Supreme Court: S. 14 Limitation Act is Applicable To Proceedings Under Arbitration & Conciliation Act

 Having considered the matter in detail, we are of the

opinion that the issue is covered by the decision of this

court in Consolidated Engg. Enterprises v. Principal

Secretary, Irrigation Dept. 2008 (7) SCC 169. (supra). {Para 9}

10. We may hasten to add that when the substantive remedies

under Sections 34 and/or 37 of the Arbitration Act are by

their very nature limited in their scope due to statutory

prescription, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

, it is necessary to interpret the limitation

provisions liberally, or else, even that limited window to

challenge an arbitral award will be lost. The remedies under

Sections 34 and 37 are precious. Courts of law will keep in

mind the need to secure and protect such a remedy while

calculating the period of limitation for invoking these

jurisdictions.

11. Applying Section 14 of the Limitation Act, we hold that

there is sufficient cause for excluding the period commencing

from 20.10.2011 to 23.02.2012. In view of the fact that this

period is excluded, the appellant will be entitled to the

statutory remedy under Section 34 of the Act.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.12849-12856/2024

KIRPAL SINGH  Vs GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, NEW DELHI & ORS. 

Dated: November 21,2024. 

Citation: 2024 INSC 944.

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Supreme Court: The period excluded U/S 14 of Limitation Act can not be counted for computing period for condonation of delay

 It is an accepted position that the appellant had filed a writ petition before the High Court on 24.02.2018, which was not entertained vide the order dated 07.03.2018 on the ground that the appellant should approach the Appellate Authority. The appellant is entitled to ask for exclusion of the said period in terms of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Exclusion of time is different, and cannot be equated with condonation of delay. The period once excluded, cannot be counted for the purpose of computing the period for which delay can be condoned. {Para 3}

 In the Supreme Court of India

(Before Sanjiv Khanna and J.K. Maheshwari, JJ.)

Laxmi Srinivasa R and P Boiled Rice Mill  Vs State of Andhra Pradesh and Another.

Civil Appeal No. of 2022 (@SLP(C) No. 11225 of 2022)

Decided on November 14, 2022

Citation: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1790.

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Supreme Court explains the difference in factors to be considered while deciding condonation of delay application either U/S 5 or U/S 14 of Limitation Act

Also, it must be remembered that merely because sufficient cause has been made out in the facts of a given case, there is no right in the Appellant to have delay condoned. This was felicitously put in Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd.,   MANU/SC/0042/1961 : (1962) 2 SCR 762 as follows: {Para 60}

It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify an enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle during all the time available to it. In this connection we may point out that considerations of bona fides or due diligence are always material and relevant when the Court is dealing with applications made Under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In dealing with such applications the Court is called upon to consider the effect of the combined provisions of Sections 5 and 14. Therefore, in our opinion, considerations which have been expressly made material and relevant by the provisions of Section 14 cannot to the same extent and in the same manner be invoked in dealing with applications which fall to be decided only Under Section 5 without reference to Section 14. (page 771).

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 995 of 2021.

Decided On: 19.03.2021

Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources Department) Vs. Borse Brothers Engineers & Contractors Pvt. Ltd.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Rohinton Fali Nariman, B.R. Gavai and Hrishikesh Roy, JJ.

Author: Rohinton Fali Nariman, J.

Citation: (2021)6 SCC 460,2021SCCONLINE SC 233, MANU/SC/0195/2021.

Read full Judgment here : Click here.

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To what extent provisions of S 5 of limitation Act are applicable to arbitration appeal under Commercial courts Act?

 Given the aforesaid and the object of speedy disposal sought to be achieved both under the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, for appeals filed Under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act that are governed by Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation Act or Section 13(1A) of the Commercial Courts Act, a delay beyond 90 days, 30 days or 60 days, respectively, is to be condoned by way of exception and not by way of rule. In a fit case in which a party has otherwise acted bona fide and not in a negligent manner, a short delay beyond such period can, in the discretion of the court, be condoned, always bearing in mind that the other side of the picture is that the opposite party may have acquired both in equity and justice, what may now be lost by the first party's inaction, negligence or laches. {Para 61}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 995 of 2021.

Decided On: 19.03.2021

Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources Department) Vs. Borse Brothers Engineers & Contractors Pvt. Ltd.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Rohinton Fali Nariman, B.R. Gavai and Hrishikesh Roy, JJ.

Author: Rohinton Fali Nariman, J.

