Showing posts with label acceptance. Show all posts
Showing posts with label acceptance. Show all posts

Monday, 16 September 2019

Whether demand of bribe without acceptance amounts to offence under Prevention of Corruption Act?

Section 7 on the other hand, is wider and uses the words "accepts" or "obtains" or "agrees to accept" or "attempts to obtain". All these four words or phrases are used for specific purposes, thus Section 7 envisages that acceptance of bribe money is covered under the words "accepts" or "obtains". However, the use of the phrases "agrees to accept" or "attempts to obtain" would clearly cover the case of demand. In these eventualities, there may or may not be acceptance and yet the offence is complete as per Section 7. Thus there is no manner of doubt to hold that the demand is covered under Section 7. Similar phrases are used in Section 13 (1)(a) and 13 (1)(b), thus under both these clauses, mere demand without acceptance is envisaged for which punishment is provided. Therefore, it cannot be said that mere demand is not an offence.

18. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ashok S/o. Ganapati Kolte & Anr. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors., reported MANU/MH/3045/2016 : (2016) ALL MR (Cri.) page 4317 has already dealt with this issue and has squarely held that for constituting offence under Section 7, there was no need to show the acceptance of bribe and mere agreeing to accept or attempting to accept the bribe from any person is sufficient. In the said case, the applicant therein had prayed for quashing of the F.I.R. on the similar set of facts. In that case, demand was made but suspecting the proposed trap, the accused decided not to accept the bribe amount. This case is very similar to the case before us and we are in agreement with the ratio laid down in the said judgment.

19. Even the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that each demand constituted a separate offence by itself. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Criminal Application No. 1077 of 2017

Decided On: 13.03.2018

Rajendra Shinde Vs. The State of Maharashtra

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
R.M. Savant and Sarang V. Kotwal, JJ.


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Sunday, 28 October 2018

Whether conditional gifts of immovable property can be cancelled by donor?

Gift means to transfer certain existing moveable or
immoveable property voluntarily and without consideration by
one person called the donor to another called the donee and
accepted by or on behalf of the donee as held by the Supreme
Court in Naramadaben Maganlal Thakker Vs. Pranivandas

Maganlal Thakker and Others1. As further held by this Court
in Naramadaben Maganlal Thakker (supra) “It would be clear
that the execution of a registered gift deed, acceptance of the gift
and delivery of the property together make the gift complete.
Thereafter, the donor is divested of his title and the donee
becomes absolute owner of the property.”
15. A conditional gift with no recital of acceptance and no
evidence in proof of acceptance, where possession remains with
the donor as long as he is alive, does not become complete
during lifetime of the donor. When a gift is incomplete and title
remains with the donor the deed of gift might be cancelled.

18. We are in agreement with the decision of this Court in
Reninkuntla Rajamma (supra) that there is no provision in law
that ownership in property cannot be gifted without transfer of
possession of such property. However, the conditions precedent
of a gift as defined in Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act
must be satisfied. A gift is transfer of property without
consideration. Moreover, a conditional gift only becomes
complete on compliance of the conditions in the deed.
19. In the instant case, admittedly, the deed of transfer was
executed for consideration and was in any case conditional
subject to the condition that the donee would look after the
petitioner and her husband and subject to the condition that the
gift would take effect after the death of the donor. We are thus
constrained to hold that there was no completed gift of the
property in question by the appellant to the respondent and the
appellant was within her right in cancelling the deed. The
judgment and order of the High Court cannot, therefore, be

sustained.
REPORTABLE
THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10785 OF 2018

S. SAROJINI AMMA Vs  VELAYUDHAN PILLAI SREEKUMAR 

Dated:OCTOBER 26, 2018
Indira Banerjee, J.
Citation: (2019) 11 SCC 391.
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Thursday, 18 October 2018

Whether a person can be convicted under prevention of corruption Act if demand and acceptance of bribe by him is not proved?

