The Fast Track to Justice: Understanding Judgment on Admissions Sheikh Abedin vs. Iqbal Ahmed (Order 12 Rule 6 of CPC)

 In the landscape of civil litigation, cases often feel like marathons, winding through years of witness testimony and procedural delays. However, the legal system possesses a powerful "fast-forward" button designed to deliver justice the moment the truth comes to light. This guide explores a critical tool used by the judiciary to end disputes swiftly: Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC).

1. The Tale of Two Claimants: Sheikh Abedin vs. Iqbal Ahmed

Our story begins in Jogabai Extension, Delhi, in a dispute that eventually reached the Supreme Court in 2026. Iqbal Ahmed, the plaintiff, approached the court claiming to be the rightful owner of a property. He possessed a registered title deed—the gold standard of ownership. He alleged that the man in physical occupation, Sheikh Abedin, was merely a "caretaker" who refused to vacate.

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Whether family court can pass divorce decree on admission without trial if both parties have not withdrawn allegations against each other?

 A perusal of decree passed by the Family Court clearly indicates that though the Family Court has taken cognizance of Section 151 of CPC which provides for inherent jurisdiction of the Court, when there is no specific provision for passing such an order, the Family Court has passed the decree of divorce contrary to Section 151 of CPC by assuming that the Appellant and the Respondent are intending to separate as marriage has been dissolved in their mind and heart. None of the parties have led any evidence. Allegations and counter allegations are made against each other. The learned Family Court could not have done guess work and could not have come to the conclusion that the marriage was dissolved in their mind and heart while passing the decree of divorce. It is a common ground when parties agree for divorce and do not make any allegations against each other or withdraw allegations made against each other, the parties could have filed a Petition for mutual divorce. No such Petition for mutual divorce was filed. {Para 19}

20. In view of the fact that, there is a specific provision for passing decree under Order 12 Rule 6 of CPC on satisfaction of conditions provided under the said provision, the Family Court could not have invoked Section 151 of CPC. The impugned order shows non application of mind on the part of the Family Court while passing decree of divorce by doing a guess work and without there being any evidence on record. As per Order 12 Rule 6 of CPC, the party who is alleged to have made an admission is entitled to be granted an opportunity to explain the so called admission made in the affidavit at the stage of trial. Such allegations made by the parties against each other could not have been brushed aside in such a summary manner as it is done by the Family Court.

21. We have perused the Application filed by the Respondent for passing decree on admission without admitting the allegations of cruelty made on part of the Appellant in the affidavit-in-reply, and also based on its own admission in the Application, praying for passing of decree of divorce on admission and submitting to the decree in terms of prayer clause (a) of the Petition. There is no admission on the part of the Appellant for decree of divorce. The decree of divorce on admission could have been passed if both parties would have agreed before the Family Court. The situation would have been different in such case.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Family Court Appeal No. 24 of 2022 and Interim Application No. 1854 of 2022 in Family Court Appeal No. 24 of 2022

Decided On: 24.03.2023

Mansi Bhavin Dharani Vs. Bhavin Jagdish Dharani

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.D. Dhanuka and Gauri Godse, JJ.

Citation:  MANU/MH/1269/2023.

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Can the person claiming to be the immovable property's owner take the defence of the title by adverse possession?

The mere fact that the defendants have come forward with a plea of adverse possession, means that they admit the plaintiff to be the true owner. For a plea of ownership on the basis of adverse possession, the first and the foremost condition is, that the property must belong to someone else other than the person pleading his title on the basis of adverse possession, In the instant case the defendants have put forward defences which are irreconcilable’ and mutually destructive and inconsistent with one another.”

18. It is pertinent to note that in the present case, the defendant no. 1 has claimed rights in the suit property on the basis of being an owner. Reference may also be made to paragraph 3 at page no. 7 of the written statement, which is set out below:

“The entire consideration amount as well as stamp duty was paid by Smt. Krishna Gupta, Sapan Gupta wife and son of defendant no. 1 and further confirmed that since the Sale Deed or transfer documents cannot be executed and registered for the time being and as and when, this would be permissible, he would transfer the same in favour of Shri. Vijay Gupta and has also stated that the possession has been handed over to Shri. Vijay Gupta as a owner who is fully authorized to use it in any manner whatsoever and there will be no right to Late Ashok Kumar or his legal heirs in future. It is submitted that the Transfer Deed is incapable of execution even today and defendant reserve his right to file appropriate legal proceedings for transfer as and when the same would be permissible.”

