What is exclusion of time and extension of time under The indian Limitation Act?

 The Indian Limitation Act, 1963 provides two distinct mechanisms to address timing issues in legal proceedings: exclusion of time and extension of time. These provisions ensure fairness and prevent technical delays from defeating genuine legal claims.

Exclusion of Time (Sections 12-15)

Exclusion of time refers to specific periods that are not counted when calculating the limitation period for filing suits, appeals, or applications. This operates automatically and does not require court discretion.

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What approach the court should adopt while dealing with delay condonation application filed by Government department?

Thus, the Supreme Court has, in clear terms, held that existence of sufficient cause for not filing the appeal in time is a condition precedent for exercising discretionary power to condone the delay. The Court further clarified that the phrases 'liberal approach', justice-oriented approach' and cause for the advancement of 'substantial justice' cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re-opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

17. The Supreme Court, while highlighting the aspect of protecting the interest of institution, has also observed that the law of limitation will have to be implemented, though would harshly affect the party. Thus, at the end of the day, the delay will have to be condoned only upon showing sufficient cause. At the same time, the institutional interest of the State will have to be considered but then the default of individuals cannot be ignored as well.

18. The default will have to be dealt with in terms of Section 10 of the Maharashtra Government Servants Regulation of Transfers and Prevention of Delay in Discharge of Official Duties Act, 2005 (for short "the Act of 2005"), which reads thus :

"10. (1) Every Government servant shall be bound to discharge his official duties and the official work assigned or pertaining to him most diligently and as expeditiously as feasible :

Provided that, normally no file shall remain pending with any Government servant in the Department or Office for more than seven working days :

Provided further that, immediate and urgent files shall be disposed of as per the urgency of the matter, as expeditiously as possible, and preferably the immediate file in one day or next day morning and the urgent file in four days :

Provided also that, in respect of the files not required to be referred to any other Department, the concerned Department shall take the decision and necessary action in the matter within forty-five days and in respect of files required to be referred to any other Department, decision and necessary action shall be taken within three months.

(2) Any wilful or intentional delay or negligence in the discharge of official duties or in carrying out the official work assigned or pertaining to such Government servant shall amount to dereliction of official duties and shall make such Government servant liable for appropriate 1.[disciplinary action under the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969, the] Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979 or any other relevant disciplinary rules applicable to such employee.

(3) The concerned competent authority on noticing or being brought to its notice any such dereliction of duties on the part of any Government servant, after satisfying itself about such dereliction on the part of such Government servant shall, take appropriate disciplinary action against such defaulting Government servant under the relevant disciplinary rules including taking entry relating to such dereliction of duty in the Annual Confidential Report of such Government servant."

19. As could be seen, sub-section (1) of Section 10 of the Act of 2005 provides that every Government servant shall discharge his official duties assigned or pertaining to him most diligently and expeditiously and that no file shall remain pending with any Government servant in the department, usually for more than seven working days. Thus, additional time taken will have to be properly justified. In addition, Rules 10 to 13 of the Maharashtra Prevention of Delay in Discharge of Official Duties Rules, 2013 (for short "the Rules of 2013) provides for detailed mechanism to prevent/avoid delay. Despite such a provision and several judgments of the Supreme Court deprecating casual approach in processing files, there is no improvement.

20. There is a reason for the same and the reason is not taking action, provided under sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 10. It is unfortunate that the effect of sub-section (1) of Section 10 has been neutralized by not taking recourse to sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 10. In that sense, all the officials have collectively failed to protect institutional interest of the State. Resultantly, the casual approach of Government servants continue and on top of it, the judgments of the Supreme Court are cited to argue as if the Government Servants have license to sit over the files and to expect the Courts to take liberal view.

21. As stated earlier, to expect from the Court a liberal approach, the officers, like the applicants, are/were duty bound to show that despite due diligence and bona fide efforts, the appeal could not be filed within stipulated time because of certain administrative exigencies, which were beyond their control. The Government Officials are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with due diligence and commitment.

22. The application as also the affidavit filed by the applicants before the First Appellate Court is completely silent as to what prevented the applicants to adhere to rigor of Section 10 of the Act of 2005. In fact, the reasons assigned to condone the delay does not show any cause, much less sufficient cause, to condone the delay. This is not a case where certain leeway could be provided to the applicants. The judgment of Sheo Raj Singh (supra) is, therefore, of no help to the applicants.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Second Appeal No. 305 of 2009

Decided On: 25.04.2024

The State of Maharashtra and Ors. Vs. Omprakash

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Anil L. Pansare, J.

