Bombay HC: Under which circumstances, disclosure made by the child victim though hearsay is admissible as per S 6 of the Indian Evidence Act?

14. The evidence of PW 2 and PW 7 as regards the disclosure made by the child victim though hearsay is admissible in view of the provisions of section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act which recognizes and embodies the rule of res gestae, which is explained by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Gentela Vijayvardhan Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in MANU/SC/0719/1996 : AIR 1996 SC 2791 thus:

"15. The principle of law embodied in Section 6 of the Evidence Act is usually known as the rule of res gestae recognised in English law. The essence of the doctrine is that a fact which, though not in issue, is so connected with the fact in issue "as to form part of the same transaction" speaking, in exception to the general rule that hearsay evidence is not admissible. The rationale in making certain statement or fact admissible under Section 6 of the Evidence Act is on account of the spontaneity and immediacy of such statement or fact in relation to the fact in issue. But it is necessary that such fact or statement must be a part of the same transaction. In other words, such statement must have been made contemporaneous with the acts which constitute the offence or at least immediately thereafter. But if there was an interval, however slight it may be, which was sufficient enough for fabrication then the statement is not part of res gestae ............... "

Section 6 is an exception to the rule of evidence that hearsay evidence is not admissible. The statement must relate to the fact in issue or relevant thereto and must be substantially contemporaneous with the fact. Such statement though not evidence of the truth of the matters stated are of corroborative value. In Sukhar ..vs.. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in MANU/SC/0626/1999 : (1999) 9 SCC 507 the Hon'ble Apex Court observes that section 6 is an exception to the general rule of inadmissibility of hearsay evidence provided such evidence is almost contemporaneous with the fact/s excluding the possibility of fabrication. The essence of the doctrine is that a fact which, though not in issue, is so connected with the fact in issue, as to the form part of the same transaction, that it becomes relevant by itself.

The evidence of PW 2 - Pushpa and PW 7 - Priya that the child victim narrated the incident to them is therefore admissible in view of the provisions of section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Criminal Appeal 316 of 2018

Decided On: 01.07.2019

Manish Vs. The State of Maharashtra

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.B. Deo, J.

Citation: 2019 SCC ONLINE BOM 1154, MANU/MH/1619/2019

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Hearsay Evidence under the Indian Evidence Act: Concept, Exceptions, and Examples

 Introduction to Hearsay Evidence

Hearsay evidence refers to information that a person gathers or collects from someone else who has first-hand knowledge of that fact or information, making it second-hand information. According to the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, hearsay evidence is generally not considered valid evidence and is inadmissible in courts.

The fundamental principle underlying this rule is that oral evidence must be direct, as mandated by Section 60 of the Indian Evidence Act. This section requires that if evidence refers to a fact that could be seen, heard, or perceived by any other sense, it must be the evidence of a witness who says they directly saw, heard, or perceived it.

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Supreme Court: Whether identification of specimen signature of accused by handwriting expert was hearsay and whether he can prove said signature?

 But what was contained in Exhibit P-75 was never admitted by A- 7 to be in his handwriting. Exhibit P-75 was marked through PW-30, the handwriting expert, and not even by the I.O. At least if the I.O. had identified and marked the specimen writings and signatures of A-7 as Exhibit P-75, it was possible for the prosecution to contend that the specimen signatures stood proved. But the I.O. did not identify Exhibit P-75. PW-30 through whom Exhibit P-75 was marked did not directly obtain the specimen writings of A-7. The statement of PW-30 that the specimen writings of A-7 are in Exhibit P-75 was only hearsay evidence, as he did not directly obtain those specimen signatures. Thus, Exhibit P- 75 never stood proved. {Para 134}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 2417 of 2010, 16 of 2011 and 2444 of 2010

Decided On: 15.06.2023

A. Srinivasulu Vs. The State Rep. by the Inspector of Police

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

V. Ramasubramanian and Pankaj Mithal, JJ.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0723/2023.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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The Application of Hearsay Evidence Principles to Electronic Evidence: Legal Evolution from Indian Evidence Act to Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam

 The intersection of traditional hearsay evidence principles with modern electronic evidence represents one of the most significant developments in Indian evidentiary law. As digital technology becomes increasingly prevalent in legal proceedings, courts must navigate the complex relationship between age-old hearsay rules and contemporary forms of electronic proof. This evolution reached a pivotal moment with the Delhi High Court's decision in Kundan Singh v. The State (2015) and has been further transformed by the enactment of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (BSA) 2023, which fundamentally reimagines how electronic evidence is treated within the Indian legal framework.

