Showing posts with label Trade mark. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Trade mark. Show all posts

Monday, 16 June 2025

Bombay High Court Upholds Order Refusing To Declare 'TikTok' As Well Known Trademark Owing To Its Ban In India

  It is obvious that due to the ban imposed by the Government of India, the aforesaid application bearing the trade mark TikTok cannot be used in India. This would be irrelevant for determining the question of inclusion of the trade mark in the list of well known marks, but, since the said mark is already a registered trade mark in India, it does enjoy all statutory protection available under the Trade Marks Act. Inclusion in the list of well known marks obviously gives added protection to a mark, but in the light of the fact that the application TikTok itself has been banned in India, which till date admittedly has not been set aside by any Competent Court or Authority, this Court finds that no error can be attributed to the said respondent in passing the impugned order while refusing the application of the petitioner for inclusion of its trade mark TikTok in the list of well known marks. {Para 24}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

IN ITS COMMERCIAL DIVISION

COMMERCIAL MISCELLANEOUS PETITION NO. 10 OF 2024

TikTok Limited Faheem Ahmad Vs  The Registrar of Trade Marks Mumbai & Anr.

 CORAM: MANISH PITALE, J.

PRONOUNCED ON : 10th JUNE 2025.

Citation: 2025:BHC-OS:8466

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Sunday, 21 July 2024

What are intellectual property rights in indian law? explain with examples

Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) in India refer to the legal rights granted to individuals or entities over their creations or inventions. These rights allow the creators or owners to control the use of their intellectual property for a certain period, encouraging innovation and creativity by providing legal protection and economic incentives. The main types of IPR in India include:

1. Copyright

Definition: Copyright protects the original works of authorship, such as literary, dramatic, musical, and artistic works, as well as cinematograph films and sound recordings.

Governing Law: The Copyright Act, 1957.

Examples:

  • A novel written by an author.
  • A song composed by a musician.
  • A painting created by an artist.
  • A film produced by a filmmaker.
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Sunday, 21 May 2017

Whether it is permissible to use registered trade mark as corporate or trading name by other person?

 Now, coming to Sub-sections (1) and (2), the same apply on its plain meaning only to "trade mark versus mark" situation. Both the sub-sections use the words "uses in the course of trade". They do not refer to use of trade mark as a part of corporate/trade/business name. Both the sub-sections do not apply when use of a registered trade mark is made by the Defendant as a part of trade/corporate/business name.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Notice of Motion No. 2463 of 2012 in Suit No. 1906 of 2012
Decided On: 01.03.2017
 CIPLA Limited

Vs.
 CIPLA Industries Private Limited and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Abhay Shreeniwas OkaA.A. Sayed and A.S. Gadkari, JJ.
Citation: AIR 2017 Bom 75
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Tuesday, 16 May 2017

Leading judgment on doctrine of honest concurrent use of Trademark

Interesting question, which has arisen incidentally, is how far the length of the concurrent, continuous and uninterrupted user would be sufficient to allow the Assistant Registrar to register the trade mark of the applicant. In this regard, following five points are required to be seen:
"(1)The extent of use in time and quantity and the area of the trade;
(2)the degree of confusion likely to ensue from the resemblance of the marks which is to a large extent indicative of the measure of public inconvenience;
(3)the honesty of the concurrent use;
(4)whether any instances of confusion have in fact been proved; and 
(5)the relative inconvenience which would be caused if the mark were registered." (para 17)
Delhi High Court
S. Mehar Singh vs M.L. Gupta & Co. on 30 May, 1997
Equivalent citations: 1997 IVAD Delhi 542, AIR 1998 Delhi 64, 1997 (2) ARBLR 250 Delhi, 67 (1997) DLT 759, 1997 (42) DRJ 403

Bench: S Kapoor
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Saturday, 11 February 2017

Leading judgment on trans border reputation for trade mark

In the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi
(Before Pradeep Nandrajog and Yogesh Khanna, JJ.)
Prius Auto Industries Ltd. & Ors
v.
Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha 
RFA (OS) 62/2016
Decided on December 23, 2016
Citation: 2016 SCC OnLine Del 6405


Trademarks serve the dual purpose of securing to the proprietor the benefits of a good reputation, which in turn help foster competition and innovation, while conveying product and proprietor information to the consumer. A trademark represents facets of a business's goodwill, symbolising inter alia a consistent quality and a reputation for service, and this goodwill forms the primary basis for consumer choice among competing brands. What is protected under trademark law is not the mark itself but what the mark symbolises, namely, a firm's goodwill. A trademark is a distinguishing mark allowing a firm with a good reputation to intimate to consumers that a certain goods belongs to them, and trademark law seeks to prevent other firms from imitating this mark and trading on another firm's reputation. A trademark's legal existence is inextricably entwined with the goodwill it symbolizes. A trademark confers no monopoly whatever in a proper sense but is merely a convenient means for facilitating the protection of one's goodwill in trade by placing a distinguishing mark or symbol, a commercial signature, upon the merchandise or the package in which it is sold.
(Para 21)

