The Fast Track to Justice: Understanding Judgment on Admissions Sheikh Abedin vs. Iqbal Ahmed (Order 12 Rule 6 of CPC)

 In the landscape of civil litigation, cases often feel like marathons, winding through years of witness testimony and procedural delays. However, the legal system possesses a powerful "fast-forward" button designed to deliver justice the moment the truth comes to light. This guide explores a critical tool used by the judiciary to end disputes swiftly: Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC).

1. The Tale of Two Claimants: Sheikh Abedin vs. Iqbal Ahmed

Our story begins in Jogabai Extension, Delhi, in a dispute that eventually reached the Supreme Court in 2026. Iqbal Ahmed, the plaintiff, approached the court claiming to be the rightful owner of a property. He possessed a registered title deed—the gold standard of ownership. He alleged that the man in physical occupation, Sheikh Abedin, was merely a "caretaker" who refused to vacate.

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Whether family court can pass divorce decree on admission without trial if both parties have not withdrawn allegations against each other?

 A perusal of decree passed by the Family Court clearly indicates that though the Family Court has taken cognizance of Section 151 of CPC which provides for inherent jurisdiction of the Court, when there is no specific provision for passing such an order, the Family Court has passed the decree of divorce contrary to Section 151 of CPC by assuming that the Appellant and the Respondent are intending to separate as marriage has been dissolved in their mind and heart. None of the parties have led any evidence. Allegations and counter allegations are made against each other. The learned Family Court could not have done guess work and could not have come to the conclusion that the marriage was dissolved in their mind and heart while passing the decree of divorce. It is a common ground when parties agree for divorce and do not make any allegations against each other or withdraw allegations made against each other, the parties could have filed a Petition for mutual divorce. No such Petition for mutual divorce was filed. {Para 19}

20. In view of the fact that, there is a specific provision for passing decree under Order 12 Rule 6 of CPC on satisfaction of conditions provided under the said provision, the Family Court could not have invoked Section 151 of CPC. The impugned order shows non application of mind on the part of the Family Court while passing decree of divorce by doing a guess work and without there being any evidence on record. As per Order 12 Rule 6 of CPC, the party who is alleged to have made an admission is entitled to be granted an opportunity to explain the so called admission made in the affidavit at the stage of trial. Such allegations made by the parties against each other could not have been brushed aside in such a summary manner as it is done by the Family Court.

21. We have perused the Application filed by the Respondent for passing decree on admission without admitting the allegations of cruelty made on part of the Appellant in the affidavit-in-reply, and also based on its own admission in the Application, praying for passing of decree of divorce on admission and submitting to the decree in terms of prayer clause (a) of the Petition. There is no admission on the part of the Appellant for decree of divorce. The decree of divorce on admission could have been passed if both parties would have agreed before the Family Court. The situation would have been different in such case.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Family Court Appeal No. 24 of 2022 and Interim Application No. 1854 of 2022 in Family Court Appeal No. 24 of 2022

Decided On: 24.03.2023

Mansi Bhavin Dharani Vs. Bhavin Jagdish Dharani

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.D. Dhanuka and Gauri Godse, JJ.

Citation:  MANU/MH/1269/2023.

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Can the court pass a decree on admission under O12 R 6 of CPC if there is no clear and categorical admission?

Be that as it may, the arguments advanced by both the sides, in our view can be appreciated by the Trial Court by affording opportunity to them to lead evidence. As per the pleadings, there may be admission to the extent of execution of the Lease Agreement, rate of rent and monthly payment but simultaneously the defense taken by the Defendant is also based on ATSI, II and III. In view of the contents of those agreements and terms specified therein, the defense as taken by the Appellant/Defendant is plausible or not is a matter of trial which may be appreciated by the Court after granting opportunity to lead evidence by the respective parties. There may be admission with respect to tenancy as per lease agreements but the defense as taken is also required to be looked into by the Court and there is need to decide justiciability of defense by the fullfledged trial. In our view, for the purpose of Order XII Rule 6, the said admission is not clear and categorical, so as to exercise a discretion by the Court without dealing with the defense as taken by Defendant. Consequently, the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court, as confirmed by the High Court, only on admission of fact without considering the defense in exercise of power under Order XII Rule 6 of CPC is hereby set aside. {Para 22}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4545 OF 2022

 Karan Kapoor Vs Madhuri Kumar

Coram: INDIRA BANERJEE; J., J.K. MAHESHWARI, J. 

Dated: July 06, 2022 

Coram: J.K. Maheshwari, J.

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Whether court should pass judgment on admission if defence of defendant is moonshine?

