Showing posts with label conspiracy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label conspiracy. Show all posts

Thursday, 28 May 2026

SC Clarifies: Failure Of Conspiracy Charge Does Not Erase Individual Guilt In Bribery Traps

As rightly observed by the High Court, there was neither proof of demand nor acceptance by A1 but for the statement of PW1 that A2 demanded the bribe on behalf of A1. There can be no reliance placed on such statement made by the co-Accused and there can be no conviction entered into on that account. We are, however, inclined and persuaded to set aside the acquittal against A2 and restore the order of the Trial Court convicting him for the offence Under Section 7 of the PC Act; there being no conspiracy Under Section 120B of Indian Penal Code established.{Para 30}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. ... of 2026 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 12486 of 2025)

Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. Baljeet Singh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

K. Vinod Chandran and P.V. Sanjay Kumar, JJ.

Author: K. Vinod Chandran, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 221,MANU/SC/0220/2026

 Decided On: 10.03.2026

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Sunday, 24 May 2026

From Accused to Approver: How to Weigh Turncoat Testimony after State of Tamil Nadu v. Ponnusamy & Ors.

The Supreme Court’s treatment of PW12 (the approver) in State of Tamil Nadu v. Ponnusamy & Ors. dated  May 19, 2026, citation: 2026 INSC 507 substantially refines how trial courts should appreciate approver evidence in a modern conspiracy-cum-murder trial. The judgment both re‑affirms the classic prudential rule of corroboration and corrects some recurring mistakes in how contradictions and “improvements” in an approver’s version are evaluated.

1. The starting point: approver evidence is usable, but with prudence

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Sunday, 19 April 2026

Supreme Court: Disclosure by One Accused U/S 27 of Evidence Act Can extend to the discovery of identity and involvement of Co- accused and recovery from that co-accused,


Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act carves out a well-known exception to the general rule that confessions made to police are inadmissible. The Supreme Court in Mehboob Ali v. State of Rajasthan, 2015 SCC OnLine SC 1043, explained that when information supplied by an accused leads to the discovery of a new fact previously unknown to the police, that part of the statement becomes admissible in evidence. Significantly, the Court held that such discovery may also include the involvement and arrest of a co-accused.

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Thursday, 6 August 2020

Whether court can convict accused for substantive offence if prosecution has failed to prove conspiracy to commit that offence?

 It was submitted that since the complainant himself did not support the prosecution version fully, it was impermissible to convict the accused persons. The statutory presumption available under Section 7 read with Section 20 of the Act was not to be utilized against the accused person. The effect of an affidavit by the complainant was lost sight of. He did not implicate the accused persons directly. Since there was no recovery from A-1, there was no material to connect him with the tainted money and he should not have been held guilty. As A-2 was not in the same room where A-1 was sitting, it has not been established as to what was his role. There was no conspiracy. A-2 did not know that the amount that was offered was bribe. Great stress has been laid by the learned counsel for the appellants on the evidence of PW-1 to show that he has not categorically implicated the accused persons. Since the accused persons were acquitted of the charge under Section 120B IPC, they are entitled to acquittal for the offence relatable to the Act. Such a plea was specifically rejected by this Court in Madan Lal v. The State of Punjab MANU/SC/0369/1967 : 1967CriLJ1401 . It was held that if the charge of conspiracy to commit criminal breach of trust is followed by a substantive charge of criminal breach of trust in pursuance of such conspiracy, the Court can convict the accused under the second charge even if conspiracy was not established. In an event, no prejudice is caused to the accused persons where there was a substantive charge of criminal breach of trust.{Para 5}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 909 and 910 of 1997

Decided On: 12.01.2004

T. Shankar Prasad   Vs State of Andhra Pradesh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Doraiswamy Raju and Dr. Arijit Pasayat, JJ.

Citation: MANU/SC/0027/2004,(2004) 3SCC 753, AIR 2004 SC 1242
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Thursday, 18 October 2018

Whether a person can be convicted under prevention of corruption Act if demand and acceptance of bribe by him is not proved?