Citation: (2021)6 SCC 460,2021SCCONLINE SC 233, MANU/SC/0195/2021

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Whether the court should reject plaint if the issue of limitation is a mixed question of law and fact?

 It is clear from a perusal of the aforesaid judgment that the policy of the section 14 of the Limitation Act is to afford protection to a litigant when he institutes a proceeding in a wrong court provided this act was done in good faith and bona fide. The section has to be interpreted liberally in a manner to advance the cause of justice rather than to abort the proceedings. The plaintiff has to establish the fact that the prior proceedings have been instituted/prosecuted in good faith and due diligence. This is obviously a question of fact which the plaintiff has to prove.

 I may note that usually the issue of limitation is a mixed question of law and fact. What defendant No. 1 seeks is an adjudication of the issue of limitation at the initial stage itself before even an opportunity has been given to the plaintiff to show that it was prosecuting the litigation before the Bombay High Court with due diligence and in good faith.{Para 22}

24. While considering an application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC only averments made in the plaint are to be looked at and the accompanying documents. Reference in this context may be had to the judgment of this court in the case of Tilak Raj Bhagat vs. Ranjit Kaur wherein this court held as follows:-

"6. It may be worthwhile to mention here that while considering an application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, the Court has to look at the averments made in the plaint by taking the same as correct on its face value as also the documents filed in support thereof. Neither defence of the defendant nor averments made in the application have to be given any weightage. Plaint has to be read as a whole together with the documents filed by the plaintiff."

28. Hence, for the purpose of considering an application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC only the averments made in the plaint have to be taken presuming them to be correct on the face of it along with the documents filed in support of the plaint. It is only in cases where the averments in the plaint itself indicate the cause of action to be barred by limitation that the plaint can be rejected at the initial stage. This must be on a mere ex facie reading of the plaint.

 As noted above, every act of the plaintiff in filing a suit in a court other than the court which as per the Agreement has exclusive jurisdiction, does not necessarily imply that the act was done without due diligence or in good faith. It would be for the plaintiff to lead evidence on this aspect. What the defendant want is that the defence of the defendant be taken into account and the plaint be dismissed without giving an opportunity to the plaintiff to lead evidence to show that the reason for pursuing the matter before the Bombay High Court was bona fide and with due diligence. This plea is clearly not permissible. On a ex-facie reading of the plaint it cannot be said that it is barred by limitation.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

CS (OS) 105/2018

Decided On: 15.06.2020

Modtech Furniture Private Ltd.  Vs.  NCUBE Planning Design Private Limited and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Jayant Nath, J.

Citation: MANU/DE/1236/2020

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How to ascertain limitation for the suit filed after the withdrawal of a previous suit with liberty to file fresh suit?

Order 23, Rule 2, on the other hand, specifically provides that where a plaintiff is permitted to withdraw the suit or abandon part of the claim with liberty to bring a fresh suit, the plaintiff shall be bound by the Law of Limitation in the same manner as if the first suit had not been instituted.

6. The courts below have held that Order 23, Rule 2, Civil P. C. applies in this case with full force, and, therefore, the appellants cannot get the benefit of Section 14(1) of the Limitation Act.

7. It is obvious that the benefit of Section 14 (1), Limitation Act, can only be given where proceedings are terminated by a court on the ground that it is unable to entertain them for want of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature. There must also be an order of the Court to this effect. Order 23, Rule 2, on the other hand, applies, where there is no order of the court terminating the proceedings, and the proceedings come to an end because a party wants to withdraw the suit or abandon part of the claim with permission to file a fresh suit.

The High Courts are practically unanimous that Section 14(1) has no application to a case to which Order 23, Rule 2 applies. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN

Second Appeal No. 94 of 1951

Decided On: 05.05.1952

 Madhosingh  Vs.  Jaitpalsingh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

K.N. Wanchoo, C.J.

Citation: MANU/RH/0021/1954: AIR 1954 Raj 46

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Whether plaintiff can get benefit of S 14 of limitation Act if he has failed to prove that he was prosecuting previous proceeding with due diligence?

Sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Limitation Act, which admittedly governs the present case, is in these terms :-

"(1). In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a Court of first instance or in a Court of appeal, against the defendant, shall be excluded, where the proceeding is founded upon the same cause of action and is prosecuted in good faith in a Court which, from defect of jurisdiction, or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it."

7. In order to bring his case within the section quoted above, the plaintiff has to show affirmatively :

(1) that he had been prosecuting with due diligence the previous suit in the court of the Munsif at Miraj,

(2) that the previous suit was founded upon the same cause of action,

(3) that it had been prosecuted in good faith in that court, and

(4) that that court was unable to entertain that suit on account of defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature.