The principles of trans-border reputation are well recognised and it is not intend to make a catalogue of various judgments dealing with trans-border reputation. Before the era of the internet, the judgments were to the effect that where a product is sold in India and sales figures coupled with money spent on advertisements show acceptability of the product in the market, this would be good evidence of the product having acquired a reputation through its trademark. Concerning trans-border reputation, the judgments were to the effect that if the product is not sold in India but information relatable thereto is available in the print media and especially magazines purchased by consumers having an interest in the particular category of goods, it would be good evidence of trans-border reputation having entered in the municipal jurisdiction of India. Post-internet era the law of trans-border reputation expanded because the internet virtually broke the domestic walls in areas of trade and business. On the internet, through search engines one can access information put on the website, be it by the manufacturer of the goods or in e-journals and e-magazines. Acquiring trans-border reputation is essentially a question of fact and it requires the evidence to be considered.
(Paras 23 and 25)
The word Prius is a Latin word and means “coming before”. The dictionary meaning shows that if not earlier, at least in the year 1989 the word had found acceptability in the English language and was entered in the dictionary with the meaning “prior”, “former” and “earlier”. Documentary evidence also shows the word as a source indicator of a hybrid motor vehicle would be irrelevant to determine the fact, whether the trademark Prius had acquired a global reputation which had permeated into the territory of India, for the reason the plaintiff's two exhibits do not show the year of the publication of Encyclopaedia Britannica from which the two pages have been downloaded. The court takes judicial notice of the fact that in the late 1970s, concerns by environmentalists of global warming had started ringing the warning bells. By this time, fuel consumption globally had arisen drastically, and how to control carbon, had become a matter of concern. With the advancement of technology, new and better machines which were energy efficient had started entering the market by mid 1980s. That fossil fuels emit carbon dioxide which is a greenhouse gas is well-known. Since motor vehicles, apart from electricity generating plants, consume a lot of fossil fuels, environmental concerns were felt in the industry and an endeavour was made to develop technology where motor vehicles could be run without a fossil fuel as the source of energy i.e. electrical cars or fuel efficient hybrid cars, where the idle power generated by the engine while running on fuel would be stored in a battery and the electric energy stored would be used at some point of time when the vehicle plied. Appellants do not refute that in the year 1997, Toyota marketed the first hybrid car under the trademark Prius. That the launching of the car was widely reported in the press is established by production of several magazines and journals published in 1997 to 2000. It is not relevant that many of the articles and publications have not been proved to be available in India, because at base is the limited issue under discussion, whether the launching of the car was widely reported in the press. These articles and publications, six of which are in India, establish that even the media in India widely reported about a hybrid car by the name of Prius being sold in the Japanese market in the year 1997. The suit was filed by Toyota in the year 2009 and it would be very difficult to lay ones hand on all newspapers and journals which reported the event in the year 1997. With passage of time, it becomes difficult to secure evidence. But the exhibits referred to above, are proof of the hybrid car launch being discussed in the print media. It becomes irrelevant whether the newspapers, weeklies, by-weeklies or monthly magazines published abroad, which have been exhibited were or were not available in India. These publications are relevant to prove the event being reported in the press world over.
(Para 26)
The weight of the evidence led by Toyota is that it has simply established that when it launched the hybrid car Prius in the market in Japan in 1997, the event was reported as a news item in different countries including India but not with such prominence that the public at large became aware of the same. The law on trans-border reputation requires two facts to be established. The first is reputation in foreign jurisdictions of the trademark. The second is knowledge of the trademark due to its reputation abroad in a domestic jurisdiction. The reason being, a trademark is territorial in its operation. If its reputation spills over beyond the territories of its operation, the benefit can be claimed in an action of passing off. The corollary of the finding that newspaper reporting of the event of Prius car launched in Japan in the year 1997, and further sales in the year 1998 and 1999 being not with much prominence would be that the knowledge would be limited to the class of persons associated with the trade in automobiles. The trademark has to build a reputation in the form of public confidence in the goods and the association of the mark with the source of the goods. Toyota has led no evidence of money spent in advertisements in India of the Prius car before it was sold for the first time in India in the year 2010. By the year 2000, only 52200 motor vehicles under the trademark Prius had been sold globally and there is evidence of re-call of the cars in the years 2009 and 2010. Albeit post-2001, said evidence would be proof that Prius cars were having problems and one can infer public confidence in the car not rooted firmly. If not shaky, the confidence would be of a wavering kind. Notwithstanding of little weightage, said evidence has to be put in the scale of evidence while deciding on the issue of reputation. No sales being made in India. There being no advertisements published by Toyota for its car Prius in India, and coupled with the fact that not all cars marketed under different trademarks by Toyota acquire a global reputation and much less in India, internet penetration as of the year 2001, being low in India, the weight of the evidence leans in favour of the view that by April 2001 Toyota had not established a global reputation in its trademark Prius which had entered India.
(Para 31)

