SC Clarifies: Failure Of Conspiracy Charge Does Not Erase Individual Guilt In Bribery Traps

As rightly observed by the High Court, there was neither proof of demand nor acceptance by A1 but for the statement of PW1 that A2 demanded the bribe on behalf of A1. There can be no reliance placed on such statement made by the co-Accused and there can be no conviction entered into on that account. We are, however, inclined and persuaded to set aside the acquittal against A2 and restore the order of the Trial Court convicting him for the offence Under Section 7 of the PC Act; there being no conspiracy Under Section 120B of Indian Penal Code established.{Para 30}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. ... of 2026 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 12486 of 2025)

Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. Baljeet Singh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

K. Vinod Chandran and P.V. Sanjay Kumar, JJ.

Author: K. Vinod Chandran, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 221,MANU/SC/0220/2026

 Decided On: 10.03.2026

Print Page

Questions and answers on law (Part 91)

 Q  When A B &C conspires , B and C having a separate communication, can A be held liable? 

Ans:- Yes—A can be held liable, but only if the prosecution proves that A was a party to the same agreement or common design; the mere fact that B and C later had a separate communication does not by itself make A liable for everything said or done between them. Under Section 120A IPC, the essence of criminal conspiracy is the agreement of two or more persons to do an illegal act, or a legal act by illegal means, and Section 120B IPC punishes anyone who is a party to that conspiracy.

Core principle

Print Page

Bombay HC: Whether offence under S 120B of IPC (Criminal Conspiracy) is attracted against Corporate body if its directors Conspire to Defraud Investors?

  The next contention raised on behalf of the applicant is that the offence under Section 120-B of the IPC (criminal conspiracy) cannot apply, since the company Finnmart is not a living or biological person. This argument, however, does not hold good in its absolute sense. The material placed before the Court does not suggest that the alleged conspiracy was only between the complainant and the company Finnmart. On the contrary, the case of the prosecution is that the applicant, along with other co-accused persons, in connivance, hatched a conspiracy to cheat innocent investors by inducing them to part with their hard-earned money on the false promise of extraordinary returns. The law under Section 120-B IPC clearly recognises that conspiracy is essentially an agreement between two or more persons to do an unlawful act. When natural persons are involved in designing and executing such a fraudulent scheme, the non-biological character of a company does not in any way take away the offence of conspiracy. The individuals who control, plan and execute the scheme can always be held liable for entering into a conspiracy. {Para 35}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Bail Application No. 1175 of 2025

Decided On: 04.09.2025

Milind Satish Sawant Vs. The State of Maharashtra

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Amit B. Borkar, J.

Citation:  MANU/MH/5408/2025,2025:BHC-AS:37033.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

Print Page

Separate Charge Framing for Criminal Conspiracy: Understanding the Distinction Between Section 120B and Substantive Offences in Indian Criminal Law

 Introduction

One of the fundamental principles in criminal jurisprudence is that "for every distinct offence there shall be a separate charge and every charge should be tried separately." This principle becomes particularly significant when dealing with criminal conspiracy under Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) alongside substantive offences. The question of whether conspiracy charges should be framed separately from the main offence has been a subject of considerable legal discourse, with courts consistently establishing that these constitute fundamentally different offences requiring separate treatment.

The Legal Foundation for Separate Charges

Print Page

Can the court convict the accused for an offence of criminal conspiracy if there is no physical manifestation of agreement to commit the crime?

Apart from the fact that the Appellant by himself could not have operated the strong room and the safe of the Bank without the presence of the officer who was in the custody of the other set of keys, it is also important to note that the prosecution completely failed in adducing any evidence to indicate the existence of any agreement between the Appellant on the one hand and A-1 and A-2 on the other. The link necessary for proving the charge of conspiracy is entirely missing. {Para 21}

22. The principal ingredient of the offence of criminal conspiracy Under Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code is an agreement to commit an offence. Such an agreement must be proved through direct or circumstantial evidence. Court has to necessarily ascertain whether there was an agreement between the Appellant and A-1 and A-2. In the decision of State of Kerala v. P. Sugathan and Anr. MANU/SC/0601/2000 : (2000) 8 SCC 203, this Court noted that an agreement forms the core of the offence of conspiracy, and it must surface in evidence through some physical manifestation:

12. ...As in all other criminal offences, the prosecution has to discharge its onus of proving the case against the Accused beyond reasonable doubt. ...A few bits here and a few bits there on which the prosecution relies cannot be held to be adequate for connecting the Accused with the commission of the crime of criminal conspiracy...

13. ...The most important ingredient of the offence being the agreement between two or more persons to do an illegal act. In a case where criminal conspiracy is alleged, the court must inquire whether the two persons are independently pursuing the same end or they have come together to pursue the unlawful object. The former does not render them conspirators but the latter does. For the offence of conspiracy some kind of physical manifestation of agreement is required to be established. The express agreement need not be proved. The evidence as to the transmission of thoughts sharing the unlawful act is not sufficient...