8. There is no dispute between the parties here that conditions (2) and (4) are satisfied. But the parties differ with reference to the first and the third conditions. It has been argued on behalf of the appellants that the courts below had misdirected themselves when they observed that there was no proof that the plaintiff had not been diligently prosecuting the previously instituted suit, or that it was not being prosecuted in good faith; that the section requires that the plaintiff must affirmatively show that the previously instituted suit was being prosecuted in good faith and with due diligence; and that, viewed in that light, the plaintiff has failed to satisfy those conditions.

9. The conclusion of the learned trial judge on this part of the case, is in these words :-

"The plaintiff's mala fides are therefore not established and the period occupied in prosecuting the former suit must be excluded under section 14 of the Limitation Act."

10. The observations of the High Court are as follows :-

"We do not see our way to accuse the plaintiff of want of good faith or any mala fides in the matter of the filing of the suit in the Subordinate Judge's Court at Miraj. There is nothing on the record to show that he was really guilty of want of good faith or non-prosecution of the suit with due diligence in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Miraj."

11. Both the courts below have viewed the controversy under section 14 of the Limitation Act, as if it was for the defendant to show mala fides on the part of the plaintiff when he instituted the previous suit and was carrying on the proceedings in that court. In our opinion, both the courts below have misdirected themselves on this question. Though they do not say so in terms, they appear to have applied the definition of "good faith" as contained in the General Clauses Act, to the effect that "A thing shall be deemed to be done in good faith where it is in fact done honestly, whether it is done negligently or not." But the Indian Limitation Act contains its own definition of good faith to the effect that "nothing shall be deemed to be done in good faith which is not done with due care and attention" - (section 2(7)). We have, therefore, to see if the institution and prosecution of the suit in the Munsiff's Court at Miraj, was done with due care and attention. We know that the plaint in the Tikoni suit filed by the same plaintiff in the same court, did contain a statement as to the value of the subject-matter, but it was conspicuous by its absence in the plaint in the suit as originally filed in the Munsiff's Court at Miraj. All the facts alleged in the plaintiff's petition for the return of the plaint, were known to the plaintiff ever since the institution of the suit. Nothing fresh was discovered in 1940. On the other hand, we know definitely that the Tikoni suit had been dismissed by the trial court on merits. The suits were of an analogous character in the sense that the controversy was similar in both of them. The appellant's contention that on the dismissal of the plaintiff's Tikoni suit in November, 1939, he, naturally, became apprehensive about the result of the other suit, and then moved the court for the return of the plaint on the ground of pecuniary jurisdiction, appears to be well-founded. The plaintiff knew all the time that the value of the properties involved in the suit, was much more than Rs. 5,000 which was the limit of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Subordinate Judge's Court. Can an omission in the plaint to mention the value of the properties involved in the suit, be brought within the condition of 'due care and attention' according to the meaning of "good faith" as understood in the Limitation Act ? It has to be remembered that it is not one of those cases which usually arise upon a revision of the valuation as given in the plaint, on an objection raised by the defendant contesting the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the suit. Curiously enough, the defendant had not raised any objection in his written statement to the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the suit. Apparently, the plaintiff was hard put to it to discover reasons for having the case transferred to another court. The question is not whether the plaintiff did it dishonestly or that his acts or omission in this connection, were mala fide. One the other hand, the question is whether, given due care and attention, the plaintiff could have discovered the omission without having to wait for about 10 years or more. The trial court examined the plaintiff's allegation that the omission was due to his pleader's mistake. As that court observed "he makes this contention with a view to shield himself behind a wrong legal advice." That court has answered the plaintiff's contention against him by observing that the plaintiff was not guided by any legal advice in this suit; that the plaint was entirely written by him in both the suits, and that he himself conducted those suits in the trial court "in a manner worthy of a senior counsel." The court, therefore, rightly came to the conclusion that the plaintiff himself was responsible for drafting the plaint and for presenting it in court, and that no pleader had any responsibility in the matter. No reason was adduced why, in those circumstances, the value of the subject-matter of the suit, was mentioned in the plaint in the Tikoni suit but not in the plaint in respect of the present suit.