Citation: 2024:BHC-NAG:4790, 2024:BHC-NAG:4722,

MANU/MH/2714/2024, 2024(4) MhLJ 428(Bom).

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Supreme Court explains the difference in factors to be considered while deciding condonation of delay application either U/S 5 or U/S 14 of Limitation Act

Also, it must be remembered that merely because sufficient cause has been made out in the facts of a given case, there is no right in the Appellant to have delay condoned. This was felicitously put in Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd.,   MANU/SC/0042/1961 : (1962) 2 SCR 762 as follows: {Para 60}

It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify an enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle during all the time available to it. In this connection we may point out that considerations of bona fides or due diligence are always material and relevant when the Court is dealing with applications made Under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In dealing with such applications the Court is called upon to consider the effect of the combined provisions of Sections 5 and 14. Therefore, in our opinion, considerations which have been expressly made material and relevant by the provisions of Section 14 cannot to the same extent and in the same manner be invoked in dealing with applications which fall to be decided only Under Section 5 without reference to Section 14. (page 771).

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 995 of 2021.

Decided On: 19.03.2021

Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources Department) Vs. Borse Brothers Engineers & Contractors Pvt. Ltd.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Rohinton Fali Nariman, B.R. Gavai and Hrishikesh Roy, JJ.

Author: Rohinton Fali Nariman, J.

Citation: (2021)6 SCC 460,2021SCCONLINE SC 233, MANU/SC/0195/2021.

Read full Judgment here : Click here.

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To what extent provisions of S 5 of limitation Act are applicable to arbitration appeal under Commercial courts Act?

 Given the aforesaid and the object of speedy disposal sought to be achieved both under the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, for appeals filed Under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act that are governed by Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation Act or Section 13(1A) of the Commercial Courts Act, a delay beyond 90 days, 30 days or 60 days, respectively, is to be condoned by way of exception and not by way of rule. In a fit case in which a party has otherwise acted bona fide and not in a negligent manner, a short delay beyond such period can, in the discretion of the court, be condoned, always bearing in mind that the other side of the picture is that the opposite party may have acquired both in equity and justice, what may now be lost by the first party's inaction, negligence or laches. {Para 61}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 995 of 2021.

Decided On: 19.03.2021

Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources Department) Vs. Borse Brothers Engineers & Contractors Pvt. Ltd.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Rohinton Fali Nariman, B.R. Gavai and Hrishikesh Roy, JJ.

Author: Rohinton Fali Nariman, J.

Citation: (2021)6 SCC 460,2021SCCONLINE SC 233, MANU/SC/0195/2021

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Whether S 5 of limitation Act is applicable for condonation of delay in filing of cross objection?

I have given careful consideration to the submissions. The first issue is regarding the condonation of delay in filing the cross-objection. A Reference will have to be made to sub rule (1) of Rule 22 of Order XLI of the said Code which reads thus:

Any respondent, though he may not have appealed from any part of the decree, may not only support the decree (but may also state that the finding against him in the Court below in respect of any issue ought to have been in his favour; and may also take any cross-objection) to the decree which he could have taken by way of appeal, provided he has filed such objection in the Appellate Court within one month from the date of service on him or his pleader of notice of the day fixed for hearing the appeal, or within such further time as the Appellate Court may see fit to allow.

5. Thus, under sub-rule (1) of Rule 22 of Order XLI of the said Code, a power has been conferred upon the Appellate Court to extend the time to file cross-objection. The Appellate Court can grant such further time as it may see fit to allow. The sub-rule (1) of Rule 22 does not lay down that sufficient cause is required to be shown by the respondent. As the said Code vests the power to extend the time to file cross-objection in the Appellate Court, it is not at all necessary for the respondent in appeal to invoke section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

First Appeal No. 1323 of 2002 Alongwith Civil Application No. 2432 of 2011 and Cross Objection ST. No. 16210 of 2011

Decided On: 24.06.2011

 State of Maharashtra  Vs.  Kalu Ladku Mhatre

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Abhay Shreeniwas Oka., J.

Citation: 2011(3) Civil court cases 796  Bom

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Whether the court can restore suit dismissed in default in the exercise of inherent powers?