The appellants had been selling auto parts under the trademark Prius since April 2001, and till December 2009 when the suit was filed there was a constant rise in the sales figures which by December 2009 would be around Rs 4.5 crores for the period 2006 till December 2009. The auto parts were packed in cartons bearing the trademark Prius, and in conformity with Section 30(2)(d) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, they were entitled to inform the consumer that the auto part was adapted for use in a particular brand of Toyota car. They indicated the same by using the word Toyota and Innova in the packaging material, not as a trademark but because of it being reasonably necessary to indicate that the goods so adapted are compatible for the Toyota motor vehicles. The only fault found by the Division Bench of the court, was the manner in which this was indicated and it is the case of the appellants that they have complied with the Order dated 10-8-2010, passed by the Division Bench, which has been transposed in the impugned judgment while passing a decree for injunction with a condition imposed; the condition being by way of permitting the use of the words Toyota and Innova in the packaging material in terms of the judgment of the Division Bench. It is possible that manner of representation to write that the goods are compatible may appear to one as a trademark use and to another as a non-trade mark use. This would not be evidence of dishonesty. That apart, this line of reasoning adopted by Toyota is an ancillary line of reasoning and not the main plank. It is intended to support the main plea of dishonesty in adoption sought to be proved through trans-border reputation and lack of credibility in the justification given by the appellants as to how defendants 1 and 2 adopted the trademark Prius motivated by the words ‘Pehla Prayas’.
(Para 33)

Nothing turns on the fact that the nature of goods is the same, the class of buyers is the same and the trade channel is the same for the reason that appellants are the registered proprietors of the trademark Prius in India. Registration was obtained by them in the year 2001. The registration subsists. Rectification proceedings are still pending. Toyota has failed to establish trans-border reputation of its trade mark Prius in India when appellants adopted the same. The court has found credibility in the justification given by the appellants as to how they adopted the word Prius which waspublici juris in the year 2001.
(Para 34)
A mental condition of a person is a fact defined under the Evidence Act, 1872. Knowledge claimed by a person or attributed to a person would be a matter of fact. The claim by defendant 1 when he appeared as DW-1 that he and defendant 2 acquired knowledge of the word Prius by consulting the dictionary is probable and possible for the reason there is irrefutable evidence that if not earlier, at least by the year 1989 the word Prius had entered the dictionary. The court takes judicial, notice of the fact that that before a non-English word enters the English dictionary it comes into popular use by English speaking people. The word Prius must have come into use by English speaking people much prior to the year 1989. The appellants have explained how they discovered the word “Prius”. Their explanation is that they were the first in India to manufacture add-on chrome plated accessories”, and they first conceptualised this attempt as “Prayas” (attempt). They being the pioneer in the field of manufacture of add-on chrome plated accessories, the defendants were looking for a word which could properly and exactly describe their first attempt or “Pehla Prayas” (first attempt). The defendants after doing research found one word in the dictionary “PRIUS” meaning “to come first” which was not only attractive but also exactly and properly described the pioneer efforts of the defendants in the field of add-on chrome plated accessories. The justification is logical. Thinking in one's mother tongue, a first pioneering venture by a person would obviously be thought of as “Pehla Prayas”, meaning first attempt. The attempt pleaded is to manufacture add-on chrome plated accessories. The justification in the written statement is, not that it was the first (“Pehla”) business venture of the appellants. The justification given is that the appellants were the first in India to manufacture add-on chrome plated accessories. The Hindi word ‘Pehla’ was used in the context of the first manufacturer and not the first business venture. The Hindi word ‘Prayas’ was used as an attempt in the context of the manufacture and not the business venture.
(Paras 36 and 37)
If a word is publici juris and a person gives good justification as to how he appropriated a word as a trademark, relating to the state of mind of the person, unless the testimony of the person is discredited, a Court would have no option but to accept the statement made on oath because the fact is of a kind which a person can prove by stating the truthfulness thereof on oath. And if, as in the instant case, there is proof that the word was publici juris it lends assurance to the claim.
(Para 38)
Understanding the logic of the claim of the appellants would be essential for if a blemish is found in the logic it would tilt the scale against the appellants and in favour of Toyota. The straight line logical reasoning is that defendants 1 and 2 wanted to set up a manufacturing unit to produce add-on chrome plated accessories, this technology was being used in India for the first time (as per their belief), therefore “Pehla”. It was an attempt (“Prayas”). The concept ‘Pehla Prayas’. The concept became the motivation to find a catchy word in the English language. The English equivalent of Hindi word ‘Pehla’ is ‘First’. Pick up the dictionary and see the meaning of the word ‘First’. One reaches the word ‘Prior’. Look at synonyms of the word ‘Prior’. One reaches the word ‘Prius’. There is no blemish in the logic of the search and the reasoning. It is probable and likely. The court finds no reason to disbelieve the version made good by the testimony of defendant 1.
(Para 39)
The appeal is allowed with respect to the limited issues which were argued, concerning the trademark Prius and The impugned decree is partly set aside but limited to the injunction issued relating to the trademark Prius. Since the appellants did not challenge the injunction order, which is based on condition concerning the trademark Toyota, the Toyota device and the trademark Innova, said part of the injunction granted is retained. Mandatory injunction is set aside. The appeal would now be listed for arguments on the issue of damages (which would now become an academic issue unless the present decision is set aside by the Supreme Court or is recalled in review). Cross-Appeal filed by Toyota seeking enhancement of damages is listed on 12-1-2017, and it is directed that this appeal may also be listed on 12-1-2017 along with Toyota's case.
(Paras 40 and 41)