12. There is another serious difficulty in the way of the plaintiff. He has not brought on the record of this case any evidence to show that he was prosecuting the previously instituted suit with "due diligence" as required by section 14. He has not adduced in evidence the order-sheet or some equivalent evidence of the proceedings in the Sub-Judge's Court at Miraj, to show that in spite of his due diligence, the suit remained pending for over ten years in that court, before he thought of having the suit tried by a court of higher pecuniary jurisdiction. In our opinion, therefore, all the conditions necessary to bring the case within section 14, have not been satisfied by the plaintiff. There could be no doubt about the legal position that the burden lay on the plaintiff to satisfy those conditions in order that he may entitled himself to the deduction of all that period between January 31, 1929 and July 4, 1940. It is also clear that the courts below were in error in expecting the contesting defendant to adduce evidence to the contrary. When the plaintiff has not satisfied the initial burden which lay upon him to bring his case within section 14, the burden would not shift, if it ever shifted, to the defendant to show the contrary. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeals Nos. 287 and 288 of 1955

Decided On: 18.04.1958

Madhavrao Narayanrao Patwardhan Vs. Ramkrishna Govind Bhanu and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.P. Sinha, K. Subba Rao and Syed Jaffer Imam, JJ.

Citation: AIR 1958 SC 767

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Whether delay in filing application U/S 34 of Arbitration can be condoned taking recourse to S 14 of limitation Act?

 Section 14 of the Limitation Act is a hard task master and it should not be set into operation very lightly and in a routine manner. In Madhurao N. Patwardhan v. Ram Kishan MANU/SC/0113/1958 : AIR 1958 SC 767, it was held that the following conditions must be satisfied by the applicant for bringing its case within the four corners of Section 14 of the Act (supra): that he had been prosecuting the previous suit with due diligence and in good faith; that the matter in issue in the previous suit and the new suit are the same; that the Court was unable to entertain that suit on account of defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature. But, in the instant case, none of the above referred conditions have been fulfilled by the applicant by virtue of which the period which has been spent by it in prosecuting the litigation before the other Courts could be excluded. As such, by no stretch of imagination, it can be held that the Section 14 of the Act (supra) is (sic) applicable to the facts of the case.

9. Furthermore, now it is to be seen as to whether there is any scope to condone the delay for preferring the objections by the applicant. The controversy was set at rest by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case Union of India v. M/s. Popular Construction Co. (supra), wherein it was held that the Court cannot condone delay in exercise of its discretion Under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in filing application Under Section 34 of the Act, 1996. Further, in case Senior Executive Engineer v. Minhas Builders MANU/PH/3766/2010 : (2010) 4 CCC 374 (P & H), it was held that where there is delay in filing objections to Arbitration Award then period of limitation cannot be extended even by invoking Section 5 of the Act.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

C.A. No. 5332 of 2017

Decided On: 07.04.2017

Haryana State Cooperative Labour and Construction Federation Ltd. 

Vs.

Unique Cooperative Labour and Construction Cooperative Society Ltd. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.S. Khehar, C.J.I., Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud and Sanjay Kishan Kaul, JJ.

Citation: (2018) 14 SCC 248

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SHORT NOTES ON LIMITATION ACT 1963 PART 1

S 2 Definitions:-

f) Easement includes a right not arising from contract, by which one person is entitled to remove and appropriate for his own profit any part of soil belonging to another or anything growing in or attached to,or subsisting upon the land of another;

h) Good faith- Nothing shall be deemed to be done in good faith which is not done with due care and attention;

m) Tort -It means a civil wrong which is not exclusively the breach of a contract or the breach of a trust;

S 3. Bar of limitation:-

Sub S 1- Every suit instituted,appeal preferred and application made after prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as defence.

Sub S 2- For the purposes of this Act:-

a) A suit is instituted

1) when plaint is presented to proper officer;

2) in the case of pauper, when his application for leave to sue as a pauper is made;

b) Any claim by way of a set off,or a counter claim shall be treated as a separate suit and shall be deemed to have been instituted-

1) in the case of set off, on the date as the suit in which set off is pleaded;

2) in the case of counter claim, on the date on which counter claim is made in court;

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What are necessary conditions for applicability of S 14 of limitation Act?

Section 14 of the Limitation Act deals with exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in a court without jurisdiction. On analysis of the said section, it becomes evident that the following conditions must be satisfied before Section 14 can be pressed into service:

(1) Both the prior and subsequent proceedings are civil proceedings prosecuted by the same party;

(2) The prior proceeding had been prosecuted with due diligence and in good faith;

(3) The failure of the prior proceeding was due to defect of jurisdiction or other cause of like nature;

(4) The earlier proceeding and the latter proceeding must relate to the same matter in issue and;

(5) Both the proceedings are in a court.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 4367 of 2004

Decided On: 23.04.2015

M.P. Steel Corporation Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise

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What are necessary conditions for applicability of S 14 of limitation Act in arbitration proceeding?

