Supreme Court: The court should consider plea of Accused On Applicability Of Section 300 CrPC before framing of the charge

At this stage, Section 227 Code of Criminal Procedure is required to be referred to, which reads as under:

227. Discharge - If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the Accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the Accused, he shall discharge the Accused and record his reasons for so doing.

7. On a fair reading of Section 227 Code of Criminal Procedure, if, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the Accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the Accused, he shall discharge the Accused and record his reasons for doing so. As per Section 228 Code of Criminal Procedure only thereafter and if, after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the Judge is of the opinion that there is ground for presuming that the Accused has committed an offence, the trial Court shall frame the charge. Therefore, as rightly submitted by Shri Siddhartha Dave, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant-Accused that the stage of discharge Under Section 227 Code of Criminal Procedure is a stage prior to framing of the charge (Under Section 228 Code of Criminal Procedure) and it is at that stage alone that the court can consider the application Under Section 300 Code of Criminal Procedure. Once the court rejects the discharge application, it would proceed to framing of charge Under Section 228 Code of Criminal Procedure.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 2249 of 2022 

 Chandi Puliya Vs. The State of West Bengal

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

M.R. Shah and C.T. Ravikumar, JJ.

Author:M.R. Shah, J.

Decided On: 12.12.2022

Citation: MANU/SC/1604/2022

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What is distinction between S 300 of CRPC and Article 20(2) of Constitution of India?

 Section 300 of the CrPC embodies the aforesaid two principles of nemo debet bis vexari (no man shall be put twice in peril for the same offence) and autrefois acquit (the person has been acquitted on a same charge on which he is being prosecuted). These principles are slightly different from the principle of double jeopardy embodied in Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India. For invoking the principle of double jeopardy, conviction of the accused is necessary, because the words “prosecuted” and “punished” are used in Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India. Insofar as the Section 300 of the CrPC is concerned, a person convicted or acquitted, cannot be tried for the same offence. Therefore, the principle embodied in Section 300 of the CrPC can be invoked in both scenarios i.e. conviction or acquittal for the same offence. It is based on the aforementioned principle that no man shall be put twice in peril for the same offence.
 In the High Court of Bombay( Nagpur Bench)

(Before Manish Pitale, J.)

Sachin Vs State of Maharashtra,

Criminal Writ Petition No. 119 of 2020

Decided on August 4, 2021, 

Citation: 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 1576 : (2021) 3 AIR Bom R (Cri) 231 : 2021 Cri LJ 3457

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Whether court should quash second FIR if it is based same facts with additional sections under IPC?

The Respondent then filed an application Under Section 156(3) Code of Criminal Procedure which was forwarded by the Magistrate to the police leading to registration of FIR dated 09.10.2008. The allegations are similar that the Appellant put up an imposter in place of the Respondent and along with one Sushil Kumar Singh and Arvind on the basis of a general power of attorney, which the Respondent had never executed, sold his lands. The FIR itself recites that earlier also the Appellant had sold the lands of the Respondent on the basis of same general power of attorney, but conceals the order of acquittal dated 07.08.1998, and also the institution of Civil Suit No. 353 of 2007 for annulment of the same.

11. It is, therefore, apparent that the subject matter of both the FIRs is the same general power of attorney dated 02.05.1985 and the sales made by the Appellant in pursuance of the same. If the substratum of the two FIRs are common, the mere addition of Sections 467, 468 and 471 in the subsequent FIR cannot be considered as different ingredients to justify the latter FIR as being based on different materials, allegations and grounds.

12. Section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides as follows:

300. Person once convicted or acquitted not to be tried for same offence.

(1) A person who has once been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such conviction or acquittal remains in force, not be liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made Under Sub-section (1) of Section 221, or for which he might have been convicted Under Sub-section (2) thereof.

13. In view of the conclusion that the substratum of the two FIRs are the same and that the Appellant has already stood acquitted on 07.08.1998 of the charge with regard to forging any general power of attorney of the Respondent, we are of the considered opinion that the subsequent prosecution of the Appellant in FIR No. 114 of 2008 dated 09.10.2008 is completely unsustainable. In the result, the FIR dated 09.10.2008, the orders dated 18.12.2015, 31.05.2016 and the impugned order dated 01.03.2017 are set aside.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 237 of 2020 

Decided On: 07.02.2020

Prem Chand Singh  Vs.  The State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Navin Sinha and Krishna Murari, JJ.