In such circumstances, there is no evidence to
prove that the appellant directly accepted the money
from the Complainant. Since the plea of conspiracy
against the appellant and Rajinder Kumar failed, it
cannot be held that money (Rs.4000/)
recovered
from the possession of Rajinder Kumar was as a
fact the bribe money meant for the appellant for
holding him guilty for the offences punishable
under Sections 7, 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the PC
Act. It is more so when the benefit of such acquittal
from the charge of conspiracy was given to Rajinder
Kumar but was not given to the appellant.

31) In our view, the prosecution, therefore, failed
to prove the factum of acceptance of bribe money of
Rs.4000/by
the appellant from the Complainant
on 29.03.1995 as per the charges framed against
him.
32) Since in order to attract the rigors of Sections
7, 13(2) read 13(1)(d) of PC Act, the prosecution was
under a legal obligation to prove the twin
requirements of “demand and acceptance of bribe
money by the accused”, the proving of one alone
but not the other was not sufficient. The appellant
is, therefore, entitled for acquittal from the charges
framed against him under the PC Act too. (See para
8 of M.K. Harshan vs. State of Kerala, (1996) 11
SCC 720)
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1276 OF 2010

Dashrath Singh Chauhan Vs Central Bureau of Investigation 

Dated:October 09, 2018
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
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Saturday, 11 March 2017

How to prove that doctor had agreed to perform operation of patient?

It has to be seen whether the proposal of the original Plaintiffs was accepted by Defendant No. 1 as the promise. If he accepted the promise, there would be an agreement. The agreement is for treating a patient for consideration. It would, therefore, be an agreement enforceable at law and consequently a contract under Section 2 (h) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The acceptance by Defendant No. 1 as the promise has to the absolute and unqualified under Section 7 (1) of the Act and be expressed in some usual and reasonable manner under Section 7 (2) of the Act. The relevant portion of Section 7 which runs thus:
7. Acceptance must be absolute.- In order to convert a proposal into a promise, the acceptance must-
(1) be absolute and unqualified;
(2) be expressed in some usual and reasonable manner...
What is the usual and reasonable manner makes for the acceptance by performance or by implications under Sections 8 & 9 of the Act which run thus :
8. Acceptance by performing conditions, or receiving consideration.- Performance of the conditions of a proposal, or the acceptance of any consideration for a reciprocal promise which may be offered with a proposal, is an acceptance of the proposal.
9. Promises, express and implied.- In so far as the proposal or acceptance of any promise is made in words, the promise is said to be express. Insofar as such proposal or acceptance is made otherwise than in words, the promise is said to be implied.

90. Defendant No. 1 accepted the proposal of the original Plaintiffs in the usual and reasonable manner that surgeons do. Surgeons would not accept only by saying "I will operate" but by actually operating, by aiding and assisting in operation as circumstances require, by charging the fees for the operation, by contriving to fix the operation to accommodate themselves as per their schedule and, of course, by being shown as one such surgeon in the records of the hospital. By all of these modes the contract between the parties in this case must be implied and is demonstrated by performance. It is implied by the patient accepting the surgeon's command to fix the operation at his convenience. It is accepted by the fact that it is fixed on a given day, 5 days after his advice in an O.T. adjoining another O.T.  where he admittedly performed another surgery. It is further implied by the charges that are levied to the patient by way of the surgeon's fees as per the schedule prevailing at the relevant time. It is further manifest in the surgeon actually remaining at the door of the O.T. where he was expected to come as per his implied obligations and where he admittedly conferred with another surgeon to understand the medical position of the patient and to command a further act before walking out.
91. This case falls squarely within the aforesaid Sections denoting an absolute and unqualified acceptance expressed by the usual mode which surgeons reasonably adopt. The acceptance is seen by the consideration sought to be charged for his fees. of course, in this case there is no direct acceptance; it could not be because there was a stiff resistance. Nevertheless the charge was demanded. It was stated to be specifically of Defendant No. 1 and none other in the notices of demand, Exhibits O & P in evidence. The charge of the anesthetist was indeed accepted which was in terms of the schedule of fees depending of the charge of the surgeons. The acceptance was not made in so many words "I will operate"; it was implied in the condescending act of Defendant No. 1 to fix the O.T. coordinated with Defendant No. 2 on the day that would convenience none other than he.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Suit No. 1101 of 1989
Decided On: 02.09.2011
 Padam Chandra Singhi and Ors.
Vs.
Dr. P.B. Desai and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
R.S. Dalvi, J.
Citation: 2012(1) ALLMR 510
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Thursday, 26 January 2017

How to ascertain territorial jurisdiction of court if offer and acceptance for contract is on telephone?

