Whether the court should exhibit gift deed (Hiba ) executed by muslim person even if it is not registered?

Under the provisions of Section 149 of the Mullas Principles of Mohammedan Law, there are only three essential conditions of a valid gift and those are 1] declaration of gift by the donor, 2] an acceptance of the gift, express or implied, by or on behalf of the donee and 3] delivery of possession of the subject of the gift by the donor to the donee. . It is stated in Section 150 that if these conditions are complied with, the gift is complete. In fact, Sub-section 3 of the Section 150 provides that if it is proved by oral evidence that gift was complete as required by law, it is immaterial that the donor has also executed the deed of gift, but the deed had not been registered as required by the Registration Act, Section 17(a). Thus in view of the provisions of Section 150(3) of the Mullas Principles of Mohamedan Law, it is clear that a gift made by the Mohamedan donor in writing is not compulsorily registrable. The trial court ought to have exhibited the document dated 11.4.1966 in the facts and circumstances of the case.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Writ Petition No. 1843/2009

Decided On: 10.11.2009

 Abdul Rahim Vs. Qayyum and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

V.A. Naik, J.

Citation: 2010(1) ALLMR 328,2010(1) MHLJ 343,

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Precaution to be taken by sub registrar prior to registration of general power of attorney

 As is apparent from the plain language of the abovementioned
Circular, the Registering Authority is required to examine the contents of
the General Power of Attorney to ascertain the nature of the document.

Clearly, parties cannot be permitted to register a General Power of
Attorney as a camouflage for sale of immovable property. Thus, it is
important to ascertain whether the Document sought to be registered
purports to create any interest in the property in favour of the person
appointed as a constituted attorney.
13. In the present case, the Power of Attorney is executed by the
petitioners in favour of their close relative (daughter -in-law and wife);
the same is not for any consideration; and does not create any interest in
the said property.
14. In view of the above, the decision of the Sub-Registrar and the
District Magistrate to decline the petitioners’ request for registration of
the General Power of Attorney, is unsustainable. 

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
 W.P.(C) 9445/2017

HARMOHINI SARNA  Vs   GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI 

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIBHU BAKHRU
Dated: 28.01.2019

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Whether will is presumed to be properly executed if it is registered?

There is one more aspect which needs consideration at this stage. The Will in question was a registered document. But, the registration of Will itself was only optional, in view of the provision of Section 18 of the Registration Act. The attestation of the Will, however, was not optional, in view of the provision of Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act. This would mean that there is no question of drawing of any presumption of due execution of a document that usually goes with a registered document, which is compulsorily registrable.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

First Appeal No. 27 of 2001

Decided On: 23.08.2017

Ruprao Vs. Prabhawati and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.B. Shukre, J.

Citation: 2018(3) MHLJ 172

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Whether deed dissolving partnership firm is to be registered?

The question raised in that case was whether the arbitration award, distributing assets of the firm after settlement of accounts, between partners in accordance with their shares, was compulsorily registrable under S. 17 of the Registration Act, 1908. Herein, it is to be emphasised that, no such dispute arises, since the impounding was occasioned when the document was presented for registration. Dissolution of partnership, whether it was compulsorily registrable, when the partnership assets included immovable property, was a vexed question which was finally resolved in the two decisions referred to in N. Khadervali Saheb (supra); viz., S.V. Chandra Pandian v. S.V. Sivalinga Nadar (MANU/SC/0450/1993 : (1993) 1 SCC 589) and Ratan Lal Sharma v. Purshottam Harit (MANU/SC/0003/1974 : (1974) 1 SCC 671).

9. Ratan Lal Sharma (supra) was concerned with the necessity of registration under Section 16 of the Registration Act. The dispute between the two partners was referred for arbitration, in which the partnership assets were assigned to one partner, in consideration of a specified sum. This exclusive allotment of the assets of the partnership, which included immovable property, was held to create rights in the immovable property, thus making registration compulsory. This decision was pressed to advance the contention of compulsory registration of an arbitration award which allotted the immovable properties and assets of a partnership to each of the partners in accordance with their shares S.V. Chandra Pandian (supra). The decision in Ratan Lal Sharma (supra) was distinguished in S.V. Chandra Pandian (supra) in the following manner:

