Showing posts with label S 353 of IPC. Show all posts
Showing posts with label S 353 of IPC. Show all posts

Sunday, 4 January 2026

Karnataka HC: How to prove that particular police officer was appointed as investigating officer in particular case?

 As per Rule 7 of SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, an offence committed under the Act shall be investigated by a Police officer not below the rank of a Deputy Superintended of Police. The Investigating Officer shall be appointed by the State Government/Director General of Police/Superintendent of Police after taking into account his past experience, sense of ability and justice to perceive the implications of the case and investigate it along with right lines within the shortest possible time. {Para 29}


30. There is no document on record to show that he was appointed by Superintendent of Police to investigate this case.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA (DHARWAD BENCH)

Cri. A. No. 2800 of 2010

Decided On: 15.05.2019

Ashok Sangappa Sidareddi Vs. State of Karnataka

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.S. Bellunke, J.

Citation: 2019 CRLJ 4052, AIRONLINE 2019 Kar 458,MANU/KA/7633/2019.

Read full judgment here : Click here.

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Karnataka HC: How to appreciate prosecution evidence U/S 353 of IPC regarding performance of official duty by public servant?

 As per Rule 7 of SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, an offence committed under the Act shall be investigated by a Police officer not below the rank of a Deputy Superintended of Police. The Investigating Officer shall be appointed by the State Government/Director General of Police/Superintendent of Police after taking into account his past experience, sense of ability and justice to perceive the implications of the case and investigate it along with right lines within the shortest possible time. {Para 29}


30. There is no document on record to show that he was appointed by Superintendent of Police to investigate this case. On perusal of his evidence, he has not at all stated anything with regard to PW1 that he was on duty and how his official duty was obstructed on account of incident in question. It is important to note that neither PW1 nor PW5 deposed with regard to the deterring by the accused in performing the official duties of PW1. There is no presumption as such with the official in the office during the office hours should be presumed to be on duty. In order to prove the offence under Section 353 of IPC, the prosecution has to prove PW1 was on official duty and the act committed by the accused deterred him from doing his duty. In the absence of these ingredients the accused could not have even convicted for the offence punishable under Section 353 of IPC. Though the Investigating Officer obtained Ex. P9, but it is not stated on what basis Ex. P9 was issued and what was the duty the complainant was doing at the time of incident. No inference can be drawn from the document that PWs. 1 and 2 were discharging any duty as such. In Ex. P9, the name of the person, who had signed is not mentioned or no office seal is attested to it. He did not know whose custody the movement register there in the office nor he has verified the same. Who obtained Ex. P9 is not forthcoming. There is no serial number of the said letter nor the name of staff who obtained and furnished the document to Investigating Officer, is not mentioned.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA (DHARWAD BENCH)

Cri. A. No. 2800 of 2010

Decided On: 15.05.2019

Ashok Sangappa Sidareddi Vs. State of Karnataka

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.S. Bellunke, J.

Citation: 2019 CRLJ 4052, AIRONLINE 2019 Kar 458,MANU/KA/7633/2019.

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Wednesday, 30 October 2024

Supreme Court: Shouting and threatening public servant does not amount to assault punishable U/S 353 of IPC

It is on the basis of the above complaint that an

FIR has been lodged against the appellant.   However,

the only allegation against the appellant in the said

complaint is that he was shouting and threatening the

staff. This itself will not amount to any assault. 

Assault is defined under Section 353 of the Indian

Penal Code as under :­

“353 Assault  ­   Whoever   makes   any

gesture,   or   any   preparation   intending   or

knowing it to be likely that such gesture or

preparation will cause any person present

to   apprehend   that   he   who   makes   that

gesture   or   preparation   is   about   to   use

criminal   force   to   that   person,   is   said   to

commit an assault.”

We   have   reproduced   the   entire   complaint

hereinabove.   On perusing the same, we find that none

of the ingredients, as mentioned in Section 353 IPC, is

reflected in the complaint letter. In other words, no

offence under Section 353 IPC is made out in this case.

