Showing posts with label minor offence. Show all posts
Showing posts with label minor offence. Show all posts

Tuesday, 3 December 2024

Supreme Court: Accused charged of a major offence can be convicted of minor offence if found guilty

 Needless to mention, it is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that if an accused is charged of a major offence but is not found guilty thereunder, he can be convicted of a minor offence if the facts established indicate that such minor offence has been committed.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1224 of 1999

Decided On: 19.11.1999

State of Himachal Pradesh Vs. Tara Dutt and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

G.B. Pattanaik, M. Srinivasan and M.B. Shah, JJ.

Author: G.B. Pattanaik, J.

Citations: AIR 2000 SUPREME COURT 297, 2000 (1) SCC 230,  MANU/SC/0729/1999.

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Tuesday, 25 May 2021

Whether court can convict an accused of a minor offence if he charged for a major offence?

 28. We may also make a reference to another three-Judge Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Shamnsaheb M.

Multtani vs. State of Karnataka [(2001) 2 SCC 577] which was not noticed in the case of Dalbir Singh (supra). In that case, the accused initially had been charged with an offence under  Section 302 IPC but was convicted for an offence under Section 304B IPC as according to the High Court there was no failure of justice. This Court found error in the judgment of the High Court convicting the accused of an offence under Section 304B as the accused was not put at notice of the adverse presumption that the Court is statutorily bound to draw on satisfaction of two ingredients of Section 304-B.

Therefore, this Court remanded the matter. It also noticed the conflict of views expressed in the cases of Lakhjit Singh (supra) and Sanagaraboina Sreenu (supra) and mentioned that in `cognate offences', the main ingredients are common and the one amongst them that is punishable with a lesser sentence can be regarded as a minor offence. The Court, finding that the ingredients of Sections 302 and 304B are different, held as follows:

"15. Section 222(1) of the Code deals with a case "when a person is charged with an offence consisting of several particulars". The section permits the court to convict the accused "of the minor offence, though he was not charged with it". Sub-section (2) deals with a similar, but slightly different situation.
"222. (2) When a person is charged with an offence and facts are proved which reduce it to a minor offence, he may be convicted of the minor offence, although he is not charged with it."

16. What is meant by "a minor offence"

for the purpose of Section 222 of the Code? Although the said expression is not defined in the Code it can be discerned from the context that the test of minor offence is not merely that the prescribed punishment is less than the major offence. The two illustrations provided in the section would bring the above point home well. Only if the two offences are cognate offences, wherein the main ingredients are common, the one punishable among them with a lesser sentence can be regarded as minor offence vis-`-vis the other offence.

17. The composition of the offence under Section 304-B IPC is vastly different from the formation of the offence of murder under Section 302 IPC and hence the former cannot be regarded as minor offence vis-`-vis the latter. However, the position would be different when the charge also contains the offence under Section 498-A IPC (husband or relative of husband of a women subjecting her to cruelty). As the word "cruelty" is explained as including, inter alia, "harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand".

18. So when a person is charged with an offence under Sections 302 and 498-A IPC on the allegation that he caused the death of a bride after subjecting her to harassment with a demand for dowry, within a period of 7 years of marriage, a situation may arise, as in this case, that the offence of murder is not established as against the accused. Nonetheless, all other ingredients necessary for the offence under Section 304-B IPC would stand established. Can the accused be convicted in such a case for the offence under Section 304-B IPC without the said offence forming part of the charge?

XXX XXX XXX

30. But the peculiar situation in respect of an offence under Section 304-B IPC, as discernible from the distinction pointed out above in respect of the offence under Section 306 IPC is this:

Under the former the court has a statutory compulsion, merely on the establishment of two factual positions enumerated above, to presume that the accused has committed dowry death. If any accused wants to escape from the said catch the burden is on him to disprove it. If he fails to rebut the presumption the court is bound to act on it.

31. Now take the case of an accused who was called upon to defend only a charge under Section 302 IPC. The burden of proof never shifts onto him. It ever remains on the prosecution which has to prove the charge beyond all reasonable doubt. The said traditional legal concept remains unchanged even now. In such a case the accused can wait till the prosecution evidence is over and then to show that the prosecution has failed to make out the said offence against him.

No compulsory presumption would go to the assistance of the prosecution in such a situation. If that be so, when an accused has no notice of the offence under Section 304-B IPC, as he was defending a charge under Section 302 IPC alone, would it not lead to a grave miscarriage of justice when he is alternatively convicted under Section 304-B IPC and sentenced to the serious punishment prescribed thereunder, which mandates a minimum sentence of imprisonment for seven years.

