Supreme court: Whether bail granted on medical grounds can be sustained when the medical necessity is vague and non urgent?

Whether bail granted on medical grounds can be sustained when the medical necessity is vague and non urgent -- Held, bail granted on medical grounds must be based on credible, specific, and urgent need, not on general or future apprehensions, and if it is shown that a party obtained bail by misrepresentation or fraud, or by suppressing material facts, such bail is liable to be cancelled on that ground alone.

 Grant of bail on medical grounds -- Held, bail on medical grounds can be granted only in exceptional cases where the medical condition is serious, cannot be treated in custody, and necessary facilities are not available in jail

Per R. Mahadevan, J.

In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, this Court cautioned that “bail on medical grounds can be granted only in exceptional cases where the medical condition is serious, cannot be treated in custody, and necessary facilities are not available in jail”. The burden to prove such necessity lies on the accused.

This Court has consistently held that bail granted on medical grounds must be based on credible, specific, and urgent need, not on general or future apprehensions. The discharge summary dated 28.11.2024 issued by the hospital, mentions that A2 is a patient with a history of diabetes, hypertension, and prior cardiac issues, and that he may require a CABG surgery in the future. However, the report does not indicate: any current emergency or need for immediate medical intervention; any life-threatening condition warranting urgent release; and any inability of the prison medical system to manage his current state. Thus, there is no compelling medical necessity for grant of bail. In Puran v. Rambilas, this Court held that "if it is shown that a party obtained bail by misrepresentation or fraud, or by suppressing material facts, such bail is liable to be cancelled on that ground alone".

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 3528-3534 of 2025 

Decided On: 14.08.2025

State of Karnataka Vs. Darshan and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

Author: R. Mahadevan, J.

Citation: 2025 KHC 6693: 2025 INSC 979, MANU/SC/1098/2025.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Whether the burden of proof is on the person to prove a mistake if he pleads mistake?

 Adverting to the questions of law framed, it is admitted by the respondent that she has been described as a Christian in all her educational records. She would claim that it is a mistake. Once the fact that there has been such wrong description is admitted, it is for the person, who claims that the wrong description is a result of  mistake, to prove the same.

I am, therefore, of the considered opinion that the courts below were not right in placing burden of proving misrepresentation on the appellant and concluding that the appellant has not discharged the burden. Once the plea of mistake is raised, it is for the party pleading mistake to prove the same. 

BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT

C.M.S.A(MD)No.05 of 2009

P.Sivakumar Vs  S.Beula 

Pronounced on: 25.02.2021

Coram:  MR.JUSTICE R.SUBRAMANIAN

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Whether consent decree will operate as estoppel if fraud, misrepresentation, or mistake vitiate compromise?

This Court’s Analysis

18. Before adverting to the specific contentions raised by the

learned senior counsel for the Petitioner, it may be useful to briefly summarise the law governing consent decrees that shall inform our conclusions on the present matter. It is well settled

that consent decrees are intended to create estoppels by judgment against the

parties, thereby putting an end to further litigation between the

parties. Resultantly, this Court has held that it would be slow to

unilaterally interfere in, modify, substitute or modulate the terms of

a consent decree, unless it is done with the revised consent of all

the parties thereto. (Gupta Steel Industries v. Jolly Steel

Industries Pvt. Ltd. & anr., (1996) 11 SCC 678; Suvaran

Rajaram Bandekar & ors. v. Narayan R. Bandekar & ors.,

(1996) 10 SCC 255).

19. However, this formulation is far from absolute and does not

apply as a blanket rule in all cases. This Court, in Byram Pestonji Gariwala v. Union Bank of India & ors., (1992) 1 SCC 31, has held that a consent decree would not serve as an estoppel, where

the compromise was vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation, or

mistake. Further, this Court in the exercise of its inherent powers

may also unilaterally rectify a consent decree suffering from clerical

or arithmetical errors, so as to make it conform with the terms of

the compromise.

 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NOS. 2224-2225

OF 2021

COMPACK ENTERPRISES INDIA (P) LTD.  Vs BEANT SINGH 

Author: MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J. 