The High Court, to our mind, has committed a mistake

in not interfering in this case. This is a case which is

nothing   but   an   abuse   of   the   process   of   law   and

therefore, in order to meet the ends of justice, we allow

this appeal and quash the entire proceedings initiated

against the appellant.   

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL  No. ___________ OF 2024

[@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO. 5905/2022 ]

K. DHANANJAY        Vs CABINET SECRETARY & ORS.            Dated: OCTOBER 21, 2024.

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Sunday, 22 September 2024

What facts are to be proved for convicting an accused for an offence U/S 353 of IPC?

 To convict an accused under Section 353 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which pertains to assault or criminal force against a public servant in the discharge of their duties, certain fundamental facts must be established. Here’s a detailed explanation of the essential elements required for conviction.

Key Elements for Conviction Under Section 353 IPC

The prosecution must prove the following essential elements:

- Assault or Criminal Force: There must be an act that constitutes an assault or the use of criminal force. According to Section 351 of the IPC, assault involves gestures or preparations that create a reasonable apprehension of imminent use of criminal force. Criminal force, as defined in Section 350, refers to the intentional use of force without consent, which is likely to cause injury, fear, or annoyance.

- Public Servant: The victim must be a public servant as defined under Section 21 of the IPC. This includes any person holding an office by virtue of which they are authorized to perform public duties.

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Bombay HC: Accused intimidating public servant by threatening to defame him on social media site as well as engineering artificial protest falls with scope of criminal force as used in S 353 of IPC.

Mr. Thobde contends that, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not make out any case for trial and that they are inherently improbable. He submitted that, ingredients of the offences as alleged are not even prima facie made out against the Petitioner. He further argues that, raising grievances in a democratic manner by protesting against illegal action or inaction of public servant does not amount to any offence. He raises a strange ground that, the Petitioner has only acted in furtherance of fundamental right bestowed upon him and hence he urges us to quash the F.I.R. as it is sheer harassment to the Petitioner to undergo the rigors of the trial. {Para 5}

8. The present case is suggestive of an emerging trend by persons such as the Petitioner herein, who with the aid of modern-day technologies devise a modus operandi to commit such offence. Hiding behind the screen of social media, irresponsible acts are done which have the propensity to effectively intimidate and cause a person to do acts which they would not otherwise lawfully do. All this while maintaining a veil of deniability of the act. The threat to use social media sites as a platform to intimidate and threat given by the petitioner and his accomplice is real enough to scare the complainant albeit a public servant ignoring their demands only at the risk of being defamed or facing an engineered protest.


9. Section 353 of the I.P.C. makes use of criminal force to any person being a public servant in the execution of his duty or with intent to prevent or deter him from discharging his duties, an offence. The act of the Petitioner in intimidating the complainant by threatening to defame him on social media site as well as engineering artificial protest also falls within the scope and ambit of the word 'criminal force' used in the Section. Threats of using social media site to intimate is a manifestation of the intention of the Petitioner to abuse modern day technology by 'virtually' using criminal force on the complainant. The ulterior motive is to deter him from discharging his public duty. In such circumstances 'criminal force' must not be restricted to only include physical force, but must bring within its ambit 'virtual force'. Section 353 cannot be interpreted in a narrow or parochial manner and a myopic view cannot be taken of the same. Such acts do not merely threaten the victims of crime but also defeats the very purpose of the criminal justice system. As in the case at hand, a public servant is at his tether's end to find a resolution to the constant threats and demands of money by the Petitioner. Finally, he found courage enough to approach the police who set up the trap to ensnare the Petitioner.