(emphasis supplied)

23. The charge of conspiracy alleged by the prosecution against the Appellant must evidence explicit acts or conduct on his part, manifesting conscious and apparent concurrence of a common design with A-1 and A-2. In State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu MANU/SC/0465/2005 : (2005) 11 SCC 600, this Court held:

101. One more principle which deserves notice is that the cumulative effect of the proved circumstances should be taken into account in determining the guilt of the Accused rather than adopting an isolated approach to each of the circumstances. Of course, each one of the circumstances should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Lastly, in regard to the appreciation of evidence relating to the conspiracy, the Court must take care to see that the acts or conduct of the parties must be conscious and clear enough to infer their concurrence as to the common design and its execution.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1066 of 2010

Decided On: 25.08.2022

 Ram Sharan Chaturvedi Vs.  The State of Madhya Pradesh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.R. Gavai and Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, JJ.

Author: Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/1048/2022

Print Page

Notes on Criminal Conspiracy

S 120 A Criminal Conspiracy

When two or more persons agree to do or cause to be done-

a) an illegal act,or

b) a legal act by illegal means-

such an agreement is called a criminal conspiracy.

Mere agreement to commit an offence amounts to criminal conspiracy and is therefore an offence.Gist of offence of conspiracy is the bare agreement to break the law.

Print Page

Landmark Supreme Court judgment on conspiracy in criminal case

We find from the judgment that the Courts below have committed an error in first holding the existence of conspiracy and proceeding on that basis and then taking tit-bits in evidence to suggest that those tit-bits would connect the accused with the conspiracy as the conspirators. The law on conspiracy has been stated time and again by this Court. In Major E.G. Barsay v. State of Bombay reported in AIR 1961 SC 1762, Subba Rao, J. observed:

"The gist of the offence is an agreement to break the law. The parties to such an agreement will be guilty of criminal conspiracy, though the illegal act agreed to be done has not been done. So too, it is not an ingredient of the offence that all the parties should agree to do a single illegal act."

In Halsbury's Laws of England the definition of conspiracy is as under:

"Conspiracy consists in the agreement of two or more persons to do an unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by unlawful means. It is an indictable offence at common law. The essence of the offence of conspiracy is the fact of combination by agreement. The agreement may be express or implied or in part express and in part implied.. and the offence continues to be committed so long as the combination persists, that is until the conspiratorial agreement is terminated by completion of its performance or by abandonment or frustration or however it may be".

In American Jurisprudence, 2nd Edn., Vol.16, Page 129, the following definition of conspiracy is given: "A conspiracy is said to be an agreement between two or more persons to accomplish together a criminal or unlawful act or to achieve by criminal or unlawful means an act not in itself criminal or unlawful ... The unlawful agreement and not its accomplishment is the gist or essence of the crime of conspiracy." Lastly, in celebrated case of Kehar Singh & ors. v. State (Delhi Administration) [1988 (3) SCC 609] it was observed by Jagannatha Shetty, J.:

"The gist of the offence of conspiracy then lies, not in doing the act, or effecting the purpose for which the conspiracy is formed, nor in attempting to do them, nor in inciting others to do them, but in the forming of the scheme or agreement between the parties. Agreement is essential. Mere knowledge, or even discussion, of the plan is not, per se enough" (emphasis ours) In the celebrated judgment of State v. Nalini & Ors. [1999 (5) SCC 253] S.S.M. Mohd. Quadri, J. relying upon Van Riper vs. United States (13 F 2d. 961) (2 nd Cir, 1926) observed:

"When men enter into an agreement for an unlawful end, they become ad hoc agents for one another and have made a partnership in crime."

Other celebrated decisions on the question of conspiracy are Yashpal Mittal v. State of Punjab [1977 (4) SCC 540] as also the State of Himachal Pradesh v. Krishan Lal Pradhan & Ors. [1987 (2) SCC 17]. It has been held in Mohd. Khalid v. State of West Bengal [2002 (7) SCC 334] and in Mohammed Usman Mohd. Hussain Maniyar v. State of Maharashatra [1981 (2) SCC 443] that the agreement amongst the conspirators can be inferred by necessary implication. All these cases together came to be considered in State of NCT of Delhi v. Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru[2005 (11) SCC 600] where even the celebrated judgments of V.C. Shukla vs. State [1980 (2) SCC 665], came to be considered wherein it was observed by Fazal Ali, J.:

"In most cases it will be difficult to get direct evidence of the agreement, but a conspiracy can be inferred even from circumstances giving rise to a conclusive or irresistible inference of an agreement between two or more persons to commit an offence."