If it is proved by the plaintiff that its trademark was well known in the market, the court would assume that those in the trade were aware of the same and any adoption of the trademark would obviously be dishonest. What is dishonest can never be honest.
(Para 22)

Issues of trans-border reputation or likelihood of confusion decided in various cases cited before the court, and even in cases not cited arose before the court, either in quia timet actions or when the defendants had just entered the market. At that point of time, the issue could be decided on the test of likelihood of confusion, and most of the judgments are dealing with the issue at the stage of injunction where documents filed by the parties had yet to translate into evidence and witnesses were yet to be examined. In such situation, the only way in which the issue of an injunction pending adjudication in the suit can be decided is on the touchstone of likelihood of confusion. But in a case of the kind at hand where the appellants had been selling the goods under the offending trademark for nearly ten years when the suit for injunction was filed, there must be evidence of actual confusion. Toyota is a big company. It has had a presence in India for over two decades when the suit was filed. It was well entrenched in the Indian market in the year 2001. No consumer of Toyota car or buyer of an auto part sold by Toyota was ever confused by the appellants selling their products under the trademark Prius, for if this was so, in ten years somebody would have complained to Toyota or at least would have made known said fact to Toyota. May be of little weightage, is a publication published in the year 2004 titled Auto Car in which advertisements of Toyota and that of the appellants have been published, and the publicity department of Toyota which had got the publication of the advertisements done would have received a copy of the publication and would have known that under the trademark Prius the appellants are selling auto parts. The evidentiary worth would be that probably the employees of Toyota in India were themselves not aware of Toyota selling a hybrid car by the name Prius.
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Monday, 30 January 2017

Whether Trade mark which is registered subsequently will relegates back to date of application?

 Having   bestowed   my   thoughts   to   the
submissions   made,   Mr   Sawant,   learned   Counsel   for
the applicant  was right in pointing out that the
application under the provisions of Sections 23 of
the  Trade  Marks  Act of  1958 came  to be  moved  on
24th  July,   1992   and   even   though   same   is   granted
subsequent   to   the   date   of   offence,   however,   such
registration   relegates   back   to   the   date   of
application   and   as   such,   the   applicant   holds
appropriate registration of the goods in question
under the provisions of Trade Marks Act. 
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
 BENCH AT AURANGABAD
                              
CRIMINAL REVISION APPLICATION NO.163 OF 2004
Perfetti Van Melle India Pvt. Ltd.,

V
The State of Maharashtra

           CORAM :  N.W. SAMBRE, J.
          
               DATE :  1st SEPTEMBER, 2016
Citation: 2016 ALLMR(CRI)4913
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Saturday, 24 September 2016

WHETHER SALE OF FOREIGN OWNED TRADEMARKS REGISTERED AND USED IN INDIA ARE TAXABLE IN INDIA?

 Thus, the legislature, where it wanted to specifically provide for a particular situation, as in the case of shares, where the share derives, directly or indirectly, its value substantially from assets located in India, it did so. There is no such provision with regard to intangible assets, such as trademarks, brands, logos, i.e., intellectual property rights. Therefore, the well accepted principle of 'mobilia sequuntur personam' would have to be followed. The situs of the owner of an intangible asset would be the closest approximation of the situs of an intangible asset. This is an internationally accepted rule, unless it is altered by local legislation. Since there is no such alteration in the Indian context, we would agree with the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner that the situs of the trademarks and intellectual property rights, which were assigned pursuant to the ISPA, would not be in India. This is so because the owner thereof was not located in India at the time of the transaction.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI
WP (C) 6902/2008
Decided On: 25.07.2016
Appellants: CUB PTY Limited
Vs.
Respondent: UOI and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Badar Durrez Ahmed and Sanjeev Sachdeva, JJ.
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Saturday, 16 July 2016

What are the parameters for testing distinctiveness of the Trade Mark?

The parameters for testing the distinctiveness of a mark as extent and period of use, goodwill and association in the minds of consumers, investments on advertisements, recognition in trade circles and channels of distribution and the relevant class of customers. 


Delhi High Court
P.P. Jewellers Pvt. Ltd. vs P.P. Buildwell Pvt. Ltd. on 24 September, 2009
Citation : 2009 (41) PTC 217 (Del)
S. Muralidhar, J.
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How to ascertain distinctiveness of a Trade Mark?

The usual approach followed by Courts of law, whilst ascertaining whether a particular trade mark has acquired a secondary meaning in relation to the product for which it is used, is to evaluate the trade mark on the anvil of various factors, viz. the extent of its use qua the product, the expenditure incurred by the plaintiff in marketing and promoting its product under the said trade mark, the profits and sales revenue revenue etc. These are valid parameters that objectively reflect the popularity, usage, consumer recognition and market strength of a trademark and thus help in ascertaining whether the trade mark has acquired a secondary meaning or not.


