Showing posts with label S 34 Arbitration Act. Show all posts
Showing posts with label S 34 Arbitration Act. Show all posts

Sunday, 15 January 2023

How to ascertain limitation in case of suo-moto correction of arbitration award?

In the present case, the arbitral tribunal in terms of powers given under sub-section (3) of Section 33 of the Act had on its own initiative made corrections in the award dated 18.04.2018, vide the award dated 05.05.2018. The suo-moto corrections in terms of sub-section (3) of Section 33 of the Act can be made within a period of 30 days from the date of arbitral award.

In our opinion, looking at the purpose and object behind Section 34 (3) of the Act, which is to enable the parties to study, examine and understand the award, thereupon, if the party chooses and is advised, draft and file objections within the time specified, the starting point for the limitation in case of suomoto correction of the award, would be the date on which the correction was made and the corrected award is received by the party. Once the arbitral award has been amended or corrected, it is the corrected award which has to be challenged and not the original award. The original award stands modified, and the corrected award must be challenged by filing objections.

This interpretation would be in terms and accord with the reasoning which has been interpreted in the “M/S Ved Prakash Mithal and Sons Vs. Union of India” (supra).

In the present case, the objections/application for setting aside the arbitral award were filed on 03.08.2018, which is within a period of ninety days from the date of the

1 For short, “Act”.

corrected award. Hence, the High Court was right in holding that the objections were filed within the limitation period. Even otherwise, the Court has the power to condone the delay for further period of thirty days. Application for condonation of delay can be filed at anytime till the proceedings are pending. Of course, exercise of discretion and whether or not the delay should be condoned is a different matter.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

  Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s). 23676/2022; 

M/S USS ALLIANCE Vs THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.

Coram: SANJIV KHANNA; J., M.M. SUNDRESH; J.

Dated: 06-01-2023 

Print Page

Saturday, 23 July 2022

Can the court permit amendment to application U/S 34 of Arbitration Act if it constitutes a fresh challenge?

 At the outset it is necessary to bear in mind that by way of the proposed amendment the grounds which are now being sought to be inserted have absolutely no foundation in the petitioner’s application preferred under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. As has been rightly noticed by the learned District Judge at no point of time any objection about neutrality of the Arbitrator was raised by resorting to Section 12, 13 or 15 of the Arbitration Act. This needs to be emphasized for the sole reason to ascertain as to if, the proposed amendment merely intends to add some facts to the pending challenge to the award or is it that it is intended to put forth absolutely new challenge. {Para 8}

9. In the matter of Hindustan Construction Ltd (supra) it has been

held that in an appropriate case amendment of an application under

Section 34 can be allowed even beyond the period provided that is three months under sub Section 3 of Section 34 and a further period of one month as provided under the proviso to that subsection. However, it has also been made clear that such amendment cannot be allowed if it constitutes a fresh challenge. 

Understood in the light of the above observations it is abundantly clear that under the garb of amendment of the application preferred under Section 34, absolutely new grounds to challenge the award are being sought to be incorporated without there being any foundation, beyond the statutory period prescribed under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act. This certainly cannot be permitted to happen.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

BENCH AT AURANGABAD

WRIT PETITION NO. 6501 OF 2022

Friends & Friends Shipping Private Limited Vs Central Warehousing Corporation

CORAM : MANGESH S. PATIL, J.

PRONOUNCED ON :12.07.2022

Print Page

Saturday, 9 April 2022

Whether one party can withhold performance bank guarantee if it has acknowledged due performance of contract?

  In view of the above, the Arbitral Tribunal had rightly directed

refund of the amount recovered by BSNL from invocation of the

Performance Bank Guarantee in question. There is no principle in law whereby BSNL could be permitted to retain the Performance Security after it had acknowledged due performance of the Contract. {Para 19}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

 Judgment delivered on: 28.03.2022

 O.M.P. (COMM) 431/2019 & I.A. 14326/2019

BHARAT SANCHAR NIGAM LIMITED  Vs TERACOM LIMITED 

CORAM

HON’BLE MR JUSTICE VIBHU BAKHRU

Print Page

Sunday, 13 February 2022

Should the court set aside an arbitral award if the arbitral tribunal has failed to consider relevant rival contentions?

 However, the issue is not limited to interpretation of Clause 18.1 of the Concession Agreement, solely on which the impugned award, essentially, rests. The interpretation of Clause 18.4 of the Concession Agreement is also vital to the controversy in the present case. The petitioner had relied on Clause 18.4 of the Concession Agreement and had contended that in terms of the said clause, any additional civil works were specifically excluded from the purview of Article XVIII of the Concession Agreement. Undisputedly, construction of additional lanes and toll booths entailed civil works and Clause 18.4 of the Concession Agreement expressly provided that “maintenance shall not include the extension of any existing pavement, bridges, structures and other civil works unless part of the project”. Clause 18.4 of the Concession Agreement, thus, clarified that extension of any structure or other civil works would not be included as part of maintenance. The written submissions filed by the petitioner before the Arbitral Tribunal indicates that the petitioner had canvassed the said clause and specifically clarified that the construction of additional lanes over and above as specified under the Concession Agreement, is excluded from the scope of maintenance. A plain reading of the impugned award indicates that the Arbitral Tribunal had not considered Clause 18.4 of the Concession Agreement while interpreting the question whether construction of the additional lanes fall within the scope of Operation and Maintenance obligations of the petitioner. {Para 49}

50. Mr. Chandra had submitted that Clause 18.4 of the Concession Agreement would not exclude construction of additional lanes as Clause 18.1 of the Concession Agreement has an overriding effect to include the same within the scope of the project. This contention is not persuasive. However, more importantly, it is clear that the Arbitral Tribunal has not considered this contention even though it was urged before the Arbitral Tribunal. Undeniably, Clause 18.1 of the Concession Agreement could not have been interpreted in isolation. It was also required to be examined in the context of the other clauses of the Concession Agreement - including Clause 18.4 of Concession Agreement, Clause 2.1 of the Concession Agreement, which defined the scope of the contract and Clause 2 of Schedule C of the Concession Agreement, which described the specifications of a toll plaza, were also required to be interpreted.

