Supreme Court: Spying in Matrimony: When Privacy Gives Way to Fair Trial Rights Under Section 122 of Evidence Act

 In matrimonial disputes under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, Section 122, the court held that the provision comprises two parts: “compellability” and “permissibility” of spousal communications. A spouse cannot be compelled to disclose confidential communication made by the other, and consent for disclosure lies with the spouse who made the communication. The provision aims to protect the sanctity of marriage, not individual fundamental right to privacy under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Consequently, the right to privacy is not a relevant consideration in such disputes. Secretly recorded telephonic conversations between spouses are admissible as evidence in matrimonial proceedings under the exception carved out within Section 122, which must be balanced with the right to a fair trial, also guaranteed by Article 21. Section 122 does not apply horizontally and recognizes the rights to a fair trial, to produce relevant evidence, and to prove one’s case against the spouse. The court rejected the argument that such evidence would disturb domestic harmony, noting that snooping between spouses indicates a broken relationship. The court clarified that while the content of a common law right may resemble a fundamental right, they are differentiated by the duties’ incidence—on private entities versus the State. Admissibility of secretly obtained evidence requires satisfying a three-fold test of relevance, identification, and accuracy. Recording conversations without the speaker’s consent or knowledge does not per se bar admissibility. Appeal allowed. (Relied on: M.C. Verghese v. T.J. Poonan, (1969) 1 SCC 37; R. M. Malkani v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCR 417).

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 9489 of 2025 

Decided On: 14.07.2025

Vibhor Garg Vs. Neha

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.V. Nagarathna and S.C. Sharma, JJ.

Author: B.V. Nagarathna, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0902/2025,2025 INSC 829

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The Constitutional Dialectic: Reconciling Privacy, Fairness, and Marital Sanctity in India's Digital Age

 Abstract

The Supreme Court of India's recent landmark judgment in Vibhor Garg vs. Neha (2025) represents a pivotal constitutional moment that redefines the delicate equilibrium between fundamental rights within the matrimonial domain. This decision transcends traditional evidence law principles, offering profound insights into the evolving jurisprudence of privacy rights, fair trial guarantees, and the constitutional architecture governing private relationships in contemporary India. This article examines the Court's nuanced approach to balancing competing constitutional imperatives while addressing the complex interplay between vertical and horizontal application of fundamental rights.

Introduction: The Constitutional Crossroads

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Secretly Recorded Spousal Conversations in Matrimonial Proceedings: Supreme Court’s Landmark Judgment Balances Privacy and Fair Trial Rights

 

The Supreme Court of India, in a landmark judgment dated July 14, 2025, in Vibhor Garg vs. Neha, has decisively addressed the contentious issue of the admissibility of secretly recorded conversations between spouses in matrimonial disputes. This ruling marks a significant turning point at the crossroads of privacy rights, evidence law, and matrimonial justice, offering much-needed clarity for courts, advocates, and litigants navigating these sensitive terrains.

Background: Privacy vs. Evidence in Matrimonial Litigation

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Digital Privacy vs Fair Trial: High Court's Game-Changing Verdict on WhatsApp Evidence in Family Disputes

 Landmark Ruling Expands Digital Evidence Admissibility in Matrimonial Cases

In a groundbreaking judgment that could reshape how digital evidence is treated in family disputes, the Madhya Pradesh High Court has ruled that WhatsApp chats obtained through surveillance—even without consent—can be admitted as evidence in family court proceedings if they assist in resolving matrimonial disputes.

Case Background: Digital Surveillance in Marriage

The case of Smt. Anjali Sharma vs. Raman Upadhyay (M.P. No. 3395/2023)Decided On: 16.06.2025, involved a marriage that took place on December 1, 2016, with a daughter born in October 2017. Th dispute arose when the husband filed for divorce under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, alleging cruelty and adultery.

