No Legal Evidence, No Process: A Session Judge's Compass for Deciding Criminal Revisions Against Orders Issuing Process

 The Core Idea in One Line

An order issuing process cannot survive revision if it rests on no admissible, relevant material connecting the accused to the offence — but a Sessions Judge examining that question in revision must look only at the record that was before the Magistrate, and must never reweigh or reappraise the evidence found there.

What Counts as "Legal Evidence"

"Legal evidence" is admissible material — recognized as such under the Evidence Act — bearing a rational, probative connection to an ingredient of the offence charged. It is not simply anything appearing in the case file. Four elements define it:

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Supreme Court: Materials gathered in an illegal search remain admissible in evidence subject to the test of relevancy and genuineness

R.M. Malkani v. State of Maharashtra   MANU/SC/0204/1972 : 1972:INSC:234 : 1973 (1) SCC 471 is a two-Judge Bench decision of this Court. In that case, this Court was examining admissibility of tape recorded conversation. In that context, this Court held that tape recorded conversation is admissible provided, firstly, the conversation is relevant to the matter in issue; secondly, there is identification of the voice; and thirdly, the accuracy of the tape recorded conversation is proved. Rejecting the contention of the Appellant that the tape recorded conversation was obtained by illegal means, this Court held that even if evidence is illegally obtained, it is admissible. However, by expressing a word of caution, this Court observed that the Judge has a discretion to disallow evidence in a criminal case if the strict rules of admissibility would operate unfairly against the Accused. This Court referred to with approval its earlier decision in Magraj Patodia v. R.K. Birla   MANU/SC/0322/1970 : 1970:INSC:184 : AIR 1971 SC 1295 which held that a document which was procured by improper or even by illegal means could not bar its admissibility provided its relevance and genuineness were proved. Referring to English decisions, this Court held that as long as evidence is not tainted by an inadmissible confession of guilt evidence even if it is illegally obtained is admissible. {Para 52}

53. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Pooran Mal v. Director of Inspector (Investigation), New Delhi   MANU/SC/0055/1973 : 1973:INSC:241 : (1974) 1 SCC 345 was examining a challenge to search and seizure of certain premises Under Section 132 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 on the ground that the authorisation for the search as also the search and seizure were illegal. After referring to various provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, this Court opined that it had permitted relevancy as the only test of admissibility of evidence; the Indian Evidence Act or any other similar law in force does not exclude relevant evidence on the ground that it was obtained under an illegal search or seizure. Elaborating further, this Court held that courts have a discretion to admit evidence obtained as a result of illegal search. Unless there is an express or necessarily implied prohibition in law, evidence obtained as a result of illegal search or seizure is not liable to be shut out. 

Ratio: Admissibility of Evidence Collected in Illegal Search – Rule of Relevancy – Even if a search is conducted in infraction of statutory procedures (such as Section 30 of the PCPNDT Act), the materials or records seized during such search are not automatically discarded. Materials gathered in an illegal search remain admissible in evidence subject to the test of relevancy and genuineness – Noted that Court must, however, examine such evidence with greater care.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1058 of 2026 

Decided On: 23.02.2026

Naresh Kumar Garg Vs. State of Haryana and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Manoj Misra and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.

Author: Ujjal Bhuyan, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 176,MANU/SC/0182/2026.

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Madhya Pradesh HC: Illegally obtained Whatsapp chat is admissible in family court proceeding as per S 14 of Family courts Act

The husband has filed a suit for dissolution of marriage under Section 13 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, on the ground of cruelty. He has also pleaded adultery on the part of wife. In order to prove adultery, in paragraphs 8 & 9 of the plaint, specific pleadings have been made with regard to WhatsApp chat of the wife with a third person. The husband has pleaded that by way of a special application installed in the wife's phone, the WhatsApp chatting of her phone are automatically forwarded to his phone, which shows that the wife is having extramarital affair with a third person.

5. When the suit was at the stage of husband's evidence, he sought to exhibit the WhatsApp chats, to which the wife raised an objection. The learned Family Court has rejected the wife's objection and has allowed the husband to exhibit the WhatsApp chats. Being aggrieved by this order of the Family Court, the instant misc. petition has been filed by wife.

24. The Bombay High Court also dealt with the similar aspect in the case of Deepali Santosh Lokhande v. Santosh Vasantrao reported in MANU/MH/3502/2017 and held as under:

"9. A cumulative reading of section 14 and section 20 of the Family Courts Act, takes within its ambit the restricted applications of the provisions of the Evidence Act qua the documentary evidence which includes electronic evidence, whether or not the same is relevant or admissible, if in the opinion of the Family Court such evidence would assist the Family Court to deal effectively with the matrimonial dispute. Considering the above object and the intention of the legislature, in providing for a departure, from the normal rules of evidence under the Evidence Act, in my opinion, there was no embargo for the learned Judge of the Family Court to accept and exhibit the documents as sought by the petitioner-wife. Ultimately, it is the absolute power and authority of the Family Court either to accept or disregard a particular evidence in finally adjudicating the matrimonial dispute. However, to say that a party would be precluded from placing such documents on record and or such documents can be refused to be exhibited unless they are proved, in my opinion, goes contrary to the object of section 14 of the Family Courts Act."

