinction between 'accidental result' and 'accidental means'. An unexpected and unforeseen consequence or result from a normal or routine activity may constitute an accident but it would not qualify as 'accidental means'. Thus, if a person suffers a fatal heart attack while dancing (considered to be a normal activity) the death may be called 'accidental' but it would fail to attract the insurance cover because it was not due to 'accidental means'. On the other hand, if a person dies due to heart attack suffered as a result of over-exertion on being chased by a ferocious dog (an unintended occurrence, and not a normal activity) the death might attract the insurance cover as it was caused by 'accidental means'.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 3413 of 2019 

Decided On: 24.04.2019

Alka Shukla  Vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud and Hemant Gupta, JJ.

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Whether landlord can straight away seek eviction of sons of deceased tenant if they were not residing with tenant at the time of his death?

Coming back to the case at hand, the petitioners had shown from the material on record that the original tenant was survived by his widow who alone was staying with him at the time of his death, the three daughters being married much prior and the two sons residing away from the tenanted premises, one in Spain and the other in Bangalore before coming down to Goa to reside at Sanquelim in the course of his avocation. The petitioners therefore were within their right to move the application seeking an inquiry whether the two sons could be considered as the legal heirs/tenants within the meaning of Section 2(o) of the Act and for other consequential reliefs. The two sons no doubt qualify as the heirs of the deceased tenant but looking to the definition of the expression "tenant" contained in Section 2(o) of the Act, do not qualify as tenants and as they were not living with the tenant at the time of his death. Therefore, the contention of Shri P.A. Kholkar, learned Advocate for the respondent that it was obligatory on the part of the petitioners to bring the legal heirs on record after the death of the tenant cannot stand the test of scrutiny. Rather, considering the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Durga Prasad (supra) in particular, the petitioners cannot be driven to file separate proceedings or suit for the eviction of the sons from the suit premises and would straight away be entitled to seek their eviction in the nature of a direction to hand over the vacant possession of the suit premises to the petitioners. Further, considering the judgment in Shri Kishori Lal (supra), and having come to a conclusive finding that the two sons were not residing with the tenant at the time of his death in the suit premises, the petitioners would be entitled to an order of eviction straight away against the legal representatives of the deceased statutory tenant.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA

Writ Petition No. 536 of 2017

Decided On: 29.01.2019

Amira Abdul Razaq Vs  Lila S. Mahtani and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Nutan D. Sardessai, J.

Citation: 2019(3) MHLJ 335

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Whether Death By Mosquito Bite is Covered Under Death By Accident?

The present appeal raises an interesting question of law. The Court is tasked with determining whether a death due to malaria occasioned by a mosquito bite in Mozambique, constituted a death due to accident. 

As the law of insurance has developed, there has been a nuanced understanding of the distinction between an accident and a disease which is contracted in the natural course of human events in determining whether a policy of accident insurance would cover a disease. At one end of the spectrum is the theory that an accident postulates a mishap or an untoward happening, something which is unexpected and unforeseen. This understanding of what is an accident indicates that something which arises in the natural course of things is not an accident. This is the basis for holding that a disease may not fall for classification as an accident, when it is caused by a bodily infirmity or a condition. A person who suffers from flu or a viral fever cannot say that it is an accident. Of course, there is an element of chance or probability in contracting any illness. Even when viral disease has proliferated in an area, every individual may not suffer from it. Getting a bout of flu or a viral illness may be a matter of chance. But a person who gets the flu cannot be described as having suffered an accident: the flu was transmitted in the natural course of things. To be bitten by a mosquito and be imbued with a malarial parasite does involve an element of chance. But the disease which is caused as a result of the insect bite in the natural course of events cannot be regarded as an accident. Particularly, when the disease is caused in an area which is malaria prone. On the other hand, there may well be instances where a bodily condition from which an individual suffers may be the direct consequence of an accident. A motor car accident may, for instance, result in bodily injuries, the consequence of which is death or disability which may fall within the cover of a policy of accident insurance. Hence, it has been postulated that where a disease is caused or transmitted in the natural course of events, it would not be covered by the definition of an accident. However, in a given case or circumstance, the affliction or bodily condition may be regarded as an accident where its cause or course of transmission is unexpected and unforeseen.

