SC Clarifies: Failure Of Conspiracy Charge Does Not Erase Individual Guilt In Bribery Traps

As rightly observed by the High Court, there was neither proof of demand nor acceptance by A1 but for the statement of PW1 that A2 demanded the bribe on behalf of A1. There can be no reliance placed on such statement made by the co-Accused and there can be no conviction entered into on that account. We are, however, inclined and persuaded to set aside the acquittal against A2 and restore the order of the Trial Court convicting him for the offence Under Section 7 of the PC Act; there being no conspiracy Under Section 120B of Indian Penal Code established.{Para 30}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. ... of 2026 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 12486 of 2025)

Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. Baljeet Singh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

K. Vinod Chandran and P.V. Sanjay Kumar, JJ.

Author: K. Vinod Chandran, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 221,MANU/SC/0220/2026

 Decided On: 10.03.2026

Print Page

Supreme Court Commutes Death Penalty Of Man Convicted For Murder & Sexual Assault Of 4 Year Old stating that Possibility Of Reformation Can't Be Ruled Out

 Sentence:

32. The Trial Court has imposed the sentence of death and the High Court has confirmed the same. It is time for us to draw up a balance sheet of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances to decide whether the case falls in the category of rarest of rare case. We also need to examine whether the sentence of life imprisonment is foreclosed and the possibility of reformation is completely ruled out.

33. Without doubt, the crime committed by the appellant was diabolic in character. He enticed the innocent child by tempting him with ice-cream and brutally sodomized and murdered the four-year old. The appellant also mercilessly strangulated the deceased. The post-mortem report clearly indicated that death was due to asphyxia by throttling.

34. On the mitigating side, the appellant was 24 years of age when the incident happened; he had no criminal antecedents; the appellant hails from a low socio-economic household as the Mitigation Investigation Report filed by Ms. Komal of Project 39A, pursuant to the order of this Court dated 05.10.2023 indicates. The mitigation report further indicates that experts have opined that the appellant is diagnosed with moderate intensity psychotic features and intellectual disability and that the appellant had in his early childhood contacted Tuberculosis Meningitis (TBM). The appellant, according to the report, maintains family ties with his 64-year-old mother who takes care of his 10 year old daughter. The appellant's wife has deserted him.

35. By an order of 05.10.2023, we also called for the conduct and behaviour of the appellant from the Superintendent of Vadodara Central Jail as well as a report on his mental health. The report from the Superintendent of Vadoara Jail indicates, that the behaviour of the appellant in prison is completely normal and that his conduct in jail is good. The report from the Hospital for Mental Health indicates that the appellant has no psychiatric problem at present. The report does indicate a feeling of remorse in the appellant. The appellant has contended that the projective test adopted by the Hospital for Mental Health has its limitations for reliability. Be that as it may.

36. Considering the overall facts and circumstances, we hold that the present is not a case where it can be said that the possibility of reformation is completely ruled out. The option of life imprisonment is also not foreclosed. The case does not fall in the category of rarest of rare case. We are of the opinion that ends of justice would be met if we adopt the path carved out in Swami Shraddananda v. State of Karnataka (2008) 13 SCC 767.

37. Even though the case of the appellant falls short of the rarest of rare category, considering the nature of the crime, we are strongly of the view that a sentence of life imprisonment which normally works out for 14 years would be grossly disproportionate and inadequate. Having regard to the nature of the offence, a sentence of imprisonment for a prescribed period without remission would alone be proportionate to the crime and also not jeopardize the public confidence in the efficacy of the legal system.

38. This Court recently in Nawas Alias Mulanavas v. State of Kerala 2024 SCC OnLine SC 315, adverting to this aspect had the following to say:—

“29. How much is too much and how much is too little? This is the difficult area we have tried to address here. As rightly observed, there can be no straitjacket formulae. Pegging the point up to which remission powers cannot be invoked is an exercise that has to be carefully undertaken and the discretion should be exercised on reasonable grounds. The spectrum is very large. The principle in Swamy Shraddananda (supra) as affirmed in V. Sriharan (supra) was evolved as the normally accepted norm of 14 years was found to be grossly disproportionate on the lower side. At the same time, since it is a matter concerning the liberty of the individual, courts should also guard against any disproportion in the imposition, on the higher side too. A delicate balance has to be struck. While undue leniency, which will affect the public confidence and the efficacy of the legal system, should not be shown, at the same time, since a good part of the convict's life with freedom is being sliced away (except in cases where the Court decides to impose imprisonment till rest of the full life), in view of his incarceration, care should be taken that the period fixed is also not harsh and excessive. While by the very nature of the task mathematical exactitude is an impossibility, that will not deter the Court from imposing a period of sentence which will constitute “a just dessert” for the convict…..”