 The Division Bench of this court in P.P.A. Impex Pvt. Ltd. (supra) after reference to T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal (1977) 4 SCC 467 observed as below:

“9. It appears to us that the approach to be taken under Order XII Rule 6 is akin to what has been enunciated by the Supreme Court in Mechalac Engineers & Manufacturers v. Basic Equipment Corporation, (1976) 4 SCC 687, in the context of Order 37 of the CPC with regard to granting leave to defend a summary suit. This is that if a defence amounting to moonshine has been presented, it should be summarily dismissed by not granting leave to defend and by decreeing the suit forthwith. The Courts are already groaning under the weight of bludgeoning and exponentially increasing litigation. The weight will unvaryingly increase if moonshine defences are needlessly permitted to go to trial.

(emphasis added) {Para 24}

25. It further went on to hold that if pleadings that were vague and were in the nature of total moonshine were taken note of, the provision of Order XII Rule 6 would be virtually annihilated.

26. Thus, while disposing of an application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC, the court is fully justified in considering the averments in the written statement to see whether essential facts have been pleaded or whether the defence is a complete moonshine, requiring the Court to not send the case for trial.

 In the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

(Before Asha Menon, J.)

Monika Tyagi and Others  Vs Subhash Tyagi and Others 

CS(OS) 230/2020 and I.As. 7755/2020 

Decided on December 17, 2021

Citation: 2021 SCC OnLine Del 5400

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Whether court can give Judgment on admission if the tenant has taken the plea that he had provided financial help to the landlord?

An application was filed by the respondent under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC seeking decree of possession as well as arrears of rent on admission. By judgment and decree dated 04.04.2019, this application under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC was allowed by the trial court. Trial court categorically held that the alleged loan was granted prior to the execution of the lease agreement and there was no mention of any loan or financial assistance in the lease deed and once the agreement was reduced into writing, petitioner (defendant before the Trial Court) could not be permitted to lead any oral evidence to alter the terms of any agreement.{Para 6}

7. It was further held that in case any right was created in favour of the petitioner in respect of immoveable property, he should have sought specific performance of such agreement and no specific performance had been sought, only a simplicitor suit for recovery of money was filed. Trial court held that this went on to show that petitioner had no independent right in the tenanted premises except as a tenant holding over.

8. In view of the admissions made by the petitioner, the trial court decreed the suit for possession under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC.

18. Further perusal of the written statement shows that petitioner has not specifically claimed any set-off against the respondent’s demand for arrears of rent. Though contention of the petitioner is that an independent Suit had already been filed, the finding of the trial court as contained in judgment and decree dated 04.04.2019 that petitioner does not have any independent right in the property except as a tenant holding over, has become final and conclusive since the appeal filed by the petitioner was withdrawn and the said finding would operate as resjudicata in so far as petitioner is concerned.

19. Petitioner has admitted the rent agreement, which was executed after the alleged loan. There is no reference of any loan or provision of rent free accommodation in the said agreement. Petitioner has admitted that the letting was at the rate of Rs. 10,000/- per month. He has also not denied that the rent has not been paid. Trial Court has merely gone on the basis of the admissions. Even before this court nothing has been shown to the contrary.

20. In view of the above, I find no merit in the contention of the petitioner or any infirmity in the order dated 17.07.2019 as also order dated 13.02.2020 rejecting the review application filed by the petitioner.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

  CM(M) 429/2020& CM APPLN. 20823/2020

DARSHAN ARORA Vs  VIJAY KUMAR 

CORAM:- HON’BLE MR JUSTICESANJEEV SACHDEVA

Judgment delivered on: 17th November, 2020

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Whether the court must frame an issue and record evidence if the defendant takes plea of Benami joint owner of the property?

Reliance was also placed on behalf of the respondents on the verdict of this Court in Bhavna Khanna Vs. Subir Tara Singh decided on 01.02.2019 in CS (OS) No. 356/2016 with observations in para 23 thereof wherein it was observed to the effect:

"Be that as it may, the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 which came into force on 5th September, 1988 i.e. much prior to the sale deed dated 16th December 2003, defined a benami transaction as a transaction in which property is transferred to one person for a consideration paid or provided by another persons. Section 3 thereof barred all persons from entering into benami transaction. Section 4 of the Act barred any defence in any suit, claim or action based on any right in respect of any property held benami, whether against the person in whose name the property is held or against any other person. The claim of the defendant that out of total sale consideration of Rs. 55 Lacs, Rs. 39.5 was contributed by him but the sale deed of the property obtained in the exclusive name of his wife Dr. Rachana Khanna falls within the definition of benami transaction and which transaction was barred on the date of sale deed and the defendant is also barred from defending this suit on the plea of being the benami joint owner of the property. The said Act was, vide amendment of the year 2016, renamed as Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act,1988 and through there has been an overhaul of all the provisions of the earlier statute but the effect remains the same. Section 4 bars a defence in respect of any property held benami. The defence of the defendant in the present suit is thus barred by the said law and once the defence is barred, again permitted evidence to be led would be only at the cost of the valuable time of this Court and the Court ultimately after recording of evidence also will be bound to decide in accordance with law. It is for this reason that I say that the defence of the defendant of joint ownership does not raise any material proposition of fact or law for an issue to have been framed thereon."

