Supreme Court explains the difference in factors to be considered while deciding condonation of delay application either U/S 5 or U/S 14 of Limitation Act

Also, it must be remembered that merely because sufficient cause has been made out in the facts of a given case, there is no right in the Appellant to have delay condoned. This was felicitously put in Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd.,   MANU/SC/0042/1961 : (1962) 2 SCR 762 as follows: {Para 60}

It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify an enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle during all the time available to it. In this connection we may point out that considerations of bona fides or due diligence are always material and relevant when the Court is dealing with applications made Under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In dealing with such applications the Court is called upon to consider the effect of the combined provisions of Sections 5 and 14. Therefore, in our opinion, considerations which have been expressly made material and relevant by the provisions of Section 14 cannot to the same extent and in the same manner be invoked in dealing with applications which fall to be decided only Under Section 5 without reference to Section 14. (page 771).

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 995 of 2021.

Decided On: 19.03.2021

Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources Department) Vs. Borse Brothers Engineers & Contractors Pvt. Ltd.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Rohinton Fali Nariman, B.R. Gavai and Hrishikesh Roy, JJ.

Author: Rohinton Fali Nariman, J.

Citation: (2021)6 SCC 460,2021SCCONLINE SC 233, MANU/SC/0195/2021.

Read full Judgment here : Click here.

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Whether landlord can be denied eviction decree on ground of bonafide need if he has no practical experience for running particular business?

 In this case appellate court found that landlord's requirement to occupy the building is to start a business in electric goods. The fact that landlord is a holder of diploma in Electrical Engineering was counted as a factor lending assurance that he would be genuinely contemplating such a business idea. Regarding the contention of the respondent tenant that landlord has not acquired practical experience in the business of electric goods the appellate court has observed that it is not necessary in every case that the landlord should establish previous experience for starting a new business.

10. But the High Court took a different view. 

12. If a person wants to start new business of his own it may be to his own advantage if he acquires experience in that line. But to say that any venture of a person in the business field without acquiring past experience reflects lack of his bona fides is a fallacious and unpragmatic approach. Many a business have flourished in this country by leaps and bounds which were started by novice in the field; and many other business ventures have gone haywire despite vast experience to the credit of the propounders. The opinion of the learned single judge that acquisition of sufficient know-how is a precondition for even proposing to start any business, if gains approval as a proposition of law, is likely to shatter the initiative of young talents and deter new entrepreneurs from entering any field of business or commercial activity. Experience can be earned even while the business is in progress. It is too pedantic a norm to be formulated that 'no experience no venture'.

13. That apart, appellant is not a total novice in the field of dealings in electrical equipment. The fact that the discipline in his academic specialization was Electrical Engineering is quite indicative of some knowledge he has in the subject, though a business in such commodities may have different phases. Learned single judge seems to have written him off as a person totally unfamiliar with any transaction in electrical goods. Such an angle is not a charitable view towards the landlord. At any rate there may be differing views for different people on how to start a business. The High Court has committed jurisdictional error in upsetting a fact finding merely on the individual view held by the learned judge about a business venture.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

C.A. No. 2489 of 1999

Decided On: 28.04.1999

Dattatraya Laxman Kamble Vs. Abdul Rasul Moulali Kotkunde and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Saiyed Saghir Ahmad and K.T. Thomas, JJ.

Citation: 1999 (1) RCR 508

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Whether Seeking restitution of Conjugal rights after 13 years of separation is bonafide?