39. Applying this principle, we hold that a sentence of imprisonment for a period of 25 (twenty-five) years without remission would be ‘a just dessert’.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

(Before B.R. Gavai, Aravind Kumar and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ.)

Criminal Appeal Nos. _________ of 2024

(@ Special Leave Petition (Crl.) Nos. 9015-9016 of 2019)

Sambhubhai Raisangbhai Padhiyar Vs State of Gujarat 

Decided on December 17, 2024

Citation: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3769,2024 INSC 987.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

Print Page

Under which circumstances not conducting DNA test is not fatal to the prosecution case of Rape?

 The argument of Ms. Uttara Babbar, learned senior counsel is that no DNA test was carried out. No doubt, the DNA test was not carried out and it would have been better for the prosecution to have done the same. However, keeping the overall conspectus of the case in mind, we do not think that not conducting DNA test was fatal to the prosecution. We draw support from the judgment of this Court in Veerendra v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2022) 8 SCC 668, wherein it was held as under:

“53. In view of the nature of the provision under Section 53-ACrPC and the decisions referred to, we are also of the considered view that the lapse or omission (purposeful or otherwise) to carry out DNA profiling, by itself, cannot be permitted to decide the fate of a trial for the offence of rape especially, when it is combined with the commission of the offence of murder as in case of acquittal only on account of such a flaw or defect in the investigation the cause of criminal justice would become the victim. The upshot of this discussion is that even if such a flaw had occurred in the investigation in a given case, the court has still a duty to consider whether the materials and evidence available on record before it, are enough and cogent to prove the case of the prosecution. In a case which rests on circumstantial evidence, the Court has to consider whether, despite such a lapse, the various links in the chain of circumstances form a complete chain pointing to the guilt of the accused alone in exclusion of all hypothesis of innocence in his favour.”{Para 26}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

(Before B.R. Gavai, Aravind Kumar and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ.)

Criminal Appeal Nos. _________ of 2024

(@ Special Leave Petition (Crl.) Nos. 9015-9016 of 2019)

Sambhubhai Raisangbhai Padhiyar Vs State of Gujarat 

Decided on December 17, 2024

Citation: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3769,2024 INSC 987.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

Print Page

Under which circumstances Matching of Blood Group of accused with blood group of victim becomes additional link in the chain of circumstances for convicting him?

 Circumstance No. 5 : Matching of Blood Group

25. Blood group on the clothes of the deceased tallied with the blood group of the accused as per Exh.50, the Serological Analysis Report. PW-9 the father of the deceased identified the clothes worn by the deceased on the fateful day. PW-17 the Investigating Officer Gajendra Kumar has clearly deposed that the apparel of the deceased was recovered near the situs of the crime. PW-7 Dr. Kamlesh Kumar who medically examined the appellant deposed that samples of pubic hair, blood, saliva, semen and nails were obtained of the accused and he further deposed that the samples were sealed and the Muddamal was sent for further investigation through police constable to FSL, Surat. Coming back to PW-17, he deposed about receiving the sealed samples and keeping it in safe custody. Thereafter, he deposed that a forwarding note was prepared for analysis of the aforementioned Muddamal and the sealed samples to FSL, Surat and that a constable was deputed to submit the same to FSL, Surat. The receipt obtained was duly filed. The Biological and Serological Reports received from FSL, Surat were marked as Exh.49 and Exh.50 respectively. The Serological analysis clearly showed that the small trouser (leggings), the anal swab (semen) and the perianal swab (semen) had blood of group O. The accused had also blood group O. We are satisfied with the chain of custody as emerging from the evidence. The defence has a case that sample mark H mentioned in Exh.47 which is the forwarding letter to the forensic science laboratory has neither been analyzed in the biological analysis Exh.49 or in the serological analysis Exh.50 and hence tampering cannot be ruled out. The State has countered the submission by contending that sample mark ‘H’ in Exh.47 is a Khaki cover and is not an item recovered from the accused and as such the State counsel contends that in all likelihood sample mark H was a cover in which all other samples were put. The matching of the blood group has occurred in sample F1 which is the anal swab (semen) and F2 perianal swab (semen). The blood group of the aforesaid semen was found to be O. It should be noted that the sample of semen of appellant along with blood and saliva in sample no. G1 to G4 also had blood group O. The judgment in Prakash v. State of Karnataka (2014) 12 SCC 133 cited by the appellant also does not advance the case of the defence. It is clear from the facts of the case, that the blood sample therein was decomposed and its original grouping could not be determined. In any event, coupled with other circumstances indicated hereinabove, we are inclined to consider the matching of blood group as an additional link in the chain as far as the facts of this case is concerned.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

(Before B.R. Gavai, Aravind Kumar and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ.)