Delhi High Court

Cadila Healthcare Ltd. vs Gujarat Co-Operative Milk ... on 23 October, 2007

Equivalent citations: MIPR 2007 (3) 497, 2008 (36) PTC 168 (Del)


Bench: G Sistani
JUDGMENT 
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Thursday, 14 July 2016

Elements to be proved by plaintiff for succeeding in passing off action

In the case of Ramdev Food Products (cited
supra) the Apex Court has quoted and considered the law
on passing off at paragraphs 88 to 90 and those are as
under :-
"ESSENCE OF PASSING OFF ACTION
88. In a case of this nature, the test for determination of
the dispute would be the same where a cause of action for
passing off arises. The deceptively similar test, thus, would
be applicable herein.

89. The doctrine of passing off is a common law remedy
whereby a person is prevented from trying to wrongfully
utilise the reputation and goodwill of another by trying to
deceive the public through ’passing off’ his goods.
90. In Kerly’s Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names’
Supplement pages 42 and 43, paragraph 16-02, the
concept of passing off is stated as under:-
"The law of passing-off can be summarised in one short
general proposition no man may pass off his goods as
those of another. More specifically, it may be expressed in
terms of the elements which the plaintiff in such an
action has to prove in order to succeed. These are three
in number.
Firstly, he must establish a goodwill or reputation
attached to the goods or services which he supplies in the
mind of the purchasing public by association with the
identifying ’get-up’ (whether it consists simply of a brand
name or a trade description, or the individual features of
labelling or packaging) under which his particular goods
or services are offered to the public, such that the get-up
is recognised by the public as distinctive specifically of
the plaintiff’s goods or services.
Secondly, he must demonstrate a misrepresentation by
the defendant to the public (whether or not intentional)
leading or likely to lead the public to belief that the
goods or services offered by him are the goods or
services of the plaintiff.
Thirdly, he must demonstrate that he suffers or, in a
quick time action, that he is likely to suffer damage by
reason of the erroneous belief engendered by the
defendant’s misrepresentation that the source of the
defendant’s goods or service is the same as the source of
those offered by the plaintiff..."
20) The observations made by the Apex Court in
the cases cited supra show that few basic things need to
be established for getting the relief which the plaintiff
wants. If provision of section 29(2) of the Act is compared

with the definition of term "deceptively similar" given in
section 2(h) of the Act, it can be said that the definition
itself is incorporated in section 29(2) of the Act in effect.
The definition given in section 2(h) runs as under :
"2. (h)"deceptively similar",-- A mark shall be deemed
to be deceptively similar to another mark if it so
nearly resembles that other mark as to be likely to
deceive or cause confusion".
21) The definition shows that the trade mark if it is
the word it should be so nearly resembling to the trade
mark of defendant that possibility of deception or causing
confusion in the mind of purchaser is created.
22) The question whether the word mark used by
the plaintiff and the defendants nearly resemble or they
do not resemble cannot be answered by generalizing the
things. The approach needs to be different for different
kinds of goods. In the case reported as AIR 1982 Delhi
308 (Essco Sanitations v. Mascot Industries) the factors
which can be considered to determine whether particular
trade mark is deceptively similar to another trade mark or
not, are enumerated and they are as under :-

(i) the nature of marks;
(ii) the degree of resemblance between the marks
(phonetic, visual as well as similarity in idea);
(iii) the nature of goods in respect of which they are used
or likely to be used as trade marks;
(iv) the similarity in the nature, character and purpose of
the goods of the rival traders;
(v) the class of purchasers who are likely to buy the
goods bearing the marks, their level of eduction and
intelligence, and the degree of care they are likely to
exercise in purchasing the goods;
(vi) the mode of purchase of the goods or placing orders
for the goods; and,
(vii) any other surrounding circumstances.
23) There cannot be uniform criteria, factors and so
each case needs to be decided on the basis of facts and
circumstances of that case.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
Appeal from Order No.111 of 2015
 Shri. Swami Samarth Agencies,

Versus
 Mauli Chemicals Industries


 CORAM: T.V. NALAWADE, J.

 DATE : 8th FEBRUARY 2016
Citation:AIR 2016(NOC)388 Bom
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Whether domain name is protected under Trade Marks Law?


The original role of a domain name was no doubt to provide an address for computers on the internet . But the internet has developed from a mere means of communication to a mode of carrying on commercial activity. With the increase of commercial activity on the internet, a domain name is also used as a business identifier. Therefore, the domain name not only serves as an address for internet communication but also identifies the specific internet site. In the commercial field, each domain name owner provides information/services which are associated with such domain name. Thus a domain name may pertain to provision of services within the meaning of Section 2 (1) (z) of Trade Marks Act, 1999.

Delhi High Court

Mr. Arun Jaitley vs Network Solutions Private Limited on 4 July, 2011

Author: Manmohan Singh

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When plaintiff is entitled to get injunction in case of infringement of Trade mark?