32. The serious consequence which may ensue to the accused in such a situation can be limned through an illustration: If a bride was murdered within seven years of her marriage and there was evidence to show that either on the previous day or a couple of days earlier she was subjected to harassment by her husband with demand for dowry, such husband would be guilty of the offence on the language of Section 304-B IPC read with Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. But if the murder of his wife was actually committed either  by a dacoit or by a militant in a terrorist act the husband can lead evidence to show that he had no hand in her death at all. If he succeeds in discharging the burden of proof he is not liable to be convicted under Section 304-B IPC. But if the husband is charged only under Section 302 IPC he has no burden to prove that his wife was murdered like that as he can have his traditional defence that the prosecution has failed to prove the charge of murder against him and claim an order of acquittal.

Reportable

Supreme Court of India
Rafiq Ahmed @ Rafi vs State Of U.P on 4 August, 2011
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Thursday, 6 August 2020

Whether Court can convict accused charged under S 302 of IPC for an offence of dishonestly receiving stolen property?

The learned Public Prosecutor relying on sections 221 and 222 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 pressed for a conviction of the appellant for an offence punishable under section 411 of the Indian Penal Code on the ground that there is acceptable evidence that M.O. 1 and M.O. 7 series were recovered from a place pointed out by the appellant. We may say at once that neither section 221 nor section 222 applies to the facts of the case.

14. The prosecution has no case at the commencement of the trial that the appellant had committed robbery or theft or any other cognate offence. The charge against the appellant is specific and categoric and he has been charged only for an offence punishable under section 302 I.P.C. There are no facts or particulars alleged in the charge showing or indicating that the appellant had committed any offence other than murder. Sub-section (2) of section 221 is controlled by sub-section (1) as is clear from the opening words' "If in such a case" in sub-section (2). While sub-section (1) of section 221 corresponds with section 236; sub-section (2) corresponds with section 237 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The general rule is that an accused person cannot be convicted of an offence in the absence of a specific charge in that respect; but sections 221 and 222 of the Code are the two exceptions to the said rule. The omission to frame a separate and specific charge in cases not covered by the above sections will be an incurable irregularity. The framing of a charge is a vital and important part of the trial. The omission to frame a charge is a serious defect which should be vigilantly guarded against, as in some cases it may be so serious that by itself it would vitiate a trial and render it illegal, prejudice to the accused being taken for granted. It is clear from section 221 that the said section applies only to a case where a single act or series of acts alleged against an accused is of such a nature that it is doubtful which of the several offences, the facts which can be proved will constitute. This doubt or uncertainty, no doubt, arises at the commencement of the trial when the charge has been framed against the appellant. And this doubt can be resolved at the end of the trial. The learned State Prosecutor relied on sub-section (2) of section 222 of the New Code. That also, according to us, has no application to the present case. This section corresponds to section 238 of the Old Code. Relying on sub-section, it is argued that the facts proved in the case constitute a minor offence. The minor offence contemplated under sub-section (2) of this section must be a cognate offence in relation to the main offence. In a case where the minor offence disclosed in the evidence is one, the ingredients of which are entirely different from the main offence with which the accused was charged, he cannot be convicted in the absence of a specific charge for the minor offence proved by invoking the aid of sub-section (2) of section 222 of the Code. The major and minor offences must have the main ingredients in common. An accused charged with one offence which is entirely of a different type from the offence which is proved to have been committed cannot in the absence of a proper charge be convicted of that offence merely on the ground that the facts proved constitute a minor offence. Where two offences involve different elements and different questions of facts, one offence cannot be said to be minor to the other. It is with reference to the main major offence referred to in section 222 of the New Code that an offence has to be treated as minor within the meaning of sub-section (2) of that section. We are fortified in our views in this regard by decisions of various High Courts. See Raghunath Singh v. State (1), Kanhaiya Lal v. Feliram (2) Makkhan v. Emperor (3) and Bheemappa v. State of Mysore (4). This apart, the recovery of M.O. 1 and M.O. 7 series has been treated and used by the prosecution only as a piece of evidence in support of the murder charge. In the absence of the charge for robbery or theft, the appellant cannot be convicted under section 411 I.P.C. and in the circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that he has not been prejudiced. The necessary ingredients of the said offence also have not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA

Decided On: 15.06.1977

Vazhambalakkal Thomachan  Vs.   State of Kerala

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
P. Janaki Amma and S.K. Kader, JJ.

Citation : 1978 CriLJ 498, MANU/KE/0130/1977
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Leading Supreme Court Judgment on basic concept of minor offence under S 222 of CRPC

Section 222(1) of the Code deals with a case "when a person is charged with an offence consisting of several particulars". The Section permits the court to convict the accused "of the minor offence, though he was not charged with it." Sub-section (2) deals with a similar, but slightly different, situation. "When a person is charged with an offence and facts are proved which reduce it to a minor offence, he may be convicted of the minor offence although he is not charged with it."{Para 16}

17. What is meant by "a minor offence" for the purpose of Section 222 of the Code? Although the said expression is not defined in the Code it can be discerned from the context that the test of minor offence is not merely that the prescribed punishment is less than the major offence. The two illustrations provided in the section would bring the above point home well. Only if the two offences are cognate offences, wherein the main ingredients are common, the one punishable among them with a lesser sentence can be regarded as minor offence vis-a-vis the other offence.