Overruling the view taken by the learned Single Judge of this Court and answering the reference by declaring that Section 151 of the Code could be invoked to seek restoration of a Suit dismissed under Sub-Rule (1) of Rule 5 of Order IX of the Code, we lodge the caveat. The caveat would be that the Plaintiff would have to show a sufficient cause. The previous conduct of the Plaintiff would also require to be considered. The inconvenience and the prejudice caused to the served defendants or the defendant who was not served as a consequence of restoration of the Suit would also have to be kept in mind.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition Nos. 896 of 2007, 7552 of 2009 and Civil Application Stamp No. 901 of 2019

Decided On: 16.10.2019

Hariba Tatyaba More  Vs.  Dada Ekhatnath More and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Pradeep Nandrajog, C.J., M.S. Karnik and Bharati H. Dangre, JJ.

Citation: 2019(6) MHLJ 511(FB)

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Whether Time spent to set aside ex-parte decree is “sufficient cause” to condone delay in filing Appeal?

A conjoint reading of Order IX Rule 13 CPC and Section
96(2) CPC indicates that the defendant who suffered an ex-parte
decree has two remedies:- (i) either to file an application under
Order IX Rule 13 CPC to set aside the ex-parte decree to satisfy
the court that summons were not duly served or those served, he
was prevented by “sufficient cause” from appearing in the court
when the suit was called for hearing; (ii) to file a regular appeal
from the original decree to the first appellate court and challenge
the ex-parte decree on merits.
11. It is to be pointed out that the scope of Order IX Rule 13
CPC and Section 96(2) CPC are entirely different. In an
application filed under Order IX Rule 13 CPC, the Court has to

see whether the summons were duly served or not or whether
the defendant was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from
appearing when the suit was called for hearing. If the Court is
satisfied that the defendant was not duly served or that he was
prevented for “sufficient cause”, the court may set aside the exparte
decree and restore the suit to its original position. In terms
of Section 96(2) CPC, the appeal lies from an original decree
passed ex-parte. In the regular appeal filed under Section 96(2)
CPC, the appellate court has wide jurisdiction to go into the
merits of the decree. The scope of enquiry under two provisions
is entirely different. Merely because the defendant pursued the
remedy under Order IX Rule 13 CPC, it does not prohibit the
defendant from filing the appeal if his application under Order IX
Rule 13 CPC is dismissed.
12. The right of appeal under Section 96(2) CPC is a statutory
right and the defendant cannot be deprived of the statutory right
of appeal merely on the ground that the application filed by him
under Order IX Rule 13 CPC has been dismissed.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4669 OF 2019


BHIVCHANDRA SHANKAR MORE  Vs  BALU GANGARAM MORE 

R. BANUMATHI, J.
Dated:May 07, 2019.

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Whether time spent in proceeding with application U 9 R 13 of CPC can be condoned in filing of first appeal?

As pointed out earlier, an appeal under Section 96 CPC is a
statutory right. Generally, delays in preferring appeals are
required to be condoned, in the interest of justice, where there is
no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide is
imputable to the party seeking condonation of delay.
17. In the case in hand, respondents No.1 to 13 filed a suit for
partition in the year 2007, which was decreed ex-parte on

04.07.2008. Appellant and respondents No.14 and 15 filed
application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC and the same came to
be dismissed on 06.08.2010. Being aggrieved by dismissal of
application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC, the appellant and
respondents No.14 and 15 preferred an appeal under Order XLIII
Rule 1(d) CPC on 03.09.2010. Of course, the said appeal was
pending for about three years and the same was withdrawn on
11.06.2013. Thereafter, on the next day i.e. on 12.06.2013, the
appellant and respondents No.14 and 15 filed an appeal
challenging the ex-parte decree and judgment dated 04.07.2008
passed in Regular Civil Suit No.35 of 2007. It cannot be said that
the appellant and respondents No.14 and 15 were grossly
negligent in pursuing the matter more so, when the decree was
passed in the suit for partition.
18. It is pertinent to note that as per Section 97 CPC where any
party aggrieved by a preliminary decree does not appeal from
such decree, he shall be precluded from disputing its correctness
in any appeal which may be preferred from the final decree. The
object is that the questions decided by the court at the stage of
passing preliminary decree cannot be challenged at the time of
final decree. If no appeal had been preferred against the

preliminary decree, the suit filed by the respondents-plaintiffs
being a suit for partition, the appellant would be deprived of the
opportunity in challenging the decree on merits. In the interest of
justice, the appellant and respondents No.14 and 15 are to be
given an opportunity to challenge the ex-parte decree dated
04.07.2008 on merits, notwithstanding the dismissal of their
application filed under Order IX Rule 13 CPC.
19. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, the time
spent in pursuing the application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC is
to be taken as “sufficient cause” for condoning the delay in filing
the first appeal. The impugned judgment of the High Court
cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4669 OF 2019