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

RSA No. 23/2019 and CM No. 4782/2019

Decided On: 21.07.2020

JAGRITI@GAYATRI Vs VIKAS SHARMA

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Anu Malhotra, J.

Citation: MANU/DE/1402/2020

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Whether the court can pass judgment on admission based on admissions made in documents of the defendant?

It is now well-established that admissions are not restricted to pleadings. More often than not, contents of the plaint are denied in order to delay proceedings and procrastinate the incidence of liability. Admissions can, therefore, be justly and soundly drawn even from attending circumstances, such as pleadings in other suits or proceedings, or documents exchanged between the parties. Infact, in my opinion, documents constitute the best source of admissions of facts. In the present case, admittedly a license deed was executed by the parties, and the Court need not travel any further. It is bound to treat the contents of such a document as admissions between the parties, and give effect to its contents at the very earliest. Failure to do so would tantamount to encouraging dishonest pleadings. All the averments put forward by the plaintiff are predicated and are sustainable merely from a reading of this deed itself."

12. Indubitably, Order XII Rule 6 CPC confers a wide discretion upon the Court to decree any suit to the extent of admissions made. Such admissions may be made in the pleadings "or otherwise". The discretion is to be exercised judicially; however, the power encompasses not only pleadings but other materials such as documents, correspondence and the like.

Delhi High Court

Gajender Kumar Loond vs Samant Barara on 9 February, 2012

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Whether the court can give judgment on admission based on admittance made in anticipatory bail application?

After filing written statement in the suit, Respondent Nos. 1 and 2/plaintiffs have filed I.A. No. 1557 of 2007 Under Order XII Rule 6 of Code of Civil Procedure, praying for judgment based on certain claimed admissions. A copy of the application filed in I.A. No. 1557 of 2007 is placed on record. The aforesaid application is filed mainly claiming that the Appellants in bail application Nos. 4109-4110 of 2006 seeking anticipatory bail in connection with the crime registered on complaint filed by impleaded 4th Respondent, have categorically admitted their readiness and willingness to execute a sale deed in their favour, in terms of the agreement dated 3.5.2005. The bail applications referred above were filed in connection with the crime registered in FIR No. 517 of 2006 on the file of Police Station Sarita Vihar, which was registered on the complaint filed by Sri Praveen Kumar Jolly (First Buyer) registered for offences Under Sections 420 and 120B Indian Penal Code.

In this case it is to be noted that the suit was filed on 1.11.2006 and written statement was filed on 25.01.2007 and the application Under Order XII Rule 6 was filed on 9.2.2007. In year 2010 issues and additional issues were framed and trial is also commenced. In that view of the matter, there is no reason to pass the impugned order now for decreeing the suit on claimed admissions, in exercise of power Under Order XII Rule 6 of Code of Civil Procedure at this stage. In view of the serious factual disputes and the defence of the Appellants in the suit, it is not permissible for making roving inquiry for disposal of the application filed Under Order XII Rule 6 of Code of Civil Procedure. When the trial is already commenced, it is desirable to record findings on various contentious issues and disputes in the suit on merits by appreciating evidence but at the same time there is no reason or justification to decree the suit at this stage. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the view that the impugned judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside on this ground alone.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

C.A. No. 4265 of 2019

Decided On: 24.04.2019

 Hari Steel and General Industries Ltd. Vs.   Daljit Singh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R. Banumathi and R. Subhash Reddy, JJ.

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Whether decree for specific performance of contract on admission can be granted in absence of specific pleading?

 I do not see how it is open to the Plaintiff to now get indirectly that which it completely failed to get by a frontal application squarely placing a case for amendment to include a prayer for specific performance. In any case, I do not see how any decree for specific performance can be passed on some sort of implicit or implied averment. The law in that regard is clear. A claim for specific performance is a distinct cause of action and it requires to be pleaded and proved in a specific manner. It cannot be assumed to exist as a cause of action buried somewhere in the pleadings, or arrived at by a process of necessary implication.

The Defendant, MTDC, does not agree that the Plaintiff is entitled to specific performance. It says in terms that the Plaintiff is not entitled to specific performance. It has always said so. What the Plaintiff is doing is to substitute pleading and proof of its own readiness and willingness by relying on the Defendant's assertion that the Defendant was always ready and willing. This is what is lost in translation. What MTDC is really saying is no admission at all. It is saying that although MTDC was always ready and willing to perform its obligations, the Plaintiff was not, and hence the termination. This is the averment in full. The law is settled, too, that an pleading (and an admission) must be read in full. There can be no admission of a case not pleaded. On any reading of the Written Statement as a whole, it cannot be said that the Defendant's case is that the Plaintiff is now entitled to the relief of specific performance. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Notice of Motion No. 270 of 2016 in Suit No. 3762 of 2002

Decided On: 12.02.2019

 K. Raheja Corp. Pvt. Ltd. Vs.  Maharashtra Tourism Development Corporation Ltd.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

G.S. Patel, J.

