The remonstrance based on cessation of the lease on the
expiry of 36 years also does not commend for acceptance in the face
of unreserved acceptance of lease rent at the earlier rate of Rs.
693.75 paisa admittedly till the year 1978. The assertion that in
any view of the matter, as the respondent-company in terms of
Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882, ought to be
construed to be the lessee, holding over the demised land on
payment of rent and that the lease stood renewed from year to year
and that accordingly on the date of the institution of the suit there
was a subsisting tenancy in respect of plantation exceeding 30
acres cannot be sustained as well. Though admittedly, at the
institution of the suit, the rubber plantation of the
respondent-company did exist on the land, in the teeth of Section
116 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882, which comprehends
renewal of the expired lease, year after year or month after month it
is essentially qua the purpose for which the property had been
originally leased which in the instant case is traceable to the year
1918. As the lease deed dated 21.6.1918 proclaims in no uncertain
terms that the transaction evidenced thereby was by no means a
tenancy in respect of plantation, the same with efflux of time, in our
estimate cannot transfigure into the same merely because a
plantation has been raised on the leasehold land in between by the
lessee who had been left at its discretion to grow the same. In
absence of a conscious intervention of the parties to the lease,
either to convert it into one for tenancy in respect of such
plantation ad idem or to extend it thereto, an automatic
transformation of the lease not for plantation cannot stand
converted into one for plantation. As a transaction of this kind
involving immovable property is essentially governed by the terms
and conditions concurred upon by the parties thereto, no unilateral
alteration or modification thereof, unless agreed to by both, in
categorical terms, ought to be permitted to be pleaded or enforced
by anyone of them to the disadvantage of the other. Neither the
lease deed contains any stipulation sanctioning such unilateral
alteration of the stipulations contained therein nor do the materials
on record testify such consensus based modification of the lease
covenants. A plain perusal of the Section 116 of the Transfer of
Property Act 1882 also does endorse this deduction.
{REPORTABLE}
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5163/2012
N K RAJENDRA MOHAN ...….APPELLANT
Vs.
THIRVAMADI RUBBER CO. LTD & ORS …..RESPONDENTS
Dated: 02 July, 2015
Amitava Roy,J.
Citation;(2015) 9 SC326
Print Page
expiry of 36 years also does not commend for acceptance in the face
of unreserved acceptance of lease rent at the earlier rate of Rs.
693.75 paisa admittedly till the year 1978. The assertion that in
any view of the matter, as the respondent-company in terms of
Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882, ought to be
construed to be the lessee, holding over the demised land on
payment of rent and that the lease stood renewed from year to year
and that accordingly on the date of the institution of the suit there
was a subsisting tenancy in respect of plantation exceeding 30
acres cannot be sustained as well. Though admittedly, at the
institution of the suit, the rubber plantation of the
respondent-company did exist on the land, in the teeth of Section
116 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882, which comprehends
renewal of the expired lease, year after year or month after month it
is essentially qua the purpose for which the property had been
originally leased which in the instant case is traceable to the year
1918. As the lease deed dated 21.6.1918 proclaims in no uncertain
terms that the transaction evidenced thereby was by no means a
tenancy in respect of plantation, the same with efflux of time, in our
estimate cannot transfigure into the same merely because a
plantation has been raised on the leasehold land in between by the
lessee who had been left at its discretion to grow the same. In
absence of a conscious intervention of the parties to the lease,
either to convert it into one for tenancy in respect of such
plantation ad idem or to extend it thereto, an automatic
transformation of the lease not for plantation cannot stand
converted into one for plantation. As a transaction of this kind
involving immovable property is essentially governed by the terms
and conditions concurred upon by the parties thereto, no unilateral
alteration or modification thereof, unless agreed to by both, in
categorical terms, ought to be permitted to be pleaded or enforced
by anyone of them to the disadvantage of the other. Neither the
lease deed contains any stipulation sanctioning such unilateral
alteration of the stipulations contained therein nor do the materials
on record testify such consensus based modification of the lease
covenants. A plain perusal of the Section 116 of the Transfer of
Property Act 1882 also does endorse this deduction.
{REPORTABLE}
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5163/2012
N K RAJENDRA MOHAN ...….APPELLANT
Vs.
THIRVAMADI RUBBER CO. LTD & ORS …..RESPONDENTS
Dated: 02 July, 2015
Amitava Roy,J.
Citation;(2015) 9 SC326