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Madhya Pradesh HC: Illegally obtained Whatsapp chat is admissible in family court proceeding as per S 14 of Family courts Act

The husband has filed a suit for dissolution of marriage under Section 13 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, on the ground of cruelty. He has also pleaded adultery on the part of wife. In order to prove adultery, in paragraphs 8 & 9 of the plaint, specific pleadings have been made with regard to WhatsApp chat of the wife with a third person. The husband has pleaded that by way of a special application installed in the wife's phone, the WhatsApp chatting of her phone are automatically forwarded to his phone, which shows that the wife is having extramarital affair with a third person.

5. When the suit was at the stage of husband's evidence, he sought to exhibit the WhatsApp chats, to which the wife raised an objection. The learned Family Court has rejected the wife's objection and has allowed the husband to exhibit the WhatsApp chats. Being aggrieved by this order of the Family Court, the instant misc. petition has been filed by wife.

24. The Bombay High Court also dealt with the similar aspect in the case of Deepali Santosh Lokhande v. Santosh Vasantrao reported in MANU/MH/3502/2017 and held as under:

"9. A cumulative reading of section 14 and section 20 of the Family Courts Act, takes within its ambit the restricted applications of the provisions of the Evidence Act qua the documentary evidence which includes electronic evidence, whether or not the same is relevant or admissible, if in the opinion of the Family Court such evidence would assist the Family Court to deal effectively with the matrimonial dispute. Considering the above object and the intention of the legislature, in providing for a departure, from the normal rules of evidence under the Evidence Act, in my opinion, there was no embargo for the learned Judge of the Family Court to accept and exhibit the documents as sought by the petitioner-wife. Ultimately, it is the absolute power and authority of the Family Court either to accept or disregard a particular evidence in finally adjudicating the matrimonial dispute. However, to say that a party would be precluded from placing such documents on record and or such documents can be refused to be exhibited unless they are proved, in my opinion, goes contrary to the object of section 14 of the Family Courts Act."

35. In view of the discussion made above, this court is of the opinion that the Legislature, being fully aware of the principals of admissibility of evidence, has enacted Section 14 in order to expand that principle in so far as disputes relating to marriage and family affairs are concerned. The Family Court is thereby freed of restrictions of the strict law of evidence. The only test under Section 14 for a Family Court to receive the evidence, whether collected legitimately or otherwise, is based upon its subjective satisfaction that the evidence would assist it to deal effectually with the dispute.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH (GWALIOR BENCH)

Misc. Petition No. 3395 Of 2023

Decided On: 16.06.2025

Anjali  Vs. Raman 

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Ashish Shroti, J.

Citation:  MANU/MP/1611/2025

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Scope of applicability of the Indian Evidence Act to the Family Courts.

 S 14 of Family courts Act:-  Application of Indian Evidence Act, 1872.—A Family Court may receive as evidence any report, statement, documents, information or matter that may, in its opinion, assist it to deal effectually with a dispute, whether or not the same would be otherwise relevant or admissible under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872).

The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (IEA) is the primary legislation governing the admissibility of evidence in Indian courts. However, in the case of Family Courts, established under the Family Courts Act, 1984 (FCA), the applicability of the IEA is nuanced and varies slightly.

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Can the family court direct, upon the wife's request, the production of hotel details and call details of her husband to prove his adultery, or can the husband claim the right to privacy?

 I have also considered the petitioner’s plea that the direction to produce the records sought by the respondent would amount to roving and fishing inquiry by the Court but do not find any merit in the same. At the cost of repetition, I may observe that it is not as if the respondent is seeking information about any stranger staying in the hotel, her plea is only for records pertaining to her legally wedded husband, who she has a reason to believe is indulging in adultery with a particular lady in a particular room. The respondent has sought details of her husband’s stay in a particular hotel during a specific time period and not of his friend or the friend’s daughter. Similarly she has also sought the call details of her husband alone, whose phone numbers she has provided. Once the respondent is seeking specific information regarding her husband’s stay during a specific period at a specific hotel, it cannot be said that the respondent is indulging in any roving and fishing inquiry. None of the respondent’s prayers, therefore, seek any information about any stranger or about any vague incident or period. The decision in Sharda (supra) relied upon by the petitioner is, therefore, not applicable to the facts of the case. {Para 35}