Having stated thus, we are obliged to scrutinise under what situations Section 14 of the Act gets attracted. Section 14(1) of the Act, which is relevant for the present purpose, reads as follows:

14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction.-(1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the Plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the Defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.

16. In Consolidated Engineering Enterprises (supra), the Court, while dealing with the conditions in which Section 14 will be applicable, enumerated five conditions which are as follows:

(1) Both the prior and subsequent proceedings are civil proceedings prosecuted by the same party;

(2) The prior proceeding had been prosecuted with due diligence and in good faith;

(3) The failure of the prior proceeding was due to defect of jurisdiction or other cause of like nature;

(4) The earlier proceeding and the latter proceeding must relate to the same matter in issue and;

(5) Both the proceedings are in a court.

In the said case, it has also been stated that:

... While considering the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, proper approach will have to be adopted and the provisions will have to be interpreted so as to advance the cause of justice rather than abort the proceedings. It will be well to bear in mind that an element of mistake is inherent in the invocation of Section 14. In fact, the Section is intended to provide relief against the bar of limitation in cases of mistaken remedy or selection of a wrong forum. On reading Section 14 of the Act it becomes clear that the legislature has enacted the said Section to exempt a certain period covered by a bona fide litigious activity....

17. From the aforesaid passage, it is clear as noon day that there has to be a liberal interpretation to advance the cause of justice. However, it has also been laid down that it would be applicable in cases of mistaken remedy or selection of a wrong forum. As per the conditions enumerated, the earlier proceeding and the latter proceeding must relate to the same matter in issue. It is worthy to mention here that the words "matter in issue" are used Under Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. As has been held in Ramadhar Shrivas v. Bhagwandas MANU/SC/1635/2005 : (2005) 13 SCC 1 the said expression connotes the matter which is directly and substantially in issue. We have only referred to the said authority to highlight that despite liberal interpretation placed Under Section 14 of the Act, the matter in issue in the earlier proceeding and the latter proceeding has to be conferred requisite importance. That apart, the prosecution of the prior proceeding should also show due diligence and good faith.

18. In the case at hand, the Respondent appeared before the learned arbitrator and after the award was passed, chose not to file any objection to the award immediately. On the contrary, the Respondent filed an application Under Section 11 of 1996 Act before the High Court for appointment of an arbitrator. As has been stated earlier, the learned Single Judge of the High Court distinguished the decision in the case of Sohanlal Chourasia and Anr. (supra) and came to hold that the application was not maintainable. However, he granted liberty to the Respondent to file an objection in accordance with law. The words "in accordance with law" gain significance. It allows an argument to be canvassed by the Respondent that the time spent in earlier proceeding deserved exclusion while computing the period of limitation. But, an ominous one for the Respondent, whether Section 14 is at all attracted? Had the learned Single Judge stated that the period consumed for pursuing the remedy Under Section 11 of the 1996 Act, would be excluded for filing objection, possibly the matter would have been different. In any case, we do not intend to dilate further on that aspect. It is quite clear that the quoted portion hereinabove does not so indicate. It only grants liberty to the Respondent to file an objection in accordance with law. Section 14(1) of the Act which we have reproduced, lays down that the proceedings must relate to the same matter in issue. It emphasises on due diligence and good faith. Filing of an application Under Section 11 of the 1996 Act for an appointment of arbitrator is totally different than an objection to award filed Under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. To put it differently, one is at the stage of initiation, and the other at the stage of culmination. By no stretch of imagination, it can be said that the proceedings relate to "same matter in issue". Additionally, the Respondent had participated in the arbitral proceeding and was aware of passing of the award. He, may be, by design, invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court for appointment of an arbitrator. We are absolutely conscious that liberal interpretation should be placed on Section 14 of the Act, but if the fact situation exposits absence of good faith of great magnitude, law should not come to the rescue of such a litigant. We say so because the Respondent instead of participating in the arbitration proceedings, could have immediately taken steps for appointment of arbitrator as he thought appropriate or he could have filed his objections Under Section 34(2) of the Act within permissible parameters but he chose a way, which we are disposed to think, an innovative path, possibly harbouring the thought that he could contrive the way where he could alone rule. Frankly speaking, this is neither diligence nor good faith. On the contrary, it is absence of both.

19. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we find that the High Court has fallen into grave error by concurring with the opinion expressed by the learned Additional District Judge and, therefore, both the orders deserve to be lancinated and, accordingly, we so direct.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 6573 of 2016 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No. 39511 of 2013)

Decided On: 19.07.2016

 Commissioner, M.P. Housing Board and Ors.Vs. Mohanlal and Company

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dipak Misra and Rohinton Fali Nariman, JJ.

Citation:(2016) 14 SCC 199

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Whether time taken for pursuing complaint under consumer protection Act can be excluded as per S 14 of limitation Act?

 Taking note of the observations of the Division Bench of
this Court and of the Apex Court referred to hereinabove, the fact that
time taken to pursue a complaint under the Consumer Protection Act
can be excluded in terms of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is
no longer res integra and, as such, the contention of Mr. Tamba,
learned Counsel appearing for the respondents No.2 to 5 that such time
cannot be excluded, cannot be accepted. In such circumstances, the
fact that the proceedings were bonafide are apparent in the context that
the proceedings were diligently pursued by the appellants before the
State Commission and, in fact, on perusal of the Judgment of the 
learned State Commission, it is clearly held that the appellants were
granted leave to pursue their claim by filing a civil suit. As such, the
suit filed by the appellant is within the period of limitation in terms of
Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The first point for
determination is answered accordingly.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA
FIRST APPEAL NO. 206 OF 2009
WITH
MISC. CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 182/2015
Shangrilla Apartments Co-op.
Housing Society Ltd.
 Versus
M/s. Rivin Builders,
 CORAM :- F.M. REIS & K.L. WADANE, JJ.
 Date : - 08/07/2015.
Citation:2016(2) MHLJ 939

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Whether time spent before Consumer Forum can be excluded in terms of S 14 of Limitation Act?