35. In view of the discussion made above, this court is of the opinion that the Legislature, being fully aware of the principals of admissibility of evidence, has enacted Section 14 in order to expand that principle in so far as disputes relating to marriage and family affairs are concerned. The Family Court is thereby freed of restrictions of the strict law of evidence. The only test under Section 14 for a Family Court to receive the evidence, whether collected legitimately or otherwise, is based upon its subjective satisfaction that the evidence would assist it to deal effectually with the dispute.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH (GWALIOR BENCH)

Misc. Petition No. 3395 Of 2023

Decided On: 16.06.2025

Anjali  Vs. Raman 

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Ashish Shroti, J.

Citation:  MANU/MP/1611/2025

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Narco-Analysis Tests in Indian Criminal Law: Constitutional Safeguards and Evidentiary Value

 Constitutional Framework and Legal Provisions

Narco-analysis tests in India are governed primarily by constitutional protections under Article 20(3) (right against self-incrimination) and Article 21 (right to personal liberty) of the Indian Constitution. These rights are considered "non-derogable and sacrosanct rights to which the judiciary cannot carve out exceptions".

The Supreme Court has established that involuntary administration of narco-analysis violates the protection given by Article 20(3), and such tests cannot be conducted without the accused's free and informed consent. The Court emphasized that "under no circumstances is an involuntary or forced narco-analysis test permissible under law".

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Supreme Court: What is evidentiary value of voluntary Narco- analysis test of accused?

 264. In light of these conclusions, we hold that no individual should be forcibly subjected to any of the techniques in question, whether in the context of investigation in criminal cases or otherwise. Doing so would amount to an unwarranted intrusion into personal liberty. However, we do leave room for the voluntary administration of the impugned techniques in the context of criminal justice, provided that certain safeguards are in place. Even when the subject has given consent to undergo any of these tests, the test results by themselves cannot be admitted as evidence because the subject does not exercise conscious control over the responses during the administration of the test. However, any information or material that is subsequently discovered with the help of voluntary administered test results can be admitted in accordance with Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872.”

SUPREME COURT OF INDIAN

(Before Sanjay Karol and Prasanna B. Varale, JJ.)

Amlesh Kumar  Vs  State of Bihar 

Criminal Appeal No.____ of 2025 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 5392 of 2024)

Decided on June 9, 2025

Citation: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1326,2025 INSC 810.

Read full judgment here: Click here

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Supreme Court: Whether an accused can voluntarily seek a narco-analysis test, as a matter of an indefeasible right?

 On the other hand, there is Rajasthan High Court, which in Sunil Bhatt v. State14, held that the accused can seek a narco-analysis test at a relevant stage in view of the statutory right to lead evidence in defence under Section 233 of the Criminal Procedure Code. {Para 19}

20. In our view, as rightly submitted by the learned Amicus, the above view of the Rajasthan High Court cannot be sustained. It cannot be said that undergoing a narco-analysis test is part of the indefeasible right to lead evidence, given its suspect nature, and moreover, we find the same to be in the teeth of the judgment of this Court in Selvi (supra). 

264. In light of these conclusions, we hold that no individual should be forcibly subjected to any of the techniques in question, whether in the context of investigation in criminal cases or otherwise. Doing so would amount to an unwarranted intrusion into personal liberty. However, we do leave room for the voluntary administration of the impugned techniques in the context of criminal justice, provided that certain safeguards are in place. Even when the subject has given consent to undergo any of these tests, the test results by themselves cannot be admitted as evidence because the subject does not exercise conscious control over the responses during the administration of the test. However, any information or material that is subsequently discovered with the help of voluntary administered test results can be admitted in accordance with Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872.”

(Emphasis supplied)

21. In view of the above exposition in Selvi (Supra), the third question is answered in the following terms:

The accused has a right to voluntarily undergo a narco-analysis test at an appropriate stage. We deem it appropriate to add, that the appropriate stage for such a test to be conducted is when the accused is exercising his right to lead evidence in a trial. However, there is no indefeasible right with the accused to undergo a narco-analysis test, for upon receipt of such an application the concerned Court, must consider the totality of circumstances surrounding the matter, such as free consent, appropriate safeguards etc., authorizing a person to undergo a voluntary narco-analysis test. 

 In the Supreme Court of India

(Before Sanjay Karol and Prasanna B. Varale, JJ.)

Amlesh Kumar  Vs  State of Bihar 

Criminal Appeal No.____ of 2025 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 5392 of 2024)

Decided on June 9, 2025

Citation: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1326,2025 INSC 810.

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Constitutional Privacy vs. State Surveillance: IRAC Analysis of Vinit Kumar v. Central Bureau of Investigation (2019)

 Issue

The primary issues before the Bombay High Court were:

• Whether the three interception orders issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs under Section 5(2) of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 violated the petitioner's fundamental right to privacy under Article 21 of the Constitution.

• Whether the Central Bureau of Investigation failed to follow due procedure established under Section 5(2) of the Telegraph Act and Rule 419A of the Telegraph Rules

• Whether evidence obtained through allegedly unlawful interception could be used in criminal proceeding.