Criminal Appeal Nos. _________ of 2024

(@ Special Leave Petition (Crl.) Nos. 9015-9016 of 2019)

Sambhubhai Raisangbhai Padhiyar Vs State of Gujarat 

Decided on December 17, 2024

Citation: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3769,2024 INSC 987.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

Print Page

Under which circumstances the conduct of accused becomes additional link in the chain of circumstances for convicting him?

Circumstance No. 4 : Conduct under Section 8 of the Evidence Act:

24. Irrespective of the admissibility of the discovery, panchnama (Exh.18) and the recovery panchnama Exh. 21 and irrespective of the admissibility of the recovery of the clothes of the deceased on the statement of the accused, we find that the conduct of the appellant in leading the investigation team and the panchas and pointing out where the apparel of the deceased was hidden would be admissible. In this case PW-17, the Investigating Officer has clearly deposed that the accused showed willingness to show the place where he had thrown the clothes. PW-17, his team and the panchas reached by walking to the place as indicated by the accused. This Court in A.N. Venkatesh v. State of Karnataka (2005) 7 SCC 714 relying on Prakash Chand v. State (Delhi Admn.), (1979) 3 SCC 90 held as under:

“9. By virtue of Section 8 of the Evidence Act, the conduct of the accused person is relevant, if such conduct influences or is influenced by any fact in issue or relevant fact. The evidence of the circumstance, simpliciter, that the accused pointed out to the police officer, the place where the dead body of the kidnapped boy was found and on their pointing out the body was exhumed, would be admissible as conduct under Section 8 irrespective of the fact whether the statement made by the accused contemporaneously with or antecedent to such conduct falls within the purview of Section 27 or not as held by this Court in Prakash Chand v. State (Delhi Admn.) [(1979) 3 SCC 90 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 656 : AIR 1979 SC 400]. Even if we hold that the disclosure statement made by the accused-appellants (Exts. P-15 and P-16) is not admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, still it is relevant under Section 8. The evidence of the investigating officer and PWs 1, 2, 7 and PW 4 the spot mahazar witness that the accused had taken them to the spot and pointed out the place where the dead body was buried, is an admissible piece of evidence under Section 8 as the conduct of the accused. Presence of A-1 and A-2 at a place where ransom demand was to be fulfilled and their action of fleeing on spotting the police party is a relevant circumstance and are admissible under Section 8 of the Evidence Act.”

We take this as an additional link in the chain of circumstances.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

(Before B.R. Gavai, Aravind Kumar and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ.)

Criminal Appeal Nos. _________ of 2024

(@ Special Leave Petition (Crl.) Nos. 9015-9016 of 2019)

Sambhubhai Raisangbhai Padhiyar Vs State of Gujarat 

Decided on December 17, 2024

Citation: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3769,2024 INSC 987.

Print Page

Supreme Court: Even if disclosure statement made by Accused is not admissible U/S 27 of Evidence Act but it is relevant U/S 8 of evidence Act as his conduct

 e) The conduct of the Appellant in leading the Investigating Officer and others to a drain nearby his house and the discovery of the knife from the drain is a relevant fact Under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. In other words, the evidence of the circumstance simpliciter that the Appellant pointed out to the Investigating Officer the place where he threw away the weapon of offence i.e., knife would be admissible as 'conduct' Under Section 8 irrespective of the fact whether the statement made by the Accused contemporaneously with or antecedent to such conduct falls within the purview of Section 27 of the Evidence Act.

59. Even while discarding the evidence in the form of discovery panchnama, the conduct of the Appellant herein would be relevant Under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. The evidence of discovery would be admissible as conduct Under Section 8 of the Evidence Act quite apart from the admissibility of the disclosure statement Under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, as this Court observed in A.N. Venkatesh and Anr. v. State of Karnataka,   MANU/SC/0468/2005 : (2005) 7 SCC 714:

9. By virtue of Section 8 of the Evidence Act, the conduct of the Accused person is relevant, if such conduct influences or is influenced by any fact in issue or relevant fact. The evidence of the circumstance, simpliciter, that the Accused pointed out to the police officer, the place where the dead body of the kidnapped boy was found and on their pointing out the body was exhumed, would be admissible as conduct Under Section 8 irrespective of the fact whether the statement made by the Accused contemporaneously with or antecedent to such conduct falls within the purview of Section 27 or not as held by this Court in Prakash Chand v. State (Delhi Admn.) [  MANU/SC/0147/1978 : 1978:INSC:234 : (1979) 3 SCC 90: 1979 SCC (Cri) 656: AIR 1979 SC 400]. Even if we hold that the disclosure statement made by the Accused-Appellants (Ex. P-15 and P-16) is not admissible Under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, still it is relevant Under Section 8. ...

