Leading Supreme Court Judgment on legal consequences of filing of premature suit

We may now briefly sum up the correct position of law which is as follows :

A suit of a civil nature disclosing a cause of action even if filed before the date on which the plaintiff became actually entitled to sue and claim the relief founded on such cause of action is not to be necessarily dismissed for such reason.

The question of suit being premature does not go to the root of jurisdiction of the Court; the Court entertaining such a suit and passing decree therein is not acting without jurisdiction but it is in the judicial discretion of the Court to grant decree or not. The Court would examine whether any irreparable prejudice was caused to the defendant on account of the suit having been filed a little before the date on which the plaintiff's entitlement to relief became due and whether by granting the relief in such suit a manifest injustice would be caused to the defendant. Taking into consideration the explanation offered by the plaintiff for filing the suit before the date of maturity of cause of action, the Court may deny the plaintiff his costs or may make such other order adjusting equities and satisfying the ends of justice as it may deem fit in its discretion. The conduct of the parties and unmerited advantage to plaintiff or disadvantage amounting to prejudice to the defendant, if any, would be relevant factors. A plea as to non-maintainability of the suit on the ground of its being premature should be promptly raised by the defendant and pressed for decision. It will equally be the responsibility of the Court to examine and promptly dispose of such a plea. The plea may not be permitted to be raised at a belated stage of the suit. However, the Court shall not exercise its discretion in favour of decreeing a premature suit in the following cases : (i) When there is a mandatory bar created by a statute which disables the plaintiff from filing the suit on or before a particular date or the occurrence of a particular event; (ii) when the institution of the suit before the lapse of a particular time or occurrence of a particular event would have the effect of defeating a public policy or public purpose; (iii) if such premature institution renders the presentation itself patently void and the invalidity is incurable such as when it goes to the root of the Court's jurisdiction, and (iv) where the lis is not confined to parties alone and affects and involves persons other than those arrayed as parties, such as in an election petition which affects and involves the entire constituency. (See : Samar Singh v. Kedar Nath and Ors. - MANU/SC/0386/1987 : AIR1987SC1926). One more category of suits which may be added to -- where leave of the Court or some authority is mandatorily required to be obtained before the institution and was not so obtained.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 2390 of 2002

Decided On: 11.03.2005

 Vithalbhai Pvt. Ltd.  Vs.  Union Bank of India

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.C. Lahoti, C.J. and G.P. Mathur, J.

Author: R.C. Lahoti, C.J.

Citation: (2005) 4 SCC 315, AIR 2005 SC 189, MANU/SC/0195/2005

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Supreme Court: Determination of lease U/S 111(d) of transfer of property Act-Doctrine of merger

 Learned Counsel for the writ Petitioner relying on provisions of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 contends that leasehold rights have been merged in the lessor since when lessor's interest coalesces with lessee's interest, the principle of merger comes into play. He has placed reliance on judgment of this Court in T. Lakshmipathi and Ors. v. P. Nithyananda Reddy and Ors. MANU/SC/0263/2003 : (2003) 5 SCC 150 and Pramod Kumar Jaiswal and Ors. v. Bibi Husn Bano and Ors. MANU/SC/0346/2005 : (2005) 5 SCC 492. This Court in T. Lakshmipathi (supra) had examined the doctrine of merger as contained in Section 111(d). In Paragraph Nos. 14 to 17, following was laid down:

14. The common-law doctrine of merger is statutorily embodied in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Section 111(d) provides:

111. Determination of lease.--A lease of immovable property, determines--

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(d) in case the interests of the lessee and the lessor in the whole of the property become vested at the same time in one person in the same right;

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A bare reading of the doctrine of merger, as statutorily recognized in India, contemplates (i) coalescence of the interest of the lessee and the interest of the lessor, (ii) in the whole of the property, (iii) at the same time, (iv) in one person, and (v) in the same right. There must be a complete union of the whole interests of the lessor and the lessee so as to enable the lesser interest of the lessee sinking into the larger interest of the lessor in the reversion.