In such circumstances, there is no evidence to
prove that the appellant directly accepted the money
from the Complainant. Since the plea of conspiracy
against the appellant and Rajinder Kumar failed, it
cannot be held that money (Rs.4000/)
recovered
from the possession of Rajinder Kumar was as a
fact the bribe money meant for the appellant for
holding him guilty for the offences punishable
under Sections 7, 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the PC
Act. It is more so when the benefit of such acquittal
from the charge of conspiracy was given to Rajinder
Kumar but was not given to the appellant.

31) In our view, the prosecution, therefore, failed
to prove the factum of acceptance of bribe money of
Rs.4000/by
the appellant from the Complainant
on 29.03.1995 as per the charges framed against
him.
32) Since in order to attract the rigors of Sections
7, 13(2) read 13(1)(d) of PC Act, the prosecution was
under a legal obligation to prove the twin
requirements of “demand and acceptance of bribe
money by the accused”, the proving of one alone
but not the other was not sufficient. The appellant
is, therefore, entitled for acquittal from the charges
framed against him under the PC Act too. (See para
8 of M.K. Harshan vs. State of Kerala, (1996) 11
SCC 720)
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1276 OF 2010

Dashrath Singh Chauhan Vs Central Bureau of Investigation 

Dated:October 09, 2018
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
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Wednesday, 29 August 2018

Notes on Criminal Conspiracy

S 120 A Criminal Conspiracy
When two or more persons agree to do or cause to be done-
a) an illegal act,or
b) a legal act by illegal means-
such an agreement is called a criminal conspiracy.

Mere agreement to commit an offence amounts to criminal conspiracy and is therefore an offence.Gist of offence of conspiracy is the bare agreement to break the law.
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Friday, 29 December 2017

When offence of criminal conspiracy is not made out in case of medical negligence?

Facts:

Wife of Respondent No. 1 was under the medical treatment of delinquent doctors. She, however, could not survive. Her husband-Respondent No. 1 was not satisfied with the manner in which medical treatment was given by these doctors. He, therefore, lodged a written complaint with the West Bengal Medical Council against those three doctors alleging negligence and maltreatment of his wife by the said three medical practitioners. On receiving the complaint, the Medical Council referred the same to the Inquiry Committee. This Committee comprised five doctors (other Appellants were the members of the Medical Council). The Inquiry Committee took opinion of certain experts in their field and the opinion of the said experts was in favour of the Complainant. Notwithstanding the same, the Inquiry Committee submitted its report giving findings that the delinquent doctors were not at fault. On the basis of that report, they were exonerated by the State Medical Council. The Complainant had also initiated proceedings against the delinquent doctors before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) alleging deficiency in service against several medical practitioners including the said three delinquent doctors. Though NCDRC rejected the complaint, in the appeal filed against the orders of the NCDRC, the present Court held the said delinquent doctors guilty of negligence but at the same time, it was found that their negligence was not of criminal nature but of civil consequence and, therefore, awarded damages in favour of the Complainant and against the delinquent doctors. It had been finally held that they acted with negligence while according medical treatment to the wife of the Complainant.

The Complainant filed criminal complaint against the members of the Inquiry Committee of State Medical Council including the Appellants alleging that they had committed offence under Section 201 read with Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The complaint was founded on the allegations that even when there were four reports of four different medical experts to the effect that delinquent doctors were guilty of professional misconduct as they had acted with negligence while giving medical treatment to the wife of the complainant, these Accused persons entered into conspiracy to save the delinquent doctors. The concerned Magistrate took cognizance of the said complaint and issued process. On receipt of the notice, the Appellants challenged the proceedings before the High Court submitting that no case of conspiracy was made out in the complaint and the 'complaint was malicious and untenable' and it could not be said that any offence by the Appellants was committed under Section 201 read with Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The High Court dismissed the petition. 
Ratio,
As mentioned above, there is a charge of conspiracy as well and, for this purpose, provisions of Section 120B Indian Penal Code are invoked. It makes the following reading:

120B. Punishment of criminal conspiracy.--(1) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards, shall, where no express provision is made in this Code for the punishment of such a conspiracy, be punished in the same manner as if he had abetted such offence.