The conduct, in order to be admissible, must be such that it has close nexus with a fact in issue or relevant fact. Explanation 1 makes it clear that the mere statements as distinguished from acts do not constitute "conduct" unless those statements "accompany and explain acts other than statements". Such statements accompanying the acts are considered to be evidence of res gestae. 

206. We have already noticed the distinction highlighted in Prakash Chand case (supra) between the conduct of an Accused which is admissible Under Section 8 and the statement made to a police officer in the course of an investigation which is hit by Section 162 Code of Criminal Procedure The evidence of the circumstance, simpliciter, that the Accused pointed out to the police officer, the place where stolen articles or weapons used in the commission of the offence were hidden, would be admissible as "conduct" Under Section 8 irrespective of the fact whether the statement made by the Accused contemporaneously with or antecedent to such conduct, falls within the purview of Section 27, as pointed out in Prakash Chand case. In Om Prakash case (supra) this Court held that: (SCC p.262, para 14)

Even apart from the admissibility of the information Under Section 27, the evidence of the investigating officer and the panchas that the Accused had taken them to PW 11 (from whom he purchased the weapon) and pointed him out and as corroborated by PW 11 himself would be admissible Under Section 8 of the Evidence Act as conduct of the Accused.

(Emphasis supplied)

61. However, in the aforesaid context, we would like to sound a note of caution. Although the conduct of an Accused may be a relevant fact Under Section 8 of the Evidence Act, yet the same, by itself, cannot be a ground to convict him or hold him guilty and that too, for a serious offence like murder. Like any other piece of evidence, the conduct of an Accused is also one of the circumstances which the court may take into consideration along with the other evidence on record, direct or indirect. What we are trying to convey is that the conduct of the Accused alone, though may be relevant Under Section 8 of the Evidence Act, cannot form the basis of conviction.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 437 of 2015

Decided On: 03.05.2024

Anees Vs. The State Govt. of NCT

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, C.J.I., J.B. Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0379/2024,2024 INSC 368.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.Click here.

Print Page

What are exceptions to the rule that burden of proof is on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the Accused ?

i. Principles of law governing the applicability of Section 106 of the Evidence Act

35. Section 106 of the Evidence Act reads as follows:

106. Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge.- When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.

Illustration

(a) When a person does an act with some intention other than that which the character and circumstances of the act suggest, the burden of proving that intention is upon him.

(b) A is charged with travelling on a railway without a ticket. The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him.

36. Section 106 of the Evidence Act referred to above provides that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. The word "especially" means facts that are pre-eminently or exceptionally within the knowledge of the Accused. The ordinary Rule that applies to the criminal trials that the onus lies on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the Accused is not in any way modified by the Rule of facts embodied in Section 106 of the Evidence Act. Section 106 of the Evidence Act is an exception to Section 101 of the Evidence Act. Section 101 with its illustration (a) lays down the general Rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult, for the prosecution to establish the facts which are, "especially within the knowledge of the Accused and which, he can prove without difficulty or inconvenience".

37. In Shambhu Nath Mehra v. The State of Ajmer   MANU/SC/0023/1956 : 1956:INSC:15 : AIR 1956 SC 404, this Court while considering the word "especially" employed in Section 106 of the Evidence Act speaking through Vivian Bose, J., observed as under:

11. ... The word "especially" stresses that it means facts that are pre-eminently or exceptionally within his knowledge. If the Section were to be interpreted otherwise, it would lead to the very startling conclusion that in a murder case the burden lies on the Accused to prove that he did not commit the murder because who could know better than he whether he did or did not.

22. Thus, Section 106 of the Evidence Act will apply to those cases where the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts which are within the special knowledge of the Accused. When the Accused fails to offer proper explanation about the existence of said other facts, the court can always draw an appropriate inference.

23. When a case is resting on circumstantial evidence, if the Accused fails to offer a reasonable explanation in discharge of burden placed on him by virtue of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, such a failure may provide an additional link to the chain of circumstances. In a case governed by circumstantial evidence, if the chain of circumstances which is required to be established by the prosecution is not established, the failure of the Accused to discharge the burden Under Section 106 of the Evidence Act is not relevant at all. When the chain is not complete, falsity of the defence is no ground to convict the Accused.

