Supreme Court: Shouting and threatening public servant does not amount to assault punishable U/S 353 of IPC

It is on the basis of the above complaint that an

FIR has been lodged against the appellant.   However,

the only allegation against the appellant in the said

complaint is that he was shouting and threatening the

staff. This itself will not amount to any assault. 

Assault is defined under Section 353 of the Indian

Penal Code as under :­

“353 Assault  ­   Whoever   makes   any

gesture,   or   any   preparation   intending   or

knowing it to be likely that such gesture or

preparation will cause any person present

to   apprehend   that   he   who   makes   that

gesture   or   preparation   is   about   to   use

criminal   force   to   that   person,   is   said   to

commit an assault.”

We   have   reproduced   the   entire   complaint

hereinabove.   On perusing the same, we find that none

of the ingredients, as mentioned in Section 353 IPC, is

reflected in the complaint letter. In other words, no

offence under Section 353 IPC is made out in this case.

The High Court, to our mind, has committed a mistake

in not interfering in this case. This is a case which is

nothing   but   an   abuse   of   the   process   of   law   and

therefore, in order to meet the ends of justice, we allow

this appeal and quash the entire proceedings initiated

against the appellant.   

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL  No. ___________ OF 2024

[@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO. 5905/2022 ]

K. DHANANJAY        Vs CABINET SECRETARY & ORS.            Dated: OCTOBER 21, 2024.

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Whether court can convict accused with aid S 34 of IPC even if he has not participated in actual assault to the victim?

 In Surender Chauhan vs. State of Madhya Pradesh,

(2000) 4 SCC 110, it was noticed that absence of a positive

act of assault was not a necessary ingredient to establish

common intention observing :“

11. Under Section 34 a person must be

physically present at the actual

commission of the crime for the purpose of

facilitating or promoting the offence, the

commission of which is the aim of the joint

criminal venture. Such presence of those

who in one way or the other facilitate the

execution of the common design is itself

tantamount to actual participation in the

criminal act. The essence of Section 34 is

simultaneous consensus of the minds of

persons participating in the criminal action

to bring about a particular result. Such

consensus can be developed at the spot

and thereby intended by all of them….”{Para 16}

18. Coming to the facts of the present case, the appellant

no.1 lay in wait along with the other two appellants who were

armed. Appellant no.1 stopped the two deceased who were

returning from the market. The assault commenced after the

deceased had halted. That there was some dispute with

regard to money is apparent from the evidence of the

witnesses. Abdul Barek died on the spot as a result of the

brutal assault. Abdul Motin was injured in the first assault

upon him by appellant no.3, after which he tried to flee.

Appellant no 1 along with the other accused chased him,

caught hold of him near the house of Mamud Ali where he

was brutally assaulted. Abdul Motin was then dragged by the

accused persons to the place where Abdul Barek lay

motionless. To our mind no further evidence is required with

regard to existence of common intention in appellant no.1 to

commit the offence in question. We, therefore, find no reason

to grant any benefit to appellant no.1 on the plea that there is

no role or act of assault attributed to him, denying the

existence of any common intention for that reason.

 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1401 OF 2012

SUBED ALI AND OTHERS Vs THE STATE OF ASSAM 

Author: NAVIN SINHA, J.

Dated: SEPTEMBER 30, 2020.

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Whether causing simple hurt can be treated as crime involving moral turpitude for taking disciplinary action against employee??

There can be no manner of doubt about certain offences which can straightaway be termed as involving moral turpitude e.g. offences under the Prevention of Corruption of Act, NDPS Act, etc. The question that arises for our consideration in this case is whether an offence involving bodily injury can be categorized as a crime involving moral turpitude. In this case, we are concerned with an assault. It is very difficult to state that every assault is not an offence involving moral turpitude. A simple assault is different from an aggravated assault. All cases of assault or simple hurt cannot be categorized as crimes involving moral turpitude. On the other hand, the use of a dangerous weapon which can cause the death of the victim may result in an offence involving moral turpitude. In the instant case, there was no motive for the Respondent to cause the death of the victims. The criminal courts below found that the injuries caused to the victims were simple in nature. On an overall consideration of the facts of this case, we are of the opinion that the crime committed by the Respondent does not involve moral turpitude. As the Respondent is not guilty of an offence involving moral turpitude, he is not liable to be discharged from service.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 7011 of 2009

Decided On: 26.04.2019

 The State Bank of India  Vs.  P. Soupramaniane

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Whether public servant can compound the case if assault is committed on him while he was acting in official capacity?

In my considered view, FIR in question cannot be quashed
on the basis of compromise. Nature of allegations show that petitioners
assaulted the complainant, who was posted as Head Constable in the
police station itself and had torn his uniform when he was conducting
investigation on the direction of the Station House Officer pursuant to a
complaint lodged against them. They also threatened to kill the
investigating officer as well as complainant. Instant dispute is not
personal in nature. Petitioners committed an offence against the State.
There can be no question of compromise between accused and officials of
the State. For this reason, FIR was lodged by the Head Constable and the
investigating agency registered a case. It is inexplicable how Head
Constable entered into a compromise on behalf of the State. There is
nothing on record to show that he was authorised by the police
department to enter into a compromise with the petitioners. Even
otherwise, such a compromise would be of no avail in view of nature of
allegations. The Head Constable while making complaint to the police
was merely acting on behalf of the police department. He would, thus,
have no authority to enter into compromise with the accused thereafter.
In my considered view after public servant lodges an FIR regarding the
assault raised upon him while he was performing his official duty, he
loses the locus standi to enter into compromise with the accused.
Judgment in Kulwinder Singh's case (supra) is not attracted to cases of
this nature. Under the circumstances, there is no ground for quashing of
FIR. The petition is hereby dismissed.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH.
CRM-M-37551-2015 (O&M)
Date of decision: December 23, 2015
Amrik Singh and others V
State of Punjab & another 
CORAM: MR. JUSTICE RAJAN GUPTA

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compensation for cyber tort

Chapter Four—Torts and Cyber Torts

 

 “Tort more or less means ‘wrong’”

Learning Objectives

1.  State the purpose of tort law

2.  Identify some intentional torts against persons and property

3.  Name the four elements of negligence

4.  Define strict liability, and list some circumstances in which it will be applied

5.  Summarize the laws protecting trademarks, patents, and copyrights

6. Have a clear understanding of cyber torts, and how tort theories are being applied in cyberspace

Through tort law, society compensates those who have suffered injuries as a result of the wrongful conduct of others.  Society recognizes an interest in personal physical safety, an interest in protecting real and personal property, and an interest in protecting certain intangible interests, such as personal privacy, family relations, reputation, and dignity.  Tort law provides remedies for invasion of these protected interests.  Also wrongful interference with others’ business rights is a business tort including the right to protect trademarks, patents, copyrights, and other property resulting from intellectual processes.

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