(2) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy other than a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable as aforesaid shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding six months, or with fine or with both.

16. Here again, criminal conspiracy that is referred to and defined Under Section 120A Indian Penal Code has to be in furtherance of committing an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards etc. The alleged conspiracy even as per the complaint was not to commit any of the offences as mentioned above. As per the complainant himself, the so-called conspiracy, if at all, was to save the delinquent doctors in disciplinary proceedings taken against them. This provision also, therefore, has no application.


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1163 of 2016 (Arising out of SLP (Criminal) No. 8024 of 2013)

Decided On: 29.11.2016

Asoke Kumar Chaudhuri and Ors.Vs. Kunal Saha and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
A.K. Sikri and Abhay Manohar Sapre, JJ.
Citation:(2017) 11 SCC 561.
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Saturday, 11 November 2017

What are limits of joint trial of criminal cases?

 This Court in Natwar Lal Sakar Lal Mody v. The State of Bombay 26 (1984) DLT 64 considered the question of joint trial of persons and offences for conspiracy as per provisions contained in Section 239(d) of the old Code of Criminal Procedure. This Court has laid down that separate trial is the Rule and joint trial is an exception. Joint trial would be an irregular exercise of discretion if a court allows innumerable offences spread over a long period of time and committed by a large number of persons to be under the protecting wings of an all-embracing conspiracy, and if each or some of the offences can be separately tried, it would be appropriate and lawful. Joint trial prolongs the trial and causes waste of judicial time and complicates the matter which might otherwise be simple, and it would confuse the Accused and cause prejudice to them. Court should not be overzealous to provide a cover of conspiracy for a number of offences unless it is satisfied that the persons who committed separate offences were parties to the conspiracy and committed the separate acts pursuant to conspiracy. This Court has laid down thus:

11. This discussion leads us to the following legal position. Separate trial is the Rule and joint trial is an exception. While Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows a joint trial of person and offences within defined limits, it is within the discretion of the Court to permit such a joint trial or not, having regard to the circumstances of each case. It would certainly be an irregular exercise of discretion if a Court allows an innumerable number of offences spread over a long period of time and committed by a large number of persons under the protecting wing of all-embracing conspiracy, if each or some of the offences can legitimately and properly form the subject-matter of a separate trial; such a joint trial would undoubtedly prolong the trial and would be a cause of unnecessary waste of judicial time. It would complicate matters which might otherwise be simple; it would confuse Accused and cause prejudice to them, for more often than not Accused who have taken part in one of the minor offences might have not only to undergo the long strain of protracted trial, but there might also be the likelihood of the impact of the evidence adduced in respect of other Accused on the evidence adduced against him working to his detriment. Nor can it be said that such an omnibus charge or charges would always be in favour of the prosecution for the confusion introduced in the charges and consequently in the evidence may ultimately benefit some of the accused, as a clear case against one or other of the Accused may be complicated or confused by the attempt to put it in a proper place in a larger setting. A Court should not be overzealous to provide a cover of conspiracy for a number of offences unless it is clearly satisfied on the material placed before it that there is evidence to prove prima facie that the persons who committed separate offences were parties to the conspiracy and they committed the separate acts attributed to them pursuant to the object of the said conspiracy.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 394, 393 and 395 of 2017

Decided On: 08.05.2017

State of Jharkhand through S.P., CBI Vs. Lalu Prasad and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Arun Mishra and Amitava Roy, JJ.
Citation:(2017) 8 SCC1
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Sunday, 15 October 2017

Whether Advocate can be prosecuted on basis of his phone chat with accused?


