Whether the lessee has the right to renewal of lease can claim renewal of lease multiple times?

  Finally, Rustom Behramji Colah has considered the question

whether a perpetual right of renewal can be held to exist in law. To answer this question, it has relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in State of U.P. v. Lalji Tandon(2004) 1 SCC 1. And, eventually, it has adopted the Lalji Tandon’s proposition that the Court always leans against a perpetual renewal. So “where there is a clause for renewal subject to the same terms and conditions, it would be construed as giving a right to renewal for the same period as the period of the original lease, but not a right to second or third renewal and so on unless, of course, the language is clear and unambiguous.”{Para 20}

The Court leans against a perpetual right of renewal even when the clause of renewal provides a renewal on the same terms and conditions.” So it has rejected the Corporation’s plea that it has a right for further renewal.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

SECOND APPEAL NO. 359 OF 2014

IN

REGULAR CIVIL APPEAL NO. 257 OF 2005

IN

REGULAR CIVIL SUIT NO. 1461 OF 1995

Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. Vs Shri Champalal Vithuram Jajoo

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Leading Supreme Court Judgment on legal consequences of filing of premature suit

We may now briefly sum up the correct position of law which is as follows :

A suit of a civil nature disclosing a cause of action even if filed before the date on which the plaintiff became actually entitled to sue and claim the relief founded on such cause of action is not to be necessarily dismissed for such reason.

The question of suit being premature does not go to the root of jurisdiction of the Court; the Court entertaining such a suit and passing decree therein is not acting without jurisdiction but it is in the judicial discretion of the Court to grant decree or not. The Court would examine whether any irreparable prejudice was caused to the defendant on account of the suit having been filed a little before the date on which the plaintiff's entitlement to relief became due and whether by granting the relief in such suit a manifest injustice would be caused to the defendant. Taking into consideration the explanation offered by the plaintiff for filing the suit before the date of maturity of cause of action, the Court may deny the plaintiff his costs or may make such other order adjusting equities and satisfying the ends of justice as it may deem fit in its discretion. The conduct of the parties and unmerited advantage to plaintiff or disadvantage amounting to prejudice to the defendant, if any, would be relevant factors. A plea as to non-maintainability of the suit on the ground of its being premature should be promptly raised by the defendant and pressed for decision. It will equally be the responsibility of the Court to examine and promptly dispose of such a plea. The plea may not be permitted to be raised at a belated stage of the suit. However, the Court shall not exercise its discretion in favour of decreeing a premature suit in the following cases : (i) When there is a mandatory bar created by a statute which disables the plaintiff from filing the suit on or before a particular date or the occurrence of a particular event; (ii) when the institution of the suit before the lapse of a particular time or occurrence of a particular event would have the effect of defeating a public policy or public purpose; (iii) if such premature institution renders the presentation itself patently void and the invalidity is incurable such as when it goes to the root of the Court's jurisdiction, and (iv) where the lis is not confined to parties alone and affects and involves persons other than those arrayed as parties, such as in an election petition which affects and involves the entire constituency. (See : Samar Singh v. Kedar Nath and Ors. - MANU/SC/0386/1987 : AIR1987SC1926). One more category of suits which may be added to -- where leave of the Court or some authority is mandatorily required to be obtained before the institution and was not so obtained.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 2390 of 2002

Decided On: 11.03.2005

 Vithalbhai Pvt. Ltd.  Vs.  Union Bank of India

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.C. Lahoti, C.J. and G.P. Mathur, J.

Author: R.C. Lahoti, C.J.