As such, the only aspect to be examined is whether the
time spent before the Consumer Forum can be excluded in terms of
Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. In this connection, it would
also be appropriate to note that the fact that the proceedings were
initiated bonafide and that the respondents were also parties to such
proceedings and defending their claim, is also undisputed. In this
connection, a Division Bench of this Court in a Judgment reported in
AIR 2001 BOMBAY 327 in the case of M/s. Deokar Exports Pvt.
Ltd., vs. new India Assurance Co. Ltd., has taken a view that the time
taken in pursuing a complaint before the Consumer Forum is to be
excluded in terms of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, by observing at
para 10, thus:
“10. We may note that on 10-2-1990, fire broke out
and the machinery was damaged. The respondent
was immediately informed orally by the appellant.
However, the respondent was informed in writing on
17-2-1990. Correspondence followed between the
"parties. The respondent declined to pay the claim of
the appellant on 18-4-1990. The appellant
approached the said NCDRC on 20-8-1991. The
same was decided by the said forum on 23-9-1992. It
came to be rejected on the ground that considering 
the contention of the respondent there was no
deficiency in service. Therefore, it has no
jurisdiction and appellant can avail of any other
remedy available. Article 44(b) of the Limitation Act,
1963 provides three years limitation from the date of
occurrence causing loss or where the claim on the
policy is denied the date of such denial. Section 14
deals with exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide
in Court without jurisdiction. Section 14(1) is as
under :--
"14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona
fide in Court without jurisdiction.-- (1) In
computing the period of limitation for any
suit the time during which the plaintiff has
been prosecuting with due diligence another
civil proceeding, whether in a Court of first
instance or of appeal or revision, against the
defendant shall be excluded, where the
proceeding relates to the same matter in issue
and is prosecuted in good faith in a Court
which, from defect of jurisdiction, or other
cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain
it."
Considering the above position, it cannot be
accepted that the resort by the appellant to the said
forum of NCDRC was not in good faith or bona fide
or it was deliberately chosen knowing full well that 
it was incompetent to deal with it. The order passed
by the said Forum shows that the appellant has
approached the said Forum bona fide and hence the
respondent was permitted to avail of any other
remedy available. At the most, it may be said that
the further steps by the appellant of going before the
Apex Court by filing S.L.P, was not in good faith.
However, in view of Section 14(1) of the Limitation
Act, the appellant is entitled for exclusion of the
period from 20th August, 1991 to 30-9-1992. The
learned counsel for the respondent has rightly relied
upon the judgment in the matter of Saushish
Diamonds Ltd. v. National Insurance Co. Ltd.
MANU/SC/1175/1998 : (1998)8SCC357 . In the
said case, precisely the same position concurred.
The appellant had approached the National
Commission for Consumer Redressal. The said
Commission in its order held that the Insurance
Company has repudiated the claim. Hence, the relief
cannot be granted by it. This order came to be
challenged before the Apex Court. It was observed
as under :--
"..... Under these circumstances, the Commission
rightly relegated the parties to a civil action. It is
true that limitation has run out against the
appellant during the pendency of the
proceedings. Therefore, the time taken between 
the date of the filing of the claim before the
Commission and the date of its disposal, namely,
28-9-1995 would be considered by the Civil
Court for exclusion under Section 14 of the
Limitation Act, 1963."
In view of the above position, we hold that the suit
filed by the appellant was within limitation.”
The Karnataka High Court, in the Judgment reported in ILR 2004 KAR
4322, SCC Online Karnataka 121 in the case of The City Municipal
Council vs. M/s. S.A. Lateef & Co. Andhra Pradesh, has also taken a
similar view that the period taken in pursuing remedy under the
Consumer Protection Act can be excluded in terms of Section 14 of the
Limitation Act by observing thus :
“LIMITATION ACT, 1963 (CENTRAL ACT NO.
36 OF 1963) – SECTION 14-Exclusion of time of
proceedings 'Bonafide' in Court without jurisdiction
– Computing the period of limitation – Prosecuting
with due diligence in another Civil Proceeding in
good faith under Consumer Protection Act. The
plaintiff had filed a complaint before District
Consumer Forum for recovery of unpaid price. The
complaint was allowed and defendant was directed
to pay the amount. In the appeal, the State
Commission by its order dated 16.1.1996, held that 
the subject matter of dispute is not governed by
Consumer Protection Act and gave liberty to the
plaintiff to approach Civil Court; Accordingly suit is
filed. HELD – Provisions of Section 14 declare that
bonafidely and with due diligence if a person is
prosecuting any Civil Proceedings, in any other
Court which has no competent jurisdiction, the
period spent in that litigation is to be deducted. The
District Consumer Forum is very much a Court of
Civil jurisdiction and the proceedings before the
Consumer Forum are Civil Proceedings. Merely by
the fact that State Forum has held that the complaint
is not maintainable and that the plaintiff is not a
consumer within the definition, is not a ground by
itself to infer that there was lack of diligence or
bonafides on the part of the plaintiff. The plaintiff
was assisted by the Counsel. The District Forum
entertained the complaint and granted a decree. The
limitation for filing the suit in the normal course was
22.3.96. The complaint before the Forum was filed
on 7.1.95 and proceedings under Consumer
Protection Act finally terminated on 9.1.97. About 2
years and 8 months is spent in litigation before
Consumer Forum. If the said period is deducted, the
present suit filed on 12.1.98 is well within the
limitation. Therefore, the grant of benefit of Section
14 of Limitation Act by Trial Court is sound and 
proper.”
In AIR 1995 SC 1428, in the case of Laxmi Engineering Works vs.
P.S.G. Industrial Institute, the Apex Court has observed, inter alia, at
para 26 that in case the appellant chooses to file a suit, the period taken
in pursuing the complaint under the Consumer Protection Act is to be
excluded in terms of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. A similar view
has also been taken by the Apex Court in the Judgment reported in
(1998) 8 SCC 357 in the case of Saushish Diamonds Ltd. vs.
National Insurance Co. Ltd..
12. Taking note of the observations of the Division Bench of
this Court and of the Apex Court referred to hereinabove, the fact that
time taken to pursue a complaint under the Consumer Protection Act
can be excluded in terms of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is
no longer res integra and, as such, the contention of Mr. Tamba,
learned Counsel appearing for the respondents No.2 to 5 that such time
cannot be excluded, cannot be accepted. In such circumstances, the
fact that the proceedings were bonafide are apparent in the context that
the proceedings were diligently pursued by the appellants before the
State Commission and, in fact, on perusal of the Judgment of the
learned State Commission, it is clearly held that the appellants were
granted leave to pursue their claim by filing a civil suit. As such, the
suit filed by the appellant is within the period of limitation in terms of
Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The first point for
determination is answered accordingly.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA
FIRST APPEAL NO. 206 OF 2009
WITH
MISC. CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 182/2015
 Shangrilla Apartments Co-op.
Housing Society Ltd.
 Versus
 M/s. Rivin Builders, 
 CORAM :- F.M. REIS &
 K.L. WADANE, JJ.
 Date : - 08/07/2015.
Citation;2016(2) ALLMR136