Rule

The legal framework governing telephone interception includes:

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Unlawful Interception and Evidence Admissibility: Lessons from Vinit Kumar v. CBI

 The first step under Section 5(2) of the Act, therefore, is the occurrence of any public emergency of the existence of a public-safety interest. Thereafter the competent authority under Section 5(2) of the Act is empowered to pass an order of interception after recording its satisfaction that it is necessary or expedient so to do in the interest of (i) sovereignty and integrity of India, (ii) the security of the State, (iii) friendly relations with foreign States, (iv) public order or (v) for preventing incitement to the commission of an offence. When any of the five situations mentioned above to the satisfaction of the competent authority require then the said authority may pass the order for interception of messages by recording reasons in writing for doing so. {Para 9}

30. The above analysis of Section 5(2) of the Act shows that so far the power to intercept messages/conversations is concerned the Section clearly lays-down the situations/conditions under which it can be exercised. But the substantive law as laid down in Section 5(2) of the Act must have procedural backing so that the exercise of power is fair and reasonable. The said procedure itself must be just, fair and reasonable. It has been settled by this Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, that "procedure which deals with the modalities of regulating, restricting or even rejecting a fundamental right falling within Article 21 has to be fair, not foolish, carefully designed to effectuate, not to subvert, the substantive right itself". Thus, understood, "procedure" must rule out anything arbitrary, freakish or bizarre. A valuable constitutional right can be canalised only by civilised processes".

6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in PUCL (Supra) thus categorically held and directed that:-

I. Right to privacy would certainly include telephonic conversation in the privacy of one's house or office. Telephone tapping would, thus, infract Article 21 of the Constitution of India unless it is permitted under the procedure established by law.

II. "Occurrence of public emergency" or "in the interest of public safety" are the "sine qua non" for the application of the provisions of Section 5(2) of the 1885 Act, and without them, the authorities have no jurisdiction to exercise the powers under the said Section to take resort to telephone tapping even though there is satisfaction that it is necessary or expedient so to do in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India etc.

III. The expression "public safety" means the State or Condition of freedom from danger or risk for the people at large.

IV. Neither the occurrence of public emergency nor the interest of public safety are secretive conditions or situations. Either of the situation would be apparent to a reasonable person.

V. The substantive law as laid down in Section 5(2) of the Act must have procedural safeguards for this valuable constitutional right as settled in Maneka Gandhi versus Union of India, that "procedure which deals with the modalities of regulating, restricting or even rejecting a fundamental right falling within Article 21 of the Constitution of India has to be fair, not foolish, carefully designed to effectuate, not to subvert, the substantive right itself", and the 'procedure' must rule out anything arbitrary, freakish and bizarre.

8. The proposition that illegal tapping of telephone conversation violates right to privacy is now accepted and reinforced as guaranteed fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, by a nine Judge Constitution Bench decision in K.S. Puttaswamy versus Union of India [MANU/SC/1044/2017 : (2017) 10 SCC 1]. by overruling the earlier Constitution Bench judgments, which did not consider right to privacy as fundamental rights, analogues to the American Fourth Amendment, viz. M.P. Sharma versus Satish Chandra [MANU/SC/0018/1954 : AIR 1954 SC 300]. or held that invasion of privacy is not an infringement of fundamental right guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution viz. Kharak Singh [MANU/SC/0085/1962 : AIR 1963 SC 1295] It has now been held by the Constitution Bench in K.S. Puttaswamy (supra) that the right to privacy is protected by the Constitution as an intrinsic part of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and as a part of the freedom guaranteed by Part-Ill of the Constitution of India.

9. Moreover, the view taken in PUCL's case (supra) was affirmed by the said nine Judge Bench in K.S. Puttaswamy (supra) with following observations:

68. In a decision of a Bench of two judges of this Court in PUCL, the Court dealt with telephone tapping. The petitioner challenged the constitutional validity of Section 5(2) of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 and urged in the alternative for adopting procedural safeguards to curb arbitrary acts of telephone tapping.

69. ............. Telephone conversations were construed to be an important ingredient of privacy and the tapping of such conversations was held to infringe Article 21, unless permitted by 'procedure established by law'.

The Court also held that telephone tapping infringes the guarantee of free speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) unless authorized by Article 19(2). The judgment relied on the protection of privacy under Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (and a similar guarantee under Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights) which, in its view, must be an interpretative tool for construing the provisions of the Constitution. Article 21. in the view of the Court, has to be interpreted in conformity with international law. 

578. It is not India alone, but the world that recognises the right of privacy as a basic human right. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights to which India is a signatory, recognises privacy as an international human right. The importance of this right to privacy cannot be diluted and the significance of this is that the legal conundrum was debated and is to be settled in the present reference by a nine-Judges Constitution Bench.

Test: Principle of proportionality and legitimacy

12. In view of the aforesaid clear and emphatic pronunciation of law on the subject by the Nine Judge Constitution Bench in K.S. Puttaswami (supra), it is no longer res-integra that:-

(a) The right to privacy is recognised by the Nine Judge Bench as inherent fundamental right having protection as an intrinsic part of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 and as a part of the freedom guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution which is subject to specified restrictions;

(b) Any infringement of the right to privacy by State Authorities will have to meet the following four tests based on the "Principle of proportionality and legitimacy":

1. The action must be sanctioned by law;

2. The proposed action must be necessary in a democratic society for a legitimate aim;

3. The extent of such interference must be proportionate to the need for such interference;

4. There must be procedural guarantees against abuse of such interference.

(c) All earlier judgments suggesting to the contrary, are no longer binding precedents. The matters of infraction of the fundamental right to privacy would now have to necessarily satisfy the aforesaid tests, and cannot be dealt with on the basis of the overruled judgments in M.P. Sharma (supra) or Kharak Singh (supra) or based thereon or on the same line of reasoning like R.M. Malkani (supra).

13. It is at this stage, it is pertinent to note that directions contained in PUCL (supra) are in consonance with the aforesaid 4 tests.