Kochi:  "Asking police to inform about the definite evidence against the lawyer, the court said in the interim order, "It appears that one of the other accused, already arrested by the police, had some contact with the petitioner over telephone. If a lawyer is prosecuted just because an accused had contacted him over telephone, every criminal lawyer will have to be prosecuted. The police will have to report the things clearly and definitely ."
The high court on Tuesday asked police to inform it about the concrete evidence against advocate C P Udayabhanu before proceeding against him in the case over death of Chalakudy-based real estate agent V A Rajeev.



Through an interim order, the court said that the police are cautioned that mere knowledge of conspiracy will not make a conspirator, as settled by the Supreme Court. "What is required is active meeting of minds to form and carry out a criminal design.So, to arraign a person as conspirator, there must be clear, concrete and definite materials showing that he had active participation by way of active involvement in the meeting of minds with the others. Simply on the basis of telephone calls, or the statements given by the co-accused, one cannot be prosecuted as conspirator. The court wants to know what exactly are the clear, definite and concrete materials to suspect this petitioner as conspirator in the murder case," the order said.
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Sunday, 27 December 2015

Supreme Court: Under which circumstances conspiracy can be proved on the basis of photograph of disputed handwriting?

On the whole, we think that if the court is satisfied that there is no trick photography and the photograph is above suspicion, the photograph can be received in evidence. It is, of course, always admissible to prove the contents of the document, but subject to the safeguards indicated, to prove the authorship. This is all the more so in India under s. 10 of the Evidence Act to prove participation in a conspiracy. Detection and proof of crime will be rendered not only not easy but sometimes impossible if conspirators begin to correspond through photographs of letters instead of originals, Many conspiracies will then remain unproved because one of the usual methods is to intercept a letter, take its photograph and then to send it on and wait for the reply. But evidence of photographs to prove writing or handwriting can only be received if the original cannot be obtained and the photographic reproduction is faithful and not faked or false. In the present case no such suggestion exists and the originals having been suppressed by the accused, were not available. The evidence of photographs as to the contents and as to handwriting was receivable. 639, Regarding the specimen writing in the letter Z 217, with which, the impugned writings were compared, we think the letter must be treated as genuine for the purpose of comparison of handwriting.
Supreme Court of India
Laxmipat Choraria And Ors vs State Of Maharashtra on 14 December, 1967
Equivalent citations: 1968 AIR 938, 1968 SCR (2) 624

Bench: Hidayatullah, M.
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Friday, 13 November 2015

When single charge is permissible in respect of different acts of cheating?