19. In light of the dicta in Rama Kanta Jain (supra), the plea of adverse possession in the present case would not be available to the defendant no. 1, as he has claimed himself to be the owner in possession of the suit property.

 In the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

(Before Amit Bansal, J.)

Anu Gupta Vs Vijay Gupta and Others 

CS(OS) 250/2020 and I.A. 11222/2021 (O-XXXIX R-2A of CPC)

Decided on August 8, 2022, 

Citation: 2022 SCC OnLine Del 2391

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Whether the court would pass judgment on admission if the defendant fails to plead the date on which his adverse possession commenced?

  With regard to what are the necessary pleadings in a case where title through adverse possession is claimed, either as a shield or as a sword, the Supreme Court in Karnataka Board of Wakf (supra) has held that a person who claims adverse possession should show : (a) on what date he had come into possession; (b) what was the nature of his possession; (c) whether the factum of the possession was known to the other party; (d) how long his possession has continued and (e) his possession was open and undisturbed. It is a well settled principle that a party claiming adverse possession must prove that his possession is “nec vi, nec clam, nec precario”, that is, peaceful, open and continuous. This possession which is adequate in continuity, in publicity, and in extent must be to show that the possession is adverse to the true owner. It must start with wrongful dispossession of the rightful owner and the actual physical and hostile continued possession over a statutory period.{Para 27}

28. No doubt the defendants have accepted the fact that this suit property had fallen in the share of late Sudhir Kumar Tyagi, the plaintiffs' predecessor-in-interest, on partition of the suit property and he had been its owner since then. However, one fact that stands out is that in 2004, the defendants admit that defendant No. 1 requested late Sudhir Kumar Tyagi to allow them to use the plot which was adjacent to their Sports Complex. In view of the fact that the parties were on good terms, as per the averments in the written statement, late Sudhir Kumar Tyagi had permitted the defendant No. 1 to use the plot. Thus, the possession has not been a result of wrongful dispossession of the rightful owner, when the defendant No. 1 came into the premises.

29. It is trite that long possession will not affect the title of the true owner. Nor would the lack of use of the property by the owner, for a long time, affect his title. It is only when the defendants start asserting hostile title that the clock will start ticking. Strangely, in the entire written statement, the defendants have not stated with any definiteness as to the dates since when they had started asserting their hostile title. That alone would disclose a valid defence to the suit by asserting title by adverse possession. The mere fact that the boundary walls had been built by the defendants cannot be termed as a hostile act against the true owner as the walls had been constructed to define the properties of the defendants after the family partition took place. Nor for that matter, would the construction activities at the site be inferred as an assertion of hostility by the defendant No. 1, as nowhere it is stated that he had done so without the permission of the true owner late Sudhir Kumar Tyagi and in fact claimed title during his life time.

30. In fact, there is no disclosure in this regard, except a bald assertion. But when the written statement is seen in totality, the fact that the parties were in a cordial relationship and the defendant No. 1 himself claims that the water and electricity meters continue to stand in the name of late Sudhir Kumar Tyagi and that he used to reimburse him when payments were made, would show that the defendant No. 1 did not assert independent and hostile title to late Sudhir Kumar Tyagi. It is in this background that a date had to be disclosed when assertion of hostile possession was first made, since limitation would then be counted from that date. An essential ingredient has thus not been pleaded.

31. The defendants had to specifically plead with sufficient clarity when the possession became adverse and the exact date when adverse possession commenced and whether this fact was let known to the real owner. Their only reliance is on construction activities but that fact alone does not establish hostile title, as the initial possession was permissive. It was deemed to have continued till the plaintiffs revoked that permission to the defendants to remain in the suit property. It is only when the required animus to hold the property in a manner hostile to the true owner that it would be possible to determine how many years have passed since such open and hostile possession continued. Without commencement, there cannot be continuation. In the present case, a fundamental plea to submit the claim of adverse possession is missing and the burden on the defendants has not been discharged.

 In the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

(Before Asha Menon, J.)