Dated: FEBRUARY 17, 2021

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How to prove that fraud or misrepresentation was committed at the time of execution of contract?

Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties, we do not find any merit in this appeal. It cannot be held that the sale deed dated 11.07.1991 executed by Dharam Singh was obtained by fraud or by mis-representation. It is clear that when the sale deed was executed by Dharam Singh, he was having sound state of mind. The Sub-Registrar, who had registered the documents was examined as DW-3. In his evidence he stated that the sale deed was executed by Dharam Singh after he had explained to the parties about contents of the said deed. Ex. D-1 was attested by PW-2 and PW-3. They have nowhere stated in their statements that Dharam Singh was not in good state of mind at the time of the execution of the document. Though it is contended on behalf of the Appellant that Dharam Singh was not keeping well, no medical evidence has been produced in support of the said contention. We do not find any ground to interfere with the judgment of the High Court.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 2367 of 2010

Decided On: 21.03.2018

 Krishna Devi Vs. Keshri Nandan

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

N.V. Ramana and S. Abdul Nazeer, JJ.

Citation:(2018) 4 SCC 481

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Whether principles applicable for proof of will is applicable for proof of gift deed?

 Gift­deed at Exhibit­92 is a registered document and was
executed   by   Damduji   in   respect   of   his   self   acquired   property.
Any objection to his competency to execute this document at Exhibit­92
has to be rejected. The only ground on which the lower Appellate Court
has reversed the decree passed by the trial Court is that the gift­deed at
Exhibit­92 was  shrouded  by suspicious circumstances. The trial Court
recorded a finding that two attesting witnesses D.W.1 Shalik and D.W.4
Kishor have proved the gift­deed at Exhibit­92. Without reversing this
finding, the lower Appellate Court, considered the so called suspicious
circumstances.   The   test   of   suspicious   circumstances   available   in
accepting a document of Will, cannot be applied to question the validity
of gift­deed. Once it is found that the document of gift is registered and
the signature of the donor on it, is proved, it cannot be held to be invalid
unless a case of fraud or misrepresentation is made out. The provisions
of Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act, Section 68 of the Evidence
Act as compared with Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, have to be
seen.   The   lower   Appellate   Court   has   committed   an   error   of   law   in

adopting such method. Apart from this, the learned counsel could not
point out any such circumstances creating doubt in acceptance of the
evidence of attesting witnesses on the registered gift­deed at Exhibit­92.
The   lower   Appellate   Court   could   not   have   therefore,   disturbed   the
findings recorded by the trial Court rejecting the claim of the plaintiff in
respect of the house property and holding that the gift­deed at Exhibit­92
was suspicious and confers no title upon the defendants. The finding to
that effect as recorded by the lower Appellate Court cannot be sustained.
The substantial question of law is answered accordingly.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR
SECOND APPEAL NO.335 OF 2015
Shalik s/o Damdu Dhobale,

V
 Sitaram s/o Damdu Dhobale,

­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­
CORAM:  R.K. DESHPANDE, J.
DATE:          17th  JUNE, 2016.
Citation: 2017(1) ALLMR 603

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Leading Judgment of SC on removal of employee from service on ground of suppression of material information by them