10. It is most unfortunate that, a public servant has been threatened and intimidated by defamatory material being circulated on social media to lower his reputation in the eyes of the right-thinking members of the society. A Tehsildar in a district is a respected public officer and is expected to discharge important functions in revenue matters. He is required to command obedience from the public at large visiting his office. If the repute of his office is lowered in the environment over which he has jurisdiction, there is a probability of chaos and disruption in the discharge of his duties. The threat of spreading false narrative by way of engineered protests in present times is bound to be quite a scary proposition for a public servant such as the complainant. The intent of the Petitioner in giving the threats and cause concern to the complainant would easily amount to an obstruction of a public servant from carrying out his public duties, particularly when the threats are coupled with aggressive and menacing acts on the part of the Petitioner and his accomplice. The F.I.R. also reveals the threat given by the Petitioner of organizing a protest during the Legislative Assembly Session in Nagpur which gives the entire act of the Petitioner a political color. This is reason enough for the complainant to be disconcerted and place him in fear of injury to his person and reputation. These acts are deprecated and need to be discouraged at their very inception, justifying prosecution.


10.1. We have recorded our above observations in detail only to bring to the fore the dangers of public servants being intimated while discharging their public duty. Public faith in public servants cannot be allowed to erode. Such acts must be viewed seriously.


11. In view of the aforenoted facts, we are of the considered opinion that, the F.I.R. prima facie discloses ingredients of the offences as alleged. We are thus not inclined to allow the Petition.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Criminal Writ Petition No. 276 of 2024

Decided On: 01.07.2024

Ajit Prabhakar Kulkarni Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.S. Gadkari and Dr. Neela Kedar Gokhale, JJ.

Author: Dr. Neela Kedar Gokhale, J.

Citation:  MANU/MH/4381/2024.

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Under which circumstances the court can not convict accused based on her dock identification in absence of prior test identification parade?

Undisputedly, the test identification parade was not conducted, after the arrest of the appellant, in this crime. The police officials identified the appellant for the first time at the time of their respective evidence. As observed above, the police officials had not seen the appellant on the spot. The test identification parade was not conducted. In my view, therefore, the very basis of their identification of the appellant in the Court being one of the member of the naxalite team loses its force. The witnesses have categorically stated that before this incident they had not seen the appellant. I am conscious of the fact that the evidence of the test identification parade is not a substantive piece of evidence. It can be used only as a corroborative piece of evidence to lend an assurance to the statements of the witnesses about the identification of the accused being the perpetrator of the crime at the earliest opportunity. The dock identification of the accused by the witnesses in the given case can be sufficient to establish the identification of the accused. The dock identification of the accused by the witnesses is substantive piece of evidence. However, in such a case, the Court has to be very careful and cautious. The Court must be satisfied that the witness had an opportunity to see the accused on the spot at the time of the commission of the crime. The Court must also be satisfied that the witness has not identified the accused in the Court, being the perpetrator of the crime, for the sake of supporting the case of the prosecution. The evidence of identification of the accused in such circumstances must be beyond doubt. In my view, the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and the attending circumstances, as discussed above, are sufficient to conclude that the appellant was not seen by them on the spot. The appellant was not known to the police officers prior to the occurrence of this incident. In the facts and circumstances, the witnesses were supposed to make a concrete statement for identifying the appellant in the Court at the time of their evidence. {Para 11}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Criminal Appeal (Apeal) No. 340 of 2022

Decided On: 30.08.2024

Parvati Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

G.A. Sanap, J.

Citation:  MANU/MH/5734/2024.