29. Recently, in Gloria Wells v. Minnesota Life Insurance Company17, the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, dealt with a case where the question of law before the court was whether death caused by a bite of a mosquito carrying West Nile Encephalitis virus in Texas was covered under an accidental death insurance policy. The Court while remanding the case to the lower court on the disputed issue of facts, observed that the determinate, single act of a mosquito bite was not incidental to a body process and the mosquito, an external force produced an unforeseen result. However, this may be distinguished from the facts in the present case. Malaria is most commonly transmitted to humans through malaria virus infested mosquito bites, and when a virus is contracted through normal means brought about by everyday life it cannot be deemed to be an unexpected or unforeseen accident.

30. In a policy of insurance which covers death due to accident, the peril insured against is an accident: an untoward happening or occurrence which is unforeseen and unexpected in the normal course of human events. The death of the insured in the present case was caused by encephalitis malaria. The claim under the policy is founded on the hypothesis that there is an element of uncertainty about whether or when a person would be the victim of a mosquito bite which is a carrier of a vector-borne disease. The submission is that being bitten by a mosquito is an unforeseen eventuality and should be regarded as an accident. We do not agree with this submission. The insured was based in Mozambique. According to the World Health Organization's World Malaria Report 2018, Mozambique, with a population of 29.6 million people, accounts for 5% of cases of malaria globally. It is also on record that one out of three people in Mozambique is afflicted with malaria. In light of these statistics, the illness of encephalitis malaria through a mosquito bite cannot be considered as an accident. It was neither unexpected nor unforeseen. It was not a peril insured against in the policy of accident insurance.

31. We are hence of the view that the interpretation placed on the terms of the insurance policy was manifestly incorrect and that the impugned order of the National Commission is unsustainable

In the Supreme Court of India

(Before Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud and Hemant Gupta, JJ.)

Branch Manager National Insurance Co. Ltd. v.  Mousumi Bhattacharjee 

Civil Appeal No 2614 of 2019

Decided on March 26, 2019

Citation: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 419

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Whether appeal will abate as a whole if there is death of one co-appellant?

 In this case, undoubtedly as we have noted the appellant and his late brother sued as plaintiffs for a declaration that the first defendant was not the adopted son and he has no rights. They also sought a prohibitory injunction. The suit stood dismissed by trial court. Let us take the converse position. Assuming that the suit was decreed by the trial court and appeal was carried by the defendants, and pending the appeal by the defendants, if the late brother of the appellant had died and if the defendants had not impleaded the legal representatives of late brother and the appeal abated as against him, would it then not open to the appellant as respondent in the appeal to contend

that if the appeal was to be allowed to proceed in the absence of the legal representatives of his late brother and succeed, there would be an inconsistent decree. On the one hand, there will be a decree by the trial Court declaring that the first defendant was not the adopted son and had no interest in the property qua the late brother of the appellant. On the other hand, the appellate court could be invited to pass a decree which should be to the effect that the first defendant was found to be the adopted son and had right and interest over the property and a declaration to that effect would have to be granted. Would not the appellate court then have to necessarily hold though the decree in favour of the deceased brother of the appellant has become final, and under it, a declaration is granted that the defendant No.1 is not the adopted son and he has no right to claim the property and there is an

injunction against him that he is the adopted son opposed to the decree which has been passed by the trial court which has attained finality. We would think that the appellate court would indeed have to refuse to proceed with the appeal on the basis that allowing the appeal by the defendants would lead to an appellate decree which is inconsistent with the decree which has become final as against the deceased brother of the appellant.

19. We would think that the situation cannot be any other different, when we contemplate the converse of the aforesaid scenario which happens to be the factual matrix obtaining in this case. The right which was set up by the appellant alongwith his late brother was joint. They were members of the joint Hindu family consisting of their late father and which consisted of late Govindareddi,

their father Shriram Reddy and Basavareddi, who was none other than the husband of the second defendant. This is not a case where their claims were distinct claims. This is not the situation which was present in the case dealt with by the Constitution Bench under the land acquisition case. Therein, several persons came together and sought relief in one proceeding. We would think that this is not the position in this case.

20. It may be true that if a separate suit had been filed by the late brother and it had abated on his death, there will be no decree on merits and the suit would have abated. No doubt, it could be argued that even though the appellant and his late brother set up the case of joint right, it would only mean that they are co-owners of the property, and therefore, they had independent rights as co-owners

which could be canvassed in two different proceedings, and therefore, the decree of the trial court dismissing the suit be treated as two different decrees - one decree against the appellant and the other against his late brother. Even then, the decree, which the High court would be invited to pass, would be contradictory and inconsistent with the decree as against late brother of the appellant which may not be permissible in law.