Citation: (2005) 4 SCC 315, AIR 2005 SC 189, MANU/SC/0195/2005

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Supreme Court: Determination of lease U/S 111(d) of transfer of property Act-Doctrine of merger

 Learned Counsel for the writ Petitioner relying on provisions of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 contends that leasehold rights have been merged in the lessor since when lessor's interest coalesces with lessee's interest, the principle of merger comes into play. He has placed reliance on judgment of this Court in T. Lakshmipathi and Ors. v. P. Nithyananda Reddy and Ors. MANU/SC/0263/2003 : (2003) 5 SCC 150 and Pramod Kumar Jaiswal and Ors. v. Bibi Husn Bano and Ors. MANU/SC/0346/2005 : (2005) 5 SCC 492. This Court in T. Lakshmipathi (supra) had examined the doctrine of merger as contained in Section 111(d). In Paragraph Nos. 14 to 17, following was laid down:

14. The common-law doctrine of merger is statutorily embodied in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Section 111(d) provides:

111. Determination of lease.--A lease of immovable property, determines--

* **

(d) in case the interests of the lessee and the lessor in the whole of the property become vested at the same time in one person in the same right;

* * *"

A bare reading of the doctrine of merger, as statutorily recognized in India, contemplates (i) coalescence of the interest of the lessee and the interest of the lessor, (ii) in the whole of the property, (iii) at the same time, (iv) in one person, and (v) in the same right. There must be a complete union of the whole interests of the lessor and the lessee so as to enable the lesser interest of the lessee sinking into the larger interest of the lessor in the reversion.

15. In Badri Narain Jha v. Rameshwar Dayal Singh MANU/SC/0054/1951 : AIR 1951 SC 186, it was held by this Court that if the lessor purchases the lessee's interest, the lease no doubt is extinguished as the same man cannot at the same time be both a landlord and a tenant, but there is no extinction of the lease if one of the several lessees purchased only a part of the lessor's interest. In such a case the leasehold and the reversion cannot be said to coincide.

16. In Sk. Faqir Bakhsh v. Murli Dhar MANU/PR/0179/1931 : AIR 1931 PC 63, the Plaintiff was holding on lease a portion of the entire property. Subsequently, the Plaintiff and the Defendant became pro indiviso joint proprietors of the property by purchasing shares from the earlier owners. The lease was subsisting when the shares were bought by the parties. In a suit for accounts filed by the Plaintiff it was held that the Plaintiff's rights under lease of a part do not merge in his rights as joint proprietor of the whole of the property as between the parties the Plaintiff held a valid and subsisting lease.

17. A Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Parmeshwar Singh v. Sureba Kuer MANU/BH/0096/1925 : AIR 1925 Pat 530, held that Section 111(d) applies only to a case where the interests of the lessee and of the lessor in the whole of the property become vested at the same time in one person in the same right. Merger is largely a question of intention, dependent on circumstances, and the courts will presume against it when it operates to the disadvantage of a party, as was held by this Court in Nalakath Sainuddin v. Koorikadan Sulaiman, MANU/SC/0564/2002 : (2002) 6 SCC 1 (SCC para 20)."

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 1533 and 1534 of 2019

Decided On: 12.02.2019

Delhi Development Authority  Vs.  Karamdeep Finance & Investment (I) Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Ashok Bhushan and K.M. Joseph, JJ.

Citation: MANU/SC/0183/2019,(2020) 4 SCC 136

Author: Ashok Bhushan, J.

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Supreme Court: Purported lessee can not claim any right based on unregistered lease deed

We are of the considered opinion, that no reliance can be placed upon the lease deeds allegedly executed between the defaulting rice miller(s) and the Respondent(s), as they do not satisfy the statutory requirements of Section 17(1)(d) of the Registration Act, 1908. These Lease-deeds thus cannot be accepted as evidence of valid transfer of possessory rights. The plea taken by the Appellant-FCI, that such documentation was made only to escape the liability fastened on the defaulting rice millers, carries some weight, though it is a pure question of fact. The High Court nevertheless ought to have refrained from opining on the sufficiency of such lease deeds for recognition of a new legal entity, and consequential non-transfer of liability to the lessees.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 2070 of 2020 

Decided On: 06.03.2020

 Food Corporation of India  Vs.  V.K. Traders and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.A. Bobde, C.J.I., B.R. Gavai and Surya Kant, JJ.

Citation:(2020) 4 SCC 60,MANU/SC/0298/2020

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Whether small cause court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit for specific performance of an agreement for the renewal of a lease deed?