"This Court while reiterating that the share of a partner in the assets of the partnership comprising even immovable properties, is moveable property and the assignment of the share does not require registration under Section 17 of the Registration Act. The legal position is thus affirmed. However, since the award did not seek to assign the share of the respondent to the appellant but on the contrary made an exclusive allotment of the partnership asset including the factory and liabilities to the appellant, thereby creating an absolute interest on payment of consideration of ` 17,000 plus half the amount of the realisable debts, it was held to be compulsorily registrable under S. 17 of the Registration Act. The Court did not depart from the principle that the share of a partner in the asset of the partnership inclusive of immovable properties, is moveable property and the assignment of the share on dissolution of the partnership did not require registration under S. 17 of the Registration Act. The decision, therefore, turned on the interpretation of the award in regard to the nature of the assignment made in favour of the appellant".

10. The essential distinction hence is in looking at whether there is an allotment of the surplus assets, on dissolution, amongst the partners. If that is so, the partners who owned the assets together, during the existence of the partnership, had a right to share in the business in accordance with their shares. On dissolution and allotment of the remaining assets, even if there is immovable property, each goes with his share, not creating any new right But when there is an assignment in favour of one or other and consideration is passed then it creates new rights on the immovable property. A deed creating such rights would have to be registered compulsorily and the creation of such right is a "release" under Article 48(b) to be stamped accordingly.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA

W.P.(C) No. 34751 of 2008

Decided On: 22.06.2015

 Vinayakrishnan Vs.Commissioner for Land Revenue

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

K. Vinod Chandran, J.

Citation:2015 (3) KLT 214 : 2015 (3) KLJ 347 : ILR 2015 (3) Ker. 537 : 2015 (3) KHC 752

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Supreme Court: Unregistered relinquishment deed is not admissible in evidence

It is well settled that the nomenclature given to the document
is not decisive factor but the nature and substance of the transaction
has to be determined with reference to the terms of the documents
and that the admissibility of a document is entirely dependent upon
the recitals contained in that document but not on the basis of the
pleadings set up by the party who seeks to introduce the document
in question. A thorough reading of both Exhibits B-21 and B-22
makes it very clear that there is relinquishment of right in respect of
immovable property through a document which is compulsorily
registerable document and if the same is not registered, becomes
an inadmissible document as envisaged under Section 49 of the
Registration Act. Hence, Exhibits B-21 and B-22 are the documents
which squarely fall within the ambit of section 17 (i) (b) of the
Registration Act and hence are compulsorily registerable documents
and the same are inadmissible in evidence for the purpose of
proving the factum of partition between the parties. We are of the
considered opinion that Exhibits B 21 and B22 are not admissible in
evidence for the purpose of proving primary purpose of partition.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8441 OF 2015

YELLAPU UMA MAHESWARI  Vs  BUDDHA JAGADHEESWARARAO & ORS.

Dated;October 08, 2015
N.V. RAMANA, J.
Citation:(2015) 16 SCC787

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Whether Sub Registrar can cancel registration of registered document?

The role of the Sub-Registrar (Registration) stands discharged, once the document is registered (see Raja Mohammad Amir Ahmad Khan (supra). Section 17 of the Act of 1908 deals with documents which require compulsory registration. Extinguishment Deed is one such document referred to in Section 17(1)(b). Section 18 of the same Act deals with documents, registration whereof is optional. Section 20 of the Act deals with documents containing interlineations, blanks, erasures or alterations. Section 21 provides for description of property and maps or plans and Section 22 deals with the description of houses and land by reference to Government maps and surveys. There is no express provision in the Act of 1908 which empowers the Registrar to recall such registration. The fact whether the document was properly presented for registration cannot be reopened by the Registrar after its registration. The power to cancel the registration is a substantive matter. In absence of any express provision in that behalf, it is not open to assume that the Sub-Registrar (Registration) would be competent to cancel the registration of the documents in question. Similarly, the power of the Inspector General is limited to do superintendence of registration offices and make Rules in that behalf. Even the Inspector General has no power to cancel the registration of any document which has already been registered.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 6673 of 2014

Decided On: 26.10.2016

 Satya Pal Anand
Vs.
State of M.P. and Ors.

Coram:Ranjan Gogoi, Prafulla C. Pant and A.M. Khanwilkar, JJ.