18. The composition of the offence under Section 304B IPC is vastly different from the formation of the offence of murder under Section 302 IPC and hence the former cannot be regarded as minor offence vis-a-vis the latter. However, the position would be different when the charge also contains the offence under Section 498A IPC (Husband or relative of husband of a women subjecting her to cruelty). As the word "cruelty" is explained as including, inter alia, "harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand."

19. So when a person is charged with an offence under Sections 302 and 498A IPC on the allegation that he caused the death of a bride after subjecting her to harassment with a demand for dowry, within a period of 7 years of marriage, a situation may arise, as in this case, that the offence of murder is not established as against the accused. Nonetheless all other ingredients necessary for the offence under Section 304B IPC would stand established. Can the accused be convicted in such a case for the offence under Section 304B IPC without the said offence forming part of the charge?

20. A two Judge Bench of this Court (K. Jayachandra Reddy and G.N. Ray, JJ) has held in Lakhjit Singh and anr. vs. State of Punjab MANU/SC/0905/1994 that if a prosecution failed to establish the offence under Section 302 IPC, which alone was included in the charge, but if the offence under Section 306 IPC was made out in the evidence it is permissible for the court to convict the accused of the latter offence.

21. But without reference to the above decision, another two Judge Bench of this Court (M.K. Mukherjee and S.P. Kurdukar, JJ) has held in Sangaraboina Sreenu vs. State of A.P. MANU/SC/0816/1997 : 1997CriLJ3955 : 1997CriLJ3955 that it is impermissible to do so. The rationale advanced by the Bench for the above position is this:

"It is true that Section 222 CrP.C. entitles a court to convict a person of an offence which is minor in comparison to the one for which he is tried but Section 306 IPC cannot be said to be a minor offence in relation to an offence under Section 302 IPC within the meaning of Section 222 Cr.P.C. for the two offences are of distinct and different categories. While the basic constituent of an offence under Section 302 IPC is homicidal death, those of Section 306 IPC are suicidal death and abetment thereof."

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Appeal (crl.) 907 of 1998

Decided On: 24.01.2001

Shamnsaheb M. Multtani Vs  State of Karnataka
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Tuesday, 4 August 2020

Whether court can convict accused of an offence U/S 304B of IPC if he was charged only under S 302 of IPC?

Be that as it may. The question raised before us is whether in a case where prosecution failed to prove the charge under Section 302 IPC, but on the facts the ingredients of section 304B have winched to the fore, can the court convict him of that offence in the absence of the said offence being included in the charge.{Para 14}

15. Sections 221 and 222 of the Code are the two provisions dealing with the power of a criminal court to convict the accused of an offence which is not included in the charge. The primary condition for application of section 221 of the Code is that the court should have felt doubt, at the time of framing the charge, as to which of the several acts (which may be proved) will constitute the offence on account of the nature of the acts or series of acts alleged against the accused. In such a case the section permits "to convict the accused" of the offence of which he is shown to have committed though he was not charged with it." But in the nature of the acts alleged by the prosecution in this case there was absolutely no scope for any doubt regarding the offence under Section 302 IPC, at least at the time of framing the charge.

16. Section 222(1) of the Code deals with a case "when a person is charged with an offence consisting of several particulars". The Section permits the court to convict the accused "of the minor offence, though he was not charged with it." Sub-section (2) deals with a similar, but slightly different, situation. "When a person is charged with an offence and facts are proved which reduce it to a minor offence, he may be convicted of the minor offence although he is not charged with it."

17. What is meant by "a minor offence" for the purpose of Section 222 of the Code? Although the said expression is not defined in the Code it can be discerned from the context that the test of minor offence is not merely that the prescribed punishment is less than the major offence. The two illustrations provided in the section would bring the above point home well. Only if the two offences are cognate offences, wherein the main ingredients are common, the one punishable among them with a lesser sentence can be regarded as minor offence vis-a-vis the other offence.

18. The composition of the offence under Section 304B IPC is vastly different from the formation of the offence of murder under Section 302 IPC and hence the former cannot be regarded as minor offence vis-a-vis the latter. However, the position would be different when the charge also contains the offence under Section 498A IPC (Husband or relative of husband of a women subjecting her to cruelty). As the word "cruelty" is explained as including, inter alia, "harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand."

19. So when a person is charged with an offence under Sections 302 and 498A IPC on the allegation that he caused the death of a bride after subjecting her to harassment with a demand for dowry, within a period of 7 years of marriage, a situation may arise, as in this case, that the offence of murder is not established as against the accused. Nonetheless all other ingredients necessary for the offence under Section 304B IPC would stand established. Can the accused be convicted in such a case for the offence under Section 304B IPC without the said offence forming part of the charge?