BHIVCHANDRA SHANKAR MORE Vs  BALU GANGARAM MORE 

R. BANUMATHI, J.
Dated:May 07, 2019.

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Whether oral prayer for condonation of delay is maintainable?

It is well settled that an oral prayer for condonation of
delay can also be entertained provided ground therefor is made out
in the petition and accordingly I do not find any merit in the
submission that in absence of any formal prayer, the oral prayer
for condonation of delay cannot be entertained. However, as
rightly pointed out on behalf of the Executor, the court has to be
satisfied that there is sufficient cause for condoning such delay
and the court has to be satisfied with the explanations offered in

the petition. In an application for restoration, the applicant is
required to furnish reasons which have to be sufficient to sustain
a plea that the applicant is entitled to restoration of the matter
and he needs to offer an explanation for the period of delay.

IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Testamentary & Intestate Jurisdiction
GA NO. 3070 OF 2018
PLA NO. 123 OF 2013

IN THE GOODS OF:
KRISHNA CHANDRA SENGUPTA (DECEASED)

BEFORE:
The Hon'ble JUSTICE SOUMEN SEN
Date : 15th November 2018.
Citation: AIR 2019(NOC) 66 Cal

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Whether magistrate can direct opening of envelope of notice while deciding application for condonation of delay in cheque dishonour case?

The aforesaid observations and the law laid down by the Apex Court show that condonation of delay is within the discretion of the Court and the Court is expected to keep in mind the aforesaid things. If the J.M.F.C. forms opinion that the envelops contain nothing and no statutory notices were sent by the complainant to the accused, this circumstance can be considered by the J.M.F.C. at the time of deciding the delay condonation applications. It cannot be said that consideration of such circumstance amounts to touching of the merits of the complaints for final disposal. If this circumstance is considered, the Court will form opinion as to whether there is some arguable case in the complaint itself for proceeding ahead like issuing process in the matter. If the J.M.F.C. has formed the opinion that such exercise is required in the present matter, there is nothing wrong in it. No particular procedure is prescribed for deciding the delay condonation application and it is up to the Magistrate to follow the procedure required in view of peculiar circumstance. This Court holds that there is nothing wrong in the order made by the J.M.F.C. No interference is warranted in the orders made by the learned J.M.F.C.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Criminal Application No. 5808 of 2016, Appln. 5809, 5810 and 5811/2016

Decided On: 20.07.2018

 Nandlal Gangaram Ranglani  Vs.  Mahak Amit Ranglani and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

T.V. Nalawade, J.

Citation: 2019(1) MHLJ 804

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When court can condone delay in filing application U/S 34 of Arbitration Act?

 Considering the object of provisions of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and in view of absence of conclusive material on record in respect of delivery of service of arbitral award on the appellants, a case is made out by the appellants that they were prevented by sufficient cause from making an application.

21. In view of the above stated facts and circumstances, we find that as the copy of the award was not served on the appellants, the explanation tendered for condoning delay in preparing petition under Section 34 deserves consideration. A party cannot be prevented to resort to statutory remedy if it is established that there was no fault on their part in approaching the Court beyond the prescribed period of limitation or in view of non-compliance of provisions of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.

In the High Court of Bombay

Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction

(Before Naresh H. Patil and G.S. Kulkarni, JJ.)

JSC Ispat Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s. HDB Financial Services Ltd. .