 Acceptance and intimation of acceptance of offer are therefore both necessary to result in a binding contract. In the case of a contract which consists of mutual promises, the offeror must receive intimation that the offeree has accepted his offer and has signified his willingness to perform his promise. When parties are in the presence of each other, the method of communication will depend upon the nature of the offer and the circumstances in which it is made. When an offer is orally made, acceptance may be expected to be made by an oral reply, but even a nod or other act which indubitably intimates acceptance may suffice. If the offeror receives no such intimation, even if the offeree has resolved to accept the offer a contract may not result. But on this rule is engrafted an exception based on ground of convenience which has the merit not a logic or principle in support, but of long acceptance by judicial decisions. If the parties are not in the presence of each other, and the offeror has not prescribed a mode ' of communication of acceptance, insistence upon communication of acceptance of the offer by the offeree would be found to be inconvenient, when the contract is made by letters sent by post. In Adams v. Lindsell 1 B & Ald. 681, it was ruled as early as in 1818 by the Court of King's Bench in England that the contract was complete as soon as it was put into transmission. In Adams's case (1 B & Ald. 681), the defendants wrote a letter to the plaintiff offering to sell a quantity of wool and requiring an answer by post. The plaintiff accepted the offer and posted a letter of acceptance, which was delivered to the defendants nearly a week after they had made their offer. The defendants however sold the goods to a third party, after the letter of acceptance was posted but before it was received by the defendants. The defendants were held liable in damages. The Court in that case is reported to have observed that "if the defendants were not bound by their offer when accepted by the plaintiffs till the answer was received, they the plaintiffs ought not to be bound till after they had received the notification that the defendants had received their answer and assented to it, And so it might go on ad infinitum. The rule Adam's case 1 B. & Ald. 681, was approved by the House of Lords in Dunlop and others v. Vincent Higgins and others 1 H.L.C. 381. The rule was based on commercial expediency, or what Cheshire calls "empirical grounds". It makes a large inroad upon the concept of consensus, "a meeting of minds" which is the basis of formation of a contract. It would be futile however to enter upon an academic discussion, whether the exception is justifiable in strict theory, and acceptable in principle. The exception has long been recognised in the United Kingdom and in other countries where the law of contracts is based on the common law of England. Authorities in India also exhibit a fairly uniform trend that in case of negotiations by post the contract is complete when acceptance of the offer is put into a course of transmission to the offerer : see Baroda Oil Cakes Traders' case MANU/MH/0130/1954 : AIR1954Bom491 , and cases cited therein. A similar rule has been adopted when the offer and acceptance are by telegrams. The exception to the general rule requiring intimation of acceptance may be summarised as follows. When by agreement, course of conduct, or usage of trade, acceptance by post or telegram is authorised, the bargain is struck and the contract is complete when the acceptance is put into a course of transmission by the offeree by posting a letter or dispatching a telegram.
11. The defendants contend that the same rule applies in the case of contracts made by conversation on telephone. The plaintiffs contend that the rule which applies to those contracts is the ordinary rule which regards a contract as complete only when acceptance is intimated to the proposer. In the case of a telephonic conversation, in a sense the parties are in the presence of each other : each party is able to hear the voice of the other. There is instantaneous communication of speech intimating offer and acceptance, rejection or counter offer. Intervention of an electrical impulse which results in the instantaneous communication of messages from a distance does not alter the nature of the conversation so as to make it analogous to that of an offer and acceptance through post or by telegraph.
12. It is true that the Post and Telegraphs Department has general control over communication by telephone and especially long distance telephone, but that is not a ground for assuming that the analogy of a contract made by post will govern this mode of making contracts. In the case of correspondence by post or telegraphic communication, a third agency intervenes and without the effective intervention of that third agency, Letters or messages cannot be transmitted. In the case of a conversation by telephone, once a connection is established there is in the normal course no further intervention of another agency. Parties holding conversation on the telephone are unable to see each other: They are also physically separated in space, but they are in the hearing of each other by the aid of a mechanical contrivance which makes the voice of one heard by the other instantaneously, and communication does not depend upon an external agency.