Monika Tyagi and Others  Vs Subhash Tyagi and Others 

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Whether court should pass judgment on admission if defence of defendant is moonshine?

 The Division Bench of this court in P.P.A. Impex Pvt. Ltd. (supra) after reference to T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal (1977) 4 SCC 467 observed as below:

“9. It appears to us that the approach to be taken under Order XII Rule 6 is akin to what has been enunciated by the Supreme Court in Mechalac Engineers & Manufacturers v. Basic Equipment Corporation, (1976) 4 SCC 687, in the context of Order 37 of the CPC with regard to granting leave to defend a summary suit. This is that if a defence amounting to moonshine has been presented, it should be summarily dismissed by not granting leave to defend and by decreeing the suit forthwith. The Courts are already groaning under the weight of bludgeoning and exponentially increasing litigation. The weight will unvaryingly increase if moonshine defences are needlessly permitted to go to trial.

(emphasis added) {Para 24}

25. It further went on to hold that if pleadings that were vague and were in the nature of total moonshine were taken note of, the provision of Order XII Rule 6 would be virtually annihilated.

26. Thus, while disposing of an application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC, the court is fully justified in considering the averments in the written statement to see whether essential facts have been pleaded or whether the defence is a complete moonshine, requiring the Court to not send the case for trial.

 In the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

(Before Asha Menon, J.)

Monika Tyagi and Others  Vs Subhash Tyagi and Others 

CS(OS) 230/2020 and I.As. 7755/2020 

Decided on December 17, 2021

Citation: 2021 SCC OnLine Del 5400

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Whether court can give Judgment on admission if the tenant has taken the plea that he had provided financial help to the landlord?

An application was filed by the respondent under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC seeking decree of possession as well as arrears of rent on admission. By judgment and decree dated 04.04.2019, this application under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC was allowed by the trial court. Trial court categorically held that the alleged loan was granted prior to the execution of the lease agreement and there was no mention of any loan or financial assistance in the lease deed and once the agreement was reduced into writing, petitioner (defendant before the Trial Court) could not be permitted to lead any oral evidence to alter the terms of any agreement.{Para 6}

7. It was further held that in case any right was created in favour of the petitioner in respect of immoveable property, he should have sought specific performance of such agreement and no specific performance had been sought, only a simplicitor suit for recovery of money was filed. Trial court held that this went on to show that petitioner had no independent right in the tenanted premises except as a tenant holding over.

8. In view of the admissions made by the petitioner, the trial court decreed the suit for possession under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC.

18. Further perusal of the written statement shows that petitioner has not specifically claimed any set-off against the respondent’s demand for arrears of rent. Though contention of the petitioner is that an independent Suit had already been filed, the finding of the trial court as contained in judgment and decree dated 04.04.2019 that petitioner does not have any independent right in the property except as a tenant holding over, has become final and conclusive since the appeal filed by the petitioner was withdrawn and the said finding would operate as resjudicata in so far as petitioner is concerned.

19. Petitioner has admitted the rent agreement, which was executed after the alleged loan. There is no reference of any loan or provision of rent free accommodation in the said agreement. Petitioner has admitted that the letting was at the rate of Rs. 10,000/- per month. He has also not denied that the rent has not been paid. Trial Court has merely gone on the basis of the admissions. Even before this court nothing has been shown to the contrary.

20. In view of the above, I find no merit in the contention of the petitioner or any infirmity in the order dated 17.07.2019 as also order dated 13.02.2020 rejecting the review application filed by the petitioner.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

  CM(M) 429/2020& CM APPLN. 20823/2020

DARSHAN ARORA Vs  VIJAY KUMAR 

CORAM:- HON’BLE MR JUSTICESANJEEV SACHDEVA

Judgment delivered on: 17th November, 2020

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Whether the court must frame an issue and record evidence if the defendant takes plea of Benami joint owner of the property?