Citation:(2016) 10 SCC767

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How to appreciate evidence in case of unregistered family settlement?

 Even though recitals in the Ex.D22 is to the effect of
relinquishment of right in items No.1 and 2, Ex.D22 could be taken
as family arrangements/settlements. There is no provision of law
requiring family settlements to be reduced to writing and

registered, though when reduced to writing the question of
registration may arise. Binding family arrangements dealing with
immovable property worth more than rupees hundred can be made
orally and when so made, no question of registration arises. If,
however, it is reduced to the form of writing with the purpose that
the terms should be evidenced by it, it required registration and
without registration it is inadmissible; but the said family
arrangement can be used as corroborative piece of evidence for
showing or explaining the conduct of the parties.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5805 OF 2016
(Arising out of SLP(C) No.27268 of 2008
SUBRAYA M.N. 
Versus
VITTALA M.N. & ORS
Citation:(2016) 8 SCC705

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When suit for declaration will be barred by limitation?

 As far as prayer (f) is concerned, plaintiff seeks declaration that all the
acts of defendant No.1 or the documents executed by him in favour of defendant
Nos.2 and 3 are void, illegal and unlawful.   Prayer   (g) is for an order and
direction against the defendants to deliver the deed of assignment dated 28th
January 2005 and deed of conveyance dated 27th  January 1992 between Mrs
Noel Pereira and Mr Yusuf Ahmed and Conveyance Deed dated 27th  January
2007 executed between Yusuf Ahmed and defendant No.3 to this Court.  Prayer

(h) is for cancellation of those documents under the direction and supervision of
this Court.   For seeking declaration in terms of prayer (f) Article 58 would be
applicable.  All the three documents referred to aforesaid were executed prior to
three years before the date of filing suit.  Prayer (f) for declaration is thus on the
face of  it barred by law of limitation. For delivery of documents sought in prayer
(g), in my view Article 113 would be applicable.  On perusal of oral evidence and
the documentary evidence, it is clear that right to sue accrued to the plaintiff
much prior to three years before filing of this suit.    Plaintiff was fully aware of
these documents.  Both the deeds of conveyance are registered documents which
amounts to constructive notice.  Prayer (g) is thus, barred by law of limitation.
For the reasons recorded in respect of prayer (g),  prayer (h) which is also for

cancellation of documents is also barred by law of limitation.   IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
 ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION 
SUIT NO. 808 OF 2011
Naresh Lachmandas Aswani  

VERSUS
 Haridas alias Hardas Lachmandas
 
     CORAM : R.D. DHANUKA, J.
 
 JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED ON : 18th OCTOBER, 2013
Citation: 2016 (4) ALLMR 286

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Whether rights of prior user of Trade Mark will prevail over registered user of Trade mark?

Scheme of the Act is such where rights of prior user are recognized superior than that of the registration and even the registered proprietor cannot disturb interfere with the rights of prior user. The overall effect of collective reading of the provisions of the Act is that the action for passing off which is premised on the rights of prior user generating a goodwill shall be unaffected by any registration provided under the Act. This proposition has been discussed in extenso in the case of N.R. Dongre and Ors. v. Whirlpool Corporation and Anr. MANU/DE/0700/1995 : AIR (1995) Delhi 300 wherein Division Bench of Delhi High Court recognized that the registration is not an indefeasible right and the same is subject to rights of prior user. The said decision of Whirlpool [supra] was further affirmed by Supreme Court of India in the case of N.R. Dongre and Ors v. Whirlpool Corporation and Anr. MANU/SC/1223/1996 : 1996 (3) R.C.R. (Civil) 697 : (1996) 5 SCC 714.

B. The above were the reasonings from the provisions arising from the plain reading of the Act which gives clear indication that the rights of prior user are superior than that of registration and are unaffected by the registration rights under the Act. Secondly, there are other additional reasonings as to why the passing off rights are considered to be superior than that of registration rights.