The contention of Defendant No. 1 that there are dissimilarities inter alia
qua packing, size of strips, labels, cartons, etc, is also not sustainable. In this case,

the two marks involved are word-marks NEBISTAR and NEBISTOL. This is
not a case to prevent Defendant No. 1 from using the packing material or the
label. This is a simple case involving two word-marks and all that is required to be
considered is whether the two marks are deceptively similar. Once the two marks
are held to be deceptively similar, the differences in packing or price etc. are
totally irrelevant. In any event, such considerations as to the carton, price, label
being different are irrelevant as far as the claim for infringement is concerned.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court has in the case of Durga Dutta Sharma Vs.
Navaratna Pharma (supra) held as follows:
 “28. …. …...In an action for infringement, the plaintiff must, no
doubt, make out that the use of the defendant's mark is likely to
deceive, but where the similarity between the plaintiff's and the
defendant's mark is so close either visually, phonetically or
otherwise and the Court reaches the conclusion that there is an
imitation, no further evidence is required to establish that the
plaintiff's rights are violated. Expressed in another way, if the
essential features of the trade mark of the plaintiff have been
adopted by the defendant, the fact that the get-up, packing and
other writing or marks on the goods or on the packets in which he
offers his goods for sale show marked differences, or indicate
clearly a trade original different from that of the registered
proprietor of the mark would be immaterial.”

The Hon'ble Supreme Court has in the case of Ruston & Hornsby Ltd. Vs.
Zamindara Engineering Cc. (supra) held that once the impugned mark
containing the word RUSTOM was deceptively similar to the Plaintiff’s
registered trademark RUSTON, a case for infringement was made out.
Therefore, the chart of alleged dissimilarities mentioned in para 10 of the written
submission of the Defendant is meaningless and a futile exercise made by the
Defendants to allege dissimilarities. The Plaintiff has also correctly dealt
with/distinguished the decisions relied upon by the Defendant No.1.I am therefore of the view that the Plaintiff has made out a prima facie case
of infringement and passing off against the Defendants.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
NOTICE OF MOTION NO. 873 OF 2014
IN
SUIT NO. 509 OF 2014
Lupin Limited …Plaintiff
Vs.
Eris Lifesciences Pvt. Ltd. & 2 Ors. ...Defendants

 CORAM: S. J. KATHAWALLA, J.

 Judgment pronounced on : 23rd
 December, 2015

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What is the difference between Trade Mark and Property Mark?


The concept of a trade mark is distinct from that of a property mark. A mark, as defined by Section 2(1)(j) of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, includes a device, brand, heading, label, ticket, name, signature, word, letter or numerical or any combination thereof. A trade mark means a mark used in relation to goods for the purpose of indicating or so as to indicate a connection in the course of trade between the goods and some person having the right as proprietor to use that mark. The function of a trade mark is to give an indication to the purchaser or a possible purchaser as to the manufacture or quality of the goods, to give an indication to his eye of the trade source from which the goods come, or the trade hands through which they pass on their way to the market, (per Bowen, L.J., in In re Powell's Trade Mark (1893) 10 R.P.C. 200. On the other hand, a property mark, as defined by Section 479 of the Penal Code means a mark used for denoting that a movable property belongs to a particular person. Thus, the distinction between a trade mark and a property mark is that whereas the former denotes the manufacture or quality of the goods to which it is attached, the latter denotes the ownership in them. In other words, a trade mark concerns the goods themselves, while a property mark concerns the proprietor. A property mark attached to the movable property of a person remains even if part of such property goes out of his hands and ceases to be his.

Supreme Court of India

Sumat Prasad Jain vs Sheojanam Prasad (Dead) & Ors on 29 August, 1972

Equivalent citations: 1972 AIR 2488, 1973 SCR (1)1050

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Whether unreleased film is entitled to protection of Trade Marks Law?


Even if the work has not been released, a sufficient amount of pre-release publicity of the title may cause a title to acquire recognition sufficient for protection. Relevant evidence from which secondary meaning for a literary title may be inferred as a question of fact include: (1) the length and continuity of use; (2) the extent of advertising and promotion and the amount of money spent; (3) the sales figures on purchases or admissions and the number of people who bought or viewed plaintiff's work; and (4) the closeness of the geographical and product markets of plaintiff and defendant. [Para no. 23]

Delhi High Court

Kanungo Media (P) Ltd. vs Rgv Film Factory And Ors. on 27 February, 2007
Equivalent citations: 138 (2007) DLT 312, 2007 (34) PTC 591 (Del)

Bench: A Sikri

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Wednesday, 13 July 2016

What is the difference between trade mark and design?


The "trade mark" and a "design" are entirely different connotations because the "trade mark" is a device, label, colour, name or any other mark put on a product to link it to its manufactuer/producer, who may be the proprietor of the registered trade mark or who might have acquired reputation in an unregistered trade mark on account of its prior use arid reputation in the trade. On the other hand, the "design" is merely a feature of shape, pattern, configuration, ornament or composition of lines or colours applied to an article to make it attractive and appealing to the eye of the consumer. A "trade mark" may also be attractive and appealing to the eye but it should be directly relatable to the producer/manufacturer of the goods whereas the "design" may be merely appealing or attractive to the eye and need not give any indication to the consumer/purchaser about the identity of the manufacturer or producer of the article. The fundamental difference, therefore,' between a "trade mark" and "design" is that "trade mark" signals to the mind the source or identity of the producers/manufacturer of the article whereas "design" appeals to the eye and attracts the consumer/purchaser. It need not necessarily reveal the identity of producer to the consumer though in certain well know designs the identity even may get conveyed. A producer or manufacturer may put his trade mark also on a designed product so that it is conveyed to the consumer that he has produced it.