Appeal (L) No. 80 of 2018

In

Notice of Motion (L) No. 2556 of 2015 (for condonation of delay)

In

Arbitration Petition No. 40 of 2018

(Arbitration Petition (L) No. 1814/2015)

With

Notice of Motion (L) No. 130 of 2018 (for stay)

Decided on March 6, 2018

Citation: 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 538

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Basic principles to be followed by court while deciding application seeking leave to omit relief in suit

Thus, it follows that, for deciding the application for leave, filed by the Plaintiff under Order-2 Rule-2(3) of C.P.C., the scope of inquiry is very limited to the extent of deciding whether the Plaintiff has given sufficient cause or explanation for not claiming that relief in this suit. The Court has only to consider whether the relief sought to be omitted could have been asked in this suit itself. No other inquiry is warranted at all in deciding such application. The question whether the Plaintiffs are entitled for the said relief, is totally beyond the scope of the inquiry in this application, as the said question will arise in subsequent suit.

7. In the present case, by filing the application under Order-2 Rule-2 of C.P.C., the Petitioners wanted only to reserve their right of filing a subsequent suit for partition. The Petitioners had also given the explanation as to why they could not ask for the relief of partition in this suit itself. The trial Court should have therefore considered that explanation only, to ascertain whether it is sufficient or not, in the light of the urgency made out by the Petitioners for filing the present suit seeking relief of injunction only, though they were entitled for the relief of partition and separate possession also. The trial Court has, however, travelled beyond this scope of enquiry and unnecessarily entered into the aspect as to whether the Petitioners are coparceners or not and whether they are eligible for getting relief of partition or otherwise. The impugned order, passed by the trial Court, therefore, being against the express provisions of law, it cannot be sustained, hence quashed and set-aside.

8. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is allowed. The application filed by the Petitioners below Exhibit-7 is allowed. The permission is granted to the Petitioners to omit the relief of partition and separate possession in this suit, reserving that relief to be sued subsequently, in view of the provisions of Order-2 Rule-2(3) of C.P.C.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 13138 of 2016

Decided On: 08.01.2018

 Nikita Manohar More and Ors. Vs.  Nitesh Pundlik Patil

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dr. Shalini Phansalkar Joshi, J.

Citation: 2018(2) MHLJ 378

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Whether exparte decree can be set aside on ground of non-communication of order of transfer of case?

Civil - Ex parte decree - Setting aside of - Application for condonation of delay - Order 9, Rule 13 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Petitionertenant filed application for condonation of delay for setting aside an exparte decree against Petitioner, on ground that Petitioner was not intimated or given notice about the transfer of proceedings from one court to another court, in an eviction petition filed by Respondent-landlord - However, same came to be dismissed - Hence, the present Writ Petition - Held, non-communication of transfer of matters from one Court to another and further proceeding and no communication from the Advocate, if causes injustice and results into exparte decree of eviction need to be considered as a sufficient ground/reason to condone the delay and to set aside the exparte decree in the interest of justice - Petitioner has shown sufficient cause and absence and delay was not malafide and intentional

"Non-communication of transfer of matters from one Court to another and no communication from the Advocate, if causes injustice and results into exparte decree of eviction need to be considered as a sufficient ground/ reason to condone the delay and to set aside the exparte decree in the interest of justice"

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 7027 of 2008

Decided On: 10.11.2008

 Ratilal son of Jivanbhai Lalji

Vs.

 Kuvarben Wd/o Chabildas Patel and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Anoop V. Mohta, J.

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Whether court can condone delay if registry refused to issue copy of order?

From a reading of the above provision of law, it is clear that at the time of filing the appeal, it is not necessary to file a copy of the order or decision against which appeal is preferred. In the instant case, though the applicants had filed a copy application, it is the Registry who refused to issue copy of the order and returned the copy application. As such, there was a delay of 54 days in filing the appeal, under Rule 12 Order 14 of O.S. Rules. Therefore, absolutely I do not find any infirmity in allowing the application to dispense with the certified copy of the impugned order. Further, I am of the opinion that the delay in filing the appeal has been explained with sufficient cause. Therefore, the connected applications in A.Nos.1156, 1157 & 1158 of 2015 deserve to be allowed and accordingly, the same are allowed as prayed for.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS

A. Nos. 1156 to 1160 of 2015 in E.P. No. 48 of 1997 in C.S. No. 43 of 1962

Decided On: 16.06.2016

 S.V.R. Saroja and Ors.

Vs.

 S.V. Matha Prasad

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R. Subbiah, J.

Citation: AIR 2017 (NOC) 145 Mad

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Whether delay can be condoned after imposing costs if sufficient cause for delay condonation is not given?