13. In the administration of the law of contracts, the Courts in India have generally been guided by the rules of the English common law applicable to contracts, where no statutory provision to the contrary is in force. The courts in the former Presidency towns by the terms of their respective letters patents, and the courts outside the Presidency towns by Bengal Regulation III of 1793, Madras Regulation II of 1802 and Bombay Regulation IV of 1827 and by the diverse Civil Courts act were enjoined in cases where no specific rule existed to act according to law or equity in the case of chartered High Court and elsewhere according to justice, equity and good conscience which expressions have been consistently interpreted to mean the rules of English common law, so far as they are application to the Indian society and circumstance.
14. In England the Court of Appeal has decided in Entores Ltd. v. Mills Far East Corporation that:
"................................ Where a contract is made by instantaneous communication, e.g. by telephone, the contract is complete only when the acceptance is received by the offeror, since generally an acceptance must be notified to the offeror to make a binding contract."
15. In Entores Ltd.'s case (1955) 2 Q.B.D. 327 the plaintiff made an offer from London By Telex to the agents in Holland of the defendant Corporation, whose headquarters were in New York, for the purchase of certain goods, and the offer was accepted by a communication received on the plaintiffs Telex machine in London. On the allegation that breach of contract was committed by the defendant Corporation, the plaintiff sought leave to serve notice of a writ on the defendant Corporation in New York claiming damages for breach of contract. The defendant Corporation contended that the contract was made in Holland, Denning L. J. who delivered the principal judgment of the Court observed at p. 332:
"When a contract is made by post it is clear law throughout the common law countries that the acceptance is a complete as soon as the letter is put into the post box, and that is the place where the contract is made. But there is no clear rule about contracts is made by telephone or by Telex. Communications by these means are virtually instantaneous and stand on a different footing.
and after examining the negotiations made in a contract arrived at by telephonic conversation on different stages, Denning L. J. observed that in the case of a telephone conservation the contract is only complete when the answer accepting the offer was made and that the same rule applies in the case of a contract by communication by Telex. He recorded his conclusion as follows.
"................... that the rule about instantaneous communications between the parties is different from the rule about the post. The contract is only complete when the acceptance is received by the offeror: and the contract is made at the place where the acceptance is received.
16. It appears that in a large majority of European countries the rule based on the theory of consensus add idem, is that a contract takes place where the acceptance of the offer is communicated to the offeror, and no distinction is made between contracts made by post or telegraph and by telephone or Telex. IN decisions of the State courts in the United States, conflicting views have been expressed, but the generally accepted view is that by the technical law of contracts the contract is made in the district where the acceptances is spoken. This is based on what is called the deeply rooted principal of common law that where the parties impliedly or expressly authorise a particular channel of communication, acceptance is effective when and where it enters that channel of communication. In the text books there is no reference to any decision of the Supreme Court of the United States of America on this question: America Jurisprudence, 2nd Edn. Vo. 17, Art. 54 p. 392 and Williston on Contracts, 3rd Edn Vo. No. 1 p.
17. Obviously the draftsman of the Indian contract Act did not envisage use of the telephone as a means of personal conversation between parties separated in space, and could not have intended to make any rule in that behalf. The question then is whether the ordinary rule which regards a contract as completed only when acceptance is intimated should apply, or whether the exception engrafted upon the rule in respect of offers and acceptances by post and by telegrams is to be accepted. If regard be had to the essential nature of conversation by telephone, it would be reasonable to hold that the parties being in a sense in the presence of each other, and negotiations are concluded by instantaneous communication of speech, communication of acceptance is a necessary part of the formation of contract, and the exception to the rule imposed on grounds of commercial expediency is inapplicable.
18. The trial Court was therefore right in the view which it has taken that a part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Civil City Court. Ahmedabad, where acceptance was Communicated by telephone to the plaintiffs.
Plaintiff and defendant entered into contract made by telephonic conversation - defendant failed to perform contract - plaintiff filed suit in Ahmedabad - defendant contended Civil Court at Ahmedabad does not have territorial jurisdiction - Trial Court opined that contract made by conversation on telephone is completed at place where acceptance of offer is intimated to offeror - Civil Court at Ahmedabad had jurisdiction to try the suit - High Court rejected defendant’s appeal - appeal before Supreme Court - held, Trial Court right in holding that part of cause of action arose within jurisdiction of Civil Court at Ahmedabad where acceptance was communicated by telephone to plaintiffs.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Civil Appeal No. 948 of 1964
Decided On: 30.08.1965