The Apex Court in Mansukhlal Dhanraj Jain v. Eknath Vithal Ogale MANU/SC/0633/1995 : 1995(2) SCC 665, while considering the provisions of Section 41(1) of the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act, 1882 which was pari materia with Section 26 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act, 1887 held that in a suit instituted by a person claiming to be a licensee of the premises for an injunction restraining the licensor from dispossessing the licensee or interfering with the possession or enjoyment of the property by the licensee would relate to the recovery of possession and fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court. 

11. Having considered the documents annexed to the Petition and the reply and having heard the counsel, indisputably the parties had a preexisting relationship of lessor and lessee and that in pursuance of a provision for renewal contained in the Lease Deed, Petitioner was seeking a continuation of that relationship. Even though Petitioner states that they are only seeking specific performance, when a Court hears such a matter, the Court must find out what does the suit in substance and in essence says and whether it is relating to the recovery of possession or the recovery of licence fee, rent or other charges between a landlord and tenant or a licensor and licensee. The Court will decide the issue by looking at the kernel and disregarding the chaff, the nature of the cause of action; the character of the reliefs sought and whether the claim of the Petitioner arises from and out of the obligations of the parties as licensor and licensee or landlord and tenant. The garb or cloak which is wrapped around the pleadings by an astute draftsman must be kept aside to deduce the pith and substance of the pleadings.

12. In my view, considering the averments in the Petition, prayers sought in this Petition and the averments contained in Paragraph 11 of the rejoinder, this dispute certainly relates to recovery of possession and it is a matter to which Section 26 of Provincial Small Causes Court Act, 1887 applies notwithstanding the fact that some of the reliefs or a portion of the cause of action is structured around a claim for specific performance.

13. The petition, therefore, stands dismissed. Interim relief granted on 13th June 2017 stands vacated.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Arbitration Petition (Lodg.) 513 of 2017

Decided On: 01.08.2017

Trent Limited Vs. Nanasaheb Govindrao Aher and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

K.R. Shriram, J.
Citation: MANU/MH/1720/2017

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Whether finding given by reference court in land acquisition proceeding shall operate as res judicata in the suit for possession based on title or as a lessor?

Thus, the finding returned in the award of the Reference Court (Ex. PW1/12) that the lease stood determined on account of nonpayment of rent was a finding made by the reference Court for a limited purpose i.e. not to accept the Defendant's claim for compensation. Such finding cannot be binding on the parties in a suit for possession based on title or as a lessor against a lessee. Section 11 of the Code bars the subsequent Court to try any suit or issue which has been directly and substantially issue in a former suit. The issue before the Reference Court was apportionment of compensation and such issue having been decided against the Defendant, the reference to notice for termination of tenancy does not operate as res judicata. Therefore, the finding recorded by the High Court that the order of the Reference Court operates as res judicata was clearly not sustainable. The first substantial question of law has been, thus, wrongly decided.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 9918 of 2011

Decided On: 19.03.2020

 Nand Ram  Vs.   Jagdish Prasad

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

L. Nageswara Rao and Hemant Gupta, JJ.

Citation: 2021(1) MHLJ 180

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Whether lessor can adjust money paid by lessee contrary to terms of lease deed?