15. The petitioner before us is a businessman and is accused No. 2 in Special CBI Case No. 99 of 2011 arising out of FIR No. RC. 0682010003 of 11th April, 2011, lodged by CBI. In brief, the case of CBI alleges that the petitioner is a bribe-giver, who gave a bribe of Rs. 10,00,000/- to accused No. 1 (Public Servant-Bank Official) for getting certain credit related favour. We are not going into the merits or otherwise of the allegations levelled by CBI. The same can be assailed by the petitioner in his discharge application before the Trial Court.

16. We are of the view that as per Section 5(2) of the Act, an order for interception can be issued on either the occurrence of any public emergency or in the interest of the public safety. The impugned three interception orders were issued allegedly for the reason of 'public safety'. As held in PUCL (supra), unless a public emergency has occurred or the interest of public safety demands, the authorities have no jurisdiction to exercise the powers under the said section. The expression "Public Safety" as held in PUCL (supra) means the state or condition of freedom from danger or risk for the people at large. When either of two conditions are not in existence, it was impermissible to take resort to telephone tapping.

17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in PUCL case (supra) has observed that neither the occurrence of public emergency nor the interest of public safety are secretive conditions or situations. Either of the situations would be apparent to the reasonable person.

18. Even at this stage, from the affidavits filed by the Respondents or the charge-sheet, the Respondents could not justify any ingredients of risk to the people at large or interest of the public safety, for having taken resort to the telephonic tapping by invading the right to privacy. Neither from the impugned orders nor from the record any situation showing interest of public safety is borne out.

19. We are satisfied that in peculiar fact of the instant case, the impugned three interception orders neither have sanction of law nor issued for legitimate aim, as sought to be suggested. The impugned three interception orders could not satisfy the test of "Principles of proportionality and legitimacy" as laid down by the nine judges' constitution bench decision in K.T. Puttaswamy (supra). We, therefore, have no hesitation in holding that all three impugned orders are liable to be set aside. Accordingly, we quash and set aside the same.

20. Having held so, the next question arises is as to whether any directions for destroying the intercepted messages are warranted in a particular case or the instant case. The answer to the said issue would lie in ascertaining whether following directions contained in PUCL case (supra) which are now upheld by the constitution bench decision in K.T. Puttaswamy (supra) are mandatory:

21. We find that there is no scope to presume that aforesaid directions are not mandatory. It is an admitted position that Rule 419(A)(17) which provides for destruction of intercepted messages also adopt the said directions. We can neither permit the Respondents to continue to ignore the directions of the Hon'ble Apex Court nor can we ignore the same. Having held that the impugned interception orders have been issued in contravention of the provisions of section 5(2) of the Act, we have no option but to further direct the destruction of intercepted messages.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 2367 of 2019

Decided On: 22.10.2019

Vinit Kumar Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.V. More and N.J. Jamadar, JJ.

Author: R.V. More, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/2931/2019.

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Understanding the Admissibility and Inadmissibility of Evidence: Insights from the Indian Evidence Act and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam

The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 serves as the cornerstone for determining the admissibility and inadmissibility of evidence in legal proceedings in India. This Act delineates what types of evidence can be presented in court, the conditions for their admission, and the rules regarding their relevance. Recent changes introduced by the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 have further refined these provisions, reflecting evolving legal standards.

Admissibility of Evidence

Definition and Criteria

Evidence is considered admissible when it meets specific criteria:

- Relevance: The evidence must directly relate to the facts at issue in the case. Sections 5 to 55 of the Indian Evidence Act outline what constitutes relevant facts.

- Legality: Evidence must be obtained through lawful means. For instance, confessions made under coercion are deemed inadmissible.

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Whether confession of accused recorded by officer of Railway Protection force is admissible in evidence?

Whether an Officer of the Railway Protection Force, making an inquiry under the Railway Property (Unlawful Possession) Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as the 1966 Act), in respect of an offence under Section 3 of that Act of unlawful possession of the railway property, is a Police Officer for the purposes of Section 25, Evidence Act and Section 162 of the CrPC. 1898; and as such any confession or incriminating statement recorded by him in the course of an inquiry under Section 9 of the Act is inadmissible in evidence.

57. In the light of the above discussion, it is clear that an officer of the RPF conducting an enquiry under Section 8(1) of the 1966 Act has not been invested with all the powers of an officer-in-charge of a police station making an investigation under Chapter XIV of the Code. Particularly, he has no power to initiate prosecution by filing a charge-sheet before the Magistrate concerned under Section 173 of the Code, which has been held to be the clinching attribute of an investigating 'police officer'. Thus, judged by the test laid down in Badku Jyoti Savant's, which has been consistently adopted in the subsequent decisions noticed above, Inspector Kakade of the RPF could not be deemed to be a 'police officer' within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act, and therefore, any confessional or incriminating statement recorded by him in the course of an inquiry under Section 8(1) of the 1966 Act, cannot be excluded from evidence under the said section.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 208-209 of 1974 and Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 630 of 1977

Decided On: 31.07.1980

 Balkishan A. Devidayal  Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

O. Chinnappa Reddy and R.S. Sarkaria, JJ.

Citation: MANU/SC/0112/1980,AIR 1981 SC 379

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Landmark Judgment on appreciation of evidence of witness whose cross-examination could not be conducted due to death or illness