Citation: (2020) 3 SCC 54,MANU/SC/0136/2020

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Supreme Court: Accused can not be prosecuted on the second FIR if the substratum of both the FIR are same

The Respondent then filed an application Under Section 156(3) Code of Criminal Procedure which was forwarded by the Magistrate to the police leading to registration of FIR dated 09.10.2008. The allegations are similar that the Appellant put up an imposter in place of the Respondent and along with one Sushil Kumar Singh and Arvind on the basis of a general power of attorney, which the Respondent had never executed, sold his lands. The FIR itself recites that earlier also the Appellant had sold the lands of the Respondent on the basis of same general power of attorney, but conceals the order of acquittal dated 07.08.1998, and also the institution of Civil Suit No. 353 of 2007 for annulment of the same.

11. It is, therefore, apparent that the subject matter of both the FIRs is the same general power of attorney dated 02.05.1985 and the sales made by the Appellant in pursuance of the same. If the substratum of the two FIRs are common, the mere addition of Sections 467, 468 and 471 in the subsequent FIR cannot be considered as different ingredients to justify the latter FIR as being based on different materials, allegations and grounds.

12. Section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides as follows:

300. Person once convicted or acquitted not to be tried for same offence.

(1) A person who has once been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such conviction or acquittal remains in force, not be liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made Under Sub-section (1) of Section 221, or for which he might have been convicted Under Sub-section (2) thereof.

13. In view of the conclusion that the substratum of the two FIRs are the same and that the Appellant has already stood acquitted on 07.08.1998 of the charge with regard to forging any general power of attorney of the Respondent, we are of the considered opinion that the subsequent prosecution of the Appellant in FIR No. 114 of 2008 dated 09.10.2008 is completely unsustainable. In the result, the FIR dated 09.10.2008, the orders dated 18.12.2015, 31.05.2016 and the impugned order dated 01.03.2017 are set aside.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 237 of 2020 

Decided On: 07.02.2020

 Prem Chand Singh  Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Navin Sinha and Krishna Murari, JJ.

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Notes on Article 20 of constitution of India

Article 20 has taken care to safeguard the rights of persons accused of crimes. Persons here means the citizens, non-citizens as well as corporations. Please note that this article cannot be suspended even during an emergency in operation under article 359. Article 20 also constitutes the limitation on the legislative powers of the Union and State legislatures.

Ex-Post facto Law

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Whether second prosecution is maintainable against same accused on same facts for different offence?

The Apex Court later in State through Superintendent of
Police, CBI/SIT vs Nalini & others  (Rajiv Gandhi Assassination case)
observed at para Nos.235 to 239 at page No.337 referring to Section 300 (1)
Cr.P.C in saying the well known maxim nemo debet bis vexari pro
eadem causa (no person should be twice vexed for the same offence) is
the well established common rule for no one should be put to peril twice
for the same offence.  The principle which is sought for incorporation into
Section 300 Cr.P.C is that no man should be vexed with more than one trial
for offences arising out of identical acts committed by him.   When an
offence has already been the subject of judicial adjudication, whether it
ended in acquittal or conviction, it is negation of criminal justice to allow
repetition of the adjudication in a separate trial on the same set of facts.

         Though Article 20 (2) of the Constitution of India embodies a
protection against a second trial after a conviction of the same offence,
the ambit of the clause is narrower than the protection afforded by Section
300 Cr.P.C as held in Manipur Administration supra that  if there is no
punishment for the offences as a result of the prosecution, Article 20 (2)
has no application for the clause embodies the principle of autrefois
convict, whereas, Section 300 Cr.P.C combines both autrefois convict and
autrefois acquit.

          Section 300 has further widened the protective wings by
debarring a second trial against the same accused on the same facts, even
for a different offence, if a different charge against him for such offence
could have been made under Section 221  (1) Cr.P.C, or he could have been
convicted for such other offence under Section 221(2) Cr.P.C.

          As the contours of the prohibition are so widely enlarged, it
cannot be contended that the second trial can escape therefrom on the
mere premise that some more allegations were not made in the first trial.

          From the above propositions with application of the facts on
hand, once there is a clear acquittal not even on a benefit of doubt for the
alleged offence of committing dacoity, the other offence for which the
present prosecution laid to charge, covered by committal proceedings from
pre-trial cognizance by the learned Magistrate under Section 209 Cr.P.C for
the alleged offence under Section 400 Cr.P.C as member of gang of dacoits
does not arise and thereby the proceedings are liable to quashed from the
bar under Section 300 Cr.P.C and from the precedents supra which rules as
law of the land.
HYDERABAD HIGH COURT
HONOURABLE Dr. JUSTICE B.SIVA SANKARA RAO           
Dated:12-11-2015 
        
Konakalla Suresh @ Mukku Suresh @ Rushi & 9 others....
Vs
        
The State of Telangana Rep. by Public Prosecutor High Court at Hyderabad & 
another.Respondents   

HONOURABLE Dr. JUSTICE B.SIVA SANKARA RAO           

CRIMINAL PETITION No.7868 of 2015    

Citation: 2016 CR LJ 1994

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Whether Magistrate can pass order of acquittal of accused in session triable cases?