It is a settled position of law that in absence of any proper
explanation for  delay, the same cannot be  condoned merely for  the
asking.  The explanation has to be reasonable or plausible to enable the
Court to exercise judicial discretion – Balwant Singh (supra).  Similarly,
the Court has to record a satisfaction that the explanation for the delay
was reasonable or satisfactory – P.K. Ramachandran (supra).   Though a
liberal approach is required to be adopted, such approach cannot be so
exercised when there is total absence of explanation for the delay being
caused – Maniben Shah (supra).
As regards the direction to pay costs, it is already noted that
the costs can be ordered subject to there being any reasonable ground to
condone the delay.  By imposition of costs the requirement of furnishing
sufficient cause cannot be dispensed with.  Costs cannot be a substitute
for absence of reasons to condone the delay.  The rights that had accrued
in  favour  of  petitioner  in  view of  the  decree   in  his  favour  are  also
required to be taken into consideration.   Therefore, in absence of any
reason whatsoever being furnished by the respondents in the application
for condonation of delay dated 15.02.2012, the delay in filing restoration
application   could   not   have   been   condoned.  
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.
WRIT PETITION NO.6835 OF 2014
Rajendra Namdeorao Akre,

V 
 Rajkumar Bhalerao Balbudhe,

­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­
CORAM:  A.S. CHANDURKAR, J.
DATE:         30th JUNE, 2015.
Citation: 2016(1) MHLJ 184

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When court should not condone delay in bringing legal heirs of deceased party on record?

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order 22, rules 3 and
9; s. 151 read with s.5 of Limitation Act, 1963 – Death of
appellant during pendency of appeal before Supreme Court
– Application filed after long delay of 778 days for bringing
the legal representatives of deceased appellant on record
accompanied by application for condonation of delay – Held:
Such applications cannot be allowed as a matter of right and
even in a routine manner – They should be rejected unless
sufficient cause is shown for condonation of delay – On facts,
except for a vague averment that the legal representatives
were not aware of the pendency of the appeal, no other
justifiable reason was stated by the applicants – The
applications also did not contain correct and true facts, thus,
want of bona fides is imputable to the applicants – No reason
nor sufficient cause was shown as to why immediate steps
were not taken by the applicants, even after they admittedly
came to know of the pendency of the appeal – The conduct
of the applicants was abnormal – They acted irresponsibly
and even with negligence, and miserably failed in showing any
‘sufficient cause’ for condonation of the long delay of 778 days
– Applications accordingly dismissed – Resultantly, the
appeal, having already abated, also dismissed.
Limitation – The law of limitation is a substantive law and
has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a
party – Once a valuable right is accrued in favour of one party
as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay
by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be
unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of
the applicant, particularly, when the delay is directly a result
of negligence, default or inaction of that party.

Supreme Court of India

Balwant Singh (Dead) vs Jagdish Singh & Ors on 8 July, 2010

Bench: B.S. Chauhan, Swatanter Kumar

Citation:AIR 2010 SC 3043

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When application of plaintiff for summoning of witness should not be allowed?

In   the   instant   case,   as   indicated   above,   the   application   dated
17/08/2004 is bereft of any reason as to why the names of the said two
witnesses whom the Plaintiff wanted to examine were not made part of the list
of witnesses and filed in the Court.  The said application is also bereft of any
reasons as to why the Plaintiff wanted to examine them after his examination
was over.  Since the pre­requisite for permitting examination of the witnesses is
on the basis of the Plaintiff showing sufficient cause. In the absence of Plaintiff
showing sufficient cause in the instant case, as the application is bereft of any
reason, the Plaintiff could not be allowed to examine the witnesses even under
Rule 1­A of Order XVI of the CPC. The Trial Court as can be seen has totally

glossed over the fact that Rule 1­A of Order XVI is controlled by sub­rule 3.  It
is only if  the  Plaintiff  satisfies the court by showing sufficient cause  then
powers can be exercised under Rule 1­A. In the instant case, as indicated
above, the application in question is bereft of any reason and therefore the
Plaintiff cannot be said to have shown sufficient cause and therefore the Trial
Court had erred in allowing the Plaintiff to examine the witnesses by having
recourse to Rule 1­A of Order XVI of the CPC. 
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO.3282 OF 2005
 Shri Sanjay Sham Bagade 
v
 Shri Ramesh Hari Madan 
CORAM : R. M. SAVANT, J.
DATE   : 11th November 2013
Citation: 2014 (4) ALLMR 19

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What is “sufficient cause” for condonation of delay?

