Showing posts with label absolute owner. Show all posts
Showing posts with label absolute owner. Show all posts

Sunday, 16 April 2023

Can the previous owner of acquired land be considered a trespasser if they retain or re-take possession of the land?

 

The issue as to what is meant by "possession of the land by the State after its acquisition" has also been considered by Constitution Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Indore Development Authority's case (supra). It is opined therein that after the acquisition of land and passing of award, the land vests in the State free from all encumbrances. The vesting of land with the State is with possession. Any person retaining the possession thereafter has to be treated trespasser. When large chunk of land is acquired, the State is not supposed to put some person or police force to retain the possession and start cultivating on the land till it is utilized. The Government is also not supposed to start residing or physically occupying the same once process of the acquisition is complete. If after the process of acquisition is complete and land vest in the State free from all encumbrances with possession, any person retaining the land or any re-entry made by any person is nothing else but trespass on the State land. Relevant paragraphs 244, 245 and 256 are extracted below:


244. Section 16 of the Act of 1894 provided that possession of land may be taken by the State Government after passing of an award and thereupon land vest free from all encumbrances in the State Government. Similar are the provisions made in the case of urgency in Section 17(1). The word "possession" has been used in the Act of 1894, whereas in Section 24(2) of Act of 2013, the expression "physical possession" is used. It is submitted that drawing of panchnama for taking over the possession is not enough when the actual physical possession remained with the landowner and Section 24(2) requires actual physical possession to be taken, not the possession in any other form. When the State has acquired the land and award has been passed, land vests in the State Government free from all encumbrances. The act of vesting of the land in the State is with possession, any person retaining the possession, thereafter, has to be treated as trespasser and has no right to possess the land which vests in the State free from all encumbrances.


245. The question which arises whether there is any difference between taking possession under the Act of 1894 and the expression "physical possession" used in Section 24(2). As a matter of fact, what was contemplated under the Act of 1894, by taking the possession meant only physical possession of the land. Taking over the possession under the Act of 2013 always amounted to taking over physical possession of the land. When the State Government acquires land and drawns up a memorandum of taking possession, that amounts to taking the physical possession of the land. On the large chunk of property or otherwise which is acquired, the Government is not supposed to put some other person or the police force in possession to retain it and start cultivating it till the land is used by it for the purpose for which it has been acquired. The Government is not supposed to start residing or to physically occupy it once possession has been taken by drawing the inquest proceedings for obtaining possession thereof. Thereafter, if any further retaining of land or any re-entry is made on the land or someone starts cultivation on the open land or starts residing in the outhouse, etc., is deemed to be the trespasser on land which in possession of the State. The possession of trespasser always inures for the benefit of the real owner that is the State Government in the case.

256. Thus, it is apparent that vesting is with possession and the statute has provided Under Sections 16 and 17 of the Act of 1894 that once possession is taken, absolute vesting occurred. It is an indefeasible right and vesting is with possession thereafter. The vesting specified Under Section 16, takes place after various steps, such as, notification Under Section 4, declaration Under Section 6, notice Under Section 9, award Under Section 11 and then possession. The statutory provision of vesting of property absolutely free from all encumbrances has to be accorded full effect. Not only the possession vests in the State but all other encumbrances are also removed forthwith. The title of the landholder ceases and the state becomes the absolute owner and in possession of the property. Thereafter there is no control of the landowner over the property. He cannot have any animus to take the property and to control it. Even if he has retained the possession or otherwise trespassed upon it after possession has been taken by the State, he is a trespasser and such possession of trespasser enures for his benefit and on behalf of the owner.

{Para 12}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 2749/2023 

Decided On: 11.04.2023

Land and Building Department through Secretary and Ors. Vs.

Attro Devi and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Abhay Shreeniwas Oka and Rajesh Bindal, JJ.

Author: Rajesh Bindal, J

Citation: MANU/SC/0361/2023,

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Monday, 16 December 2019

Kerala HC: Nature of title to be proved by landlord for getting eviction decree against tenant

As regards the legal status of the landlord to claim eviction, this Court has come to a definite finding that what matters is not the absolute title over the property in question, but his legal right to claim eviction as landlord under the provisions of the Act. After examining the various decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court on the point, we have come to a finding that the landlord in this case would satisfy the definition of "landlord" under the Act, and that the question of absolute title claimed by him as the adopted son of the original landlord will have to be decided by the competent civil court. In paragraph 19 of the common order dated 14.2.2019 in R.C.R. Nos. 210/2016 and 215/2016, this Court found thus, "the jurisdiction of the Rent Control Court is only to decide, whether the petitioner is entitled to get an order of eviction on any of the grounds as a "landlord", and not whether the petitioner has the legal right and status to claim eviction. That will have to be decided by the competent civil court." In paragraph 16 of the order also, this Court has found as follows, "whether the petitioner has proprietary title, or whether he can claim title as the adopted son of Subhalakshmi Ammal must be left to be decided by the competent civil court."

8. Thus, as discussed above, the right of the landlord to claim eviction was considered in detail by this Court, and this Court has found that he is entitled to claim eviction as landlord, as meant and defined under the Act, though the question of his absolute title as true owner will have to be ultimately decided by the competent civil court.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

 RC Rev. 215/2016,

Decided On: 29.08.2019

Jayan Pisharody  Vs.  T.S. Rajagopalan

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
K. Harilal and P. Ubaid, JJ.