Traditionally, passing off in common law is considered to be a right for protection of goodwill in the business against misrepresentation caused in the course of trade and for prevention of resultant damage on account of the said misrepresentation. The three ingredients of passing off are goodwill, misrepresentation and damage. These ingredients are considered to be classical trinity under the law of passing off as per the speech of Lord Oliver laid down in the case of Reckitt & Colman Products Ltd. v. Borden Inc MANU/UKHL/0012/1990 : (1990) 1 AllE.R. 873 which is more popularly known as "Jif Lemon" case wherein the Lord Oliver reduced the five guidelines laid out by Lord Diplock in Erven Warnink v. Townend & Sons Ltd. [1979) AC 731, 742 (HL)] (the "Advocate Case") to three elements: (1) Goodwill owned by a trader, (2) Misrepresentation and (3) Damage to goodwill. Thus, the passing off action is essentially an action in deceit where the common law rule is that no person is entitled to carry on his or her business on pretext that the said business is of that of another. This Court has given its imprimatur to the above principle in the case of Laxmikant V. Patel v. Chetanbhat Shah and Anr. MANU/SC/0763/2001 : 2002 (2) R.C.R. (Civil) 357 : (2002) 3 SCC 65.

The applicability of the said principle can be seen as to which proprietor has generated the goodwill by way of use of the mark name in the business. The use of the mark/carrying on business under the name confers the rights in favour of the person and generates goodwill in the market. Accordingly, the latter user of the mark/name or in the business cannot misrepresent his business as that of business of the prior right holder. That is the reason why essentially the prior user is considered to be superior than that of any other rights. Consequently, the examination of rights in common law which are based on goodwill, misrepresentation and damage are independent to that of registered rights. The mere fact that both prior user and subsequent user are registered proprietors are irrelevant for the purposes of examining who generated the goodwill first in the market and whether the latter user is causing misrepresentation in the course of trade and damaging the goodwill and reputation of the prior right holder/former user. That is the additional reasoning that the statutory rights must pave the way for common law rights of passing off.

C. Thirdly, it is also recognized principle in common law jurisdiction that passing off right is broader remedy than that of infringement. This is due to the reason that the passing off doctrine operates on the general principle that no person is entitled to represent his or her business as business of other person. The said action in deceit is maintainable for diverse reasons other than that of registered rights which are allocated rights under Recent Civil Reports the Act. The authorities of other common law jurisdictions like England more specifically Kerry's Law of Trademarks and Trade Names, Fourteenth Edition, Thomson, Sweet & Maxwell South Asian Edition recognizes the principle that where trademark action fails, passing off action may still succeed on the same evidence. This has been explained by the learned Author by observing the following:--

15-033 "A claimant may fail to make out a case of infringement of a trade mark for various reasons and may yet show that by imitating the mark claimed as a trademark, or otherwise, the Defendant has done what is calculated to pass off his goods as those of the claimant. A claim in "passing off' has generally been added as a second string to actions for infringement, and has on occasion succeeded where the claim for infringement has failed"

The same author also recognizes the principle that Trade Marks Act affords no bar to the passing off action. This has been explained by the learned Author as under:--

15-034 "Subject to possibly one qualification, nothing in the Trade Marks Act 1994 affects a trader's right against another in an action for passing off. It is, therefore, no bar to an action for passing off that the trade name, get up or any other of the badges identified with the claimant's business, which are alleged to have been copies or imitated by the Defendant, might have been, but are not registered as, trade marks, even though the evidence is wholly addressed to what may be a mark capable of registration. Again, it is no defense to passing off that the Defendant's mark is registered. The Act offers advantages to those who register their trade marks, but imposes no penalty upon those who do not. It is equally no bar to an action for passing off that the false representation relied upon is an imitation of a trade mark that is incapable of registration. A passing off action can even lie against a registered proprietor of the mark sued upon. The fact that a claimant is using a mark registered by another party (or even the Defendant) does not of itself prevent goodwill being generated by the use of the mark, or prevent such a claimant from relying on such goodwill in an action against the registered proprietor. Such unregistered marks are frequently referred to as "common law trade marks"

From the reading of aforementioned excerpts from Kerly's Law of Trademarks and Trade Names, it can be said that not merely it is recognized in India but in other jurisdictions also including England/UK (Provisions of UK Trade Marks Act, 1994 are analogous to Indian Trade Marks Act, 1999) that the registration is no defense to a passing off action and nor the Trade Marks Act, 1999 affords any bar to a passing off action. 