15. In Badri Narain Jha v. Rameshwar Dayal Singh MANU/SC/0054/1951 : AIR 1951 SC 186, it was held by this Court that if the lessor purchases the lessee's interest, the lease no doubt is extinguished as the same man cannot at the same time be both a landlord and a tenant, but there is no extinction of the lease if one of the several lessees purchased only a part of the lessor's interest. In such a case the leasehold and the reversion cannot be said to coincide.

16. In Sk. Faqir Bakhsh v. Murli Dhar MANU/PR/0179/1931 : AIR 1931 PC 63, the Plaintiff was holding on lease a portion of the entire property. Subsequently, the Plaintiff and the Defendant became pro indiviso joint proprietors of the property by purchasing shares from the earlier owners. The lease was subsisting when the shares were bought by the parties. In a suit for accounts filed by the Plaintiff it was held that the Plaintiff's rights under lease of a part do not merge in his rights as joint proprietor of the whole of the property as between the parties the Plaintiff held a valid and subsisting lease.

17. A Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Parmeshwar Singh v. Sureba Kuer MANU/BH/0096/1925 : AIR 1925 Pat 530, held that Section 111(d) applies only to a case where the interests of the lessee and of the lessor in the whole of the property become vested at the same time in one person in the same right. Merger is largely a question of intention, dependent on circumstances, and the courts will presume against it when it operates to the disadvantage of a party, as was held by this Court in Nalakath Sainuddin v. Koorikadan Sulaiman, MANU/SC/0564/2002 : (2002) 6 SCC 1 (SCC para 20)."

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 1533 and 1534 of 2019

Decided On: 12.02.2019

Delhi Development Authority  Vs.  Karamdeep Finance & Investment (I) Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Ashok Bhushan and K.M. Joseph, JJ.

Citation: MANU/SC/0183/2019,(2020) 4 SCC 136

Author: Ashok Bhushan, J.

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When tenancy will not extinguish by Merger?

Buchi Devi had willingly joined with Bhagabandei in filing the suit. During the continuity of litigation she parted with her share in the property. One out of the two tenants purchased her share. It seems that the tenancy is in the name of a partnership firm and some of the partners have purchased the share of Bhagabandei. It is not clear if all the partners or only a few out of all the partners are the buyers. The fact remains that they have purchased only a share in the property and not the entire property. The applicability of doctrine of merger within the meaning of Clause (d) of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is not attracted. In order to bring the tenancy to an end the merger should be complete, i.e. the interest of the landlord in its entirety must come to vest and merge into the interest of tenant in its entirely. When part of the interest of the landlord or the interest of one out of many co-landlords-cum-owners comes to vest in the tenant, there is no merger and the tenancy is not extinguished. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 5357 and 5358 of 1996

Decided On: 05.01.2004

India Umbrella Manufacturing Co. Vs. Bhagabandei Agarwalla (Dead) 

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Whether landlord who are purchaser pendente lite can take stand contrary to one taken by his predecessor in interest?

 The decree, in so far as the other tenant and sub-tenants i.e. the appellants in C.A. No. 5358/1996 are concerned, has to be sustained. The partners of the other tenant firm i.e. M/s. India Umbrella Manufacturing Co. (appellant in C.A. No. 5357/1996) have purchased the property pendente lite and therefore they cannot be allowed to take a stand contrary to the one taken by their predecessor in interest and to the prejudice of the other plaintiff whose rights they have not purchased. Their filing an application that they were not interested in securing eviction of the other tenant is in the facts and circumstances of the case immaterial and irrelevant.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 5357 and 5358 of 1996

Decided On: 05.01.2004

India Umbrella Manufacturing Co. Vs. Bhagabandei Agarwalla (Dead) 

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.C. Lahoti and Ashok Bhan, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2004 SC 1321

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