 I have given the matter my consideration and am of the view that the statement of a witness in examination-in-chief, which was admissible at the time it was recorded, cannot become inadmissible by reason of the subsequent death of the witness before cross-examination. The absence of cross-examination would undoubtedly affect the value and weight to be attached to the statement of the witness, but it would not render the statement inadmissible or result in its effacement. So far as the question is concerned as to what weight should be attached to such statement made in examination-in-chief the Court has to keep in view the facts and circumstances of each individual case. Some of the factors which may be borne in mind are the nature of the testimony, its probative value, the status of the witness, his relationship or connection with the parties to the case, a likely animus which may colour his statement and any other factor touching the credibility of the witness which may emerge on the record. Regard must also be had to the fact that the witness has not been subjected to cross-examination. The Court should see whether there are indications on the record that as a result of cross-examination his testimony was likely to be seriously shaken or his good faith or credit to be successfully impeached. The Court may also adopt a rule not to act upon such testimony unless it is materially corroborated or is supported by the surrounding circumstances. If after applying that rule of caution, the Court decides to rely upon the statement of a witness who was examined in chief, but who died before cross-examination, the decision of the Court in this respect would not suffer from any infirmity.

In the High Court of Delhi

Appellate Civil

(Before H.R. Khanna, J.)

Krishan Dayal Vs  Chandu Ram

R.S.A. No. 28 of 1962

Decided on July 8, 1969

Citation: 1969 SCC OnLine Del 134 : ILR (1969) Del 1090

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Whether evidence given by witness becomes inadmissible if police has read over his statement recorded U/S 161 of CRPC before he enters witness box?

he Full Bench answered the questions in paragraph 27 of the judgment at p. 60 thus (at p. 45) of Cri LJ):

"(1) The evidence of such witness does not become inadmissible; its probative value has to be judged in the circumstances of each case. No hard and fast rule can be laid down that in all such cases the evidence of such witness will be of no value whatsoever.

(2) Reading over of the police statement to the witness before he enters the box does not amount to contravention of the prohibition contained in Section 162(1). But the fact of reading over of the statement may affect the probative value of the evidence of the witness.

(3) Reading over of such a statement to the witness before he enters the box does not amount to use of such statement contrary to Section 162(1)."

5. I am in respectful agreement with the views expressed by the Gujarat High Court in the Full Bench decision aforementioned. As observed therein the user contemplated in Section 162 of the Code is actual user in Court proceedings and not user dehors the Court proceedings. The Court proceedings begin when the Court starts hearing a case and end when the Court stops the proceedings and adjourns them to some other day. The section does not prevent user of a police statement outside the Court proceedings. That is manifested from the words "be used for any purpose, save as hereinafter provided, at any inquiry or trial in respect of any offence under investigation." The prohibition is only for using such statements in proceedings before Court. It was for that reason that the Privy Council in Zahiruddin's case (MANU/PR/0030/1947) (supra), held that evidence of the witness is inadmissible. In that case the evidence was rendered inadmissible for two reasons (1) he had previously given a signed statement to the police and (2) the statement was made use of by the witness while giving evidence to prompt his memory. The ratio of the decision of the Privy Council cannot therefore be extended to the present case. The result is that the testimonies of PWs. 1 and 3 do not become inadmissible for the reason that the police had read out the statement to them before they entered the witness box. There is thus no contravention of the prohibition contained in Section 162(1) of the Code. The reading of the statement to the witnesses does not therefore amount to use of such a statement contrary to the provision contained in Section 162(1) of the Code. Still the reading over of the statement may affect the probative value of the evidence of the witness which the Court has to judge in the circumstances of each case.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA

Cri. Appeal No. 462 of 1992

Decided On: 13.01.1995

 Ali  Vs.  State of Kerala

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

K.P. Balanarayana Marar, J.

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Whether unregistered family settlement is admissible in evidence?

 It is required to be noted that the deed dated
23.04.1971, under which the suit property had gone /devolved in
favour of the Krishnappa, was reduced in writing before the
Panchayat and Panchas, and the same was signed by the village
people/panchayat people and all the members of the family
including even the plaintiff. Though the plaintiff disputed that
the partition was not reduced in writing in the form of document
Exhibit D4, on considering the entire evidence on record and
even the deposition of plaintiff (crossexamination),
he has
specifically admitted that the oral partition had taken place in the
year 1971. He has also admitted that he has got the share which
tellies with the document dated 23.04.1971 (Exhibit D4).
Execution of the document/ Partition Deed/ Palupatta dated
23.04.1971 has been established and proved by examining
different witnesses. The High Court has refused to look into the
said document and/or consider document dated 23.04.1971
(Exhibit D4) solely on the ground that it requires registration and
therefore as it is unregistered, the same cannot be looked into.
However, as observed by this Court in the case of Kale (Supra)
that such a family settlement, though not registered, would
operate as a complete estoppel against the parties to such a

family settlement. In the aforesaid decision, this Court
considered its earlier decision in the case of S. Shanmugam Pillai
and Others v. K. Shanmugam Pillai and Others (1973) 2 SCC 312
in which it was observed as under:
“13. Equitable, principles such as estoppel,
election, family settlement, etc. are not mere
technical rules of evidence. They have an
important purpose to serve in the administration
of justice. The ultimate aim of the law is to
secure justice. In the recent times in order to
render justice between the parties, courts have
been liberally relying on those principles. We
would hesitate to narrow down their scope.
As observed by this Court in T.V.R. Subbu
Chetty’s Family Charities case, that if a person
having full knowledge of his right as a possible
reversioner enters into a transaction which
settles his claim as well as the claim of the
opponents at the relevant time, he cannot be
permitted to go back on that agreement when
reversion actually falls open.”
9.5 As held by this Court in the case of Subraya M.N.
(Supra) even without registration a written document of family
settlement/family arrangement can be used as corroborative
evidence as explaining the arrangement made thereunder and
conduct of the parties. In the present case, as observed
hereinabove, even the plaintiff has also categorically admitted
that the oral partition had taken place on 23.04.1971 and he also