A  firm having two partners entered into a contract for  the
supply of 1306.5 tons of bottom boards for railway wagons of
certain  specified  varieties  of hardwood  to the  Central
Railwaf
339
Administration.   The wood was to be supplied  at  different
places in different quantities.  The firm supplied wood  of
inferior  quality.  Thomson and other officers issued  false
inspection  notes certifying the quality of the wood  to  be
according  to  specification.  On the basis of those  false
inspection notes, the firm received payment of Rs. 3,77,771.
The accused were charged under ss. 109,120-B and 420 of  the
Indian Penal Code and s. 5 (1) (d) read with s.5 (2) of  the
Prevention of Corruption Act, and were sent up for  trial to
the  court of the Special judge Kerala.  Charges  were also
framed against them.  However,the case was  transferred  by
this  court to the court of the Special judge, Poona.  The
latter amended certain charges and also added a new  charge
against certain appellants.  The accused went in revision to
the  High  Court of Bombay and questioned  the legality  or
propriety  of  various charges.   The High  Court  ordered
certain minor modifications in the charges and against that
order  both the accused and the Union of India came to this
court by special leave.  It was contended 'on behalf of  the
accused  that  the  obtaining of money by  submitting each
separate  bill amounted to one distinct offence for which  a
separate charge should have been framed in view of s 233  of
the Code of Criminal Procedure and the charge as framed  was
a combination of a number of charges with respect to several
offences  of  cheating committed by obtaining money  on  the
presentation  of 18 or 19 bills and was, therefore,  against
the  provisions of s. 233.  It was also contended  that  the
charge of  cheating should have been  framed  against that
partner who had submitted the bill and obtained money.
 Held, that the expression "every distinct offence"  in  s.
233 Code of Criminal Procedure has a different content from
the  expression "every offence" or "each offence"  and that
offences would be distinct if they be not in any way  inter-
related.
Chunne v. The State, A. I. R. 1954 All. 795, approved.
Held, further that a single charge for the offence of cheat-
ing  in  pursuance  of conspiracy  did not  contravene  the
provisions of s. 233 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.  The
conspiracy  entered  into  by the  appellants  was  not  for
obtaining  diverse  amounts by cheating but  to  obtain  the
entire contract money by cheating.  The offence of  cheating
contemplated   by  the conspirators  was  one offence   of
obtaining,  by cheating,  the full  amount  due  under  the
contract for the material supplied.  While the obtaining  of
money by cheating on the presentation of an individual bill
did constitute the offence of cheating, the obtaining of the
entire money  in  pursuance  of the  terms  of  the  single
contract and the single conspiracy entered into also
340
constituted the offence of cheating.  When the accused could
not be punished for more than one such offence, it could not
be the intention of law that he be charged with each of  the
offences  which  were  in a way  included  in  the  complete
offence  made  up- by the entire course of  conduct  of  the
accused in pursuance of the conspiracy.
     Bhagat  Singh  v. The State, [1952] 2 S. C.  R. 371,
refered to.
Empress  v.  Raghu Rai, (1881) A.W.N. 154, Poonit  Singh  v.
Madho  Bhot, (1886) I.L.R. 13 Cal. 270, Joan Subrna  v.  The
King  Emperor, (1905) 10 C. W. N. 320 and Promotha Nath  Bay
v. King Emperor, (1912) 17 C. W. N 478, approved.
Both  the partners conspired to cheat the  Government.  The
bills were presumably presented on behalf of the firm, and,
therefore, both the partners were responsible for  obtaining
the money on the presentation of the bills.  Hence, both  of
them were rightly charged.
A  court trying an accused for an offence of  conspiracy  is
competent to try him for all offences committed in pursuance
of that conspiracy irrespective of the fact that any or  all
the  other  offences were committed within  its  territorial
jurisdiction. The charge framed by the Special  judge  was
approved.
Supreme Court of India
Banwari Lal Jhunjhunwalaand ... vs Union Of India And Another(And ... on
 21 November, 1962
Equivalent citations: 1963 AIR 1620, 
1963 SCR Supl. (2) 338,(1963)2 CRLJ 529
Bench: Dayal, Raghubar
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Sunday, 4 October 2015