 In the facts of instant appeals there is a role reversal to the extent that
accusations are made against the respondent/husband which had the
disastrous effect on him to the extent that he had to leave his village and
settled in Rajasthan. Perhaps he has taken this step to save the matrimonial
life of his own brother as he was accused of having living in adultery with
his wife. As per the settled legal position casting aspersion of such nature 
had the deleterious effect on the mind of her husband which can be termed
as one of the worst form of mental cruelty.
28. So far as dismissal of the petition and seeking restitution of conjugal
rights are concerned, it was the appellant who had left the matrimonial home
in the year 1998 for her delivery at her parent’s home and then in the year
1999 in the company of her family members. No complaint of any physical
violence, harassment of dowry demand or any other reason compelling her
to leave the matrimonial home was made by her soon after leaving the
matrimonial home. She was residing independently in Delhi leaving her
daughter at her parental home.
29. The prayer of the appellant/wife for restitution of conjugal rights has
rightly been declined by learned Judge Family Court in the given facts and
circumstances. In the decision reported as (1994) 1 SCC 337 V.Bhagat Vs.
D.Bhagat it was held as under:-
“A mental cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) can be defined as
that conduct which inflicts upon the other party such mental
pain and suffering as would make it not possible for that party
to live with the other. It is held that mental cruelty must be of
such a nature that the parties cannot reasonably be expected to
live together. It is also held that the situation must be such that
the wronged party cannot reasonably be asked to put up with
such conduct and continue to live with the other party. In my
view the said judgment clearly applies to the facts of this case.”
30. Even otherwise filing of a petition seeking restitution of conjugal
rights in the year 2012 i.e. after 13 years of leaving the matrimonial home
does not seem to be a bonafide act on her part for the re-union. That too with
the background already litigating with the respondent by filing a petition
under Protection of Women from Domestic Violence, 2005 as well for
maintenance much prior to that. In the given facts, learned Judge, Family
Court has rightly dismissed her petition seeking restitution of conjugal 
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
 Judgment Delivered on: August 31, 2016
MAT.APP.(F.C.) 137/2015
SUDESH V SURESH SOLANKI 
CORAM:
MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP NANDRAJOG
 MS. JUSTICE PRATIBHA RANI
Dated:AUGUST 31, 2016

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What is “sufficient cause” for condonation of delay?

The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where
a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant
has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which
means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to
approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be
negligent, or for want of bonafide on his part in the facts and
circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or
remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the
delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate
delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be
decided only within the parameters laid down by this court in regard
to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to
prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay
without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts

to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it
tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6974 of 2013
Basawaraj & Anr. 
V
The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer 
Dated;August 22, 2013
Dr. B. S. CHAUHAN, J.
Citation:2013(5) ALLMR934 SC

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Whether Stranger can impeach sale deed as void and invalid on all possible grounds?

 In Lal Achal Ram v. Raja Kazim Hussain Khan (1905) 32 Indian Appeals 113, the Privy Council laid down the principle that a stranger to a sale deed cannot dispute payment of consideration or its adequacy. This decision has since been considered by various High Courts and a distinction has been drawn between a deed which was intended to be real or operative between the parties and a deed which is fictitious in character and was never designed as a genuine document to effect transfer of title. In such a situation, it would be open even to a stranger to impeach the deed as void and invalid on all possible grounds. This was also laid down in Kamini Kumar Deb v. Durga Charan Nag and Ors. AIR (1923) Calcutta 521 and again in Saradindu Mukherjee v. S.M. Kunja Katnini Roy and Ors. . The Patna High Court in Jugal Kishore Tiwari and Anr. v. Umesh Chandra Tiwari and Ors. and the Orissa High Court in Sanatan Mohapatra and Ors. v. Hakim Mohammad Kazim Mohammad and Ors. have also taken the same view.

20. The above decisions appear to be based on the principle that a person in his capacity as a defendant can raise any legitimate plea available to him under law to defeat the suit of the plaintiff. This would also include the plea that the sale deed by which title to the property was intended to be conveyed to plaintiff was void or fictitious or, for that matter, collusive and not intended to be acted upon. Thus, the whole question would depend upon the pleadings of the parties, the nature of the suit, the nature of the deed, the evidence led by the parties in the suit and other attending circumstances. For example, in a landlord-tenant matter where the landlord is possessed of many properties and cannot possibly seek eviction of his tenant for bona fide need from one of the properties, the landlord may ostensibly transfer that property to a person who is not possessed of any other property so that that person, namely, the transferee, may institute eviction proceedings on the ground of his genuine need and thus evict the tenant who could not have been otherwise evicted. In this situation, the deed by which the property was intended to be transferred, would be a collusive deed representing a sham transaction which was never intended to be acted upon. It would be open to the tenant in his capacity as defendant to assert, plead and prove that the deed was fictitious and collusive in nature.1

Supreme Court of India

Vidhyadhar vs Manikrao & Anr. on 17 March, 1999

Equivalent citations: AIR 1999 SC 1441, 1999 (3) ALT 1 SC, JT 1999 (2) SC 183

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