admitted that 3 to 4 punchayat people were also present.
However, according to him, the same was not reduced in writing.
Therefore, even accepting the case of plaintiff that there was an
oral partition on 23.04.1971, the document Exhibit D4 dated
23.04.1971, to which he is also the signatory and all other family
members are signatory, can be said to be a list of properties
partitioned. Everybody got right/share as per the oral
partition/partition. Therefore, the same even can be used as
corroborative evidence as explaining the arrangement made
thereunder and conduct of the parties. Therefore, in the facts
and circumstances of the case, the High Court has committed a
grave/manifest error in not looking into and/or not considering
the document Exhibit D4 dated 23.04.1971.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 784 OF 2010

Thulasidhara  Vs Narayanappa 

M.R. SHAH, J.
Dated:MAY 1, 2019.

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Whether confession of accused recorded under TADA is admissible in trial for offences under other enactments?

 We may hasten to observe that it is now well settled that
the Designated Court, besides trying the case under TADA,
can also try any other offence with which the accused may be
charged at the same trial if the offences are connected with
offences under TADA. For, implicit power has been bestowed
upon the Designated Court to convict the accused for offences
under other enactments if there is legally admissible evidence
to establish those charges. We may usefully refer to the
dictum in paragraph 37 of the Constitution Bench judgment in
Prakash Kumar alias Prakash Bhutto (supra), which reads
thus:
“37. The legislative intendment underlying Sections 12(1)
and (2) is clearly discernible, to empower the Designated
Court to try and convict the accused for offences committed
under any other law along with offences committed under
the Act, if the offence is connected with such other offence.
The language “if the offence is connected with such other
offence” employed in Section 12(1) of the Act has great
significance. The necessary corollary is that once the
other offence is connected with the offence under TADA
and if the accused is charged under the Code and tried
together in the same trial, the Designated Court is
empowered to convict the accused for the offence under
any other law, notwithstanding the fact that no offence
under TADA is made out. This could be the only
intendment of the legislature. To hold otherwise, would
amount to rewrite or recast legislation and read something
into it which is not there.”

(emphasis supplied)
This exposition has been applied by a Two Judge Bench in a
recent decision in Ashrafkhan alias Babu Munnekhan
Pathan & Anr. Vs. State of Gujarat 10 (2012) 11 SCC 606, as is evident from
paragraph 41, which reads thus:
“41. We have held the conviction of the accused to have
been vitiated on account of noncompliance
with Section
20A( 1) of TADA and thus, it may be permissible in law to
maintain the conviction under the Arms Act and the
Explosive Substances Act but that shall only be possible
when there are legally admissible evidence to establish
those charges. The Designated Court has only relied on the
confessions recorded under TADA to convict the accused for
offences under the Arms Act and the Explosive Substances
Act. In view of our finding that their conviction is
vitiated on account of noncompliance
of the mandatory
requirement of prior approval under Section 20A(
1) of
TADA, the confessions recorded cannot be looked into to
establish the guilt under the aforesaid Acts. Hence, the
conviction of the accused under Sections 7 and 25(1A)
of
the Arms Act and Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Explosive
Substances Act cannot also be allowed to stand.”
(emphasis supplied)
24. Even in the present case, it is noticed that the
prosecution has essentially relied upon the confessional

statement of the accused recorded under the provisions of
TADA. That will be of no avail and certainly not admissible
against the accused in the trial for offences under other
enactments, especially when the Designated Court could not
have taken cognizance of the offence under TADA for lack of a
valid sanction.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 13591361
OF 2007
The State of Gujarat  Vs Anwar Osman Sumbhaniya 

A.M. Khanwilkar, J.

Dated:February 27, 2019.

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Whether admissibility of document in evidence is necessary for discovery of document?

 Nor do we think that the High Court was right in holding that the documents ordered to be discovered were not relevant to the injury. The documents sought to be discovered need not be admissible in evidence in the enquiry or proceedings. It is sufficient if the documents would be relevant for. the purpose of throwing light on the matter in controversy. Every document which will throw any light on the case is a document relating to a matter in dispute in the proceedings, though it might not be admissible in evidence. In other words, a document might be inadmissible in evidence yet it may contain information which may either directly or indirectly enable the party seeking discovery either to advance his case or damage the adversary's case or which may lead to a trail of enquiry which may have either of these two consequences. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 665(N) of 1972

Decided On: 19.07.1972

Shri M.L. Sethi Vs. Shri R.P. Kapur

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

K.K. Mathew and P. Jaganmohan Reddy, JJ.

Citations: 1972 AIR 2379, 1973 SCR (1) 697

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Whether recital as to boundaries in sale deed of adjacent land is admissible in evidence?

 Section 11(2) of the India Evidence Act, however, says that a fact or facts which may not be relevant, may make the existence or non-existence of a fact or facts highly probable or improbable.

270. Thus it is concluded that three sale deeds Paper No. 160-Ga, 161-Ga and 162-Ga though are not admissible in evidence as the document of proof of ownership but recital of boundaries therein are of some substance and relevance for the limited purpose of making probable the existence of "Roll Wali Dharmshala" in Mohalla Govind deo Ji, when read all other evidences on record.