(Emphasis supplied)

39. In Tulshiram Sahadu Suryawanshi and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra,   MANU/SC/0748/2012 : 2012:INSC:401 : (2012) 10 SCC 373, this Court observed as under:

23. It is settled law that presumption of fact is a Rule in law of evidence that a fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred from certain other proved facts. When inferring the existence of a fact from other set of proved facts, the court exercises a process of reasoning and reaches a logical conclusion as the most probable position. The above position is strengthened in view of Section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872. It empowers the court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened. In that process, the courts shall have regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct, etc. in addition to the facts of the case. In these circumstances, the principles embodied in Section 106 of the Evidence Act can also be utilised. We make it clear that this Section is not intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of the Accused beyond reasonable doubt, but it would apply to cases where the prosecution has succeeded in proving facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts, unless the Accused by virtue of his special knowledge regarding such facts, failed to offer any explanation which might drive the court to draw a different inference. It is useful to quote the following observation in State of W.B. v. Mir Mohammad Omar and Ors. [  MANU/SC/0535/2000 : 2000:INSC:422 : (2000) 8 SCC 382: 2000 SCC (Cri) 1516]: (SCC p. 393, para 38)

38. Vivian Bose, J., had observed that Section 106 of the Evidence Act is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible for the prosecution to establish certain facts which are particularly within the knowledge of the Accused. In Shambhu Nath Mehra v. The State of Ajmer [  MANU/SC/0023/1956 : 1956:INSC:15 : AIR 1956 SC 404: 1956 Cri LJ 794] the learned Judge has stated the legal principle thus:

11. This lays down the general Rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult, for the prosecution to establish facts which are "especially" within the knowledge of the Accused and which he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience.

The word "especially" stresses that. It means facts that are pre-eminently or exceptionally within his knowledge.

(Emphasis supplied)

The law does not enjoin a duty on the prosecution to lead evidence of such character which is almost impossible to be led or at any rate extremely difficult to be led. The duty on the prosecution is to lead such evidence which it is capable of leading, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. Here it is necessary to keep in mind Section 106 of the Evidence Act which says that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Illustration (b) appended to this Section throws some light on the content and scope of this provision and it reads:

(b) A is charged with travelling on a railway without ticket. The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him.

15. Where an offence like murder is committed in secrecy inside a house, the initial burden to establish the case would undoubtedly be upon the prosecution, but the nature and amount of evidence to be led by it to establish the charge cannot be of the same degree as is required in other cases of circumstantial evidence. The burden would be of a comparatively lighter character. In view of Section 106 of the Evidence Act there will be a corresponding burden on the inmates of the house to give a cogent explanation as to how the crime was committed. The inmates of the house cannot get away by simply keeping quiet and offering no explanation on the supposed premise that the burden to establish its case lies entirely upon the prosecution and there is no duty at all on an Accused to offer any explanation.

22. Where an Accused is alleged to have committed the murder of his wife and the prosecution succeeds in leading evidence to show that shortly before the commission of crime they were seen together or the offence takes place in the dwelling home where the husband also normally resided, it has been consistently held that if the Accused does not offer any explanation how the wife received injuries or offers an explanation which is found to be false, it is a strong circumstance which indicates that he is responsible for commission of the crime. ...

31. The pristine Rule that the burden of proof is on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the Accused should not be taken as a recognized doctrine as though it admits no process of intelligent reasoning. The doctrine of presumption is not alien to the above rule, nor would it impair the temper of the rule. On the other hand, if the traditional Rule relating to burden of proof of the prosecution is allowed to be wrapped in pedantic coverage, the offenders in serious offences would be the major beneficiaries and the society would be the casualty.

32. In this case, when the prosecution succeeded in establishing the afore-narrated circumstances, the court has to presume the existence of certain facts. Presumption is a course recognized by the law for the court to rely on in conditions such as this.

33. Presumption of fact is an inference as to the existence of one fact from the existence of some other facts, unless the truth of such inference is disproved. Presumption of fact is a Rule in law of evidence that a fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred from certain other proved facts. When inferring the existence of a fact from other set of proved facts, the court exercises a process of reasoning and reaches a logical conclusion as the most probable position. The above principle has gained legislative recognition in India when Section 114 is incorporated in the Evidence Act. It empowers the court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened. In that process the court shall have regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct etc. in relation to the facts of the case.

34. When it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that Mahesh was abducted by the Accused and they took him out of that area, the Accused alone knew what happened to him until he was with them. If he was found murdered within a short time after the abduction the permitted reasoning process would enable the Court to draw the presumption that the Accused have murdered him. Such inference can be disrupted if the Accused would tell the Court what else happened to Mahesh at least until he was in their custody.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 437 of 2015

Decided On: 03.05.2024

Anees Vs. The State Govt. of NCT

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, C.J.I., J.B. Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0379/2024,2024 INSC 368

Print Page

To what extent conduct of accused in relevant even if prosecution has failed to prove his discovery statement U/S 27 of Evidence Act?