22. The crux of the matter is this: Would there be occasion for a failure of justice by adopting such a course as to convict an accused of the offence under Section 304B IPC when all the ingredients necessary for the said offence have come out in evidence, although he was not charged with the said offence? In this context a reference to Section 464(1) of the Code is apposite:

"No finding, sentence or order by a Court of competent jurisdiction shall be deemed invalid merely on the ground that no charge was framed or on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the charge including any misjoinder of charges, unless, in the opinion of the Court of appeal, confirmation or revision, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby." (emphasis supplied)

23. In other words, a conviction would be valid even if there is any omission or irregularity in the charge, provided it did not occasion a failure of justice.

24. We often hear about "failure of justice" and quite often the submission in a criminal court is accentuated with the said expression. Perhaps it is too pliable or facile an expression which could be fitted in any situation of a case. The expression "failure of justice" would appear, sometimes, as an etymological chameleon (The simile is borrowed from Lord Diplock in Town Investments Ltd. vs. Department of the Environment 1977(1) A E R 813. The criminal court, particularly the superior court should make a close examination to ascertain whether there was really a failure of justice or whether it is only a camouflage.

25. One of the cardinal principles of natural justice is that no man should be condemned without being heard, ("Audi alteram partem"). But the law reports are replete with instances of courts hesitating to approve the contention that failure of justice had occasioned merely because a person was not heard on a particular aspect. However, if the aspect is of such a nature that non-explanation of it has contributed to penalising an individual, the court should say that since he was not given the opportunity to explain that aspect there was failure of justice on account of non-compliance with the principle of natural justice.

26. We have now to examine whether, on the evidence now on record the appellant can be convicted under Section 304B IPC without the same being included as a count in the charge Section 304B has been brought on the statute book on 9-11-1986 as a package along with Section 113B of the Evidence Act. Section 304B(1) IPC reads thus:

"304-B. Dowry death.- (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death", and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death."
27. In the Explanation to the Section it is said that the word "dowry" shall be understood as defined in the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.

28. The postulates needed to establish the said offence are: (1) Death of a wife should have occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage; (2) soon before her death she should have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by the accused in connection with any demand for dowry. Now reading section 113B of the Evidence Act, as a part of the said offence, the position is this: If the prosecution succeeds in showing that soon before her death she was subjected by him to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with any demand for dowry and that her death had occurred (within seven years of her marriage) otherwise than under normal circumstances "the court shall presume that such person had caused dowry death."

29. Under Section 4 of the Evidence Act "whenever it is directed by this Act that the Court shall presume the fact it shall regard such fact as proved unless and until it is disproved." So the court has no option but to presume that the accused had caused dowry death unless the accused disproves it. It is a statutory compulsion on the court. However it is open to the accused to adduce such evidence for disproving the said compulsory presumption, as the burden is unmistakably on him to do so. He can discharge such burden either by eliciting answers through cross-examination of the witnesses of the prosecution or by adducing evidence on the defence side or by both.

30. Section 113A of the Evidence Act says that under certain conditions, almost similar to the conditions for dowry death "the court may presume having regard to the circumstances of the case, that such suicide has been abetted by her husband etc." When the law says that the court may presume the fact, it is discretionary on the part of the court either to regard such fact as proved or not to do so, which depends upon all the other circumstances of the case. As there is no compulsion on the court to act on the presumption the accused can persuade the court against drawing a presumption adverse to him.

31. But the peculiar situation in respect of an offence under Section 304B IPC, as discernible from the distinction pointed out above in respect of the offence under Section 306 IPC is this: Under the former the court has a statutory compulsion, merely on the establishment of two factual positions enumerated above, to presume that the accused has committed dowry death. If any accused wants to escape from the said catch the burden is on him to disprove it. If he fails to rebut the presumption the court is bound to act on it.

32. Now take the case of an accused who was called upon to defend only a charge under Section 302 IPC. The burden of proof never shifts on to him. It ever remains on the prosecution which has to prove the charge beyond all reasonable doubt. The said traditional legal concept remains unchanged even now. In such a case the accused can wait till the prosecution evidence is over and then to show that the prosecution has failed to make out the said offence against him. No compulsory presumption would go to the assistance of the prosecution in such a situation. If that be so, when an accused has no notice of the offence under Section 304B IPC, as he was defending a charge under Section 302 IPC alone, would it not lead to a grave miscarriage of justice when he is alternatively convicted under Section 304B IPC and sentenced to the serious punishment prescribed thereunder, which mandates a minimum sentence of imprisonment for seven years.

33. The serious consequence which may ensue to the accused in such a situation can be limned through an illustration:- If a bride was murdered within seven years of her marriage and there was evidence to show that either on the previous day or a couple of days earlier she was subjected to harassment by her husband with demand for dowry, such husband would be guilty of the offence on the language of Section 304B IPC read with Section 113B of the Evidence Act. But if the murder of his wife was actually committed either by a decoit or by a militant in a terrorist act the husband can lead evidence to show that he had no hand in her death at all. If he succeeds in discharging the burden of proof he is not liable to be convicted under Section 304B, IPC. But if the husband is charged only under Section 302 IPC he has no burden to prove that his wife was murdered like that as he can have his traditional defence that the prosecution has failed to prove the charge of murder against him and claim an order of acquittal.