56. It is significant at this stage to note the observations in V.C. Shukla (cited supra) wherein it was laid that in order to prove criminal conspiracy, there must be evidence direct or circumstances to show that there was an agreement between two or more persons to commit an offence. It was further held that there must be a meeting of minds resulting in ultimate decision taken by the conspirators regarding the commission of the offence and where the factum of conspiracy is sought to be inferred even from circumstances giving rise to a conclusive or irresistible inference of an agreement between two or more persons to commit an offence. Relying on that, Pasayat, J. in Esher Singh v. State of A.P. [2004 (11) SCC 585] observed that the prosecution has to discharge its onus of proving the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances in a case, when taken together on their face value, should indicate the meeting of the minds between the conspirators for the intended object of committing an illegal act or an act which is not illegal, by illegal means. A few bits here and a few bits there on which the prosecution relies cannot be held to be adequate for connecting the accused with the commission of the crime of criminal conspiracy. It has to be shown that all means adopted and illegal acts done were in furtherance of the object of conspiracy hatched. The circumstances relied for the purposes of drawing an inference should be prior in point of time than the actual commission of the offence in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy.

57. In Esher Singh's case (cited supra) this Court held that the conspiracy was proved between the nine accused. A systematic role played by each accused was highlighted. Pasayat, J. in that judgment also considered the decision in Bhagwan Swarup Lal Bishan Lal etc.etc vs. State of Maharashtra [AIR 1965 SC 682] and observed that there is no difference between the mode of proof of the offence of conspiracy and that of any other offence. The other decisions in State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa [JT 1996 (4) SC 615]), Ajay Aggarwal v. Union of India & Ors. [1993 (3) SCC 609] as also Mohd. Usman's case (cited supra) and Yashpal Mittal (cited supra) were considered in that decision. The law laid down in Ajay Agrawal's case (cited supra) was reiterated and it was held that it is not necessary that each conspirator must know all the details of the scheme nor be a participant at every stage. It is necessary that they should agree for design or object of the conspiracy. Conspiracy is conceived as having three elements: (1) agreement; (2) between two or more persons by whom the agreement is effected; and (3) a criminal object, which may be either the ultimate aim of the agreement, or may constitute the means, or one of the means by which that aim is to be accomplished. These decisions were thereafter considered in Navjot Sandhu's case (cited supra). In K.R. Purushothaman v. State of Kerala [2005 (12) SCC 631] a specific observation was made to the effect that all conspirators need not take active part in the commission of each and every conspiratorial act but, mere knowledge, even discussion, of the plan would not constitute conspiracy. It was further observed that each one of the circumstances should be proved beyond reasonable doubt and such circumstances proved must form a chain of events from which the only irresistible conclusion is about the guilt of the accused which can be safely drawn and no other hypothesis of the guilt is possible. We respectfully agree with the law laid down in Navjot Sandhu's case and K.R. Purushothaman's case.

Supreme Court of India

John Pandian vs State Rep.By Inspector Of ... on 3 December, 2010

Author: V Sirpurkar

Bench: V.S. Sirpurkar, Cyriac Joseph

Read full judgment here; click here

Print Page

Whether mere agreement to commit offence constitute offence of criminal conspiracy?

 In State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu alias Afsan Guru, (2005) 11 SCC 600, this Court after analyzing the history of the offence of conspiracy held as follows:

88. Earlier to the introduction of Sections 120-A and 120-B, conspiracy per se was not an offence under the Penal Code except in respect of the offence mentioned in Section 121-A. However, abetment by conspiracy was and still remains to be an ingredient of abetment under clause secondly of Section 107 IPC. The punishment therefor is provided under various sections viz.Sections 108 to 117. Whereas under Section 120-A, the essence of the offence of criminal conspiracy is a bare agreement to commit the offence, the abetment under Section 107 requires the commission of some act or illegal omission pursuant to the conspiracy. A charge underSections 107/109 should therefore be in combination with a substantive offence, whereas the charge under Sections 120-A/120-B could be an independent charge.

89. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons to the Amendment Bill, it was explicitly stated that the new provisions (120-A and 120-B) were "designed to assimilate the provisions of the Penal Code to those of the English Law....". Thus, Sections 120-A and 120-B made conspiracy a substantive offence and rendered the mere agreement to commit an offence punishable. Even if an overt act does not take place pursuant to the illegal agreement, the offence of conspiracy would still be attracted. The passages from Russell on Crimes, the House of Lords decision in Quinn v. Leathem and the address of Willes, J. to the Jury in Mulcahy v. R. are often quoted in the decisions of this Court. The passage in Russell on Crimes referred to by Jagannatha Shetty, J. in Kehar Singh case (SCC at p. 731, para 271) is quite apposite:

"The gist of the offence of conspiracy then lies, not in doing the act, or effecting the purpose for which the conspiracy is formed, nor in attempting to do them, nor in inciting others to do them, but in the forming of the scheme or agreement between the parties. Agreement is essential. Mere knowledge, or even discussion, of the plan is not, per se, enough."

Supreme Court of India

R.Dineshkumar@Deena vs State Rep. By Inspector Of Police ... on 16 March, 2015

Bench: J. Chelameswar, C. Nagappan

Read full judgment here; click here

Print Page