The fraud and misrepresentation vitiates a transaction and in case
employment has been obtained on the basis of forged documents, as observed in
M. Bhaskaran’s case (supra), it has also been observed in the reference order that if
an appointment was procured fraudulently, the incumbent may be terminated
without holding any inquiry, however we add a rider that in case employee is
confirmed, holding a civil post and has protection of Article 311(2), due inquiry
has to be held before terminating the services. The case of obtaining appointment
on the basis of forged documents has the effect on very eligibility of incumbent for
the job in question, however, verification of antecedents is different aspect as to his
fitness otherwise for the post in question. The fraudulently obtained appointment
orders are voidable at the option of employer, however, question has to be
determined in the light of the discussion made in this order on impact of
suppression or submission of false information.
26. No doubt about it that verification of character and antecedents is one of the
important criteria to assess suitability and it is open to employer to adjudge
antecedents of the incumbent, but ultimate action should be based upon objective
criteria on due consideration of all relevant aspects.
27. Suppression of ‘material’ information presupposes that what is suppressed
that ‘matters’ not every technical or trivial matter. The employer has to act on due
consideration of rules/instructions if any in exercise of powers in order to cancel
candidature or for terminating the services of employee. Though a person who has
suppressed the material information cannot claim unfettered right for appointment
or continuity in service but he has a right not to be dealt with arbitrarily and
exercise of power has to be in reasonable manner with objectivity having due
regard to facts of cases.
28. What yardstick is to be applied has to depend upon the nature of post, higher
post would involve more rigorous criteria for all services, not only to uniformed
service. For lower posts which are not sensitive, nature of duties, impact of
suppression on suitability has to be considered by concerned authorities
considering post/nature of duties/services and power has to be exercised on due
consideration of various aspects.
29. The ‘McCarthyism’ is antithesis to constitutional goal, chance of
reformation has to be afforded to young offenders in suitable cases, interplay of
reformative theory cannot be ruled out in toto nor can be generally applied but is
one of the factors to be taken into consideration while exercising the power for
cancelling candidature or discharging an employee from service.
30. We have noticed various decisions and tried to explain and reconcile them as
far as possible. In view of aforesaid discussion, we summarize our conclusion thus:
(1) Information given to the employer by a candidate as to conviction,
acquittal or arrest, or pendency of a criminal case, whether before or after
entering into service must be true and there should be no suppression or
false mention of required information.
(2) While passing order of termination of services or cancellation of
candidature for giving false information, the employer may take notice of
special circumstances of the case, if any, while giving such information.
(3) The employer shall take into consideration the Government
orders/instructions/rules, applicable to the employee, at the time of taking
the decision.
(4) In case there is suppression or false information of involvement in a
criminal case where conviction or acquittal had already been recorded
before filling of the application/verification form and such fact later
comes to knowledge of employer, any of the following recourse
appropriate to the case may be adopted : -
(a) In a case trivial in nature in which conviction had been
recorded, such as shouting slogans at young age or for a petty
offence which if disclosed would not have rendered an
incumbent unfit for post in question, the employer may, in its
discretion, ignore such suppression of fact or false information
by condoning the lapse.
(b) Where conviction has been recorded in case which is not trivial
in nature, employer may cancel candidature or terminate
services of the employee. 
(c) If acquittal had already been recorded in a case involving moral
turpitude or offence of heinous/serious nature, on technical
ground and it is not a case of clean acquittal, or benefit of
reasonable doubt has been given, the employer may consider all
relevant facts available as to antecedents, and may take
appropriate decision as to the continuance of the employee.
(5) In a case where the employee has made declaration truthfully of a
concluded criminal case, the employer still has the right to consider
antecedents, and cannot be compelled to appoint the candidate.
(6) In case when fact has been truthfully declared in character verification
form regarding pendency of a criminal case of trivial nature, employer, in
facts and circumstances of the case, in its discretion may appoint the
candidate subject to decision of such case.
(7) In a case of deliberate suppression of fact with respect to multiple
pending cases such false information by itself will assume significance
and an employer may pass appropriate order cancelling candidature or
terminating services as appointment of a person against whom multiple
criminal cases were pending may not be proper.
(8) If criminal case was pending but not known to the candidate at the time
of filling the form, still it may have adverse impact and the appointing
authority would take decision after considering the seriousness of the
crime.
(9) In case the employee is confirmed in service, holding Departmental
enquiry would be necessary before passing order of termination/removal
or dismissal on the ground of suppression or submitting false information
in verification form.
(10) For determining suppression or false information attestation/verification
form has to be specific, not vague. Only such information which was
required to be specifically mentioned has to be disclosed. If information
not asked for but is relevant comes to knowledge of the employer the
same can be considered in an objective manner while addressing the
question of fitness. However, in such cases action cannot be taken on
basis of suppression or submitting false information as to a fact which
was not even asked for.
(11) Before a person is held guilty of suppressio veri or suggestio falsi,
knowledge of the fact must be attributable to him.
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITIOIN [C] NO.20525/2011
Avtar Singh … Petitioner
Vs.
Union of India & Ors. … Respondents
[With SLP [C] Nos.4757/2014 and 24320/2014]
Dated:July 21, 2016.
ARUN MISHRA, J.