34. The above illustration would amplify the gravity of the consequence befalling an accused if he was only asked to defend a charge under Section 302 IPC and was alternatively convicted under Section 304B IPC without any notice to him, because he is deprived of the opportunity to disprove the burden cast on him by law.

35. In such a situation, if the trial court finds that the prosecution has failed to make out the case under Section 302 IPC, but the offence under Section 304B IPC has been made out, the court has to call upon the accused to enter on his defence in respect of the said offence. Without affording such an opportunity to the accused, a conviction under Section 304B IPC would lead to real and serious miscarriage of justice. Even if no such count was included in the charge, when the count affords him an opportunity to discharge his burden by putting him to notice regarding the prima facie view of the court that he is liable to be convicted under Section 304B IPC, unless he succeeds in disproving the presumption, it is possible for the court to enter upon a conviction of the said offence in the event of his failure to disprove the presumption.

36. As the appellant was convicted by the High Court under Section 304B IPC, without such opportunity being granted to him, we deem it necessary in the interest of justice to afford him that opportunity. The case in the trial court should proceed against the appellant (not against the other two accused whose acquittal remains unchallenged now) from the stage of defence evidence. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Appeal (crl.) 907 of 1998

Decided On: 24.01.2001

Shamnsaheb M. Multtani Vs  State of Karnataka

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
K.T. Thomas, R.P. Sethi and B.N. Agrawal, JJ.

Citation: Citation : AIR 2001 SC 921,(2001) 2 SCC 577, MANU/SC/0047/2001
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Friday, 24 July 2020

Whether court can convict accused of an offence U/S 353 of IPC on same facts if prosecution of accused U/S 186 of IPC is barred by S 195 of CRPC?

In Satis Chandra Chakravarti v. Ram Dayal De MANU/WB/0191/1920 : 24 C.W.N. 982 it was held by Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court that where the maker of a single statement is guilty of two distinct offences, one under s. 211, Indian Penal Code, which is an offence against public justice, and the other an offence under s. 499, wherein the personal element largely predominates, the offence under the latter section can be taken cognizance of without the sanction of the court concerned, as the Criminal procedure Code has not provided for sanction of court for taking cognizance of that offence. It was said that the two offences being fundamentally distinct in nature, could be separately taken cognizance of. That they are distinct in character is patent from the fact that the former is made non-compoundable, while the latter remains compoundable; in one for the initiation of the proceedings the legislature requires the sanction of the court under s. 195, Criminal Procedure Code, while in the other, cognizance can be taken of the offence on the complaint of the person defamed. It is pointed out in the Full Bench case that where upon the facts the commission of several offences is disclosed some of which require sanction and other do not, it is open to the complainant to proceed in respect of those only which do not require sanction; because to hold otherwise would amount to legislating and adding very materially to the provisions of Sections 195 to 199 of the Code of Criminal procedure. The decision of the Calcutta case has been quoted with approval by this Court in Basir-ul-Huq and Others v. The State of West Bengal MANU/SC/0028/1953 : 1953CriLJ1232 in which it was held that if that allegations made in a false report disclose two distinct offences, one against a public servant and the other against a private individual, the latter is not debarred by the provisions of s. 195, Criminal Procedure Code, from seeking redress for the offence committed against him.

6. In the present case, therefore, we are of the opinion that s. 195, Criminal Procedure Code does not bar the trial of the appellants for the distinct offence under s. 353 of the Indian Penal Code, though it is practically based on the same facts as for the prosecution under s. 186, Indian Penal Code.
 We have expressed the view that s. 195, Criminal Procedure Code does not bar the trial of an accused person for a distinct offence disclosed by the same or slightly different set of facts and which is not included within the ambit of the section, but we must point out that the provisions of s. 195 cannot be evaded by resorting to devices or camouflage. For instance, the provisions of the section cannot be evaded by the device of charging a person with an offence to which that section does not apply and then convicting him of an offence to which it does, on the ground that the latter offence is a minor of the same character, or by describing the offence as one punishable under some other section of the Indian Penal Code, though in truth and substance the offence falls in the category of sections mentioned in s. 195, Criminal Procedure Code. Merely by changing the garb or label of an offence which is essentially an offence covered by the provisions of s. 195 prosecution for such an offence cannot be taken cognizance of by misdescribing it or by putting a wrong label on it. On behalf of the appellants Mr. Garg suggested that the prosecution of the appellant under s. 353, Indian Penal Code was by way of evasion of the requirements of s. 195, Criminal Procedure Code. But we are satisfied that there is no substance in this argument and there is no camouflage or evasion in the present case.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 67 of 1964

Decided On: 23.02.1966

Durgacharan Naik  Vs.  State of Orissa
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Sunday, 6 October 2019

Whether offence U/S 366 of IPC can be treated as minor offence to S 366A of IPC?