Landmark Supreme Court judgment on conspiracy in criminal case

We find from the judgment that the Courts below have committed an error in first holding the existence of conspiracy and proceeding on that basis and then taking tit-bits in evidence to suggest that those tit-bits would connect the accused with the conspiracy as the conspirators. The law on conspiracy has been stated time and again by this Court. In Major E.G. Barsay v. State of Bombay reported in AIR 1961 SC 1762, Subba Rao, J. observed:
"The gist of the offence is an agreement to break the law. The parties to such an agreement will be guilty of criminal conspiracy, though the illegal act agreed to be done has not been done. So too, it is not an ingredient of the offence that all the parties should agree to do a single illegal act."
In Halsbury's Laws of England the definition of conspiracy is as under:
"Conspiracy consists in the agreement of two or more persons to do an unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by unlawful means. It is an indictable offence at common law. The essence of the offence of conspiracy is the fact of combination by agreement. The agreement may be express or implied or in part express and in part implied.. and the offence continues to be committed so long as the combination persists, that is until the conspiratorial agreement is terminated by completion of its performance or by abandonment or frustration or however it may be".
In American Jurisprudence, 2nd Edn., Vol.16, Page 129, the following definition of conspiracy is given: "A conspiracy is said to be an agreement between two or more persons to accomplish together a criminal or unlawful act or to achieve by criminal or unlawful means an act not in itself criminal or unlawful ... The unlawful agreement and not its accomplishment is the gist or essence of the crime of conspiracy." Lastly, in celebrated case of Kehar Singh & ors. v. State (Delhi Administration) [1988 (3) SCC 609] it was observed by Jagannatha Shetty, J.:
"The gist of the offence of conspiracy then lies, not in doing the act, or effecting the purpose for which the conspiracy is formed, nor in attempting to do them, nor in inciting others to do them, but in the forming of the scheme or agreement between the parties. Agreement is essential. Mere knowledge, or even discussion, of the plan is not, per se enough" (emphasis ours) In the celebrated judgment of State v. Nalini & Ors. [1999 (5) SCC 253] S.S.M. Mohd. Quadri, J. relying upon Van Riper vs. United States (13 F 2d. 961) (2 nd Cir, 1926) observed:
"When men enter into an agreement for an unlawful end, they become ad hoc agents for one another and have made a partnership in crime."
Other celebrated decisions on the question of conspiracy are Yashpal Mittal v. State of Punjab [1977 (4) SCC 540] as also the State of Himachal Pradesh v. Krishan Lal Pradhan & Ors. [1987 (2) SCC 17]. It has been held in Mohd. Khalid v. State of West Bengal [2002 (7) SCC 334] and in Mohammed Usman Mohd. Hussain Maniyar v. State of Maharashatra [1981 (2) SCC 443] that the agreement amongst the conspirators can be inferred by necessary implication. All these cases together came to be considered in State of NCT of Delhi v. Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru[2005 (11) SCC 600] where even the celebrated judgments of V.C. Shukla vs. State [1980 (2) SCC 665], came to be considered wherein it was observed by Fazal Ali, J.:
"In most cases it will be difficult to get direct evidence of the agreement, but a conspiracy can be inferred even from circumstances giving rise to a conclusive or irresistible inference of an agreement between two or more persons to commit an offence."
56. It is significant at this stage to note the observations in V.C. Shukla (cited supra) wherein it was laid that in order to prove criminal conspiracy, there must be evidence direct or circumstances to show that there was an agreement between two or more persons to commit an offence. It was further held that there must be a meeting of minds resulting in ultimate decision taken by the conspirators regarding the commission of the offence and where the factum of conspiracy is sought to be inferred even from circumstances giving rise to a conclusive or irresistible inference of an agreement between two or more persons to commit an offence. Relying on that, Pasayat, J. in Esher Singh v. State of A.P. [2004 (11) SCC 585] observed that the prosecution has to discharge its onus of proving the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances in a case, when taken together on their face value, should indicate the meeting of the minds between the conspirators for the intended object of committing an illegal act or an act which is not illegal, by illegal means. A few bits here and a few bits there on which the prosecution relies cannot be held to be adequate for connecting the accused with the commission of the crime of criminal conspiracy. It has to be shown that all means adopted and illegal acts done were in furtherance of the object of conspiracy hatched. The circumstances relied for the purposes of drawing an inference should be prior in point of time than the actual commission of the offence in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy.
57. In Esher Singh's case (cited supra) this Court held that the conspiracy was proved between the nine accused. A systematic role played by each accused was highlighted. Pasayat, J. in that judgment also considered the decision in Bhagwan Swarup Lal Bishan Lal etc.etc vs. State of Maharashtra [AIR 1965 SC 682] and observed that there is no difference between the mode of proof of the offence of conspiracy and that of any other offence. The other decisions in State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa [JT 1996 (4) SC 615]), Ajay Aggarwal v. Union of India & Ors. [1993 (3) SCC 609] as also Mohd. Usman's case (cited supra) and Yashpal Mittal (cited supra) were considered in that decision. The law laid down in Ajay Agrawal's case (cited supra) was reiterated and it was held that it is not necessary that each conspirator must know all the details of the scheme nor be a participant at every stage. It is necessary that they should agree for design or object of the conspiracy. Conspiracy is conceived as having three elements: (1) agreement; (2) between two or more persons by whom the agreement is effected; and (3) a criminal object, which may be either the ultimate aim of the agreement, or may constitute the means, or one of the means by which that aim is to be accomplished. These decisions were thereafter considered in Navjot Sandhu's case (cited supra). In K.R. Purushothaman v. State of Kerala [2005 (12) SCC 631] a specific observation was made to the effect that all conspirators need not take active part in the commission of each and every conspiratorial act but, mere knowledge, even discussion, of the plan would not constitute conspiracy. It was further observed that each one of the circumstances should be proved beyond reasonable doubt and such circumstances proved must form a chain of events from which the only irresistible conclusion is about the guilt of the accused which can be safely drawn and no other hypothesis of the guilt is possible. We respectfully agree with the law laid down in Navjot Sandhu's case and K.R. Purushothaman's case.