271. This fact i.e. the recital of boundaries therein, therefore, becomes relevant under Section 11 read with Section 13 of the Indian Evidence Act.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD

First Appeal Nos. 55 of 2008, 448 and 472 of 2007

Decided On: 06.03.2017

Radha Sharan Dubey and Ors. Vs. Ram Niwas and Ors.

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Leading Supreme Court judgment on admissibility of hearsay evidence

The following is the evidence of which the Courts below have acted. First, there is the 5th plaintiff Khantar Jha (P.W. 6). He proves the entire genealogy. It is true he has not got personal knowledge of every step in the sense that he knew each one of the persons named; that would be impossible as many died before he was born. But personal knowledge is not necessary in these cases.

A member of the family can speak in the witness box of what he has been told and what he has learned about his own ancestors, provided what he says is an expression of his own independent opinion (even though it is based on hearsay derived from deceased, not living, persons) and is not merely repetition of the hearsay opinion of others, and provided the opinion is expressed by conduct. His sources of information and the time at which he acquired the knowledge (for example, whether before the dispute or not) would affect its weight but not its admissibility. This is therefore legally admissible evidence which, if believed, is legally sufficient to support the finding.

11. However, the lower Courts have not rested their decision solely on the 5th plaintiffs testimony. They have used certain Panjis as corroboration and the question is, are they admissible in evidence?

The attack made on them is that the 5th plaintiff admits as P.W. 6 that it was he who dictated the genealogy to Nirsoo Jha (P.W. 29) and to another Panjikar, Raghunath Jha (P.W. 40) after the dispute arose. He says he told Nirsoo about five years before he was speaking (that is to say, in or about the year 1939) and Raghunath eight to ten years before (that is, in 1934 or 1936). This was admittedly after the dispute, so it was said that the entries are inadmissible in evidence.

12. These Panjis are maintained by Panjikars who are professional genealogists. They systematically maintain pedigree tables in the community of Naithal Brahmins. They go from place to place and periodically ascertain the genealogies of their clients and enter them in Panjis (palm leaf manuscripts of genealogy) and add to them such fresh additions as occur in the family from time to time. They are considered important in this community because questions of marriage (who may marry whom) and relationship and caste turn on them. Statements about pedigree are not therefore lightly made in such cases.

The weight to be attached to them may, in a given case, be nil; on the other hand, they may be regarded as important because a man in such a position would ordinarily hesitate before giving a false pedigree as so many unforeseen consequences of importance to him and his family may turn on it. But the question of weight is for the Courts of fact to determine; we are only concerned with the admissibility.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeals Nos. 34 and 35 of 1953

Decided On: 21.04.1954

Sitaji  Vs. Bijendra Narain Choudhary and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
M.C. Mahajan, C.J., Vivian Bose and Ghulam Hasan, JJ.

Citation:AIR 1954 SC 601
Vivian Bose, J.

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Whether evidence of witness to whom oath is not administered is admissible in evidence?

The first point taken before us related to the admissi- bility of the evidence of the girl herself. Her age was stated to be seven or eight years at the time of the exami- nation by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge who recorded her testimony. He certified that she did not understand the sanctity of an oath and accordingly did not administer one to her. He did not certify that the child understood the duty of speaking the truth.

The proviso to section 5 of the Indian Oaths Act, 1873, prescribes that--"Provided that where the witness is a child under twelve years of age, and the Court or person having authority to examine such witness is of opinion that, though he understands the duty of speaking the truth, he does not understand the nature of an oath or affirmation, the forego- ing provisions of this section and the provisions ofsection 6 shall not apply to such witness, but in any such case the absence of an oath or affirmation shall not render inadmis- sible any evidence given by such witness nor affect the obligation of the witness to state the truth."

The question is whether the opinion referred to must be formally recorded or whether it can be inferred from the circumstances in which the deposition was taken. The proviso quoted above must be read along with section 118 of the Evidence Act and section 13 of the Oaths Act. In my opinion, an omission to administer an oath, even to an adult, goes only to the credibility of the witness and not his competency. The question of competency is dealt with in section 118. Every witness is competent unless the Court considers he is pre- vented from understanding the questions put to him, or from giving rational answers by reason of tender years, extreme old age, disease whether of body or mind, or any other cause of the same kind. It will be observed that there is always competency in fact unless the court considers otherwise. No other ground of incompetency is given, therefore, unless the Oaths Actadds additional grounds of incompetency it is evident that section 118 must prevail.

Now the Oaths Act does not deal with competency. Its main object is to render persons who give false evidence liable to prosecution. It is true a subsidiary object is to bring home to the witness the solemnity of the occasion and to impress upon him the duty of speaking the truth, but in view ofsection 118 these matters only touch credibility and not admissibility. In my opinion, section 13 of the Oaths Act places this beyond doubt. It states--

"No omission to take any oath or make any affirmation......... and no irregularity whatever, in the form in which any one of them is administered, shall invali- date any proceeding or render inadmissible any evidence whatever.......... "

Section 5 is the main provision regarding the adminis- tration of oaths. The proviso only sets out the cases in which the oath is not to be administered. If, therefore, an omission to take the oath does not affect the admissibility of the evidence, it follows that irregularity of the kind we are considering which arises out of the proviso cannot affect the admissibility either. Section 118 remains and unless the judge considers otherwise the witness is compe- tent.