 Even if we have to discard the evidence of discovery

on the ground that no independent witnesses were present

at the time of discovery, still the fact that the appellant

herein led the police party to his house and handed over the

ice pick used at the time of the assault, would be reflective

of his conduct. By virtue of Section 8 of the Evidence Act,

the conduct of an accused is relevant, if such conduct

influences or influenced by any fact in issue or relevant fact.

The evidence of the circumstance, simpliciter, that the

accused pointed out to the police officer, the place where he

had concealed the weapon of offence i.e. ice pick, would be

admissible as conduct under Section 8 irrespective of the

fact whether the statement made by the appellant convict

contemporaneously with or antecedent to such conduct

falls within the purview of Section 27 of the Evidence Act or

not. Even if we hold that the discovery statement made by

the appellant convict referred to above is not admissible

under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, still it is relevant

under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. {Para 78}

2023INSC765

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1554 OF 2015

MUKESH SINGH Vs THE STATE (NCT OF DELHI) 

Author: J.B. PARDIWALA, J. :

Dated: AUGUST 24, 2023.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

Print Page

Whether accused can refuse to participate in test identification parade on the ground that they were shown to the witnesses in advance?

 Gyan Sudha Misra, J. while disagreeing with H.S.

Bedi, J. took the view that it is not open to accused to refuse

to participate in the TIP. The learned Judge observed in

para 27 as under:-

“27. In my considered view, it was not open to the

accused to refuse to participate in the TI parade nor

was it a correct legal approach for the prosecution to

accept refusal of the accused to participate in the test

identification parade. If the appellant-accused had

reason to do so, specially on the plea that he had

been shown to the eyewitnesses in advance, the

value and admissibility of the evidence of TI parade

could have been assailed by the defence at the stage

of trial in order to demolish the value of the test

identification parade. But merely on account of the

objection of the accused, he could not have been

permitted to decline from participating in the test

identification parade from which adverse inference

can surely be drawn against him at least in order to

corroborate the prosecution case.” {Para 50}

[Emphasis supplied]

 2023INSC765

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1554 OF 2015

MUKESH SINGH Vs THE STATE (NCT OF DELHI) 

Author: J.B. PARDIWALA, J. :

Dated: AUGUST 24, 2023.

Print Page

Whether conduct of accused is admissible in evidence?

 It is a settled legal position that the facts need not be self-probatory and the word "fact" as contemplated in Section 27 of the Evidence Act is not limited to "actual physical material object". The discovery of fact arises by reason of the fact that the information given by the Accused exhibited the knowledge or the mental awareness of the informant as to its existence at a particular place. It includes a discovery of an object, the place from which it is produced and the knowledge of the Accused as to its existence. It will be useful to advert to the exposition in the case of Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. State of Maharashtra MANU/SC/1098/2014 : (2015) 1 SCC 253, in particular, paragraphs 23 to 29 thereof. The same read thus:

23. While accepting or rejecting the factors of discovery, certain principles are to be kept in mind. The Privy Council in Pulukuri Kotayya v. King Emperor MANU/PR/0049/1946 : AIR 1947 PC 67 has held thus: (IA p. 77)

...it is fallacious to treat the 'fact discovered' within the Section as equivalent to the object produced; the fact discovered embraces the place from which the object is produced and the knowledge of the Accused as to this, and the information given must relate distinctly to this fact. Information as to past user, or the past history, of the object produced is not related to its discovery in the setting in which it is discovered. Information supplied by a person in custody that 'I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house' does not lead to the discovery of a knife; knives were discovered many years ago. It leads to the discovery of the fact that a knife is concealed in the house of the informant to his knowledge, and if the knife is proved to have been used in the commission of the offence, the fact discovered is very relevant. But if to the statement the words be added 'with which I stabbed A', these words are inadmissible since they do not relate to the discovery of the knife in the house of the informant.

12. The expression 'provided that' together with the phrase 'whether it amounts to a confession or not' show that the Section is in the nature of an exception to the preceding provisions particularly Sections 25 and 26. It is not necessary in this case to consider if this Section qualifies, to any extent, Section 24, also. It will be seen that the first condition necessary for bringing this Section into operation is the discovery of a fact, albeit a relevant fact, in consequence of the information received from a person Accused of an offence. The second is that the discovery of such fact must be deposed to. The third is that at the time of the receipt of the information the Accused must be in police custody. The last but the most important condition is that only 'so much of the information' as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered is admissible. The rest of the information has to be excluded. The word 'distinctly' means 'directly', 'indubitably', 'strictly', 'unmistakably'. The word has been advisedly used to limit and define the scope of the provable information. The phrase 'distinctly relates to the fact thereby discovered' is the linchpin of the provision. This phrase refers to that part of the information supplied by the Accused which is the direct and immediate cause of the discovery. The reason behind this partial lifting of the ban against confessions and statements made to the police, is that if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of information given by the Accused, it affords some guarantee of truth of that part, and that part only, of the information which was the clear, immediate and proximate cause of the discovery. No such guarantee or assurance attaches to the rest of the statement which may be indirectly or remotely related to the fact discovered.