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Whether rights of prior user of Trade Mark will prevail over registered user of Trade mark?

Scheme of the Act is such where rights of prior user are recognized superior than that of the registration and even the registered proprietor cannot disturb interfere with the rights of prior user. The overall effect of collective reading of the provisions of the Act is that the action for passing off which is premised on the rights of prior user generating a goodwill shall be unaffected by any registration provided under the Act. This proposition has been discussed in extenso in the case of N.R. Dongre and Ors. v. Whirlpool Corporation and Anr. MANU/DE/0700/1995 : AIR (1995) Delhi 300 wherein Division Bench of Delhi High Court recognized that the registration is not an indefeasible right and the same is subject to rights of prior user. The said decision of Whirlpool [supra] was further affirmed by Supreme Court of India in the case of N.R. Dongre and Ors v. Whirlpool Corporation and Anr. MANU/SC/1223/1996 : 1996 (3) R.C.R. (Civil) 697 : (1996) 5 SCC 714.

B. The above were the reasonings from the provisions arising from the plain reading of the Act which gives clear indication that the rights of prior user are superior than that of registration and are unaffected by the registration rights under the Act. Secondly, there are other additional reasonings as to why the passing off rights are considered to be superior than that of registration rights.

Traditionally, passing off in common law is considered to be a right for protection of goodwill in the business against misrepresentation caused in the course of trade and for prevention of resultant damage on account of the said misrepresentation. The three ingredients of passing off are goodwill, misrepresentation and damage. These ingredients are considered to be classical trinity under the law of passing off as per the speech of Lord Oliver laid down in the case of Reckitt & Colman Products Ltd. v. Borden Inc MANU/UKHL/0012/1990 : (1990) 1 AllE.R. 873 which is more popularly known as "Jif Lemon" case wherein the Lord Oliver reduced the five guidelines laid out by Lord Diplock in Erven Warnink v. Townend & Sons Ltd. [1979) AC 731, 742 (HL)] (the "Advocate Case") to three elements: (1) Goodwill owned by a trader, (2) Misrepresentation and (3) Damage to goodwill. Thus, the passing off action is essentially an action in deceit where the common law rule is that no person is entitled to carry on his or her business on pretext that the said business is of that of another. This Court has given its imprimatur to the above principle in the case of Laxmikant V. Patel v. Chetanbhat Shah and Anr. MANU/SC/0763/2001 : 2002 (2) R.C.R. (Civil) 357 : (2002) 3 SCC 65.

The applicability of the said principle can be seen as to which proprietor has generated the goodwill by way of use of the mark name in the business. The use of the mark/carrying on business under the name confers the rights in favour of the person and generates goodwill in the market. Accordingly, the latter user of the mark/name or in the business cannot misrepresent his business as that of business of the prior right holder. That is the reason why essentially the prior user is considered to be superior than that of any other rights. Consequently, the examination of rights in common law which are based on goodwill, misrepresentation and damage are independent to that of registered rights. The mere fact that both prior user and subsequent user are registered proprietors are irrelevant for the purposes of examining who generated the goodwill first in the market and whether the latter user is causing misrepresentation in the course of trade and damaging the goodwill and reputation of the prior right holder/former user. That is the additional reasoning that the statutory rights must pave the way for common law rights of passing off.