Here it is useful to refer
the decision in the case of Iqbal Vs State of Kerala
(2008) Cri.L.J. 436 wherein the Hon'able Apex court in
para 9 to 11 observed as under:
“9. The residual question is of applicability of Section 366A
IPC. In order to attract Section 366A
IPC, essential ingredients
are (1) that the accused induced a girl; (2) that the person
induced was a girl under the age of eighteen years; (3) that the
accused has induced her with intent that she may be or knowing
that it is likely that she will be forced or seduced to illicit
intercourse; (4) such intercourse must be with a person other
than the accused; (5) that the inducement caused the girl to go
from any place or to do any act.
10. In the instant case, the admitted case of the prosecution is
that girl had left in the company of the accused of her own will
and that she was not forced to sexual intercourse with any person
other than the accused. The admitted case is that she had sexual
intercourse with the accused for which, considering her age,
conviction u/s 376 IPC has been maintained. Since the essential
ingredient that the intercourse must be with a person other than
the accused has not been established, Section 366A
has no
application.

28. Relying upon the decision in the case of
Bhagwan Laxman Rakshe (supra) learned APP submitted that
in case, it is held that the prosecution has failed to
prove offence under Section 366A
of the IPC against
accused then accused be convicted for the offence under
Section 366 of the IPC by altering the conviction from
Section 366A
into a conviction under Section 366 of the
IPC though no charge is framed under Section 366 of the
IPC. In the said case in paragraph No.17 as referred
earlier in detail it was observed that Section 366 of the
IPC, apart from abduction or seducing a woman to compel
her marriage, interalia, deals with offence of kidnapping
with intention that the woman may be forced to illicit
intercourse. The punishment is prescribed of 10 years for
both the offences under Section 366A
and Section 366 of
the IPC and hence it would be appropriate to convert
conviction awarded under Section 366A
into conviction
under Section 366 of the IPC and as such sentence as
passed by the trial Court was maintained.

29. Here, it would be appropriate to refer three
judges decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
Shamnsaheb M. Multtani Vs State of Karnataka (2001) 2
Supreme Court Cases 577 wherein in paragraph Nos.16,17
and 18 of the said judgment the aspect what is meant by a
minor offence for the purpose of Section 222 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure is considered. Said paragraph Nos.
16,17 and 18 read as under:“
16. What is meant by “a minor offence” for the purpose of
Section 222 of the Code? Although the said expression is not
defined in the Code it can be discerned from the context that the
test of minor offence is not merely that the prescribed
punishment is less than the major offence. The two illustrations
provided in the section would bring the above point home well.
Only if the two offences are cognate offences, wherein the main
ingredients are common, the one punishable among them with a
lesser sentence can be regarded as minor offence visavis
the
other offence.


31. From the decision in the case of Shamnsaheb M.
Multtani (supra) it is clear that the test of minor
offence is not merely that the prescribed punishment is
less than the major offence and that two illustrations
provided in Section 222 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
would bring the said point home well. So also, it is
clear from the said decision that only if the two
offences are cognate offences, wherein main ingredients

are common, the one punishable among them with a lesser
sentence can be regarded as minor offence visavis
the
other offence. The ingredients of offence punishable
under Section 366A
are five as referred earlier in
paragraph No.24 (supra) and the ingredients of offence
punishable under Section 366 of the IPC are that; 1.
Kidnapping or abducting of any woman, 2. Such kidnapping
or abducting must be(
i) with intent that she may be
compelled or knowing it to be likely that she will be
compelled to marry any person against her will; or (ii)
in order that she may be forced or seduced to illicit
intercourse, or knowing it to be likely that she will be
forced or seduced to illicit intercourse; or (iii) by
means of criminal intimidation or otherwise by inducing
any woman to go from any place with intent that she may
be, or knowing that she will be, forced or seduced to
illicit intercourse. The main ingredients of these two
offences are not appearing common. The material
ingredients of offence under Section 366A
of the IPC is
the inducement of a girl under the age of 18 years with
intent that she may be or knowing that it is likely that
she would be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse and
such intercourse must be with a person other than the
accused, while material ingredients of offence under
Section 366 is kidnapping or abducting of any woman with

intent that she may be compelled or knowing it to be
likely that she would be compelled to marry any person
against her will or she may be forced or seduced to
illicit intercourse, or knowing it to be likely that she
may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse.
Moreover, the punishment provided for both the offences
is the same and the punishment of either of these
offences is not less than the other offence. Considering
these aspects and applying the aforementioned
observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding a minor
offence in the case of Shamnsaheb M. Multtani (supra) I
hold that the offence under Section 366 of the IPC cannot
be regarded as minor offence to Section 366A
of the IPC.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.466 OF 2016

Bhagwat Munjabhau Hoge  Vs  The State of Maharashtra 

CORAM : S.M.GAVHANE,J.

PRONOUNCED ON : 07.06.2019

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Sunday, 14 May 2017

Whether accused can be punished for major offence after being charged with minor offence?