Equivalent Citation: 2016(66)PTC1(SC), 2015(2)RCR(Civil)810, 2015(7)SCALE136, (2016)2SCC683

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 2758 of 2015 (Arising Out of SLP (C) No. 12671 of 2014)

Decided On: 17.03.2015

Appellants: S. Syed Mohideen 
Vs.
Respondent: P. Sulochana Bai

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:H.L. Dattu, C.J.I. and A.K. Sikri, J.

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Good legal article on drafting of contract and their use in court

DOCUMENT WHICH IS REGISTRABLE AND NOT TRANSACTION

Deb Dutt Seal v. Raman Lal, AIR 1970 SC 659 wherein the

Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that it is on the construction of the document wherein it requires registration or not. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that in order to require registration, document must contain all the essentials of transaction and one essential is that the title deeds contain all essential of transaction. According to the Hon'ble Supreme Court it is a document which is registrable under the Registration Act and not a transaction.

THE REGISTERED DOCUMENT WILL OPERATE, NOT FROM THE DATE OF ACTUAL REGISTRATION, BUT FROM THE DATE WHEN THE DEED WAS EXECUTED

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Whether Subsequent written agreement between mortgagor and mortgagee reducing rate of interest requires registration?

Equivalent Citation: AIR1952SC153, 1952(54)BOMLR543, [1952]1SCR491

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Decided On: 22.02.1952

Appellants:Kashinath Bhaskar Datar
Vs.
Respondent:Bhaskar Vishweshwar Karve

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
S. Murtaza Fazal Ali and Vivian Bose, JJ.

Indian Registration Act 1908 - s. 17(1)(b)—Subsequent document varying terms of the previous document—“Interest” in Immovable property being limited and extinguished

Indian Registration Act (XVI of 1908), Section 17(1)(b), 17(2)(v)(xi)-Indian Evidence Act (I of 1872), Section 92, prov. 4-Mortgage-Mortgagee entitled to certain rate of interest under mortgage bend- Subsequent written agreement between mortgagor and mortgagee reducing rate of interest-Whether agreement requires registration.

One part of the "interest" which a mortgagee has in mortgaged property within the meaning of Section 17(1)(b) of the Indian Registration Act, 1908, is the right to receive interest at a certain rate when the document provides for interest. If that rate is varied, whether to his advantage or otherwise, then his "interest" in the property is affected. If the subsequent agreement substitutes a higher rate, then to the extent of the difference it "creates" a fresh "interest" which was not there before. If the rate is lowered, then his original "interest" is limited.

U Po Thin v. The Official Assignee (1938) R.L.R. 293 : s.c. [1938] A.I.R. Ran. 285, approved.

Tika Ram v. Deputy Commissioner of Bara Banki (1899) L.R. 26 I.A. 97 100 : s.c. 1 Bom. L.R. 692 referred to.

There is a difference between a receipt acknowledging payment of the mortgage debt and a remission or a release by the mortgagee. A receipt is not the payment, nor does the document in such a case serve to extinguish the mortgage or limit the liability. It is the payment of the money which does that and the receipt does no more than evidence the fact. Not so a release. The extinguishment or diminution of liability is in that event effected by the agreement itself and not by something external to it. If the agreement is oral, it is hit by proviso 4 to Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, for it "rescinds" or "modifies" the contract of mortgage. If it is in writing, it is hit by Section 17(1)(b) of the Indian Registration Act, 1908, for in that case the writing itself "limits" or "extinguishes" the liability under the mortgage.

If the mortgagee cannot, in the face of the subsequent agreement, enforce the terms of his bend, then the subsequent undertaking has effected a modification, and if that has the effect of limiting or extinguishing the mortgagee's interest, it is hit either by Section 17(7)(b) of the Indian Registration Act, 1908, or a. 92, prov. 4, of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. But when there is a mere payment of money, that is done under the terms of the bend, for the contract of mortgage postulates that the mortgagor should repay the money borrowed, and (that when he does so, the mortgagee's interest in the property shall be "limited" to the extent pf the repayment or, when all is repaid, be wholly extinguished ; nor does a payment have to be made by a written or registered instrument, or oven evidenced by one. Clause (xi) to Section 17(2) of the Indian Registration Act is based on this principle. It draws a distinction between a document which, by force of its terms, effects the extinguishment, or purports to do so, and one which merely evidences an external fact which brings about that result.