  Now, I will consider the challenge of the revision

petitioners against Annexure-B order relying on the principle that no

person can be punished or prosecuted for the same offence more than

once.    However, a bare perusal of section 300, Cr.P.C would reveal

that it incorporates principle of autrefois acquit viz., no one shall be

punished or put on twice for the same matter. The plea based on this

principle or the doctrine of double jeopardy is recognized by section

300 Cr.P.C only where an issue of a fact has been tried by a competent

court on a former occasion and a finding has been returned in favour

of the accused as in such eventuality, the finding would constitute an

estoppel or res judicata against the parties to that proceedings. In this

case, the learned Sessions Judge interfered with the judgment in the

calender case passed by the learned Magistrate by which the learned

Magistrate, ignoring the fact that offence under section 333, IPC is


triable exclusively by a Court of Session, tried the revision petitioners

and acquitted them.     In such circumstances, the provisions under

section 300, Cr.P.C would not be available to challenge the order

passed by the learned Sessions Judge.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

                                        PRESENT:

                  MR.JUSTICE C.T.RAVIKUMAR

       12TH DAY OF JANUARY 2015.
                   Crl.Rev.Pet.No. 18 of 2015 ()
                         

       BADARUDEEN, S/O UMANKANNU RAWTHER,
       Vs
        STATE OF KERALA, 

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Whether second criminal complaint case for distinct offence on same facts is tenable after discharge of accused in prior proceedings?

Having perused Section 300, we are satisfied, that the

submission advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the

respondent, namely, that Section 300 of the Criminal Procedure

Code, will be an embargo to obstruct the right of the appellant to

file a second complaint against the respondent, is not justified.

Our above determination is based on the fact, that the respondent

had not been tried, in furtherance of the previous complaint made

by the appellant, under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code. The

contention of the learned counsel for the appellant, that the

respondent had been discharged in furtherance of the complaint made

by the appellant, without any trial having been conducted against

him (the respondent), was not disputed. Based on the above factual

contention, learned counsel for the appellant had placed emphatic

reliance, on the explanation under Section 300 of the Criminal

Procedure Code. The explanation relied upon, clearly mandates that

the dismissal of a complaint, or the discharge of an accused, would

not be construed as an acquittal, for the purposes of this Section.

In this view of the matter, we are in agreement with the contention

advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the appellant. We

are of the considered view, that proceedings in the second

complaint would not be barred, because no trial had been conducted

 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

 CRIMINAL APPEAL No.457 OF 2008

RAVINDER KAUR V ANIL KUMAR 

Citation;(2015)8 SCC286

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Whether proceedings under Domestic Violence Act are quasi-criminal proceedings?

 It may be noticed that D.V.A.No.18 of 2007 itself was filed after the 1st petitioner obtained divorce from the 2nd respondent. Sri Ashish Samanth, learned Counsel for the petitioners contended that laying of D.V.C.No.18 of 2007 is tantamount to double jeopardy as the petitioners were acquitted on identical allegations in C.C.No.226 of 2003 and that the petitioners cannot be proceeded against again in D.V.A.No.18 of 2007. I do not agree with this contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner for the reason that the protection envisaged by the Article 20(2) of the Indian Constitution as well as by Section 300 Cr.P.C., which is a protection against the double jeopardy would apply if both the proceedings are criminal in nature, whereas the proceedings in D.V.A.No.18 of 2007 cannot be considered to be criminal proceedings. Like proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C., perhaps the proceedings under Domestic Violence Act are quasi-criminal proceedings. However, they are not criminal proceedings as such to fall within the mischief of Article 20(2) of the Indian Constitution or under Section 300 Cr.P.C.

Andhra High Court

A.Sreenivasa Rao And Others vs The State Of A.P., Rep. By Its ... on 1 April, 2011

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Whether prosecution U/S 420 of IPC is maintainable even if accused is convicted u/s 138 of NI Act?

Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant was already convicted under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and hence he could not be again tried or punished on the same facts under Section 420 or any other provision of IPC or any other statute. We find force in this submission.

Thus, it can be seen that Section 300(1) of Cr.P.C. is wider than Article 20(2) of the Constitution. While, Article 20(2) of the Constitution only states that 'no one can be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once', Section 300(1) of Cr.P.C. states that no one can be tried and convicted for the same offence or even for a different offence but on the same facts. In the present case, although the offences are different but the facts are the same. Hence, Section 300(1) of Cr.P.C. applies. Consequently, the prosecution under Section 420, IPC was barred by Section 300(1) of Cr.P.C. The Appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside.

Supreme Court of India

Kolla Veera Raghav Rao vs Gorantla Venkateswara Rao And ... on 1 February, 2011

Bench: Markandey Katju, Gyan Sudha Misra

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