36. Now coming to the petitioner’s plea that the divulgence of this information to the respondent, even though, initially being sought in a sealed cover would be violative of his right to privacy or the right of his lady friend or that of her minor child. While Ms. Singh is correct in urging that even a legally wedded wife may not have a fundamental right to know every minor detail about her husband or to seek information as to with whom he talks on his mobile phone and therefore the production of information as directed under the impugned order may amount to infringement of privacy of the petitioner husband, what cannot be ignored is that the respondent is the legally wedded wife who has a reasonable apprehension that her husband is indulging in adultery for which she has filed a petition seeking divorce under Section 13(1)(i) of the Hindu Marriage Act. She has pleaded before the learned Family Court that she has no other means to prove except by securing information from the hotel and the mobile agencies, which plea has been accepted by the learned Family Court. Can it be said that the learned Family Court, in the light of the documents already placed on record, was unjustified in coming to her aid, is the question which needs to be answered by this Court. As held in Linda Constance Edwards (supra) rarely would there be direct evidence of adultery. I am therefore of the considered view that when in a case like the present, when a wife seeks the help of the Court for procuring evidence which would go a long way to prove adultery on the part of her husband, the Court must step in; this would be in consonance with Section 14 of the Family Courts Act which gives a leeway to the Court to consider evidence which may be not admissible or relevant under the Indian Evidence Act.

41. Having given my thoughtful consideration as to whose right should prevail in the facts of the present case, I am inclined to accept the respondent’s plea. The petitioner’s claim is based solely on the right to privacy which, as held in K.S. Puttuswamy (supra) and Joseph Shine (supra) is not an absolute right; on the other hand, the respondent’s prayer is based not only on morality but also on specific rights granted under the Hindu Marriage Act and the Family Courts Act. I, therefore, have no hesitation in holding that the respondent’s right must prevail and therefore, find no reason to interfere with the impugned orders. The learned Family Court by way of the impugned orders has sought records which pertain only to the respondent’s husband and not to his friend or her daughter. There is, therefore, no question of their right of privacy being violated in any manner.

 Neutral Citation No. 2023:DHC:3197

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI 

CM(M) 64/2023, CM APPL. 2082/2023 (stay) & CM APPL. 6247/2023 SACHIN ARORA  Vs MANJU ARORA .

 CORAM: HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE REKHA PALLI 

Date of Decision: 10.05.2023 

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Right of a husband to get Fair trial Vs Right of privacy of wife

1)  In the divorce proceedings, the husband filed a Compact Disc (CD) purporting to contain an audio-video

recording of the wife supposedly speaking with her lady friend, by name Sugandha, on phone and talking about the husband and his family in a manner, which the husband claims was derogatory, defamatory and constituted cruelty to him.

2) The wife opposed the CD being brought on record on the ground, firstly, that the contents of the CD were tampered with and were therefore not authentic ; and secondly, that the contents of the CD were not admissible in evidence since they were a

recording of a ‘private’ conversation that the wife had had with a friend, which had been secretly recorded by the husband, without the knowledge or consent of the wife, in breach of her fundamental right to privacy.

3)  On the other hand, it is the husband's contention that although privacy

has been recognised by the Supreme Court as a fundamental right, this right

is not absolute but is subject to exceptions. Relying upon other judicial

precedents, it is urged that the husband was entitled to establish cruelty on

the wife’s part and to prove his case seeking dissolution of marriage on that

ground ; and in these circumstances, the wife's right to privacy must give

way to the husband's right to bring evidence to prove his case, else the

husband would be denied the right to fair trial guaranteed under Article 21

of the Constitution. It is of course also argued on behalf of the husband, that

section 14 of the Family Courts Act specifically empowers a Family Court

to receive evidence, if in its opinion such evidence will assist the court to

deal effectively with the dispute, regardless of whether the same is otherwise

relevant or admissible under the Evidence Act.
4) While a litigating party certainly has a right to privacy, that right must

yield to the right of an opposing party to bring evidence it considers relevant

to court, to prove its case. It is a critical part of the hallowed concept of fair

trial that a litigating party gets a fair chance to bring relevant evidence

before court. It is important to appreciate that while the right to privacy is

essentially a personal right, the right to a fair trial has wider ramifications

and impacts public justice, which is a larger cause. The cause of public

justice would suffer if the opportunity of fair trial is denied by shutting-out

evidence that a litigating party may wish to lead at the very threshold.