Reliance was also placed on behalf of the respondents on the verdict of this Court in Bhavna Khanna Vs. Subir Tara Singh decided on 01.02.2019 in CS (OS) No. 356/2016 with observations in para 23 thereof wherein it was observed to the effect:

"Be that as it may, the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 which came into force on 5th September, 1988 i.e. much prior to the sale deed dated 16th December 2003, defined a benami transaction as a transaction in which property is transferred to one person for a consideration paid or provided by another persons. Section 3 thereof barred all persons from entering into benami transaction. Section 4 of the Act barred any defence in any suit, claim or action based on any right in respect of any property held benami, whether against the person in whose name the property is held or against any other person. The claim of the defendant that out of total sale consideration of Rs. 55 Lacs, Rs. 39.5 was contributed by him but the sale deed of the property obtained in the exclusive name of his wife Dr. Rachana Khanna falls within the definition of benami transaction and which transaction was barred on the date of sale deed and the defendant is also barred from defending this suit on the plea of being the benami joint owner of the property. The said Act was, vide amendment of the year 2016, renamed as Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act,1988 and through there has been an overhaul of all the provisions of the earlier statute but the effect remains the same. Section 4 bars a defence in respect of any property held benami. The defence of the defendant in the present suit is thus barred by the said law and once the defence is barred, again permitted evidence to be led would be only at the cost of the valuable time of this Court and the Court ultimately after recording of evidence also will be bound to decide in accordance with law. It is for this reason that I say that the defence of the defendant of joint ownership does not raise any material proposition of fact or law for an issue to have been framed thereon."

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

RSA No. 23/2019 and CM No. 4782/2019

Decided On: 21.07.2020

JAGRITI@GAYATRI Vs VIKAS SHARMA

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Anu Malhotra, J.

Citation: MANU/DE/1402/2020

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Whether the court can pass judgment on admission based on admissions made in documents of the defendant?

It is now well-established that admissions are not restricted to pleadings. More often than not, contents of the plaint are denied in order to delay proceedings and procrastinate the incidence of liability. Admissions can, therefore, be justly and soundly drawn even from attending circumstances, such as pleadings in other suits or proceedings, or documents exchanged between the parties. Infact, in my opinion, documents constitute the best source of admissions of facts. In the present case, admittedly a license deed was executed by the parties, and the Court need not travel any further. It is bound to treat the contents of such a document as admissions between the parties, and give effect to its contents at the very earliest. Failure to do so would tantamount to encouraging dishonest pleadings. All the averments put forward by the plaintiff are predicated and are sustainable merely from a reading of this deed itself."

12. Indubitably, Order XII Rule 6 CPC confers a wide discretion upon the Court to decree any suit to the extent of admissions made. Such admissions may be made in the pleadings "or otherwise". The discretion is to be exercised judicially; however, the power encompasses not only pleadings but other materials such as documents, correspondence and the like.

Delhi High Court

Gajender Kumar Loond vs Samant Barara on 9 February, 2012

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Whether the court can give judgment on admission based on admittance made in anticipatory bail application?

After filing written statement in the suit, Respondent Nos. 1 and 2/plaintiffs have filed I.A. No. 1557 of 2007 Under Order XII Rule 6 of Code of Civil Procedure, praying for judgment based on certain claimed admissions. A copy of the application filed in I.A. No. 1557 of 2007 is placed on record. The aforesaid application is filed mainly claiming that the Appellants in bail application Nos. 4109-4110 of 2006 seeking anticipatory bail in connection with the crime registered on complaint filed by impleaded 4th Respondent, have categorically admitted their readiness and willingness to execute a sale deed in their favour, in terms of the agreement dated 3.5.2005. The bail applications referred above were filed in connection with the crime registered in FIR No. 517 of 2006 on the file of Police Station Sarita Vihar, which was registered on the complaint filed by Sri Praveen Kumar Jolly (First Buyer) registered for offences Under Sections 420 and 120B Indian Penal Code.

In this case it is to be noted that the suit was filed on 1.11.2006 and written statement was filed on 25.01.2007 and the application Under Order XII Rule 6 was filed on 9.2.2007. In year 2010 issues and additional issues were framed and trial is also commenced. In that view of the matter, there is no reason to pass the impugned order now for decreeing the suit on claimed admissions, in exercise of power Under Order XII Rule 6 of Code of Civil Procedure at this stage. In view of the serious factual disputes and the defence of the Appellants in the suit, it is not permissible for making roving inquiry for disposal of the application filed Under Order XII Rule 6 of Code of Civil Procedure. When the trial is already commenced, it is desirable to record findings on various contentious issues and disputes in the suit on merits by appreciating evidence but at the same time there is no reason or justification to decree the suit at this stage. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the view that the impugned judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside on this ground alone.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

C.A. No. 4265 of 2019

Decided On: 24.04.2019

 Hari Steel and General Industries Ltd. Vs.   Daljit Singh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R. Banumathi and R. Subhash Reddy, JJ.