21. The decree, which the appellant, if successful in the appeal, would obtain, would be absolutely contrary to the decree which has also attained finality between his late brother and the defendants. They are mutually irreconcilable, totally inconsistent. Laying one side by side, the only impression would be that one is in the teeth

of the other. In one, the suit is dismissed whereas in the other, the suit would have been decreed.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4103 OF 2008

HEMAREDDI  Vs  RAMACHANDRA YALLAPPA HOSMANI

K.M. JOSEPH, J.

Dated:May 07, 2019.

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Whether case against Hindu undivided family will abate on death of its Karta?

The matter can be looked at from another point of view also. Rule 10, Order 30. Civil P.C. provides that a Hindu undivided family carrying on business under any name, may be sued in such name or style as if it were a firm name, and, in so far as the nature of such case permits, all rules under Order 30 shall apply accordingly. Rule 4 of Order 30. Civil P.C. provides that notwithstanding anything contained in Section 45 of the Contract Act, 1872, where two or more persons may sue or be sued in the name of a firm under the foregoing provisions and any of such person dies, whether before the institution or during the pendency of any suit, it shall not be necessary to joint the legal representatives of the deceased as a party to the suit. It is not disputed that Messrs. Rai Bahadur Kishore Chand and Sons was a Joint Hindu family concern and had been sued through its Karta, Rai Bahadur Kishore Chand. In view of the said provision of Rule 4. on the death of the Karta, it was not necessary to bring on record his legal representatives because the joint Hindu family concern continues to be a party in spite of the death of the Karta. So the question of the abatement of the appeal did not arise and the name of the new Karta could be impleaded as a party any time. It is therefore, not possible to sustain the view of the learned single Judge that the appeal had abated on the death of Rai Bahadur Kishore Chand, the Karta of the joint Hindu family concern and the impugned judgment is accordingly reversed.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

Decided On: 21.03.1983

 Shila Wanti  Vs. R.B. Kishore Chand and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.S. Sandhawalia, C.J. and Satya Parkash Goyal, J.

Citation: AIR 1984 P& H 35

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Whether court should dismiss appeal in entirety if there is death of some of defendants?

 Order 22 Rule 4, CPC lays down that where within the time
limited by law, no application is made to implead the legal
representatives of a deceased defendant, the suit shall abate as
against a deceased defendant. This rule does not provide that by
the omission to implead the legal representative of a defendant,
the suit will abate as a whole. If the interests of the codefendants
are separate, as in the case of coowners,
the suit will
abate only as regards the particular interest of the deceased
party. In such a situation, the question of the abatement of the
appeal in its entirety that has arisen in this case depends upon
general principles. If the case is of such a nature that the
absence of the legal representatives of the deceased respondent
prevents the court from hearing the appeal as against the other
respondents, then the appeal abates in toto. Otherwise, the
abatement takes place only in respect of the interest of the
respondent who has died. The test often adopted in such cases
is whether in the event of the appeal being allowed as against the
remaining respondents there would or would not be two
contradictory decrees in the same suit with respect to the same

subject matter. The court cannot be called upon to make two
inconsistent decrees about the same property, and in order to
avoid conflicting decrees the court has no alternative but to
dismiss the appeal as a whole. If on the other hand, the success
of the appeal would not lead to conflicting decrees, then there is
no valid reason why the court should not hear the appeal and
adjudicate upon the dispute between the parties. In the matter
on hand, the absence of certain defendants who have been
deleted from the array of parties along with the absence of legal
representatives of a number of deceased defendants will prevent
the court from hearing the appeals as against the other
defendants. We say so because in the event of these appeals
being allowed as against the remaining defendants, there would
be two contradictory decrees in the same suit in respect of the
same subject matter. One decree would be in favour of the
defendants who are deleted or dead and whose legal
representatives have not been brought on record; while the other
decree would be against the defendants who are still on record in
respect of the same subject matter. The subject matter in the
suit is the validity of the two Wills. The Courts including the
Division Bench of the High Court have consistently held that the

two Wills are proved, and thus Veeraswamy being the beneficiary
under the two Wills had become the absolute owner of the suit
properties in question. Such decree has attained finality in favour
of the defendants who are either deleted or dead and whose legal
representatives have not been brought on record. In case these
appeals are allowed in respect of the other defendants, the decree
to be passed by this Court in these appeals would definitely
conflict with the decree already passed in favour of the other
defendants. As mentioned supra, the Court cannot be called
upon to make two inconsistent decrees about the same subject
matter. In order to avoid conflicting decrees, the Court has no
alternative but to dismiss the appeals in their entirety (see the
judgment of this Court in the case of Shahazada Bi vs. Halimabi,
(2004) 7 SCC 354).