24. Since no fundamental right under our Constitution is absolute, in the

event of conflict between two fundamental rights, as in this case, a contest

between the right to privacy and the right to fair trial, both of which arise

under the expansive Article 21, the right to privacy may have to yield to the right to fair trial.

5)  If it were to be held that evidence sought to be adduced before a Family Court should be excluded based on an objection of breach of privacy or some other cognate right, then in many a case the provisions of section 14 would be rendered nugatory and dead-letter. It must be borne in mind that Family Courts have been established to deal with what are essentially

sensitive, personal disputes relating to dissolution of marriage, restitution of conjugal rights, legitimacy of children, guardianship, custody, and access to minors; which matters, by the very nature of the relationship from which

they arise, involve issues that are private, personal and involve intimacies. It

is easily foreseeable therefore, that in most cases that come before the

Family Court, the evidence sought to be marshalled would relate to the private affairs of the litigating parties. If section 14 is held not to apply in its full expanse to evidence that impinges on a person's right to privacy, then section 14 may as well be effaced from the statute. And yet, falling back upon the general rule of evidence, the test of admissibility would only be

relevance ; and accordingly, even ignoring section 14, fundamental considerations of fair trial and public justice would warrant that evidence be received if it is relevant, regardless of how it is collected. No purpose would therefore be  served by emasculating the salutary provisions of section 14 of

the Family Courts Act by citing breach of privacy. Looking at it

dispassionately, even assuming evidence is collected in breach of privacy, at best and at worst, it is the process of collection of evidence that would be tainted not the evidence itself.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

 Dated : 30th June, 2020

 CM(M) 40/2019 and CM APPL.No.1226/2019

DEEPTI KAPUR Vs  KUNAL JULKA 

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANUP JAIRAM BHAMBHANI

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Whether the second wife can prove the first marriage of husband by producing a photocopy of his passport before Family court?

The burden of proof to establish that there subsisted a marriage, is on the appellant. The appellant not being the holder of the document, she could only have produced photocopies of the passports. The rigor of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is not to be applied in a proceeding before the Family Court in view of Section 14 of the Family Courts Act, 1984. In the judgment in Sithara v. Harikrishnan Nair [MANU/KE/1677/2011 : 2011 (4) KLT 492], a Division Bench of this Court held that when a wife filed petition for declaration of marriage as null and void and produces a photocopy of prior marriage certificate, propriety required that Family Court declare the marriage null and void based on undisputed averments in the affidavit. Under Section 14, the Family Court may receive as evidence any document, information or matter that may in its opinion assist it to deal with a dispute, whether or not the same would be otherwise admissible under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. In the present case, the appellant has discharged her burden of proof by filing affidavit in proof and producing photocopies of the passports of the respondent.

12. The respondent has not cared to appear in the Family Court proceedings and to controvert the evidence adduced by the appellant. Section 10 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 requires Family Courts to follow the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 subject to the other provisions of the Act. Order VIII Rule 10 of CPC provides that where any party from whom a written statement is required fails to present the same, the court shall pronounce judgment against him or make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit. The counsel for the appellant relied on a Division Bench judgment of the Patna High Court in Arti Jaiswal v. Pawan Chaudhary and others [MANU/BH/1208/2016 : AIR 2016 Pat. 200] wherein it was held that in a proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage on ground of subsistence of earlier marriage, when evidence on record by way of affidavit and pleadings remain unchallenged, subsistence of earlier marriage can be presumed.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

Mat. Appeal No. 1132 of 2017

Decided On: 20.08.2019

 Namitha S. Nair  Vs.  V. Ravikanth

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

C.T. Ravi Kumar and N. Nagaresh, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2020 Kerala 19

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Whether family court can permit production of electronic evidence without certificate as per S 65B of Evidence Act?