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Whether decree for specific performance of contract on admission can be granted in absence of specific pleading?

 I do not see how it is open to the Plaintiff to now get indirectly that which it completely failed to get by a frontal application squarely placing a case for amendment to include a prayer for specific performance. In any case, I do not see how any decree for specific performance can be passed on some sort of implicit or implied averment. The law in that regard is clear. A claim for specific performance is a distinct cause of action and it requires to be pleaded and proved in a specific manner. It cannot be assumed to exist as a cause of action buried somewhere in the pleadings, or arrived at by a process of necessary implication.

The Defendant, MTDC, does not agree that the Plaintiff is entitled to specific performance. It says in terms that the Plaintiff is not entitled to specific performance. It has always said so. What the Plaintiff is doing is to substitute pleading and proof of its own readiness and willingness by relying on the Defendant's assertion that the Defendant was always ready and willing. This is what is lost in translation. What MTDC is really saying is no admission at all. It is saying that although MTDC was always ready and willing to perform its obligations, the Plaintiff was not, and hence the termination. This is the averment in full. The law is settled, too, that an pleading (and an admission) must be read in full. There can be no admission of a case not pleaded. On any reading of the Written Statement as a whole, it cannot be said that the Defendant's case is that the Plaintiff is now entitled to the relief of specific performance. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Notice of Motion No. 270 of 2016 in Suit No. 3762 of 2002

Decided On: 12.02.2019

 K. Raheja Corp. Pvt. Ltd. Vs.  Maharashtra Tourism Development Corporation Ltd.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

G.S. Patel, J.

Citation: 2019(5) MHLJ 206

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Whether court can pass judgment on admission on the basis of email and reply exchanged between parties?

In Uttam Singh Dugal & Co. Ltd. v. Union Bank of India MANU/SC/0485/2000 : (2000) 7 SCC 120, the Supreme Court observed that the object of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC is to enable the party to obtain a speedy judgment at least to the extent of the relief to which, according to the admission of the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled. The contention urged before the Supreme Court was that the resolutions or minutes of the meetings of the Board of Directors could not amount to a pleading or come within the scope of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC as such statements were not made in the course of the pleadings or otherwise. However, the Supreme Court observed that when a statement is made to a party and such statement is brought before the Court showing admission of liability, by way of an application filed under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC and the other side has sufficient opportunity to explain the said admission and if such explanation is not accepted by the Court, the trial Court would not be helpless. The Supreme Court further observed that when the trial Court found that the statement made in the proceedings of the Board of Directors meetings and the letter sent as well as the pleadings, when read together, led to an unambiguous and clear admission and only the extent to which the admission was made, being in dispute, the trial Court would have a duty to decide the same and grant a decree. The Supreme Court categorically held that this approach would be unexceptionable.

9. This being the legal position, it is manifest that the opinion of the trial Court that an admission for the purposes of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC necessarily has to be made only in the pleadings cannot be countenanced. Even correspondence can be looked into for the purpose of determining as to whether the requirements of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC are satisfied. The petitioner-plaintiff relies upon not only the e-mails exchanged between the parties but also the reply dated 09.12.2015 of the respondent-defendant through its Advocate, in response to the legal notice dated 10.11.2015 issued by the petitioner-plaintiff. Unfortunately, the trial Court lightly brushed aside this document while coming to the conclusion that no admission had been made in terms of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC. The trial Court seems to have gone mostly by the fact that the e-mails did not mention any 'due amounts' and therefore, there was no admission, though the reply notice dated 09.12.2015 stood on a different footing. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Charanjit Lal Mehra (supra), an admission in terms of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC can also be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case. Therefore, the trial Court necessarily had to consider not only the e-mails but also the reply notice dated 09.12.2015, together and in their entirety, before concluding as to whether any admission had been made by the respondent-defendant, warranting exercise of power by the trial Court by taking recourse to Order 12 Rule 6 CPC. As the trial Court failed to undertake this exercise and proceeded on the wrong assumption that for the purposes of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC, an admission necessarily had to be made in writing and only in the course of the pleadings, we are left with no alternative but to set aside the order under revision and remit the matter to the trial Court for consideration afresh of the subject I.A. on its merits and in accordance with law.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT HYDERABAD 