13. At one time it was held that the expression 'fact discovered' in the Section is restricted to a physical or material fact which can be perceived by the senses, and that it does not include a mental fact (see Sukhan v. Emperor MANU/LA/0128/1929 : AIR 1929 Lah 344; Ganu Chandra Kashid v. Emperor MANU/MH/0264/1931 : AIR 1932 Bom 286). Now it is fairly settled that the expression 'fact discovered' includes not only the physical object produced, but also the place from which it is produced and the knowledge of the Accused as to this (see Pulukuri Kotayya v. King Emperor4; Udai Bhan v. State of U.P. MANU/SC/0144/1962 : AIR 1962 SC 1116 : (1962) 2 Cri. LJ 251 : 1962 Supp (2) SCR 830).

(Emphasis in original)

27. In the case at hand, as is perceptible, the recovery had taken place when the Appellant was Accused of an offence, he was in custody of a police officer, the recovery had taken place in consequence of information furnished by him and the panch witnesses have supported the seizure and nothing has been brought on record to discredit their testimony.

28. Additionally, another aspect can also be taken note of. The fact that the Appellant had led the police officer to find out the spot where the crime was committed, and the tap where he washed the clothes eloquently speak of his conduct as the same is admissible in evidence to establish his conduct. In this context we may refer with profit to the authority in Prakash Chand v. State (Delhi Admn.) MANU/SC/0147/1978 : (1979) 3 SCC 90 wherein the Court after referring to the decision in H.P. Admn. v. Om Prakash MANU/SC/0118/1971 : (1972) 1 SCC 249 held thus: (Prakash Chand case, SCC p. 95, para 8)

8. ... There is a clear distinction between the conduct of a person against whom an offence is alleged, which is admissible Under Section 8 of the Evidence Act, if such conduct is influenced by any fact in issue or relevant fact and the statement made to a police officer in the course of an investigation which is hit by Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. What is excluded by Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is the statement made to a police officer in the course of investigation and not the evidence relating to the conduct of an Accused person (not amounting to a statement) when confronted or questioned by a police officer during the course of an investigation. For example, the evidence of the circumstance, simpliciter, that an Accused person led a police officer and pointed out the place where stolen articles or weapons which might have been used in the commission of the offence were found hidden, would be admissible as conduct, Under Section 8 of the Evidence Act, irrespective of whether any statement by the Accused contemporaneously with or antecedent to such conduct falls within the purview of Section 27 of the Evidence Act.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1617 of 2011

Decided On: 24.10.2018

Asar Mohammad  Vs.  The State of U.P.

Print Page

Whether joint disclosures by accused is admissible in evidence as per S 27 of evidence Act?

Learned counsel has tried to assail the prosecution case on one more ground by relying on the case of Abdul Hafeez v. State of A.P. : MANU/SC/0091/1982 : (1983) SCC 143 : (MANU/SC/0091/1982 : AIR 1983 SC 307) and has challenged the prosecution case about recovery of dead body at the instance of appellants by haranguing that it was a joint disclosure which is not admissible.

69. There appears no force in the aforesaid arguments.

70. In State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu : MANU/SC/0465/2005 : (2005) 11 SCC 600 : (AIR 2005 SC 3820) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down the law as under:

"Before parting with the discussion on the subject of confessions under Section 27, we may briefly refer to the legal position as regards joint disclosures. This point assumes relevance in the context of such disclosures made by the first two accused viz. Afzal and Shaukat. The admissibility of information said to have been furnished by both of them leading to the discovery of the hideouts of the deceased terrorists and the recovery of a laptop computer, a mobile phone and cash of Rs. 10 lacs from the truck in which they were found at Srinagar is in issue. Learned senior counsel Mr. Shanti Bhushan and Mr. Sushil Kumar appearing for the accused contend, as was contended before the High Court, that the disclosure and pointing out attributed to both cannot fall within the Ken of Section 27, whereas it is the contention of Mr. Gopal Subramanium that there is no taboo against the admission of such information as incriminating evidence against both the informants/accused. Some of the High Courts have taken the view that the wording "a person" excludes the applicability of the Section to more than one person. But, that is too narrow a view to be taken. Joint disclosures to be more accurate, simultaneous disclosures, perse, are not inadmissible under Section 27. 'A person accused' need not necessarily be a single person, but it could be plurality of accused. It seems to us that the real reason for not acting upon the joint disclosures by taking resort to Section 27 is the inherent difficulty in placing reliance on such information supposed to have emerged from the mouths of two or more accused at a time. In fact, joint or simultaneous disclosure is a myth, because two or more accused persons would not have uttered informatory words in a chorus. At best, one person would have made the statement orally and the other person would have stated so substantially in similar terms a few seconds or minutes later, or the second person would have given unequivocal nod to what has been said by the first person. Or, two persons in custody may be interrogated separately and simultaneously and both of them may furnish similar information leading to the discovery of fact. Or, in rare cases, both the accused may reduce the information into writing and hand over the written notes to the police officer at the same time. We do not think that such disclosures by two or more persons in police custody go out of the purview of Section 27 altogether. If information is given one after the other without any break almost simultaneously, and if such information is followed up by pointing out the material thing by both of them, we find no good reason to eschew such evidence from the regime of Section 27."