 So far as the payment made by Petitioner towards lease premium and interest and adjustment thereof by Respondent No. 1 is concerned, Mr. Samdani relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Industrial Credit Development Syndicate v. Smithaben H. Patel (MANU/SC/0092/1999 : (1999) 3 SCC 80 : (AIR 1999 SC 1036)) to contend that Respondent No. 1 was right in adjusting the amount paid by the Petitioner firstly towards the penal interest, then towards the interest and lastly towards the principle. Having gone through said decision, we are unable to buy the submission of Mr. Samdani. The Apex Court in this case was considering the question as to how the adjustment is to be made by the decree-holder under various heads comprising of principle, cost and interest. The Apex Court held that the payment has to be adjusted strictly in accordance with the direction of the Court, if any and in the absence of such direction the adjustment has to be made subject to an agreement to the contrary between the parties, firstly towards the interest and cost and thereafter towards the principle amount. The Apex Court was dealing with a situation about the adjustment of principle, cost and interest in pursuance of the decree of civil Court. So far as the present case is concerned, the liability of the parties has arisen in out of purely contractual obligation to pay interest, penal interest and premium as specified by clause 2(a) of the said supplementary lease deed. This clause does not stipulate that the payment by Petitioner is to be adjusted firstly towards the penal interest, then towards the interest and lastly towards the lease premium. The said clause simpliciter puts obligation on the part of the petitioner to pay lease premium in 4 annual equal installments with simple interest @ 10% per annum and in the event of delay in payment of installment, to pay penal interest at the prevailing prime lending rate decided by the RBI. Be that as it may, the Petitioner has annexed at Exhibit-D various receipts issued by Respondent No. 1 acknowledging the payment thereof. These receipts acknowledge the Petitioner's payment either to the lease premium or towards the interest or towards the penal interest. In short, whatever payment made by the Petitioner is specifically accepted by Respondent No. 1 either towards the lease premium or interest or penal interest. Now, therefore, it is not permissible for Respondent No. 1 to take a contrary stand. In our view, Respondent No. 1 cannot be permitted to act arbitrarily and therefore Respondent No. 1 shall adjust the said amount paid by the Petitioner as per the acknowledging receipts given by them.

9. As far as payment of penal interest is concerned, the issue is whether Respondent No. 1 can unilaterally seek to charge 4% additional interest over and above the agreed RBI prime lending rate. In our prima facie opinion, the Respondents are bound by the terms of mutually agreed and as recorded in the supplementary lease deed dated 29th October, 2013. The mutually agreed rate of penal interest is as per the RBI prime lending rate. Respondent No. 1 however by issuing the impugned circular dated 19th August, 2018 decided to charge penal interest at 4% over and above the prime lending rate. In this circular itself the prime lending rate is prescribed by Respondent No. 1 at 9.55% from 1st July, 2018. When there is mutual contract between the parties, the terms of this contract cannot be unilaterally changed. In our prima facie opinion, therefore, the Respondents are not entitled to charge 4% penal interest over and above the prime lending rate.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition Ld. No. 212 of 2019

Decided On: 20.02.2019

Raghuleela Builders Private Limited Vs. Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.V. More and Bharati H. Dangre, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2019(NOC) 827 Bom

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Whether it is necessary to adduce oral evidence to prove terms of lease deed?

 Section 91 of the Indian Evidence Act deals with evidence of terms of contracts, grants and other dispositions of property reduced to the form of documents. The lease deed is a document within the meaning of Section 91 and, therefore, no amount of oral evidence is required for elucidation of the terms and conditions stipulated under the said lease deed. The document speaks for itself. So also Section 92 is relevant in the present case which relates to exclusion of evidence of oral agreement. When the document itself is admitted, no oral agreement can improve the defendant's case.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA

G.A. No. 1058 of 2016 and C.S. No. 100 of 2009

Decided On: 14.02.2018

Kanak Projects Limited  Vs.  Hooghly Printing Company Limited

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Whether lessee is liable to be evicted even if he has made construction in tenanted premises with permission of municipal corporation?

 The question whether the construction by itself is a violation of the terms and conditions of the lease deed and whether for such violation any right has accrued to the defendant to terminate the lease or not, is a legal question and in my considered view, is not a triable issue for which no evidence is required. The argument advanced by the learned Counsels appearing for the defendant that inasmuch as permission obtained from the Kolkata Municipal Corporation before making construction the construction cannot be said to be illegal or unauthorized. The word 'unauthorized' should be interpreted not in the context of Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, but in the context of the agreed terms between the parties. In the present case, the terms and conditions incorporated in the lease deed were agreed by the parties and for any breach thereof, the defaulting party is bound to suffer the consequences. Therefore, legality of the construction need not be considered through evidence inasmuch as the defendant has admitted that they have made construction.

17. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Thimmappa Rai (supra) an admission made by a party to the suit in an earlier proceeding is admissible as against him provided such an admission is a relevant fact. The admission made by the defendant is with regard to the construction at the demised premises and this construction has a direct nexus with the prohibition contained under the lease deed which entitles the lessor to re-enter into possession upon termination of lease. Therefore, the defendant is bound to suffer consequence of making such construction in violation of the terms of the lease deed.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA

G.A. No. 1058 of 2016 and C.S. No. 100 of 2009

Decided On: 14.02.2018

Kanak Projects Limited  Vs.  Hooghly Printing Company Limited

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sahidullah Munshi, J.

Citation: AIR 2018 (NOC) 792 Cal

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Whether subletting of premises is made out if lessee retain legal possession?

We may mention that in Gundalapalli Rangamannar Chetty v. Desu Rangiah and Ors. MANU/TN/0154/1954 : AIR1954Mad182 , Subba Rao, J. as the learned Chief Justice then was, held that there cannot be a subletting, unless the lessee parted with legal possession. The mere fact that another is allowed to use the premises while the lessee retains the legal possession is not enough to create a sub-lease.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 3551 of 1979

Decided On: 06.05.1987

Helper Girdharbhai Vs.  Saiyed Mohmad Mirasaheb Kadri and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S. Natarajan and Sabyasachi Mukherjee, JJ.

Citation:AIR 1987 SC 1782

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Whether lessee is bound to pay municipal taxes if lease specifically exempts lessee from payment of municipal taxes?

In view
of the specific exemption given under the lease deed regarding
payment of any taxes on the demised premises, in our

considered opinion, the appellant-Company is not at all
required to pay any municipal taxes on the demised premises.
 REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
 CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 4944-4945 OF 2016
M/s Welspun Projects Ltd.
(Formerly known as M/s MSK Projects
India Ltd.) 
V
Director, State Transport,
Punjab & Anr
Citation:(2016) 10 SCC203
Dated:NOVEMBER 8, 2016.

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Whether lessee who is in possession of property can claim adverse possession against true owner?

b. Whether the plea taken by deceased Respondent No. 1/defendant No. 1 being in possession as a lessee could claim the alternate plea of adverse possession taken by Respondent No. 1 or vice-versa?
The Respondent cannot claim to have acquired title over the suit property by pleading adverse possession only in the absence of the name of the Appellants in the revenue records. In the case of Thakur Kishan Singh (Dead) v. Arvind Kumar MANU/SC/0015/1995 : (1994) 6 SCC 591 and P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy and Ors. v. Revamma and Ors.MANU/SC/7325/2007 : (2007) 6 SCC 59, this Court held that in cases where the possession was initially permissive, the burden lies heavily on that person alleging adverse possession to prove that the possession has become adverse. Mere possession for long time does not convert permissive possession into adverse possession.
As far as issue No. 2 is concerned, Respondent No. 1 has no right to claim ownership over the suit property on the ground of adverse possession by taking a plea of sham transaction. This plea of the Respondent is not only prohibited by the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988, but makes the Appellants absolute owner.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 2151 of 2016 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 2489 of 2011)

Decided On: 01.03.2016

 Prem Nath Khanna and Ors.

Vs.

 Narinder Nath Kapoor and Ors.

Coram:V. Gopala Gowda and U.U. Lalit, JJ.

Citation; AIR 2016 SC 1433,(2016) 12 SCC288

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When lessee is not entitled to take benefit of S 53-A of transfer of property(part performance)

Though the covenant like that the lease runs with immovable property, and section 53-A can be used against the purchaser also, it was necessary for the defendant to pay or tender the rent to the lessor and then to the plaintiff regularly as it was month to month tenant. The defendant disputed the title of the plaintiff and it claimed that it was in possession under agreement of sale with the previous owner. The defendant could not prove that there was such agreement between it and the previous owner  but in spite of that it did not pay the rent. In view of these circumstances, this Court holds that the defendant failed to prove that it was ready and willing to perform its part of the contract, to pay rent regularly. So the defendant is not entitled to the protection under section 53-A also.