C.R.P. No. 3877 of 2018

Decided On: 20.12.2018

 Blue Cube Germany Assets GmbH and Co. KG Vs. Vivimed Labs Limited

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

P.V. Sanjay Kumar and M. Ganga Rao, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2019(NOC) 557 Hyd

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Whether lessee is liable to be evicted even if he has made construction in tenanted premises with permission of municipal corporation?

 The question whether the construction by itself is a violation of the terms and conditions of the lease deed and whether for such violation any right has accrued to the defendant to terminate the lease or not, is a legal question and in my considered view, is not a triable issue for which no evidence is required. The argument advanced by the learned Counsels appearing for the defendant that inasmuch as permission obtained from the Kolkata Municipal Corporation before making construction the construction cannot be said to be illegal or unauthorized. The word 'unauthorized' should be interpreted not in the context of Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, but in the context of the agreed terms between the parties. In the present case, the terms and conditions incorporated in the lease deed were agreed by the parties and for any breach thereof, the defaulting party is bound to suffer the consequences. Therefore, legality of the construction need not be considered through evidence inasmuch as the defendant has admitted that they have made construction.

17. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Thimmappa Rai (supra) an admission made by a party to the suit in an earlier proceeding is admissible as against him provided such an admission is a relevant fact. The admission made by the defendant is with regard to the construction at the demised premises and this construction has a direct nexus with the prohibition contained under the lease deed which entitles the lessor to re-enter into possession upon termination of lease. Therefore, the defendant is bound to suffer consequence of making such construction in violation of the terms of the lease deed.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA

G.A. No. 1058 of 2016 and C.S. No. 100 of 2009

Decided On: 14.02.2018

Kanak Projects Limited  Vs.  Hooghly Printing Company Limited

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sahidullah Munshi, J.

Citation: AIR 2018 (NOC) 792 Cal

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Whether court can decree the suit if written statement is not filed?

 Applying the said position of law to the facts of the present case would show that the appellant has relied heavily on a document termed as Partition Deed. Even in the absence of written statement on behalf of the respondents specifically denying the claims made by the appellant, the burden was on the appellant to prove the aforesaid document in terms of the requirements of law, in order to successfully claim the relief of declaration and other ancillary reliefs sought in the suit filed by him. The Courts below have found that the appellant failed to produce the original Partition Deed and that only a photocopy of the same was placed on record. It was stated in the evidence of the appellant that the original of the said document was with respondent No. 1, but, no efforts were taken by the appellant in terms of law to ensure that the original document was brought before the Court.

13. In the absence of the most crucial piece of evidence in support of the claims made by the appellant being brought on record, merely producing alleged witnesses to the said document before the Court was of no avail. In fact, the trial Court specifically records this aspect while rejecting the claims made by the appellant.

14. In the absence of written statement on behalf of defendants and deemed admissions by them, as claimed by the appellant, the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court places greater responsibility on the trial Court to ensure that the appellant has been able to prove his case to the hilt. In the present case, on the basis of material on record it is evident that the appellant, being the plaintiff, had miserably failed to produce cogent evidence on record to prove his case, even in the absence of written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. The view taken by the trial Court in this context cannot be found faulted with and the appellate Court has also confirmed the same by correctly applying the position of law.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Second Appeal No. 476 of 2015

Decided On: 10.04.2018

 Martand Vs.  Dilip Namdeorao Gotmare and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Manish Pitale, J.

Citation: 2018(5) MHLJ 674

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When it is not necessary to frame issue on point of will?

Lower Appellate Court has remained oblivious of the provision of Order 14 Rule 1 of Code of Civil Procedure, which reads thus:-

"1. Framing of issues (1) Issues arise when a material proposition of fact or law is affirmed by the one party and denied by the other. (2) Material propositions are those propositions of law or fact which a plaintiff must allege in order to show a right to sue or a defendant must allege in order to constitute his defence.