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whether S 14 of Limitation Act would apply to Section 34(3) of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

 Quite apart from Mukri Gopalan’s case being out of step
with at least five earlier binding judgments of this Court, it does
not square also with the subsequent judgment in Consolidated
Engg. Enterprises v. Principal secy., Irrigation Deptt., (2008)
7 SCC 169. A 3-Judge Bench of this Court was asked to
decide whether Section 14 of the Limitation Act would apply to
Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. After
discussing the various provisions of the Arbitration Act and the
Limitation Act, this Court held:
“23. At this stage it would be relevant to ascertain
whether there is any express provision in the Act of
1996, which excludes the applicability of Section 14
of the Limitation Act. On review of the provisions of
the Act of 1996 this Court finds that there is no
provision in the said Act which excludes the
applicability of the provisions of Section 14 of the
Limitation Act to an application submitted under
Section 34 of the said Act. On the contrary, this
Court finds that Section 43 makes the provisions of
the Limitation Act, 1963 applicable to arbitration
proceedings. The proceedings under Section 34 are
for the purpose of challenging the award whereas
the proceeding referred to under Section 43 are the
original proceedings which can be equated with a
suit in a court. Hence, Section 43 incorporating the
Limitation Act will apply to the proceedings in the
arbitration as it applies to the proceedings of a suit
in the court. Sub-section (4) of Section 43, inter alia,
provides that where the court orders that an arbitral
award be set aside, the period between the
commencement of the arbitration and the date of
the order of the court shall be excluded in
computing the time prescribed by the Limitation Act,
1963, for the commencement of the proceedings
with respect to the dispute so submitted. If the
period between the commencement of the
arbitration proceedings till the award is set aside by
the court, has to be excluded in computing the
period of limitation provided for any proceedings
with respect to the dispute, there is no good reason
as to why it should not be held that the provisions of
Section 14 of the Limitation Act would be applicable

to an application submitted under Section 34 of the
Act of 1996, more particularly where no provision is
to be found in the Act of 1996, which excludes the
applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, to an
application made under Section 34 of the Act. It is to
be noticed that the powers under Section 34 of the
Act can be exercised by the court only if the
aggrieved party makes an application. The
jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act, cannot be
exercised suo motu. The total period of four months
within which an application, for setting aside an
arbitral award, has to be made is not unusually long.
Section 34 of the Act of 1996 would be unduly
oppressive, if it is held that the provisions of Section
14 of the Limitation Act are not applicable to it,
because cases are no doubt conceivable where an
aggrieved party, despite exercise of due diligence
and good faith, is unable to make an application
within a period of four months. From the scheme
and language of Section 34 of the Act of 1996, the
intention of the legislature to exclude the
applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act is not
manifest. It is well to remember that Section 14 of
the Limitation Act does not provide for a fresh period
of limitation but only provides for the exclusion of a
certain period. Having regard to the legislative
intent, it will have to be held that the provisions of
Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would be
applicable to an application submitted under Section
34 of the Act of 1996 for setting aside an arbitral
award.”

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4367 OF 2004
M.P. STEEL CORPORATION …APPELLANT

VERSUS
COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL
EXCISE ...RESPONDENT
Citation;(2015)7 SCC58
R.F. Nariman, J.

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Whether benefit of S14 of Limitation Act can be given to plaintiff without hearing other side?

 Shri Deshpande, the learned advocate for the petitioner has submitted
that the earlier civil suit was dismissed on merits and not on any technical
grounds and, therefore, the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act cannot be
given to the respondent. Moreover, the learned District Judge could not have
granted the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act to the respondent without
there being any application and without there being any pleadings in that
regards. The grant of benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act cannot be said
to be a mechanical act of the Court but whether the plaintiff was prosecuting the
earlier proceedings with “due diligence” and in good faith is required to be
adjudicated and it can be done only after giving an opportunity to the defendant
to point out that the plaintiff is entitled for the benefit of Section 14 of the
Limitation Act. The learned District Judge has committed an error in granting
benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act to the respondent without there being
any application or pleadings on the record to substantiate that the respondent
was prosecuting the earlier proceedings with due diligence and in good faith.
 In view of the above, the judgment and decree passed by the District

Court is unsustainable.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH AT NAGPUR
WRIT PETITION NO.6454/2005
Rajendra Antharam Tijoriwala and Gujrathi,

V
 Takhatmal Shrivallabh Charitable Trust,



CORAM
: Z.A. HAQ, J.
DATE : 20.12.2014
Citation;2015(2) MHLJ179

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