 The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Family Court failed to notice and to give effect to Section 14 of the Family Courts Act (for short 'the Act') which empowers the Family Courts to dispense with the application of the rigid rules of the relevancy and admissibility of evidence incorporated in the Indian Evidence Act 1872 to the proceedings before them and further erred in refusing to receive the uncertified CD in evidence. The argument, according to us, is legally sound and merits acceptance.

10. Section 14 of the Act reads as follows:

"Application of Indian Evidence Act, 1872:- A Family court may receive as evidence any report, statement, documents, information or matter that may, in its opinion, assist it to deal effectually with a dispute, whether or not the same would be otherwise relevant or admissible under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872)."

The words employed in the Section make it abundantly clear that, any matter, information etc., placed before a Family Court may be admitted in evidence uninhibited by the rules of relevancy and admissibility prescribed by the Evidence Act, provided the Family Court is of the opinion that the matter before it is essential for the effective resolution of the dispute in the proceeding. Understood in the light of the object and scheme of the Act, Section 14 of the Act seems to convey the legislative intention that Family Court has absolute freedom to depart from adopting the sophisticated and strict rules of relevancy and admissibility applicable to the regular civil courts in the country. The freedom of partial departure from the Evidence Act helps the Family Courts prevent valuable information and materials necessary for effective adjudication of disputes from being shut out in the enquiries and trial. In effect, the rules of relevancy and admissibility in the Evidence Act ought to be read subject only to Section 14 of the Act. In the event of any inconsistency emerging between the provisions of these two Acts, Family Courts Act 1984 alone will prevail, thanks to Section 20 of the Act. In the two decisions of the High Court of Kerala, Treasa Bency Vs. Preceline George, MANU/KE/0658/2013 : (2013) (3) KLT 414) and Pankajakshan Nair Vs. Shylaja, MANU/KE/0097/2017 : (2017) (1) KLJ 739), the uniform view taken is to the effect that the technicalities of the Evidence Act should not be imported to the proceeding before the Family Courts in view of the provisions in Section 14 of the Act. We too concur with the view expressed in the said decisions.

11. In view of the overriding effect of the Section 14 of the Act on the rules of admissibility in the Evidence Act, we hold that the CD produced before the Family Court, Thalassery is admissible in evidence, despite the fact that it was not certified as mandated by Section 65-B(4) of the Act. The contention put forth by the learned counsel for the respondent that the non obstante clause in Section 65-B (1) introduced by Act No. 21 of 2000 would, however, prevail over Section 14 of the Act rendering production of certificate under Section 65-B(4) of the Evidence Act inevitable, does not merit acceptance. The words used in Section 65-B(1) sufficiently indicate that the non obstante clause does not extend outside the Evidence Act nor does it curtail the operation of any other law.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

OP (FC) No. 513 of 2018

Decided On: 14.01.2019

Pramod E.K.   Vs.  Louna V.C.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

C.K. Abdul Rehim and T.V. Anilkumar, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2019 Kerala 85

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Whether family court can admit hearsay evidence?

 The Family Courts though not bound by the sophisticated
rules of relevancy or admissibility of evidence by virtue of Section 14
of the Act, in our opinion, should not, however be understood to
possess unregulated or unbridled power or freedom to receive in
evidence indiscriminately all matters that are brought before them.
Any undue and excessive liberal interpretation put on Section 14 of
the Act may only produce mischievous and disaster result and even
do disservice to the system. While interpreting Section 14, only the
true legislative object should be given effect to and promoted and any
mischief suppressed. The hearsay which is inherently inadmissible
cannot be therefore acknowledged as an evidence in any proceeding
before a Family Court also.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT


OP (FC).No. 513 of 2018

PRAMOD E.K. Vs LOUNA V.C.

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Whether quarrelsome talk of wife can be proved through admission of CD in evidence?