(3) Each material proposition affirmed by one-party and denied by the other shall form the subject of distinct issue. (4) Issues are of two kinds:

(a) issues of fact,

(b) issues of law.

(5) At the first hearing of the suit the Court shall, after reading the plaint and the written statements, if any, and after examination under rule 2 of Order X and after hearing the parties or their pleaders], ascertain upon what material propositions of fact or of law the parties are at variance, and shall thereupon proceed to frame and record the issues on which the right decision of the case appears to depend. (6) Nothing in this rule requires the Court to frame and record issues where the defendant at the first hearing of the suit makes no defence."

Order 14 Rule 3 of Code of Civil Procedure, reads thus:-

"3. Materials from which issues may be framed.- The court may frame the issues from all or any of the following materials:--

(a) allegations made on oath by the parties, or by any persons present on their behalf, or made by the pleaders of such parties;

(b) allegations made in the pleadings or in answers to interrogatories delivered in the suit;

(c) the contents of documents produced by either party. "

Issues are to be framed where parties are at variance.

On co-joint reading of the aforementioned sub-Rule and Order, it is evident that issues are to be framed where only parties are at variance however, on going through entire written statement, there is not even a single averments denying the Will. Paragraph No.2 of the written statement, where the Will has been admitted, reads thus:-

"2. That in reply to para No.2 of the plaint that Santa Singh during his lifetime had executed a Will dated 04.08.1980 but the plaintiff has again denied this fact that he has relinquished his rights in favour of father of the defendant after receiving Rs.25,000/- from the father of the defendant and affidavit to this effect was also given by the plaintiff in favour of the father of defendant. The said affidavit dated 11.8.1980 was duly attested by Executive Magistrate, Kapurthala. It is also wrong that the father of the plaintiff had died about 20 years ago. As a matter of fact, the father of the plaintiff expired in the year 1993."

Rather the defence of the defendants had been, that the plaintiff had asserted his right owing to the affidavit dated 11.08.1980 after receipt of the payment of `25,000/-. Though aforementioned plea of defendant has been discarded by both the Courts below as the said affidavit tantamounts to relinquishment such act requires registration. The question before this Court is that in view of the admission of the Will, Can the party be dispensed with 6 of 10 in proving the Will, Answer is "Yes". In my view, there was no need for the Courts below to frame the issue of Will when same was admitted. It is settled law that admitted thing need not be proved. Even the judgment on admission as per the provision of Order 12 Rule 6 is permissible.

Punjab-Haryana High Court

Gurpyari Singh & Ors vs Kamaldeep Singh on 29 September, 2016
Citation: AIR 2017(NOC)123 P&H

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Whether court can pass divorce decree on admission?

In the case of Bai Kanku Vs. Shiva Toya, 17 Bmbay 624 (F.B.),
the Full Bench of this Court held that a decree for dissolution of
marriage cannot be made merely on admissions and without recording
any evidence. In the case of Sushila Mahendra Nanavati Vs.
Mahendra Manilal Nanavati, AIR 1960 Bombay 117, the Division
Bench of this Court held that under Order 8, Rule 5, it is well settled that
both the plaintiff as well as the defendant must be held bound by the
statement of facts in their respective pleadings. But under the proviso to
Order VIII, Rule 5, the Court may, in its discretion require any fact
admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admission. The proviso to
Section 58 of the Evidence Act is also to the same effect. In
matrimonial proceedings, there can be no judgment by default or
admission. Even in the case of Pranjali Bingi (supra), the learned
Single Judge of this Court held in paragraph 10 that merely because both
the parties have prayed for same reliefs of divorce, on the basis of
different set of facts, the Court does not get jurisdiction to pass order

under Order 12, Rule 6 C.P.C.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MUMBAI
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO.6066 OF 2014
Meenal Nigam Vs.Ravi Kalsi

 CORAM : R. G. KETKAR, J.

Pronounced on: 13TH MARCH, 2015
Citation;2016(1) ALLMR 89

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Whether plaintiff can claim Judgment on admission as matter of right?