Bombay High Court

 The Osmanabad Janata Sahakari vs Pandharinath Gyanba Gunale on 1 August, 2014

Bench: T.V. Nalawade

Citation;AIR 2015(NOC)659 Bom

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Whether lessee can remain in possession of tenanted premises when lease agreement is unregistered?

(Satish Chand v. Govardhan Das) and in the case of SMS
Tea Estates (cited supra), the Apex Court has discussed
the purpose for which such unregistered lease document
can be used. It is laid down that to ascertain nature of
possession, whether it is lawful, whether it is of lessee, the
document can be used. However, the terms and conditions
of the lease which are not enforceable in view of the
provisions of section 107 of the T.P Act cannot be read in
evidence. Thus, for collateral purpose, to ascertain nature
of possession, the possession as lessee, this document can
be read in evidence. Only to that extent the protection is
available under section 53-A of the T.P Act. The lessee

cannot be allowed to say that he is entitled to keep
possession for the period mentioned in the unregistered
document as that will amount to enforcing the terms of
transaction which is not permissible under section 107 of
the T.P Act and under Section 49 of the Registration Act.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
First Appeal No.1214 of 2003

The Osmanabad Janata Sahakari
Bank Ltd., 

Versus
Pandarinath Gyanba gunale

CORAM: T.V. NALAWADE, J.

Citation; 2014(6) ALLMR 250
Judgment delivered on : 1st August 2014.

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Supreme Court: Secured creditor cannot take over possession unless lawful possession of lessee comes to an end

Supreme Court: The major issue in the present case was whether a mortgagee of a previously leased out property (unknown to the creditor) claim possession of the property upon the failure of the mortgagor in clearing his debts within the stipulated time. The bench comprising of Hon'ble Justice A. K. Patnaik and Hon'ble Justice Gopala Gowda,primarily ruled that without the determination of a valid lease, the possession of the lessee is lawful and such lawful possession of a lessee was to be protected by all courts and tribunals. Discussing the primary need of determining the lease, the Court required that a lessee could either surrender or resist the possession of the property by the secured creditor. In the former case, the lease would stand determined even if the property be in the legal possession of the lessee but in the latter case, the authorized officer shall refer the dispute to the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate who shall then, in accordance to the principles of natural justice, validate the lease and accordingly award possession of the property to the lessee or the secured creditor. Further, the Court set aside a Judgment of the Bombay High Court and the views taken in the case of M/s Trade Well v. Indian Bank [2007 CRI. L.J. 2544], observing that the appellants, however, had no remedy under the SARFAESI (Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest) Act for moving the Debts Recovery Tribunal. Concluding, the Court set aside the previous orders passed by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate asking of him to pass fresh orders in accordance with the Court's judgment and any other law that may be relevant, after hearing the appellants and the secured creditors.  

 Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 736 OF 2014
(Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No.1666 of 2012)

Harshad Govardhan Sondagar v. International Assets Reconstruction Co. Ltd. & Ors.,

 Dated: April 3, 2014
Citation: (2014) 6 SCC 1
A. K. PATNAIK, J.

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Once a lease expires,it bounden duty of lessee to put lessor into possession of leased premises.

1. Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 defines a lease of an immovable property as a transfer of a right to enjoy immovable property for a certain time, or in perpetuity, in consideration of a price paid or promised, or of money, a share of crops, service or any other thing of value, to be rendered periodically or on specified occasions to the transferor by the transferee who accepts the transfer on such terms. The transferor is called the lessor and the transferee is called the lessee. The price is called the premium and the money, share, service or other thing to be so rendered is called the rent. 

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Whether Govt can terminate lease granted by it if lessees committed breach of terms of contract?