The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where
a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant
has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which
means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to
approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be
negligent, or for want of bonafide on his part in the facts and
circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or
remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the
delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate
delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be
decided only within the parameters laid down by this court in regard
to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to
prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay
without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts

to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it
tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6974 of 2013
Basawaraj & Anr. 
V
The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer 
Dated;August 22, 2013
Dr. B. S. CHAUHAN, J.
Citation:2013(5) ALLMR934 SC

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Whether litigant can seek condonation of delay on account of misconduct of Advocate?

 At this stage, it is required to be noted that the Appellant is a resident of Nepeansea Road, Mumbai and also owns property in Awas village Taluka Alibag which is a weekend destination for many of the well to do persons from Mumbai. The suit properties are situated in the close vicinity in Taluka Alibag. The Appellant is therefore a person of means and the fact that the Appellant has chosen to purchase another property pending the instant suit shows that he is a person conversant with the legal niceties as immediately after purchasing the property he has chosen to file an application for his impleadment in the suit in the year 2010. The Appellant therefore by no means can be said to be a lay person or a person who can be said to be totally ignorant of the legal procedure. It is on the touchstone of the aforesaid facts that the issue would have to be considered. At this stage, it would be gainful to refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in Basawaraj's case (supra). The Apex Court has after referring to various judgments which are an exposition as to what constitutes "sufficient cause" has summarised the law on the issue in paragraph 15 of its judgment. The said paragraph 15 is reproduced hereinunder :-

"15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature."

11. The Apex Court therefore has held that in case a party is held to be negligent or lacking in bona fides or not acted diligently or inactive, there cannot be justified ground to condone the delay. In the instant case, as indicated above, the Appellant has sought to put the blame on his advocate. It is the case of the Appellant that the advocate did not give him proper guidance in respect of the filing of the Written Statement and also did not inform him about the decision in the suit. The said reason coming from a person of the standing of the Appellant who has all the wherewithal at his disposal cannot be accepted. The question that begs an answer is what prevented the Appellant from making inquiries with his advocate as regards the developments in the suit. It is very easy to blame the advocate for whatever has transpired in the litigation. There is absolutely no explanation forthcoming on the said aspect. It has to be borne in mind that the Appellant is an educated person staying in an up market area of Mumbai and also owning property at village Awas in Taluka Alibag which is a weekend destination of the well to do persons from Mumbai. It has also come in the evidence of the Appellant that he visits Alibag very often. The standard applicable to him obviously would be different than say a lay villager. It is also required to be noted that apart from purchasing the suit property pendent-lite, the Appellant also did not whilst the suit was pending in the Trial Court take steps to file his Written Statement nor there is anything on record to show that he made any inquiries with his advocate about the suit. Such a conduct cannot be countenanced of a person belonging to the Appellants standing. The conduct of the Appellant is therefore one of gross negligence and also indolence. The Appellant it seems has chosen to file the Appeal as per his own convenience. A Court vested with the power of considering whether discretion has been properly exercised cannot loose sight of such conduct.

Bombay High Court

Vasant Vithal Gawand vs Shantaram Tukaram Gawand (Decd) ... on 28 October, 2015

Bench: R.M. Savant

                                                  
   CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

    WRIT PETITION NO.9929 OF 2015

Citation;2016(2) ALLMR 235

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When court can condone delay of Nine years in filing appeal ?

 The learned Counsel for the applicants has
placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme
Court in case Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries
Ltd. (supra) and submits that the respondent No.
1 has not approached the District Court with
clean hands and, there is inordinate delay of
nine years and eleven months in filing the
appeal. Therefore, this Court may allow the
revision application. It is true that in the
given case, the delay of few days in absence of
sufficient cause cannot be condoned. However,
if sufficient cause is disclosed in the
application for condonation of delay, in that
case, the Court can always exercise discretion
and condone delay.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

BENCH AT AURANGABAD.


CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO.12 OF 2013

 Sambhaji Khanduji Nagare, V Taher Khan s/o Wahed Khan

 CORAM: S.S. SHINDE,J.

PRONOUNCED ON:31st JULY, 2013.
Citation; 2015 (7) ALLMR185,2014(1)ABR53, 2013(6)MhLj346

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