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Supreme Court: Jostling & Pushing To Wriggle Out Of Arrest Didn't Amount to Criminal Use Of Force for Convicting accused U/S 353 IPC

Having considered the oral evidence and the medical evidence, we are constrained to conclude that the prosecution has not established that the Appellant has assaulted or used criminal force against the trap party. In fact, what transpires is that when the Appellant was apprehended there appears to have been an attempt by the Appellant to wriggle out and in the process, jostling and pushing appears to have happened, in the process of the Appellant trying to extricate himself from the arrest. None of the ingredients of assault or criminal force have been attracted.{Para 28}

29. Further, there is absolutely no evidence to show that the Accused used any hard and blunt object. PW-13 Dr. H.L. Bhuria had deposed that the injuries on PW-9 Niranjan Singh, PW-8 N.K. Parihar, Constable Raj Kumar and Constable Shivshankar might have been caused by hard and blunt object. In view of the above, there is no evidence to indicate that the Accused assaulted or used criminal force on the trap party in execution of their duties or for the purpose of preventing or deterring them in discharging their duties. In short, none of the ingredients of Section 353 are attracted. The jostling and pushing by the Accused with an attempt to wriggle out, as is clear from the evidence, was not with any intention to assault or use criminal force.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 520 of 2012

Decided On: 12.08.2024

Mahendra Kumar Sonker Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.R. Gavai, K.V. Viswanathan and N. Kotiswar Singh, JJ.

Author: K.V. Viswanathan, J.

Citation: 2024 INSC 600, MANU/SC/0874/2024.
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Whether the court can convict an accused for an offence U/S 353 and S 332 of IPC if prosecution fails to prove that assault has link with discharge of duty by public servant?

In the present case also it is seen that the complainant was questioned with regards to some complaint lodged by him against the accused. The motive for assault has no link with the discharge of duty by the complainant. It is manifest that the assault on the PW-1 had no real nexus or causal connection or consequential relation with the performance of his duty as a public servant. There was no evidence from which it could be reasonably inferred that the intent of the accused was to prevent or deter him from discharge of his duty as such public servant. As such the charge under Sections 332 and 353 of IPC cannot sustain and the conviction for the said offences is also required to be set aside. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

Criminal Revision Application No.52 of 2005

Balasaheb Nivrutti Jagtap Vs. The State of Maharashtra

Dated: 20th March, 2018.

Coram: PRAKASH D. NAIK, J.

Citation: 2018 ALL MR (Cri) 2693.

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Thursday, 25 April 2024

When prosecution U/ S 353 of IPC is liable to be quashed?

A plain reading of this provision indicates that first and foremost requirement for attracting rigour of this provision is that the public servant must be discharging his duty. Needless to say that such duty must be ‘lawful’. Unlike in some other provisions, the “purported discharge of duty” by public servant, is not contemplated herein. Hence for making this provision applicable, the discharge of lawful duty is a condition precedent.

{Para 8}

16. It further needs to be recorded that as per first information report of respondent No. 2, the said incident has not occurred at the time of actual demolition but prior to 2-3 hours thereof, when respondent No. 2 claims to have been to the spot. Thus, there is apparently no discharge of duty in any manner whatsoever sought to be done by the respondent No. 2 and hence even otherwise he has neither been obstructed nor been deterred to desist from discharge of duty. Considering the aforesaid facts even if the first informant report is accepted in his entirety as true, still no offence punishable under Section 353 is made out against the applicant.

 In the High Court of Bombay,Aurangabad Bench

(Before Anuja Prabhudessai and R.M. Joshi, JJ.)


Amer Khan  Vs State of Maharashtra and Others

Cri minal Application No. 3312 of 2019

Decided on February 22, 2023,


2023 SCC OnLine Bom 818 : (2023) 2 AIR Bom R (Cri) 399 : 2023 Cri LJ (NOC 259) 85
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Friday, 24 July 2020

Whether court can convict accused of an offence U/S 353 of IPC on same facts if prosecution of accused U/S 186 of IPC is barred by S 195 of CRPC?