Section 215 Cr.P.C. provides that omission to frame charge will not be treated as material unless it has resulted in any failure of justice by accused being misled by such error or omission. Such failure of justice includes violation of legal rights of accused. In judging a question of prejudice, the court must act with broad vision and look to the substance of the case and main concern should be to ensure as to whether the accused knew what he was being tried for and whether the facts established were explained to him fairly and whether the accused had been given full and fair opportunity to defend him. Provisions of Section 222(1) CrPC provides that when accused is charged with one offence, he may be convicted for other minor offence of similar nature. The question remains to be considered is as to whether accused can be punished for major offence after being charged with minor offence, if there is no prejudice and quantum of punishment is not more than that of minor offence. 





18. In this matter, the accused-appellant was charged for offence under Section 304-B I.P.C., in which maximum punishment was imprisonment for life, but he was punished for the charge under Section 302 I.P.C., which was a major offence, in which maximum punishment is death sentence. Apart from it, the nature of both the offences are different and law of evidence relating to both the offences are entirely different. Therefore, it is immaterial that in present case, this finding of learned Sessions Judge may be correct that having knowledge of facts of the charge, nature of evidences adduced. In spite of the understanding of accused to defend the charge of murder, the questions put to him under Section 313 Cr.P.C. regarding offence of murder and opportunity to adduce evidence apparently for the murder charge, there is always a possibility that accused-appellant was not heard and afforded opportunity to defend his case for major offence of Section 302 I.P.C. Because of not being charged for the same. Therefore, considering the verdict of Apex Court in Shamnsaheb M. Multtani's case (supra), as above, this appeal deserves to be allowed for him only. 


ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT


 JAIL APPEAL No. - 4846 of 2011 


Tejveer @ Pappi V  State 

Hon'ble Arvind Kumar Tripathi, J. 
Hon'ble Pramod Kumar Srivastava, J. 
Citation: 2017 CRLJ(NOC) 144 ALL
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Saturday, 14 January 2017

When it is permissible for court to convict accused of minor offence though he was not charged with it?

 Section 222(1) of the Code deals with a case when a person is charged with an offence consisting of several particulars. The Section permits the court to convict the accused of the minor offence, though he was not charged with it. Sub-section (2) deals with a similar, but slightly different, situation. When a person is charged with an offence and facts are proved which reduce it to a minor offence, he may be convicted of the minor offence although he is not charged with it.
16. What is meant by a minor offence for the purpose of Section 222 of the Code? Although the said expression is not defined in the Code it can be discerned from the context that the test of minor offence is not merely that the prescribed punishment is less than the major offence. The two illustrations provided in the section would bring the above point home well. Only if the two offences are cognate offences, wherein the main ingredients are common, the one punishable among them with a lesser sentence can be regarded as minor offence vis-à-vis the other offence.
17. The composition of the offence under Section 304-B IPC is vastly different from the formation of the offence of murder under Section 302 IPC and hence the former cannot be regarded as minor offence vis-à-vis the latter. However, the position would be different when the charge also contains the offence under Section 498-A IPC (Husband or relative of husband of a women subjecting her to cruelty). As the word cruelty is explained as including, inter alia, harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.
Allahabad High Court
Dara Singh And Another vs State Of U.P. on 17 June, 2016
Bench: Amar Singh Chauhan
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Wednesday, 24 August 2016

Whether a person can be denied public employment on account of conviction in minor offence?

In a growing democracy, where the systems are failing and the weak
and the downtrodden are hardly given the opportunity to sharpen their
intellect thereby diminishing the ability of their consciousness to act as a
mirror to their acts and actions, it is high time that the executive brings into
place a policy where summary/ordinary conviction should not be treated as a
conviction for entry or retention in government service.
33. Till then, it would be the duty of the Court to interpret the law by
harmonizing human sufferings and human wants, delinquencies and criminal
tendencies; conscious of the fact that passengers on Spaceship Earth are the
rich and the poor, the needy and the well-off, the hungry and the well-fed,
the educated and the uneducated. The need of the hour is to understand that
criminals are not born and are not irredeemable brutes. Crime may be a
disease but not the criminal, who are a kind of psychic patients and to
understand, that anti-social maladies are mostly the result of social
imbalances. It must be remembered that on the one hand, social stresses, for
various reasons, explosively mount in the real world’s hard environs and the
harsh remedy of heartless incarceration and ouster from society deepens the
criminality. The swing of the pendulum to the humanist side requires
respect for the worth of personhood and the right of every man and woman
in its residual human essence. 
34. We have discussed hereinabove the necessity to harmonize the
various social imbalances and in particular in favour of those who have been
denied the opportunity of developing their consciousness and thereby being
deprived of their conscious acting as a mirror to their acts. We have
highlighted as to how in various jurisdictions abroad the issue is dealt with.
We have discussed hereinabove the deliberations at the ‘All India Seminar
on Correctional Service’ where emphasis for re-habilitation of ex-convicts,
committing minor offences, by induction in public service was accorded
primacy in the deliberations.
A criminal record is a record of a person's criminal history, generally
used by potential employers to assess the candidate’s trustworthiness. The
information included in a criminal record varies between countries and even
between jurisdictions within a country. In most cases it lists all nonexpunged
criminal offenses and may also include traffic offenses such as
speeding and drunk-driving. In some countries the record is limited to actual
convictions (where the individual has pleaded guilty or been declared guilty
by a qualified court) while in others it also includes arrests, charges
dismissed, charges pending and even charges of which the individual has
been acquitted. The latter policy is often argued to be a human
rights violation since it works contrary to the presumption of innocence by