71. In paragraph 146 of the aforesaid judgment, the Apex Court has discussed the case of Mohd. Abdul Hafeez v. State of A.P.; MANU/SC/0091/1982 : (1983) 1 SCC 143 : (AIR 1983 SC 367)(supra) cited by learned counsel for the appellants and has held that:

"there is nothing in this judgment which suggests that simultaneous disclosures by more than one accused do not at all enter into the arena of Section 27, as a proposition of law."

72. Accordingly we do not find any illegality in the admissibility of joint disclosure statement by the appellants in this case specially in view of the fact that the dead body along with other incriminating articles and the 'aari' used as weapon of murder have been recovered by the police after such disclosure.

73. The Apex Court in the case of A. N. Venkatesh and another v. State of Karnataka; MANU/SC/0468/2005 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1938 : (AIR 2005 SC 3809) has held that even if the disclosure statement is held to be not admissible under Section 27 due to some reason, still it is relevant under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. The evidence of the circumstances, simpliciter, that the accused pointed out to the police officer, the place where the dead body of the kidnapped boy was found is admissible under Section 8 irrespective of the fact whether the statement made by the accused falls within the purview of Section 27 or not. Even if, the disclosure statement is held to be not admissible under Section 27 of Evidence Act, still it is relevant under Section 8 of Evidence Act.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD

Criminal (Capital) Appeal No. 962 of 2007

Decided On: 22.01.2016

Vikash Sharma Vs.  State of Uttar Pradesh

Coram:B.K. Narayana and Vijay Lakshmi, JJ.

Citation: 2016 CRLJ(NOC)328 KAR

Print Page

Whether conduct of accused taking press conference is relevant in his prosecution?

PW-41, the investigating officer of the case has
categorically stated in the trial that:
“In course of my investigation I tried my level best to
examine the accused Sushil Choudhury. But he was
not willing to give statement about the incident
which took place in his complex.”
 On the other hand, the appellant held a press
conference for declaring some ex-gratia payment to the bereaved
family and reward for the person who would trace out the
assailants. The purpose was to dispel the cloud of suspicion
around him. Such post conduct of the appellant is relevant and
admissible under Section 8 of the Evidence Act.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
A G A R T A L A
CRL.A (J) No.28 of 2014
Sri Sushil Choudhury  V The State of Tripura


BEFORE
 CHIEF JUSTICE MR. DEEPAK GUPTA
 MR. JUSTICE S. TALAPATRA

Dated: 10.12.2015

Citation: 2016 CRLJ(NOC)157 TRI

Print Page

Where the accused himself lodges the first information report, the fact of his giving the information to the police is admissible against him as evidence of his conduct under Section 8 of the Evidence Act to the extent it is non-confessional in nature

The Apex Court in Bheru Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (supra) has laid down :--

"17. Where the first information report is given by an accused himself to a police officer and amounts to a confessional statement, proof of the confession is prohibited by Section 25 of the Evidence Act. No part of the confessional statement can be proved or received in evidence, except to the extent it is permitted by Section 27 of the Evidence Act. The first information report recorded under Section 154 of the Criminal Procedure Code is not a substantive piece of evidence. It may be used to corroborate the informant under Section 157 of the Evidence Act or to contradict him under Section 145 of the Evidence Act in case the informant appears as a witness at the trial. Where the accused himself lodges the first information report, the fact of his giving the information to the police is admissible against him as evidence of his conduct under Section 8 of the Evidence Act to the extent it is non-confessional in nature. It would also be relevant under Section 21 of the Evidence Act but the confessional part of the first information report by the accused to the Police Officer cannot be used at all against him in view of the ban of Section 25 of the Evidence Act."

Bombay High Court

Bandu Yedu Metkari vs State Of Maharashtra on 22 February, 2002

Equivalent citations: 2002 BomCR Cri, (2002) 2 BOMLR 492, 2002 (2) MhLj 867

Bench: R Batta, F Rebello

Print Page