Delhi High Court

Corning, Incorporated And Ors. vs Raj Kumar Garg And Ors. on 9 September, 2003

Equivalent citations: 2004 (73) DRJ 649, 2004 54 SCL 378 Delhi, 2004 (28) PTC 257

Bench: R Chopra


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Saturday, 14 May 2016

Whether rights of prior user of Trade Mark will prevail over registered user of Trade mark?


Scheme of the Act is such where rights of prior user are recognized superior than that of the registration and even the registered proprietor cannot disturb interfere with the rights of prior user. The overall effect of collective reading of the provisions of the Act is that the action for passing off which is premised on the rights of prior user generating a goodwill shall be unaffected by any registration provided under the Act. This proposition has been discussed in extenso in the case of N.R. Dongre and Ors. v. Whirlpool Corporation and Anr. MANU/DE/0700/1995 : AIR (1995) Delhi 300 wherein Division Bench of Delhi High Court recognized that the registration is not an indefeasible right and the same is subject to rights of prior user. The said decision of Whirlpool [supra] was further affirmed by Supreme Court of India in the case of N.R. Dongre and Ors v. Whirlpool Corporation and Anr. MANU/SC/1223/1996 : 1996 (3) R.C.R. (Civil) 697 : (1996) 5 SCC 714.
B. The above were the reasonings from the provisions arising from the plain reading of the Act which gives clear indication that the rights of prior user are superior than that of registration and are unaffected by the registration rights under the Act. Secondly, there are other additional reasonings as to why the passing off rights are considered to be superior than that of registration rights.
Traditionally, passing off in common law is considered to be a right for protection of goodwill in the business against misrepresentation caused in the course of trade and for prevention of resultant damage on account of the said misrepresentation. The three ingredients of passing off are goodwill, misrepresentation and damage. These ingredients are considered to be classical trinity under the law of passing off as per the speech of Lord Oliver laid down in the case of Reckitt & Colman Products Ltd. v. Borden Inc MANU/UKHL/0012/1990 : (1990) 1 AllE.R. 873 which is more popularly known as "Jif Lemon" case wherein the Lord Oliver reduced the five guidelines laid out by Lord Diplock in Erven Warnink v. Townend & Sons Ltd. [1979) AC 731, 742 (HL)] (the "Advocate Case") to three elements: (1) Goodwill owned by a trader, (2) Misrepresentation and (3) Damage to goodwill. Thus, the passing off action is essentially an action in deceit where the common law rule is that no person is entitled to carry on his or her business on pretext that the said business is of that of another. This Court has given its imprimatur to the above principle in the case of Laxmikant V. Patel v. Chetanbhat Shah and Anr. MANU/SC/0763/2001 : 2002 (2) R.C.R. (Civil) 357 : (2002) 3 SCC 65.
The applicability of the said principle can be seen as to which proprietor has generated the goodwill by way of use of the mark name in the business. The use of the mark/carrying on business under the name confers the rights in favour of the person and generates goodwill in the market. Accordingly, the latter user of the mark/name or in the business cannot misrepresent his business as that of business of the prior right holder. That is the reason why essentially the prior user is considered to be superior than that of any other rights. Consequently, the examination of rights in common law which are based on goodwill, misrepresentation and damage are independent to that of registered rights. The mere fact that both prior user and subsequent user are registered proprietors are irrelevant for the purposes of examining who generated the goodwill first in the market and whether the latter user is causing misrepresentation in the course of trade and damaging the goodwill and reputation of the prior right holder/former user. That is the additional reasoning that the statutory rights must pave the way for common law rights of passing off.
C. Thirdly, it is also recognized principle in common law jurisdiction that passing off right is broader remedy than that of infringement. This is due to the reason that the passing off doctrine operates on the general principle that no person is entitled to represent his or her business as business of other person. The said action in deceit is maintainable for diverse reasons other than that of registered rights which are allocated rights under Recent Civil Reports the Act. The authorities of other common law jurisdictions like England more specifically Kerry's Law of Trademarks and Trade Names, Fourteenth Edition, Thomson, Sweet & Maxwell South Asian Edition recognizes the principle that where trademark action fails, passing off action may still succeed on the same evidence. This has been explained by the learned Author by observing the following:--
15-033 "A claimant may fail to make out a case of infringement of a trade mark for various reasons and may yet show that by imitating the mark claimed as a trademark, or otherwise, the Defendant has done what is calculated to pass off his goods as those of the claimant. A claim in "passing off' has generally been added as a second string to actions for infringement, and has on occasion succeeded where the claim for infringement has failed"
The same author also recognizes the principle that Trade Marks Act affords no bar to the passing off action. This has been explained by the learned Author as under:--
15-034 "Subject to possibly one qualification, nothing in the Trade Marks Act 1994 affects a trader's right against another in an action for passing off. It is, therefore, no bar to an action for passing off that the trade name, get up or any other of the badges identified with the claimant's business, which are alleged to have been copies or imitated by the Defendant, might have been, but are not registered as, trade marks, even though the evidence is wholly addressed to what may be a mark capable of registration. Again, it is no defense to passing off that the Defendant's mark is registered. The Act offers advantages to those who register their trade marks, but imposes no penalty upon those who do not. It is equally no bar to an action for passing off that the false representation relied upon is an imitation of a trade mark that is incapable of registration. A passing off action can even lie against a registered proprietor of the mark sued upon. The fact that a claimant is using a mark registered by another party (or even the Defendant) does not of itself prevent goodwill being generated by the use of the mark, or prevent such a claimant from relying on such goodwill in an action against the registered proprietor. Such unregistered marks are frequently referred to as "common law trade marks"
From the reading of aforementioned excerpts from Kerly's Law of Trademarks and Trade Names, it can be said that not merely it is recognized in India but in other jurisdictions also including England/UK (Provisions of UK Trade Marks Act, 1994 are analogous to Indian Trade Marks Act, 1999) that the registration is no defense to a passing off action and nor the Trade Marks Act, 1999 affords any bar to a passing off action. 
Equivalent Citation: 2016(66)PTC1(SC), 2015(2)RCR(Civil)810, 2015(7)SCALE136, (2016)2SCC683
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Civil Appeal No. 2758 of 2015 (Arising Out of SLP (C) No. 12671 of 2014)
Decided On: 17.03.2015
Appellants: S. Syed Mohideen 
Vs.
Respondent: P. Sulochana Bai
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:H.L. Dattu, C.J.I. and A.K. Sikri, J.
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What is first user test or ‘first in the market’ test in respect of use of Trade Mark?