Bhagwandas Goverdhandas Kedia Vs. Girdharilal Parshottamdas and Co. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
J.C. ShahK.N. Wanchoo and M. Hidayatullah, JJ.

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Tuesday, 31 May 2016

Essential ingredients to be proved for proving offence under prevention of corruption Act

 In that respect, we found that evidence of P. Ws. 3 and 6 were more relevant as they were the complainant and the trap witnesses. When we perused the evidence of P.W. 3 who turned hostile and was cross-examined at length by the Respondent up to the point of recovery from A2 based on the alleged direction of the Appellant is concerned, we do not find any conflict. In other words, the narration as made by P.W. 3 as well as P.W. 6 who were the key witnesses speak about the factum of demand and acceptance of bribe, were to some extent consistent in narrating the event up to the point of the demand of Rs. 1500/- (Rupees One thousand five hundred) as tainted notes to accused Janakraj at the park which was located outside the office of M.C.D.
 Thereafter, when we wanted to ascertain as to the case of the prosecution that the said accused Janakraj carried the direction of the Appellant by handing over the tainted money to the Appellant and as to whether such tainted currency notes were recovered from the Appellant, we find that there was no acceptable legal evidence to that effect. We can profitably refer to the evidence of P.W. 3 who stated initially that the recovery of tainted currency notes after Janakraj was taken to the chamber of the Appellant was from the right side pant pocket of accused Janakraj. Immediately after making the said statement, P.W. 3 took diametrically opposite stand and said that it was not recovered from accused Janakaraj but was recovered from the Appellant. Immediately thereafter he went on to state that he did not remember whether in his 161 Statement, stated that the money was recovered from the pocket of the Appellant and not from the pocket of Janakaraj. In fact, P.W. 3 was confronted with his 161 statement where it was not so recorded. He also confirmed in the cross examination that hand wash of Janakaraj was taken by allowing him to dip his left hand fingers in a freshly prepared colourless solution of sodium carbonate which turned pink.
 Going by the above version of P.W. 3, it was clear that both on the first occasion when accused Janakraj was confronted by the officials of C.B.I. the process of dipping his fingers in the solution was carried out and the said process was repeated afresh after he was taken to the chambers of the Appellant. Secondly, nowhere in the evidence of P.W. 3 either in chief or in the cross we could deduce any statement to the effect that at any point of time the hand wash of the Appellant was taken in order to show that after the initial recovery from accused Janakaraj the process was continued to ensure that the demand of the Appellant and acceptance of the bribe money through Janakaraj was completed by accepting the money from accused Janakaraj and ultimately recovery was also effected from the Appellant by the usual practice of hand wash of the Appellant.
 In fact, we do not find any such legally acceptable evidence either from P.W. 3 or from the other so called independent witness P.W. 6 or the shadow witness in order to show that the mandatory requirement for conviction Under Sections 7 and 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) namely, the demand, acceptance and recovery was chronologically proved as against the Appellant. In the light of our above conclusion based on the analysis of the evidence led before the Court, we are constrained to hold that the conviction imposed on the Appellant by the trial court as well as confirmation of the same by the High Court cannot be sustained.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Criminal Appeal No. 9 of 2012
Decided On: 28.01.2015
Appellants: R.P.S. Yadav
Vs.
Respondent: Central Bureau of Investigation
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:F.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla and Abhay Manohar Sapre, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2015 SC(supp) 1137
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