9. The words in Order XII Rule 6 CPC “may” and
“make such order…” show that the power under Order XII
Rule 6 CPC is discretionary and cannot be claimed as a
matter of right. Judgment on admission is not a matter of
right and rather is a matter of discretion of the Court. Where
the defendants have raised objections which go to the root of
the case, it would not be appropriate to exercise the
discretion under Order XII Rule 6 CPC. The said rule is an
enabling provision which confers discretion on the Court in
delivering a quick judgment on admission and to the extent
of the claim admitted by one of the parties of his opponent’s
claim. In the suit for eviction filed by the
respondent-landlord, appellant-tenant has admitted the
relationship of tenancy and the period of lease agreement;
but resisted respondent-plaintiff’s claim by setting up a
defence plea of agreement to sale and that he paid an
advance of Rs.82.50 lakhs, which of course is stoutly denied
by the respondent-landlord. The appellant-defendant also
filed the Suit for Specific Performance, which of course is
contested by the respondent-landlord. When such issues

arising between the parties ought to be decided, mere
admission of relationship of landlord and tenant cannot be
said to be an unequivocal admission to decree the suit under
Order XII Rule 6 CPC.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 6106-6108 OF 2015

S.M. ASIF V VIRENDER KUMAR BAJAJ 
Dated: August 12, 2015
 R. BANUMATHI, J.
Citation;(2015) 9 SCC287,2016(2) MHLJ510

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When court should not pass decree on the basis of admission given by other side in pleading?

The SC further said: “In the suit for eviction filed by the respondent-landlord, appellant-tenant has admitted the relationship of tenancy and the period of lease agreement; but resisted respondent-plaintiff’s claim by setting up a defence plea of agreement to sale and that he paid an advance of Rs.82.50 lakhs, which of course is stoutly denied by the respondent-landlord. The appellant-defendant also filed the Suit for Specific Performance, which of course is contested by the respondent-landlord. When such issues arising between the parties ought to be decided, mere admission of relationship of landlord and tenant cannot be said to be an unequivocal admission to decree the suit under Order XII Rule 6 CPC.”
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 6106-6108 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 4987-4989 of 2015)
S.M. ASIF V VIRENDER KUMAR BAJAJ 
 Dated;August 12, 2015
 R. BANUMATHI, J.

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When court should not give decree for divorce on admission of other spouse?

 The question that arises for consideration, therefore, is
whether in the facts of the case, the afore-stated admissions of the
respondent, warrant a decree on admission. At the outset, it may be noted
that the proceedings are matrimonial proceedings, wherein the petitioner
has sought divorce on the grounds of cruelty and desertion. The said
petition is contested by the respondent by filing his written statement.
According to the respondent, he is ready and willing to give divorce to the
petitioner, as per the customs prevailing in their community. The said
acceptance of the respondent of divorce cannot be said to be an admission
under Order 12 Rule 6. The grounds on which divorce is sought by the
petitioner i.e. cruelty and desertion are not accepted by the respondent and
are infact contested by him.
 Thus, there can be no application of Order 12 Rule 6, in the
facts of the present case, as all the allegations will have to be gone into by
the Trial Court, before granting the decree of divorce. What is important
are the grounds on which divorce is sought and not merely the prayer for
divorce. Merely, because the respondent is willing to give divorce as per
the customs prevailing in the community, does not mean that the grounds
on which the divorce is sought, are accepted by him. The learned Judge has
rightly rejected the application, preferred by the petitioner.
 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 6474 OF 2013
Karishma Qureshi,V Faisal Qureshi,

CORAM : REVATI MOHITE DERE, J.

PRONOUNCED ON : JULY 30, 2014
Citation; AIR 2015 Bombay 46

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Whether more than one decree can be passed as per Order XII Rule 6 of CPC ?

The Apex Court observed that Order XII Rule 6 of CPC has confers wide discretion on the court to pass a judgment at any stage of the suit on the basis of admission of facts made in the pleading or otherwise without waiting for the determination of any other question arose between the parties. Since the Rule permits the passing of judgment at any stage without waiting for determination of other question, it follows that there can be more than one decree that may be passed at different stages of the same suit. The principle behind Order XII Rule 6 of CPC is to give the plaintiff a right to speedy judgment so that either party may get rid of the rival claims which are not in controversy.
‘REPORTABLE’
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1822 OF 2015
(arising out of SLP(C)No.29805 of 2014)
Raveesh Chand Jain

versus
Raj Rani Jain

M. Y. EQBAL, J.
Dated;February 12, 2015.

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