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 43804382
OF 2016

SUNKARA LAKSHMINARASAMMA  Vs SAGI SUBBA RAJU & OTHERS ETC
MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.
Dated:NOVEMBER 28, 2018.

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Whether letters written by deceased related to her death are admissible as her dying declaration?

Thus, from a review of the authorities mentioned above and the clear language of Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, the following propositions emerge:

(1) Section 32 is an exception to the rule of hearsay and makes admissible the statement of a person who dies, whether the death is a homicide or a suicide, provided the statement relates to the cause of death, or exhibits circumstances leading to the death. In this respect, as indicated above, the Indian Evidence Act, in view of the peculiar, conditions of our society and the I'lvccip nature and character of owe people, has thought it necessary to widen the sphere of Section 32 to avoid injustice.

(2) The test of proximity cannot be too literally construed and practically reduced to a cut-and-dried formula of universal application so as to be confined in a strait-jacket. Distance of time would depend on vary with the circumstances of each case. For instance, where death is a logical culmination of a continuous drama long in process and is, as it were, a finale of the story, the statement regarding each step directly connected with the end of the drama would be admissible because the entire statement would have to be read as an organic whole and not torn from the context Sometimes statements relevant to or furnishing an immediate motive may also be admissible as being a part of the transaction of death, It is manifest that all these statements come to light only after the death of the deceased who speaks from death. For instance, where the death takes place within a very short time of the marriage or the distance of time is not spread over snore, than 3-4 months the statement may be admissible under Section 32.

(3) The second part of Clause (1) of Section 32 is yet another exception to the rule that in criminal law the evidence of a person who was not being subjected to or given an opportunity of being cross-examined by the accused, would be valueless because the place of cross-examination is taken by the solemnity and sanctity of oath for the simple reason that a person on the verge of death is not likely to make a false statement unless there is strong evidence to show that the statement was secured either by prompting or tutoring.

(4) It may be important to note that Section 32 does not speak of homicide alone but includes suicide also, hence all the circumstances which may be relevant to prove a case of homicide would be equally relevant to prove a case of suicide.

(5) Where the main evidence consists of statements and letters written by the deceased which are directly connected with or related to her death and which reveal a tell-tale story, the said statement would clearly fall within the four comers of Section 32 and, therefore, admissible. The distance of time alone in such cases would not make the statement irrelevant.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 745 of 1983

Decided On: 17.07.1984

 Sharad Birdhichand Sarda Vs.  State of Maharashtra

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Whether execution proceeding will abate if there is death of decree holder or judgment debtor?

If during, the pendency of a regular execution proceeding filed on the basis of a decree or order of a Civil Court, the decree holder or the judgment debtor dies and his legal representatives are not brought on record within ninety days, can the Civil Court dismiss the execution petition as abated?

12. Order 22 Rule 12 of the CPC reads as follows:

"Order 22 Rule 12: Application of order to execution proceedings'. Nothing in Rules 3, 4 and 8 shall apply to proceedings in execution of a decree or order."

13. In other words the normal principle arising in a suit - before the decree is passed - that the legal representatives are to be brought on record within a particular period and if not, the suit could abate, - is not applicable to cases of death of the decree holder or the judgment debtor in execution proceedings.

14. In Venkatachalam v. Ramaswami, ILR (1932) Mad. 352 : AIR (1932) Mad. 73, a Full Bench of the Madras High Court has held that this rule enacts that the penalty of abatement shall not attach to execution proceedings. Mulla's Commentary on CPC (Vol.3) p. 2085 (15th Ed., 1997) refers to a large number of judgments of the High Courts and says:

"Rule 12 engrafts an exemption which provides that where a party to an execution proceedings dies during its pendency, provisions as to abatement do not apply. The rule is, therefore, for the benefit of the decree holder, for his heirs need not take steps for substitution under Rule 2 but may apply immediately or at any time while the proceeding is pending, to carry on the proceeding or they may file a fresh execution application."

15. In our opinion, the above statement of law in Mulla's Commentary on the CPC, correctly represents the legal position relating to the procedure to be adopted by the parties in execution proceedings and as to the powers of the Civil Court.