C. Thirdly, it is also recognized principle in common law jurisdiction that passing off right is broader remedy than that of infringement. This is due to the reason that the passing off doctrine operates on the general principle that no person is entitled to represent his or her business as business of other person. The said action in deceit is maintainable for diverse reasons other than that of registered rights which are allocated rights under Recent Civil Reports the Act. The authorities of other common law jurisdictions like England more specifically Kerry's Law of Trademarks and Trade Names, Fourteenth Edition, Thomson, Sweet & Maxwell South Asian Edition recognizes the principle that where trademark action fails, passing off action may still succeed on the same evidence. This has been explained by the learned Author by observing the following:--

15-033 "A claimant may fail to make out a case of infringement of a trade mark for various reasons and may yet show that by imitating the mark claimed as a trademark, or otherwise, the Defendant has done what is calculated to pass off his goods as those of the claimant. A claim in "passing off' has generally been added as a second string to actions for infringement, and has on occasion succeeded where the claim for infringement has failed"

The same author also recognizes the principle that Trade Marks Act affords no bar to the passing off action. This has been explained by the learned Author as under:--

15-034 "Subject to possibly one qualification, nothing in the Trade Marks Act 1994 affects a trader's right against another in an action for passing off. It is, therefore, no bar to an action for passing off that the trade name, get up or any other of the badges identified with the claimant's business, which are alleged to have been copies or imitated by the Defendant, might have been, but are not registered as, trade marks, even though the evidence is wholly addressed to what may be a mark capable of registration. Again, it is no defense to passing off that the Defendant's mark is registered. The Act offers advantages to those who register their trade marks, but imposes no penalty upon those who do not. It is equally no bar to an action for passing off that the false representation relied upon is an imitation of a trade mark that is incapable of registration. A passing off action can even lie against a registered proprietor of the mark sued upon. The fact that a claimant is using a mark registered by another party (or even the Defendant) does not of itself prevent goodwill being generated by the use of the mark, or prevent such a claimant from relying on such goodwill in an action against the registered proprietor. Such unregistered marks are frequently referred to as "common law trade marks"

From the reading of aforementioned excerpts from Kerly's Law of Trademarks and Trade Names, it can be said that not merely it is recognized in India but in other jurisdictions also including England/UK (Provisions of UK Trade Marks Act, 1994 are analogous to Indian Trade Marks Act, 1999) that the registration is no defense to a passing off action and nor the Trade Marks Act, 1999 affords any bar to a passing off action. 

Equivalent Citation: 2016(66)PTC1(SC), 2015(2)RCR(Civil)810, 2015(7)SCALE136, (2016)2SCC683

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 2758 of 2015 (Arising Out of SLP (C) No. 12671 of 2014)

Decided On: 17.03.2015

Appellants: S. Syed Mohideen 
Vs.
Respondent: P. Sulochana Bai

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:H.L. Dattu, C.J.I. and A.K. Sikri, J.

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Whether it is mandatory for a party pleading fraud to state particulars thereof with dates?

The unfair advantage or the hardship contemplated 

under Section 20 has to be seen   as working against the defendant and not the 
plaintiff.     There   are     no     circumstances   either   making   enforcement   of   specific 
performance of the contract as inequitable.  For these reasons,  this case cannot be 
seen to be  falling  in any of  the instances mentioned in clauses (a)to (c)  of sub­
section (2) of Section 20 of Specific Relief Act. Then, no details of pending litigations 
have been given so as to make out the  case that  the defendant was cheated into 
signing stamp papers,  as required under Order VI Rule 4 of Code of Civil Procedure. 

Order VI Rule 4 makes it mandatory for a party pleading fraud, misrepresentation, 
breach of trust, wilful default or undue influence, to state the particulars thereof 
with dates and items and so on.  This is because to put the other side on sufficient 
notice of the case it has to meet.  Here, neither the particulars nor any evidence has 
been adduced in regard to the pending litigations, dates etc. to make out the case of 
misuse of stamp papers.  I, therefore, find   no substance in the arguments canvassed 
in this regard on behalf of the defendant and find merit in the argument of learned 
counsel for the plaintiff.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.
SECOND APPEAL No. 342  OF 1989
Chintaman Sitaram Bajad (DEAD)   
   VERSUS
Shankar Sonaji Shingne   

CORAM :   
 S.B. SHUKRE, J.
             DATE :     JANUARY 07, 2014.
        
   Citation; 2014 (2) ALLMR 156 Bombay

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