51. In view of the above, there is merit in the petitioner's contention that since one of the principal contentions advanced by the petitioner regarding interpretation of Article XVIII of the Concession Agreement has not been considered and the impugned award rests substantially on the interpretation of a sub-clause of Article XVIII of the Concession Agreement; the award must be construed to be unreasoned.

52. Section 31(3) of the A&C Act requires that an arbitral award must state reasons upon which it has been based. The said requirement must be read in a meaningful manner. In an adversarial system of litigation, the reasons for a decision must necessarily take into account the relevant rival contentions. Thus, the question whether construction of additional lanes and toll booths fall within the scope of the Concession Agreement was required to be addressed in the light of the contentions advanced by both parties. However, the Arbitral Tribunal has completely ignored the petitioner's contention regarding the interpretation of Clause 18.4 of the Concession Agreement.

53. Justice (Retired) Devinder Gupta has, in his opinion, considered all the relevant clauses of the Concession Agreement including Clause 18.4 of the Concession Agreement and concluded that the scope of work under the Concession Agreement did not include construction of additional lanes at the toll plazas. This Court concurs with the said view.

54. In the aforesaid context, this Court is of the view that the impugned award is contrary to the expressed terms of the contract as it ignores Clause 18.4 of the Concession Agreement, which expressly provides that extension of pavements or ‘other civil works’ would not be included as a part of maintenance unless such construction is a part of the project. There is no clause in the Concession Agreement, which specified construction of additional toll lanes as a part of the project.

55. In view of the above, the impugned award is set aside. The petitioner is at liberty to seek a reference of the disputes to arbitration.

In the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

(Before Vibhu Bakhru, J.)

GVK Jaipur Expressway Private Limited  Vs National Highway Authority of India 

O.M.P. (COMM) 377/2020

Decided on October 29, 2021

Citation: 2021 SCC OnLine Del 4851

Print Page

Whether O 6 R 17 of CPC for amendment of pleading is applicable to petition U/S 34 of Arbitration Act?

 The governing principles which are applied while considering an

application under Order VI Rule 17 cannot be applied when a person seeks amendment of the application filed under Section 34 of the Act. This Court is of the view that some amount of discretion in the matter of amendment is still available with the Court and the Court while exercising such discretion judiciously cannot refuse unless this Court has reasons to believe that the amendment proposed are not legitimate or that the amendment is likely to take away the right accrued to the other side. {Para 17}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

C.R.P.(PD) No.3790 of 2019

Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. Vs. Sudhir Cranes Pvt. Ltd.,

CORAM

 MR. JUSTICE S.S.SUNDAR

 DATED: 04.01.2022

Print Page

Tuesday, 17 November 2020

Whether the court can permit amendment of the petition filed U/S 34 of Arbitration Act?

 From these pleadings it can be seen that since filing of the written submissions the respondent nos. 1 and 2 had disputed the agreement dated 17.08.1999 and the stand that they were not aware as to who the Arbitrator was had been specifically taken. As regards the other respondents, they had denied execution of both the agreements. They had also stated that they were not aware as to who the Arbitrator was. In the application filed vide Exhibit 52 seeking to raise the additional ground of challenge, it has been stated that the respondent nos. 1 and 2 got knowledge about the proceedings in S.C.S. No. 844/2003 filed on behalf of the Arbitrator during the pendency of the proceedings under Section 34 of the said Act. There is no specific denial to this aspect in reply filed on behalf of the claimant at Exhibit 56. The only stand taken is that the application contained misleading statement of facts. The learned Principal District Judge while allowing the said application found that the interests of justice required grant of reasonable opportunity to the respondent nos. 1 and 2 to raise that challenge and that it would not change the nature of the proceedings. Heavy reliance has been placed by the learned Senior Advocate on the decision in Hindustan Construction Company Limited (supra) to urge that such a challenge which constitutes a new ground to assail the award of the Arbitrator could not have been permitted to be raised beyond the period of limitation prescribed for challenging the award. In Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. (supra), it was observed that if incorporation of an additional ground by way of amendment in the application under Section 34 of the said Act is held to amount to filing of a fresh application for challenging the award, in all situations it would follow that no amendment in the application for setting aside the award howsoever material or relevant it may be for consideration by the Court could be added nor an existing ground could be amended after expiry of the period of limitation. It was held that this could not have been the intention of the legislature while enacting Section 34 of the said Act. The observations in paragraph 30 of the said case are relevant and the same read as under:-


"30. More so, Section 34(2)(b) enables the Court to set aside the arbitral award if it finds that the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law for the time being in force or the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India. The words in clause (b) "the Court finds that" do enable the Court, where the application under Section 34 has been made within prescribed time to grant leave to amend such application if the very peculiar circumstances of the case so warrant and it is so required in the interest of justice."


11. From these observations it is seen that the hands of the Court hearing proceedings under Section 34 of the said Act are not tied if the Court finds that the circumstances of the case justify the grant of leave to amend the application under Section 34 of the said Act.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Arbitration Appeal No. 14/2017

Decided On: 30.08.2019

Ganesh Builders  Vs.  Nagorao and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.S. Chandurkar, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/2442/2019,2020(2) MHLJ 720.

Print Page