16. It is clear, therefore, that if after the filing of an execution petition in time, the decree holder dies and his legal representatives do not come on record - or the judgment debtor dies and his legal representatives are not brought on record, then there is no abatement of the execution petition. If there is no abatement, the position in the eye of law is that the execution petition remains pending on the file of the execution Court. If it remains pending and if no time limit is prescribed to bring the legal representatives on record in execution proceedings, it is open in case of death of the decree holder, for his legal representative to come on record at any time. The execution application cannot even be dismissed for default behind the back of the decree holder's legal representatives. In case of death of the judgment debtor, the decree holder could file an application to bring the legal representatives of the judgment debtor on record, at any time. Of course, in case of death of judgment-debtor, the Court can fix a reasonable time for the said purpose and if the decree holder does not file an application for the aforesaid purpose, the Court can dismiss the execution petition for default. But in any event the execution petition cannot be dismissed as abated. Alternatively, it is also open to the decree holder's legal representatives, to file a fresh execution petition in case of death of the decree holder; OR, in case of death of the judgment debtor, the decree holder can file a fresh execution petition impleading the legal representatives of the judgment debtor; such a fresh execution petition, if filed, is, in law, only a continuation of the pending execution petition - the one which was filed in time by the decree holder initially. This is the position under the CPC.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

S.L.P. (C) No..../1998 (CC 1802)

Decided On: 18.02.1998

 V. Uthirapathi Vs. Ashrab Ali and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Saiyed Saghir Ahmad and M. Jagannadha Rao, JJ.

Citation: AIR 1998 SC 1168

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Whether partnership firm can be continued after death of one of partner?

 Section 37 of the Act provides that if any member of a firm dies and the surviving partners carry on the business without any final settlement of accounts, the estate of the deceased partner is entitled to such share of the profits made as may be attributable to his share of the property or to interest @ 6% per annum on the amount of his share in the property of the firm. In our considered opinion, it will have no application in the facts of the case in view of Clause 14 of the partnership deed, which also provides for the manner of calculating the dues. Similarly, Section 42(c) of the Act, providing for dissolution of the firm on the death of a partner, will also have no application in view of the aforesaid Clause evincing a clear intention to continue the partnership on the death of a partner.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 2597 of 2016

Decided On: 04.10.2017

Kodendera K. Uthaiah (D) by LR. Vs. P.M. Medappa and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Ranjan Gogoi and Navin Sinha, JJ.

Citation: (2017) 16 SCC 331

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Whether legal heirs of complainant can prosecute complaint after death of original complainant?

The question as to whether the heirs of the complainant can be allowed to file an application Under Section 302 of the Code to continue the prosecution is no longer res integra as the same has been concluded by a decision of this Court in the case of Ashwin Nanubhai Vyas v. State of Maharashtra in which case the Court was dealing with a case Under Section 495 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, which is corresponding to Section 302 of the Code. In that case, it was laid down that upon the death of the complainant, under the provisions of Section 495 of the said Code, mother of the complainant could be allowed to continue the prosecution. It was further laid down that she could make the application either herself or through a pleader. Undisputedly, in the present case, the heirs themselves have not filed the applications to continue the prosecution, rather the same have been filed by their power-of-attorney holders....

15. In view of what has been discussed above, we are of the view that High Court did not commit any error in allowing the legal heirs of the complainant to prosecute the Criminal Misc. Petition before the High Court.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1860 of 2017 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 4580 of 2017)

Decided On: 03.11.2017

Chand Devi Daga and Ors. Vs. Manju K. Humatani and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.K. Sikri and Ashok Bhushan, JJ.

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Whether date of knowledge of death of party is relevant for deciding delay condonation application?

We are of the view that the order passed by the learned Single Judge is unsustainable in law. The delay in taking out the application has to be computed from the date of knowledge of the death of a party. It is the case of the appellants that they had no knowledge and as soon as they acquired knowledge, they took out application for bringing legal heirs on record. This aspect as regards knowledge is not seriously disputed by the respondent. Secondly, it is now well settled that the provisions of Order 22, Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code are not penal in nature. It is a rule of procedure and substantial rights of the parties cannot be defeated by pedantic approach by observing strict adherence to the procedural aspect of law. In the aforesaid circumstances, we are of the view that the learned Single Judge was in error in refusing to use discretion vested in him for condoning delay in taking out application for bringing legal heirs on record. Even if proceeding abates, the Court has ample powers to set aside the abatement, and condone the delay to bring legal heirs on record.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

L.P.A. No. 81 of 1993 in W.P. No. 2571 of 1991

Decided On: 28.10.2004

 Keshao s/o Kawadu Maral and Anr. Vs.State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

V.C. Daga and S.U. Kamdar, JJ.

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