 This naturally takes us to an inquisitive question whether the
production and admission of the CD in evidence by the mere force of
Section 14 of the Evidence Act are proof of the alleged quarrelsome
talk of the respondent. Mere admission of a document in evidence,
whether it be electronic or otherwise, will not discharge the burden of
the party proposing evidence from proving the contents also. What
Section 14 of the Act enacts is not any special rule of evidence as
certain other special statues do. A document merely marked with or
without consent of the opposite party in a proceeding before a Family
Court is no proof at all unless the contents thereof are either
admitted by the adverse party or proved through the persons who
can vouch for the truth of the facts. This is an elementary principle of
proof flawing from principles of natural justice, logic fairness and
expediency dehors the provisions of the Evidence Act. We are of the

opinion that Family Courts cannot take any exception to this binding
fundamental rule of evidence and therefore, the CD produced before
the Family Court cannot be said to be proved unless the contents are
also proved despite its admission in evidence. Section 14 of the Act
as evident from the very language of the Section itself only relaxes
observance of the rules of relevancy and admissibility of evidence
rather than dispensing with the very fundamental principles of
evidence and natural justice or proof of contents of a document.
15. The purported voice of respondent extracted in the CD in
our opinion has to be proved in the same manner as a tape recorded
conversation. The petitioner can succeed in proving the alleged
riotous dialogue in the CD only when the identity of the speaker is
also proved. Proof of the accuracy of the statement recorded is
another essential requirement in the matter of proof of a tape
recorded conservation. The court accepting the evidence must rule
out that no tampering was made while the statement was recorded.
These are only some of the guidelines in the matter of proof of
contents of the CD. Elaborate discussion as to how a tape recorded
conservation could be proved is decipherable from Ram Singh and
others V. Col.Ram Singh, (AIR 1986 SC 3), Yusufalli Esmail
Nagree (AIR 1968 SC 147) and Sunil Panchal Vs. State of

Rajasthan, (MANU/RH/0987/2016 ). Unless all the essential
conditions above are satisfied, contents of the CD produced by the
petitioner cannot be said to be proved despite its admission in
evidence by the mere force of Section 14 of the Act.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT


OP (FC).No. 513 of 2018

PRAMOD E.K. Vs LOUNA V.C.

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Whether family court can admit CD in evidence even in absence of certificate as per S 65B of Evidence Act?

The core question to be addressed in the present case is

whether the CD produced before the Family Court could be admitted

in evidence in the absence of certification under Section 65-B(4) of

the Indian Evidence Act.

9. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is

that the Family Court failed to notice and to give effect to Section 14

of the Family Courts Act (for short 'the Act') which empowers the

Family Courts to dispense with the application of the rigid rules of the

relevancy and admissibility of evidence incorporated in the Indian

Evidence Act 1872 to the proceedings before them and further erred

in refusing to receive the uncertified CD in evidence. The argument,

according to us, is legally sound and merits acceptance.

10. Section 14 of the Act reads as follows:

“Application of Indian Evidence Act, 1872:- A Family court

may receive as evidence any report, statement, documents,

information or matter that may, in its opinion, assist it to deal

effectually with a dispute, whether or not the same would be

otherwise relevant or admissible under the Indian Evidence

Act, 1872 (1 of 1872).”

The words employed in the Section make it abundantly clear that, any

matter, information etc., placed before a Family Court may be

admitted in evidence uninhibited by the rules of relevancy and

admissibility prescribed by the Evidence Act, provided the Family

Court is of the opinion that the matter before it is essential for the

effective resolution of the dispute in the proceeding. Understood in

the light of the object and scheme of the Act, Section 14 of the Act

seems to convey the legislative intention that Family Court has

absolute freedom to depart from adopting the sophisticated and strict

rules of relevancy and admissibility applicable to the regular civil

courts in the country. The freedom of partial departure from the

Evidence Act helps the Family Courts prevent valuable information

and materials necessary for effective adjudication of disputes from

being shut out in the enquiries and trial. In effect, the rules of

relevancy and admissibility in the Evidence Act ought to be read

subject only to Section 14 of the Act. In the event of any

inconsistency emerging between the provisions of these two Acts,

Family Courts Act 1984 alone will prevail, thanks to Section 20 of the family courts Act.