exposing people to discrimination on the basis of unproven allegations.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
 Judgment Delivered on : July 15, 2016
W.P.(C) 11979/2015
MANOJ 

v
UOI & ORS

CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP NANDRAJOG
HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE PRATIBHA RANI

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Saturday, 4 April 2015

What is meant by “a minor offence” for the purpose of Section 222 of CRPC?



What is meant by “a minor offence” for the
purpose of Section 222 of the Code? Although the
said expression is not defined in the Code it can be
discerned from the context that the test of minor
offence
is
not
merely
that
the
prescribed
punishment is less than the major offence. The
two illustrations provided in the section would
bring the above point home well. Only if the two
offences are cognate offences, wherein the main
ingredients
are
common, the one punishable
among them with a lesser sentence can be
regarded as minor offence vis-à-vis the other
offence.”


IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 39 OF 2012

Mr. Shrinivas Guramkondu, V/s The State of Goa,

CORAM : U.V. BAKRE, J.
DATE : 17th November, 2014
Citation;2015 ALLMR(cri)1003
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Thursday, 27 February 2014

Whether Accused who is released on bail for minor offence can be arrested again if offence converts in to non bailable offence?



 Where such person already released on bail for a bailable offence is proceeded in the crime for a non bailable offence he becomes disentitled to the liberty granted to him in relation to the minor offence. The law applicable in such a situation has been stated by the Apex Court in Prahlad Singh Bhati v. N.C.T. Delhi (AIR2001SC1444 thus:- "With the change of the nature of the offence, the accused becomes disentitled to the liberty granted to him in relation to a minor offence, if the offence is altered for an aggravated crime." In the present case petitioners(accused) were released on bail by police at a stage when they were accused of a bailable offence. When investigation has revealed that the offence committed by them was an aggravated one, a non bailable offence, they become disentitled to the liberty granted to them in relation to the minor  offence. In such a case no orders from the Sessions Court or High court under section 439(2) of the Code is warranted for their arrest by police. Their previous release on bail by police when they were proceeded only for bailable offence would no way shield them from arrest by police if investigation disclose their culpability in a non bailable offence. Even where a person is granted bail by the court under section 436(1) of the Code, if he is later proceeded for a non bailable offence in the same crime no cancellation of bail need be applied by investigating officer but only informing the court of inclusion of the aggravated offence for issue of direction to the accused to apply for bail again for the graver offence. No order of cancellation of bail is required or called for. The argument canvassed by counsel that a person arrested and released on bail under section 436(1) of the Code can be rearrested only under an order passed only by Sessions Court or High Court under section 439 (2) of the Code has no merit. The words 'under this Chapter' in sub section (2) of Section 439 do not postulate that a person released on bail under section 436(1) of the Code, whether it be by police or court, can be rearrested only by an order of the Sessions Court or High Court. What is provided under that sub section is a plenary power to the High Court or Court of Session for revoking or cancelling bail granted to any person under Chapter XXXIII of the Code for arresting and committing him to custody where circumstances demand such an order to advance the ends of justice. Where no cancellation or revocation of a bail granted in relation to a bailable offence is needed or called for when the person granted bail is proceeded for an aggravated non bailable offence sub section (2) of Section 439 of the Code has no applicability at all. View expressed by this court in Biju v. State of Kerala (2000(2) KLT495 that "when an accused has been released on bail under section 436 of the Code and later a nonbailable offence is added, his bail can be cancelled only under section 439(2) or under section 437(5) Cr.P.C and that too on misuse B.A.No.5555/2013 10 of liberty granted" cannot hold good in the light of judicial pronouncement rendered over that question by the Apex Court in Prahlad Singh Bhati's case referred to above. In a fact situation where a person has been released on bail when proceeded with for a bailable offence alone, adding of aggravated nonbailable offence against him in the crime disentitle him to the liberty granted in respect of the minor offence. In such a case no question of revoking or cancelling the bail granted earlier for the minor bailable offence is called for.

KERALA HIGH COURT

Ahamed Basheer Vs. Sub Inspector of Police,vidyanagar

Citation; 2014 CR L J 137 kerala

Judge : MR.JUSTICE S.S.SATHEESACHANDRAN
Decided On : Sep-23-2013
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