The Court then proceeded to hold that leases in question were given for a period of 30 years containing clause of perpetual renewal. It then found that the lessees have option to terminate the lease but so long as they continue as lessee, it is not possible for the Government to terminate lease unless lessees committed breach of terms of the contract or failed to pay the rent. The Court 

positively found that the leases have got a character which is akin to a perpetual lease. 

Bombay High Court

Smt. Jaikumari Amarbahadursingh vs The State Of Maharashtra, Through on 30 September, 2008

Bench: A.M. Khanwilkar, R. C. Chavan

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A lease is a transfer of an estate of inheritance, it does not terminate with death of original lessee

We, therefore, find that a monthly tenancy is a heritable asset. A monthly tenancy, that is to say, a tenancy from month to month, is of indefinite duration until it is brought te aa end by notice to quit. There is, of course, no question of a notice to quit having been served, so far as this case is concerned. I have also pointed out above, how under the Hindu Law Ishwariprasad became one of the heirs of Prasadifal, since the deceased had no widow or children, or parents alive at the time of his death. The next question is whether an heir of a lessee would incur liability, only if he entered into possession. A lease is a transfer of an estate of inheritance, it does not terminate with the death of the original lessee, but sur-vives during the remainder of the term to his heirs and representatives. Maharaja Tej Chand v. Sreekanth Ghosh, (1844) 3 Moo Ind App 261 (PC), Denoollah v. Amanutoolah, (1871) 16 WR 147. Both under the English law and the Indian law, an assignee of a lease is liable by privity of estate whether he enters into posses-sion or not (see Kunhanujan v. Anjelu, (1889) ILR 17 Mad 296, Monica v. Subraya Hebbara, (1807) ILR 30 Mad 410 and Ram Kinkar Banerjee v. Satya Charan Srimani, 66 Ind App 50 at p. 58: (AIR 1989 PC 14 at p. 16). Since it is an estate of inheritance, upon the death of the lessee the estate devolves on the heir and vests in him by operation of law. In case where the estate vests by operation of law, it may be said that privity of estate is created in the same way as in the case of an assignee. For example, in bankruptcy an estate vests in the assignee in bankruptcy. In the case of bankruptcy, however, there is a special provision by which an onerous estate may be disclaimed. There is no such provision in the ease of an ordinary heir (See Titterton v. Cooper, (1882) 9 QBD 473). Or course, an heir of a lessee may terminate the lease by giving a notice to quit. The position seems to be as follows; Under the Hindu law, Ishwariprasad became an heir with regard to the lease-hold property namely, the monthly tenancy. Upon the death of Prasadi-lal, his estate vested in his heirs including Ishwariprasad. I do not see why liability as a lessee should await the taking of possession. Mr. Sen, however, appearing on behalf of the respondent has cited a Nagpur decision which I shall now proceed to consider. In Rajib Husain v. Nawab Yanuskhan, AIR 1937 Nag 321 Vivian Bose J., was considering the case of a tenancy, which in the absence of any evidence as to the terms thereof, was held to be a tenancy from month to month under Section 106 of T. P. Act. The learned Judge said as follows:

"There is no doubt from the definition of lease given in Section 105 that a lease is a transfer of an interest in land, and there is equally no doubt that the right to land or of an interest in it is ordinarily heritable. Even the learned counsel for the appellant conceded that a lease for a definite term would be heritable and that the heir of a deceased lessee would succeed to the remainder of the term..... Now, even if a lease from month to month is nothing but a lease for a succession of definite terms each of a month's duration, still if the lessee were to die before its termination, it would follow that his heir must, on this admission, succeed at least to the unexpired portion of the month in which the death occurs. Therefore, he would Become a lessee for that period, however short it might be. After that, even if it be assumed that the original lease expires at the end of the month; the heir would be a lessee holding over within the meaning of Section 116 and not a trespasser, and would thus, in his turn, be deemed to be a lessee from month to month en the old conditions.

Calcutta High Court

Mannalal Serowgie vs Ishwariprasad Jain And Anr. on 10 August, 1965

Equivalent citations: AIR 1966 Cal 447

Bench: D Sinha, S Masud

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