In view of the overriding effect of the Section 14 of the Act on

the rules of admissibility in the Evidence Act, we hold that the CD

produced before the Family Court, Thalassery is admissible in

evidence, despite the fact that it was not certified as mandated by

Section 65-B(4) of the Act.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

PRESENT

OP (FC).No. 513 of 2018

PRAMOD E.K. Vs LOUNA V.C.

Coram:

C.K.ABDUL REHIM

&

T.V.ANILKUMAR, JJ.

Dated:14th day of January 2019

Citation: 2019 SCC OnLine Ker 165, AIR 2019 Ker 85 

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Whether family court can take into consideration unsigned closure report?

 Reading of the examination-in-chief would show that PW-2 Renuka Singh, Inspector, UP Police has categorically deposed that she was in-charge of the Women Cell in Sector 14A, Noida UP and had seen the photocopy of the closure report, which was prepared and typed by her (Emphasis added). In her cross-examination, she testified that it was correct that the closure report was not signed by her but she volunteered to say that ordinarily such reports are signed and admitted and the original may contain her signatures.

11. Sections 14 and 20 of the Family Courts Act, read as under: “14. Application of Indian Evidence Act, 1872.-A Family Court may receive as evidence any report, statement, documents, information or matter that may, in its opinion, assist it to deal effectually with a dispute, whether or not the same would be otherwise relevant or admissible under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872). "

…..

“20. Act to have overriding effect.—The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than this Act.”

12. Reading of Section 14 makes it abundantly clear that the Family Court may receive as evidence any report, statement, documents, information or matter that may in its opinion would assist it to deal effectually with the dispute.

13. The present case is on a much better footing as the PW-2 has admitted that she prepared and typed the closure report, thus to say that the closure report is false and fabricated is an argument without any force.

Accordingly, we find no infirmity with the order passed by the Family Court.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

 Date of Judgment: 16th August, 2018

 MAT.APP.(F.C.) 42/2018

SANGEETA GERA  Vs SANJEEV GERA

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G.S.SISTANI

HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE SANGITA DHINGRA SEHGAL

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Whether privileged communication between husband and wife is admissible in family court proceeding?

Section14 of the Family Court Act, 1984 provides that a family court may receive any evidence, report, statement, documents, information or matter which in its opinion will facilitate the effective adjudication of the disputes before it, whether or not the same would be otherwise relevant or admissible under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The aforesaid section therefore makes it pellucid that the issues of relevance and admissibility of evidence which regulate a regular trial do not burden proceedings before the family courts. It is the discretion of the family court to receive or not to receive the evidence, report, statement, documents, informations etc. placed before it on the test whether it does or does not facilitate an effective adjudication of the disputes before it. Aside of the aforesaid, I am of the considered view that Section 65B of the Act of 1872 only deals with the secondary evidence qua electronic records. It does not at all deal with the original electronic records, as in the instant case, where the pinhole camera, with a hard disk memory on which the recording was done has been submitted before the Family Court. The Apex Court in the case of Anvar P.V. Vs. P.K. Basheer [(2014)10 SCC 473] has held that if an electronic record is produced as a primary evidence under Section 62 of the Evidence Act, the same is admissible in evidence without compliance with the conditions of Section 65B of the Act of 1872. That evidence would take the colour of primary evidence, subject no doubt to its credibility based on forensic examination and cross examination. Further, I am of the considered view that the privilege in respect of the husband and the wife's communication under section 122of the Act of 1872 would also not attract, as Section 14 of the Family Court Act eclipses Section 122 of the Evidence Act in proceedings before the Family Court. Section 14 aforesaid is a special law, so to say, as against the general law, which Section 122 of the Act of 1872 encapsulates vis-a-vis privileged communications between husband and wife.

Rajasthan High Court

Preeti Jain vs Kunal Jain &Anr; on 27 May, 2016

AT JAIPUR BENCH

(S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.224/2016)

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