Since we are confronted with the legal propriety of a temporary
injunction, we must abjure from going into minute details and refrain from
discussing the case threadbare, in order to preclude rendering the suit itself an
exercise in futility and the decision therein a foregone conclusion. All that we
would say in the present Appeal is that since the Plaintiff-Respondents have
alleged, and have prima facie supported with proof, that they had already been
using their trademark well before the attempted user of an identical or closely
similar trademark by the Defendant-Appellant, the former would be entitled to a
temporary injunction, in light of the abovementioned ‘first in the market’ test.
We find that the Plaintiff-Respondents have made out a prima facie case. The
two other factors in an interim injunction, namely the balance of convenience
and an irreparable loss, are both in favour of the Plaintiff-Respondents, given
the potential loss of goodwill and business they could suffer should an
injunction be denied. The Defendant-Appellant has been injuncted from using
the mark ROFOL since 2005, after having launched products bearing the mark
only in the previous year, so the balance of convenience is in favour of allowing
the injunction to continue. 
 REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPEALLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1018 OF 2006
Neon Laboratories Ltd. ... Appellant
Versus
Medical Technologies Ltd. & Ors. ... Respondents

VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.
Dated;October 5, 2015.
Citation;(2016)2 SCC 672

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Sunday, 14 February 2016

When a person is not entitled to use family name of his wife as trademark of his business?

  The main contention advanced by the learned counsel for

the appellant is that 'Panikkassery' being the family name of the wife of


the defendant, the use of the said name by the defendant will not



amount to infringement. Section 35 of the Trade Marks Act relied on by



the defendant in support of his contention reads thus :



                     "Section 35. Saving for use of name, address or description of



              goods or services--Nothing in this Act shall entitle the proprietor or a



              registered user of a registered trade mark to interfere with any bona fide



              use by a person of his own name or that of his place of business, or of the



              name, or of the name of the place of business, of any of his predecessors



              in business, or the use by any person of any bona fide description of the



              character or quality of his goods or services."



Section 35 protects bona fide use by a person of his own name or that of



his place of business, or of the name, or of the name of the place of



business, of any of his predecessors in business. It is evident from



Section 35 that the said Section permits only bona fide use of the name



referred to in the Section. Bona fide use means honest use by a person



without any intention to deceive anybody or without any intention to



make use the good will of another. In the instant case, 'Panikkassery' is



the family name of the wife of the defendant. The said name is not a



name contemplated under Section 35 of the Trade Marks Act and at any



rate, the said name being the family name of the wife of the defendant, it



is difficult to hold that the use of the said name by the defendant is bona


fide and without any intention to make use the good will of the plaintiff.



The defendant is, therefore, not entitled to the protection under Section



35 of the Trade Marks Act.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM


                                                      PRESENT:



     THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P.B.SURESH KUMAR



             THURSDAY, THE 19TH DAY OF MARCH 2015



                          FAO.No. 292 of 2014 



            SHOUKKATH.J, 

Vs


            M.MUHAMMED NOUSHAD,

           
Citation;AIR 2016(NOC)134 Kerala
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