Citation: 2019(1) RCR(Rent) 357 Kerala
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Sunday, 25 March 2018

Whether Article 65(b) of limitation Act is applicable to suit filed by legal heirs of female who was absolute owner of suit property?

Article 65(b) applies where the female was a 'limited owner' with regard to the disputed property. Hence, if the sale is not for legal purposes, it would not be binding on the estate, the husband's heirs who would be entitled to inherit the estate after the widow's death, would be entitled on such death to sue for the recovery of the property from the purchaser. As their right would be one derived from the husband and not from the widow, it would be independent of the widow and they would be the persons "entitled to sue for possession of the property on the death of the widow" within the meaning of Explanation (b) to Article 65. Hence, the above Explanation will apply to their suit and they would be entitled to a period of 12 years from the widow's death within which to bring the suit as held by Full Bench verdicts in Amar Singh and Ors. v. Sewa Ram and Ors. MANU/PH/0271/1960 : AIR 1960 Punjab 530, Harak Singh v. Kailash Singh and Anr. MANU/BH/0191/1958 : AIR 1958 Pat. 581; and Mt. Lukai W/o Katikram and Ors. v. Niranjan Dayaram and Ors. MANU/MP/0056/1958 : AIR 1958 MP 160.

13. In the instant case possession never became adverse to the Plaintiffs. There is concurrent finding recorded that the Plaintiffs were in joint possession of the disputed land on the date of filing of the suit. The Defendants have taken the plea of ouster and the suit has been filed beyond 12 years of death of Shakuntalabai but they have not been able to prove their adverse possession. On the contrary the finding is that Chimasaheb admitted the title of Anandibai. The finding is that till 1976, Chimasaheb never denied the title of Anandibai. Be that as it may. As adverse possession has not been concurrently found by the three courts and in this case the starting point of limitation would not be the date of death of Shakuntalabai in the year 1962 as she was full owner, as such suit could not be said to be barred by limitation.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 3110 of 2012

Decided On: 25.04.2017

Bapusaheb Chimasaheb Naik-Nimbalkar (dead through L.Rs.) and Ors. Vs.  Mahesh Vijaysinha Rajebhosale and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Arun Mishra and S. Abdul Nazeer, JJ.
Citation: 2018(1) MHLJ11
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Friday, 22 July 2016

Whether Hindu widow will become absolute owner of property from which she has right to receive maintenance?

 After hearing the learned counsel on either side, the

following question is formulated for decision in the second

appeal :


                 "Whether the right of Kalikutty for maintenance

                 out of the proceeds of the suit property    has

                 become an absolute right in her favour by virtue

                 of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act?"

        4. The right of maintenance of a Hindu widow is not a

right to property, but only a right against the property [See

Vaddeboyina Tulasamma v. Vaddeboyina Sesha Reddi

(AIR 1977 SC 1944)]. In Suraj Mal v. Babu Lal (AIR 1985

Delhi 95), the Delhi High Court         held that the provisions

contained in Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act would

apply to property possessed by a Hindu female and to which

she had some kind of title, however restricted the nature of her

interest may be. It was clarified by the Delhi High Court in the

said case that Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act will not

have any application to a case where a widow had no rights

whatsoever in the properties except a right of maintenance out

of the proceeds of the property. Later, in Ram Vishal v. Jagan

Nath [(2004)9 SCC 302], the Apex Court reiterated the

aforesaid propositions holding that to come within the scope of


the said Section of the Hindu Succession Act, the Hindu female

must not only be possessed of the property but she must have

acquired the property either by way of inheritance or devise, or

at a partition or "in lieu of maintenance or arrears of

maintenance" or by gift or her own skill or exertion or by

purchase or by prescription and a mere right of maintenance

without acquisition of some right in the property is not sufficient

to attract the said Section. Paragraph 16 of the said judgment

of the Apex Court reads thus :



          "16. In our view, the authority in Raghubar Singh case3 can be of

          no assistance to the respondent. As has been held by this Court, a

          pre-existing right is a sine qua non for conferment of a full

          ownership under Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. The

          Hindu female must not only be possessed of the property but she

          must have acquired the property. Such acquisition must be either

          by way of inheritance or devise, or at a partition or "in lieu of

          maintenance or arrears of maintenance" or by gift or by her own

          skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription. In the present

          matter, it is nobody's case that Manki had got possession of the

          1/4th share in lieu of maintenance or in arrears of maintenance. It

          was also not their case that there was a partition of the property

          and that in such partition, she had been given the property. A


          mere right of maintenance without actual acquisition in any

          manner is not sufficient to attract Section 14."



As far as the present case is concerned, the plaintiff has no

case that Kalikutty had acquired any right in the property by

way of inheritance or devise, or at a partition or "in lieu of

maintenance or arrears of maintenance" or by gift or her own

skill or exertion or by purchase or by prescription. As such, it

cannot be held that Kalikutty had limited interest in the

property within the meaning of Section 14 of the Hindu

Succession Act.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

                                                    PRESENT:

                   THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P.B.SURESH KUMAR

           THURSDAY, THE 7TH DAYOF JANUARY 2016

                                              SA.No. 357 of 2003
                                       

            VASUDEVAN,
           Vs
           DEVAKAY,
             Citation: AIR 2016 (NOC) 442 Kerala
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