Supreme Court of India

John Pandian vs State Rep.By Inspector Of ... on 3 December, 2010
Author: V Sirpurkar
Bench: V.S. Sirpurkar, Cyriac Joseph
Read full judgment here; click here


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Sunday, 27 September 2015

Whether mere agreement to commit offence constitute offence of criminal conspiracy?

 In State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu alias Afsan Guru, (2005) 11 SCC 600, this Court after analyzing the history of the offence of conspiracy held as follows:
88. Earlier to the introduction of Sections 120-A and 120-B, conspiracy per se was not an offence under the Penal Code except in respect of the offence mentioned in Section 121-A. However, abetment by conspiracy was and still remains to be an ingredient of abetment under clause secondly of Section 107 IPC. The punishment therefor is provided under various sections viz.Sections 108 to 117. Whereas under Section 120-A, the essence of the offence of criminal conspiracy is a bare agreement to commit the offence, the abetment under Section 107 requires the commission of some act or illegal omission pursuant to the conspiracy. A charge underSections 107/109 should therefore be in combination with a substantive offence, whereas the charge under Sections 120-A/120-B could be an independent charge.
89. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons to the Amendment Bill, it was explicitly stated that the new provisions (120-A and 120-B) were "designed to assimilate the provisions of the Penal Code to those of the English Law....". Thus, Sections 120-A and 120-B made conspiracy a substantive offence and rendered the mere agreement to commit an offence punishable. Even if an overt act does not take place pursuant to the illegal agreement, the offence of conspiracy would still be attracted. The passages from Russell on Crimes, the House of Lords decision in Quinn v. Leathem and the address of Willes, J. to the Jury in Mulcahy v. R. are often quoted in the decisions of this Court. The passage in Russell on Crimes referred to by Jagannatha Shetty, J. in Kehar Singh case (SCC at p. 731, para 271) is quite apposite:
"The gist of the offence of conspiracy then lies, not in doing the act, or effecting the purpose for which the conspiracy is formed, nor in attempting to do them, nor in inciting others to do them, but in the forming of the scheme or agreement between the parties. Agreement is essential. Mere knowledge, or even discussion, of the plan is not, per se, enough."

Supreme Court of India
R.Dineshkumar@Deena vs State Rep. By Inspector Of Police ... on 16 March, 2015
Bench: J. Chelameswar, C. Nagappan
Read full judgment here; click here
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Sunday, 14 June 2015

How to prove conspiracy to commit criminal breach of trust by chairman and other members of co-operative society?


  Indian Penal  Code 1860,  Ss. 120 B, 109, 408, 467 and
471.
     Chairman of  Co-operative Society  along with  others
charged with  conspiracy to commit criminal breach of trust-
Charge of conspiracy having failed-Sessions Court acquitting
all but  one accused-Appeal  by State-High  Court convicting
Chairman-Conviction whether valid and legal.
     Defalcation of  properties-Several accused charged with
conspiracy-Prosecution to prove collusion and cohesion among
all  accused-Mens  rea not  to  be  excluded-If  charge  of
conspiracy fails-Prosecution  to  prove  affirmatively that
accused directly  and  personally  connected  with  acts  or
omissions.