If a document itself creates an interest in Immovable property, the fact that it contemplates the execution of another document will not exempt it from registration under Section 17(2)(v) of the Indian Registration Act, 1908.

Vivian Bose, J.

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Conviction of doctor under PCPNDT Act-when his registration to practise should not be suspended?

The order dated 12th June,2014 passed by the learned Sessions Judge whereby the conviction of the petitioner has been suspended is in exercise of the powers under Section 389(1) of Cr.P.C. The petitioner had appropriately moved an application before the Sessions Court invoking the powers under Section 389(1) of Cr.P.C. by pointing out that the order of conviction if was permitted to remain in operation, the same would seriously prejudice and adversely affect the livelihood of the petitioner inasmuch as the petitioner would be suspended from the medical practice by the respondents. It is on complete satisfaction of all these facts by a detailed order, the learned Sessions Judge has suspended the conviction of the petitioner. We have already taken into considering as to what would be the effect of an order passed under Section 389(1) of Cr.P.C. by which the conviction is suspended. The order passed by the Sessions Court under Section 389(1) of Cr.P.C. could not have been overlooked by the respondent.

Hence, there is much substance in the submissions of the learned Counsel for the petitioner in assailing the impugned order passed by the respondent. The order of suspension of the petitioner's medical practice as passed by the respondent undoubtedly has severe consequences and a drastic effect, inasmuch as the petitioner's livelihood stands directly affected. We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that the impugned order deserves to be stayed during the subsistence of the order dated 12 th June,2014 passed below Exhibit 12 by the Court of learned Sessions Judge, Raigad in Criminal Appeal no.3 of 2014.Bombay High Court

Dr. Shubham Singh vs Maharashtra Medical Council on 7 October, 2014

Bench: A.S. Oka

Citation;2015 ALLMR(CRI)898

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Whether sale certificate requires registration?

 It is held by the Apex Court in the above decision made in 2007(5) SCC 745 (cited supra), that the Sale Certificate does not require registration. Consequently, the respondents are not entitled to seek for production of the said Sale Certificate for impounding the same for payment of deficit stamp duty. Accordingly, I am of the view that the impugned action in both the writ petitions are liable to be set aside

Madras High Court

D.B.Prakashchand Jain vs The Inspector General Of ... on 24 February, 2014

Citation; AIR2014 Madras 161

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When registration of medical practitioner can be suspended for violation of provision of PCPNDT Act?

The suspension of registration of a medical practitioner
pending enquiry or prosecution is a drastic action and takes away
the fundamental right to practise the profession, as guaranteed
under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. Such an
action can be taken only to enforce reasonable restrictions
imposed by making a law in the general public interest in terms
of Clause (6) of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. The
exercise of power under Section 10 or 22 of the said Act is guided
by the circumstances pointed out by the judgment of the Division
Bench in the case of Ramineni, cited supra. The action can be
taken in cases of grave urgency and in appropriate cases, even

without affording an opportunity of being heard in the matter and
the validity of action can be judged in a postdecisional
hearing.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR
Writ Petition No.320 of 2014
Dr. Sadanand Madhukar Ingle,

Vs
Maharashtra medical council Mumbai

Coram : R.K. Deshpande, J.
Dated : 19 th March, 2014
Citation; 2014(4) MHLJ 360 Bom,2014(4)ABR751,

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Supreme Court: Adoption Deed does not require Registration

In this context, it will be worthwhile to note the requirement of registration of an Adoption Deed. Section 17 of the Registration Act specifically refers to the documents of which registration is compulsory. The deed of adoption is not one of the documents mentioned in sub-section 1 of Section 17 which mandatorily required registration. Sub-section 3 of Section 17 only refers to the mandatory requirement of registration of an authorization that may be given for adopting a son executed after 01.01.1872 if such authorization was not conferred by a Will. Dealing with the said provision relating to authorization, it has been held in the decision reported in Vishvanath Ramji Karale V. Rahibai Ramji Karale and others - AIR 1931 Bombay 105 by a deed of adoption as distinguished from authority to adopt does not require registration.

Supreme Court of India

Mst.Param Pal Singh Tr.Father vs M/S National Insurance Co.& Anr. on 14 December, 2012

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