I would add however that it is desirable that judges and magistrates should always record their opinion that the child understands the duty of speaking the truth and state why they think that, otherwise the credibility of the wit- ness may be seriously affected, so much so, that in some cases it may be necessary to reject the evidence altogether. But whether the magistrate or judge really was of that opinion can, I think, be gathered from the circumstances when there is no formal certificate. In the present case, it is plain that the learned Judge had the proviso in mind because he certified that the witness does not understand the nature of an oath and so did not administer one but despite that went on to take her evidence. It is also an important fact that the accused, who was represented by counsel, did not object. Had he raised the point the Judge would doubtless have made good the omission. I am of opinion that Mst. Purni was a competent witness and that her evi- dence is admissible. In (1) 14 Beng. L.R. 294 F.N. (2) (1907) 10 O.C. 337 the Privy Council case which I have just cited, their Lord- ships said--

"It is not to be supposed that any judge would accept as a witness a person who he considered was incapable not only of understanding the nature of an oath but also the necessi- ty of speaking the truth when examined as a witness."

That is the very point here. One can presume that the learned Judge had that in mind from the fact that he exam- ined the child after referring to a fact which arises out of the proviso.

Supreme Court of India

Rameshwar vs The State Of Rajasthan on 20 December, 1951

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Whether legal necessity can be proved by statement of deceased recorded before tenancy court?

Exhibits 133 and 134 record of tenancy
proceeding which was filed by Laxmibai against husband
of Anjanibai shows that the proceeding was filed for
possession by Laxmibai on the ground that the husband of
Anjanibai was not giving crop share to her. These
documents include evidence of Laxmibai recorded before
the tenancy Court and there is both, the examination-inchief
and the cross-examination of Laxmibai. This record
is considered by the Courts below as Laxmibai is dead and
it is relevant matter under section 32 of the Evidence Act.
This record shows that maximum quantity of six mans
food-grains was given to Laxmibai by the husband of
Anjanibai in one year and in one year only three mans
food-grain was given. The record shows that Laxmibai had
tried to convince the husband of Anjanibai to give more
food-grains as crop share for her survival and that was
done through mediator also. But the husband of Anjanibai
had refused to give her crop share. In the cross
examination of Laxmibai it was suggested to her that

under agreement with husband of Anjanibai, land was
given for cultivation and she had no objection against the
husband of Anjanibai to cultivate the land if he was acting
as per the terms and conditions of lease. It was brought
on the record that Laxmibai had made attempts to give
the suit land to one Mohan for cultivation. Laxmibai had
stated that due to husband of Anjanibai, Mohan had
refused to cultivate the land. Thus, difficulties, which
Laxmibai had faced in cultivating the land and get it
cultivated through others were stated before the authority
by Laxmibai.
27) The aforesaid discussion shows that Laxmibai
had become helpless. The family of the plaintiff was not
taking care of her. She was not in a position to personally
cultivate the land. Further the land was not giving
sufficient income and for survival she was required to take
some steps. Considering the value of the land it was not
possible for her to raise money by mortgaging the land for
her survival. Further there would have been question of
repayment of loan. In view of these circumstances
Laxmibai sold the property to Tatyaba. It is specifically

mentioned in the sale deed that she wanted to repay the
loan and she wanted to use the remaining money, part of
the consideration, for family expenses, for maintenance.
This evidence was certainly sufficient to create probability
that there was legal necessity and there was no other
alternative before Laxmibai than to sell the property. The
effect of the aforesaid circumstances ought to have been
considered by the Courts below in view of the law laid
down in that regard. The aforesaid circumstances are not
separately and cumulatively considered by the Courts
below.
THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
Second Appeal No.55 of 1989
 Kisan Ramchandra Kokane

V
 Anjani w/o Laxman Kapase,


 CORAM: T.V. NALAWADE, J.
 DATE : 20th JUNE 2016.
Citation: AIR 2017 (NOC) 64 Bom

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When brain mapping and Narco analysis tests reports are not admissible in evidence?

It is incidentally noticed that it is not in dispute that the appellant was subjected to brain mapping and Narco Analysis Test, but the person who had conducted the test was not tendered as a witness before the court and none has been examined to explain the report of the brain mapping and Narco Analysis Test.

Admittedly, the bulk of the allegations against the appellant are hence not on the basis of independent material evidence, but is apparently on the basis of revelations said to have been made by the appellant, while in a drug induced state when polygraph, brain mapping and narco analysis tests were resorted to in extracting information from the appellant. Though seemingly incriminating reports are placed on record, the person who had conducted these tests was never examined as a witness. However, the reports are marked as Exhibits P-95 to P-97. The said reports cannot also be relied upon as the same is violative of the law as laid down by the Apex Court in Selvi & others v. State of Karnataka, MANU/SC/0325/2010 : AIR 2010 SC 1974. Compulsory involuntary administration of the Narco-analysis, Polygraph examination and the Brain Electrical Activation Profile violates the right against self incrimination enumerated in Article 20(3) of the Constitution, as the subject does not exercise conscious control over the responses during the administration of the test.

Hence, it cannot be said that the prosecution had made out a case on the basis of the evidence on record that the appellant was guilty of any offence punishable under Section 121, 122 or 124-A of the IPC.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA (KALABURAGI BENCH)

Criminal Appeal No. 3645/2010

Decided On: 20.07.2016

 Abdul Raheman

Vs.

 The State of Karnataka

Coram:

Anand Byrareddy and L. Narayana Swamy, JJ.

Citation: 2017 CRLJ(NOC)28 Kar

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