HEADNOTE:
     The  appellant   was  the Chairman  of  an  autonomous
cooperative society under the control and supervision of the
State  Government.   On  receipt  of  complaints  about  the
financial  management  of  the Society,  the  Registrar  of
Cooperative Societies  appointed a  special auditor to audit
the Society's  accounts. On  the basis of the audit report a
charge-sheet was  filed against all the accused for entering
into a conspiracy to  commit criminal breach of trust. The
conspiracy charge  having failed, all the accused except one
were acquitted by the Sessions Judge.
     On appeal by the State, the  High Court convicted the
appellant in  respect of  three items, namely, purchase  of
fertilisers  involving  two  transactions  and  missing  of
certain oil  engines, on  the ground that as Chairman of the
Managing Committee  he must be held to be vicariously liable
for any  order given  or misappropriation  committed by  the
other accused.
     In appeal to this  Court it was contended on behalf of
the appellant  that no case of defalcation had been made out
against the appellant.
     Allowing the appeal,
^
     HELD: 1.  There was no justification for the High Court
to  interfere  with  the  appellant's  acquittal.  The case
against the  appellant had not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt and  he was  wrongly convicted by the High Court. [802
D-E]
798
     2. In a case where there was serious defalcation of the
properties, unless  the prosecution  proved that there was a
close cohesion and collusion  between all the accused which
formed the  subject matter  of a  conspiracy,  it  would  be
difficult to  prove the  charges against  the appellant. The
charge of  conspiracy having  failed, the  most material and
integral part of the prosecution story against the appellant
disappeared. [801 B-C]
     3. In  a criminal case of such serious nature mens rea
cannot be excluded. Once the charge of conspiracy has failed
the onus  lay on the prosecution to prove affirmatively that
the appellant  was directly  and personally  connected with
acts or omissions pertaining to the items purchased. [801 E]
     4. In  the absence  of a  charge of conspiracy the mere
fact that  the appellant  happened to be the Chairman of the
Committee would  not make  him liable  in a vicarious sense.
There is no evidence either direct or circumstantial to show
that apart  from approving  the purchase  of fertilisers  he
knew  that   the  firms  from  which  the  fertilisers were
purchased did  not exist.  If the  Chairman was  to be made
liable then  all members of the Committee, viz Tehsildar and
other nominated  members would be equally liable because all
of them  participated in the deliberation of the meetings of
the Committee. The appellant  as Chairman of the Sangh, had
to deal  with a large variety of matters and it would not be
humanly possible  for him to analyse and go into the details
or every small matter in order to find out whether there has
been any criminal breach of trust. [801 G-H; 802 A-B]


Supreme Court of India
Jethsur Surangbhai vs State Of Gujarat on 9 November, 1983


Equivalent citations: 1984 AIR 151, 1984 SCR (1) 797
1984CriLJ162,1983(2)Crimes942(SC),1984 SCC(cri)474
 
Bench: Fazalali, Syed Murtaza
1984 SCC(cri)474
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Tuesday, 14 April 2015

Whether conspiracy can be hatched on the basis of unanticipated happening?



While   viewing   the   case,   and   more   particularly   the 
theory of conspiracy, as put forth by the prosecution, it must be 
understood that the fact that Shivaji Gade had gone to Babybai's 

house in the mid­night, is not in dispute though what he did after 
going there, may be in dispute.  Thus, visit of Shivaji Gade could 
not have been anticipated by Babybai Jadhav and/or the school 
management.  This is significant because the conspiracy could not 
have been hatched based on such unanticipated happening. 
            CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO.825 OF 2014
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Sanjay Kumar K. Shinde
Versus
The State of Maharashtra


­­­
CORAM :   ABHAY M. THIPSAY, J.
Citation;2015 ALLMR(CRI)1085
DATED  :    10th DECEMBER 2014.
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