In Satis Chandra Chakravarti v. Ram Dayal De MANU/WB/0191/1920 : 24 C.W.N. 982 it was held by Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court that where the maker of a single statement is guilty of two distinct offences, one under s. 211, Indian Penal Code, which is an offence against public justice, and the other an offence under s. 499, wherein the personal element largely predominates, the offence under the latter section can be taken cognizance of without the sanction of the court concerned, as the Criminal procedure Code has not provided for sanction of court for taking cognizance of that offence. It was said that the two offences being fundamentally distinct in nature, could be separately taken cognizance of. That they are distinct in character is patent from the fact that the former is made non-compoundable, while the latter remains compoundable; in one for the initiation of the proceedings the legislature requires the sanction of the court under s. 195, Criminal Procedure Code, while in the other, cognizance can be taken of the offence on the complaint of the person defamed. It is pointed out in the Full Bench case that where upon the facts the commission of several offences is disclosed some of which require sanction and other do not, it is open to the complainant to proceed in respect of those only which do not require sanction; because to hold otherwise would amount to legislating and adding very materially to the provisions of Sections 195 to 199 of the Code of Criminal procedure. The decision of the Calcutta case has been quoted with approval by this Court in Basir-ul-Huq and Others v. The State of West Bengal MANU/SC/0028/1953 : 1953CriLJ1232 in which it was held that if that allegations made in a false report disclose two distinct offences, one against a public servant and the other against a private individual, the latter is not debarred by the provisions of s. 195, Criminal Procedure Code, from seeking redress for the offence committed against him.

6. In the present case, therefore, we are of the opinion that s. 195, Criminal Procedure Code does not bar the trial of the appellants for the distinct offence under s. 353 of the Indian Penal Code, though it is practically based on the same facts as for the prosecution under s. 186, Indian Penal Code.
 We have expressed the view that s. 195, Criminal Procedure Code does not bar the trial of an accused person for a distinct offence disclosed by the same or slightly different set of facts and which is not included within the ambit of the section, but we must point out that the provisions of s. 195 cannot be evaded by resorting to devices or camouflage. For instance, the provisions of the section cannot be evaded by the device of charging a person with an offence to which that section does not apply and then convicting him of an offence to which it does, on the ground that the latter offence is a minor of the same character, or by describing the offence as one punishable under some other section of the Indian Penal Code, though in truth and substance the offence falls in the category of sections mentioned in s. 195, Criminal Procedure Code. Merely by changing the garb or label of an offence which is essentially an offence covered by the provisions of s. 195 prosecution for such an offence cannot be taken cognizance of by misdescribing it or by putting a wrong label on it. On behalf of the appellants Mr. Garg suggested that the prosecution of the appellant under s. 353, Indian Penal Code was by way of evasion of the requirements of s. 195, Criminal Procedure Code. But we are satisfied that there is no substance in this argument and there is no camouflage or evasion in the present case.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 67 of 1964

Decided On: 23.02.1966

Durgacharan Naik  Vs.  State of Orissa
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Supreme Court: Distinction between offence U/S 353 of IPC and S 186 of IPC

It is true that most of the allegations in this case upon which the charge under s. 353, Indian Penal Code is based are the same as those constituting the charge under s. 186, Indian Penal Code but it cannot be ignored that Sections 186 and 353, Indian Penal Code relate to two distinct offences and while the offence under the latter section is a cognizable offence, the one under the former section is not so. The ingredients of the two offences are also distinct. Section 186, Indian Penal Code is applicable to a case where the accused voluntarily obstructs a public servant in the discharge of his public functions but under s. 353, Indian Penal Code the ingredient of assault or use of criminal force while the public servant is doing his duty as such is necessary. The quality of the two offences is also different. Section 186 occurs in Ch. X of the Indian Penal Code dealing with Contempts of the lawful authority of public servants, while s. 353 occurs in Ch. XVI regarding the offences affecting the human body. It is well-established that s. 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code does not bar the trial of an accused person for a distinct offence disclosed by the same set of facts but which is not within the ambit of that section.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 67 of 1964

Decided On: 23.02.1966

Durgacharan Naik  Vs.  State of Orissa

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
K. Subba Rao and Vaidynathier Ramaswami, JJ.

Citations: 1966 AIR 1775, 1966 SCR (3) 636, MANU/SC/0078/1966
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