Citation: 2019(5) MHLJ 206

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Whether court can pass judgment on admission on the basis of email and reply exchanged between parties?

In Uttam Singh Dugal & Co. Ltd. v. Union Bank of India MANU/SC/0485/2000 : (2000) 7 SCC 120, the Supreme Court observed that the object of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC is to enable the party to obtain a speedy judgment at least to the extent of the relief to which, according to the admission of the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled. The contention urged before the Supreme Court was that the resolutions or minutes of the meetings of the Board of Directors could not amount to a pleading or come within the scope of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC as such statements were not made in the course of the pleadings or otherwise. However, the Supreme Court observed that when a statement is made to a party and such statement is brought before the Court showing admission of liability, by way of an application filed under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC and the other side has sufficient opportunity to explain the said admission and if such explanation is not accepted by the Court, the trial Court would not be helpless. The Supreme Court further observed that when the trial Court found that the statement made in the proceedings of the Board of Directors meetings and the letter sent as well as the pleadings, when read together, led to an unambiguous and clear admission and only the extent to which the admission was made, being in dispute, the trial Court would have a duty to decide the same and grant a decree. The Supreme Court categorically held that this approach would be unexceptionable.

9. This being the legal position, it is manifest that the opinion of the trial Court that an admission for the purposes of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC necessarily has to be made only in the pleadings cannot be countenanced. Even correspondence can be looked into for the purpose of determining as to whether the requirements of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC are satisfied. The petitioner-plaintiff relies upon not only the e-mails exchanged between the parties but also the reply dated 09.12.2015 of the respondent-defendant through its Advocate, in response to the legal notice dated 10.11.2015 issued by the petitioner-plaintiff. Unfortunately, the trial Court lightly brushed aside this document while coming to the conclusion that no admission had been made in terms of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC. The trial Court seems to have gone mostly by the fact that the e-mails did not mention any 'due amounts' and therefore, there was no admission, though the reply notice dated 09.12.2015 stood on a different footing. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Charanjit Lal Mehra (supra), an admission in terms of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC can also be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case. Therefore, the trial Court necessarily had to consider not only the e-mails but also the reply notice dated 09.12.2015, together and in their entirety, before concluding as to whether any admission had been made by the respondent-defendant, warranting exercise of power by the trial Court by taking recourse to Order 12 Rule 6 CPC. As the trial Court failed to undertake this exercise and proceeded on the wrong assumption that for the purposes of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC, an admission necessarily had to be made in writing and only in the course of the pleadings, we are left with no alternative but to set aside the order under revision and remit the matter to the trial Court for consideration afresh of the subject I.A. on its merits and in accordance with law.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT HYDERABAD 

C.R.P. No. 3877 of 2018

Decided On: 20.12.2018

 Blue Cube Germany Assets GmbH and Co. KG Vs. Vivimed Labs Limited

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

P.V. Sanjay Kumar and M. Ganga Rao, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2019(NOC) 557 Hyd

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When court should not pass decree on admission?

The words in Order XII Rule 6 CPC “may” and
“make such order…” show that the power under Order XII
Rule 6 CPC is discretionary and cannot be claimed as a
matter of right. Judgment on admission is not a matter of
right and rather is a matter of discretion of the Court. Where
the defendants have raised objections which go to the root of
the case, it would not be appropriate to exercise the
discretion under Order XII Rule 6 CPC. The said rule is an
enabling provision which confers discretion on the Court in
delivering a quick judgment on admission and to the extent
of the claim admitted by one of the parties of his opponent’s
claim. In the suit for eviction filed by the
respondent-landlord, appellant-tenant has admitted the
relationship of tenancy and the period of lease agreement;
but resisted respondent-plaintiff’s claim by setting up a
defence plea of agreement to sale and that he paid an
advance of Rs.82.50 lakhs, which of course is stoutly denied
by the respondent-landlord. The appellant-defendant also
filed the Suit for Specific Performance, which of course is
contested by the respondent-landlord. When such issues

arising between the parties ought to be decided, mere
admission of relationship of landlord and tenant cannot be
said to be an unequivocal admission to decree the suit under
Order XII Rule 6 CPC.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 6106-6108 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 4987-4989 of 2015)

S.M. ASIF  Vs VIRENDER KUMAR BAJAJ

 R. BANUMATHI, J.
Citation; 2016(2) MHLJ511

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