Understanding the Hearsay Evidence Principle

Foundational Concepts of Hearsay

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How is the doctrine of hearsay applicable for proof of Electronic evidence?

In Balram Prasad Agrawal versus State of Bihar and Others; MANU/SC/0427/1997 : (1997) 9 SCC 338, the Supreme Court referred to the concept of hearsay evidence and observed that even if some information is ruled out as hearsay, it may still remain admissible as evidence of the conduct of the witness. Relying on Section 8 of the Evidence Act, it was observed as under:-

"11. ...This part of the evidence of PW 6 would not be hit by the rule of exclusion of hearsay evidence. A decision of this Court deserves to be noted on this aspect. In the case of J.D. Jain v. State Bank MANU/SC/0427/1981 : AIR 1982 SC 673 of India a Bench of three learned Judges speaking through Baharul Islam, J. in the Report has made the following pertinent observations: (AIR p. 676, para 10 : SCC p. 148, paras 21 and 22)

"The word "hearsay" is used in various senses. Sometimes it means whatever a person is heard to say; sometimes it means whatever a person declares on information given by someone else. (See Stephen on Law of Evidence)

The Privy Council in the case of Subramaniam v. Public Prosecutor 1956 WLR 965, observed:

"Evidence of a statement made to a witness who is not himself called as a witness may or may not be hearsay. It is hearsay and inadmissible when the object of the evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in the statement. It is not hearsay and is admissible when it is proposed to establish by the evidence, not the truth of the statement but the fact that it was made. The fact that it was made quite apart from its truth, is frequently relevant in considering the mental state and conduct thereafter of the witness or some other persons in whose presence these statements are made."

The term "hearsay" applies to both spoken or oral evidence and also has reference to what is written. Hearsay evidence is rejected on the principle that the best evidence obtainable should be produced as it is relatively trustworthy, whereas hearsay evidence poses difficulties for it derives value not from the witness himself, but on the veracity and competence of some other person whose version is not tested in the cross-examination.

50. For principle of hearsay to apply and reject an evidence, it must be shown that it was made by some other declarant other than the one testifying at the trial of hearing and the statement is being offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Therefore, even if the evidence is an assertion made by the declarant, it will not be hearsay until it is offered to prove the truth of what is asserted.

51. A statement which is not assertion, i.e., to state the truth declared and maintained, but only a statement of fact is not hearsay. A hearsay declarants non-verbal conduct may qualify as a "statement" for purpose of exclusion under the hearsay rule, if the conduct of the person intended by him as a substitute for oral or written verbal expression.(see, Matter of Cherl H., 2 Dist. 153 CA 3d 1098). Pertinently, in case of self-generated data or information there is no declarant as such who is asserting a fact.

52. Evidence may be offered for different purposes. The same evidence can be treated as hearsay and non-hearsay depending upon its relevance, i.e., whether it is relevant for a substantive truth or for some other purpose. For example, when person A meets person B and speaks to him about an occurrence, testimony of person B to the said effect would not be hearsay, but may become hearsay if a party seeks to rely upon facts stated by person A implicating a third person. Thus, we must notice and record the difference between a "factum of statement" and "truth of a statement". The said distinction has been recognised and accepted in several pronouncements in J.D. Jain versus State Bank of India, MANU/SC/0427/1981 : AIR 1982 SC 673, Manilal Navavati versus Sushila Mahendra Nanavati, MANU/SC/0192/1964 : AIR 1965 SC 364 and S.R. Ramaraj versus Special Court, Bombay, MANU/SC/0600/2003 : (2003) 7 SCC 175. Thus, electronic record produced as a statement as a tangible in form of a CD, print out on paper, etc. as a fact in itself, must be distinguished from electronic record, which is produced to prove truth of the matter it asserts or correctness of contents for the latter postulates adjudication of veracity and credibility of the information by the person who has made a statement offering or producing the document for its truth.

53. In view of the aforesaid discussion, information memorised as business record or records maintained in common course of events are not treated as hearsay even if the maker lacks personal knowledge of the facts or events. The document should be prepared in normal course of business must have been at or near the time of events it records and should have been made in normal course of business activities or events. Sub-section (4) to Section 65B postulates that the certificate should be given by a person occupying a responsible official position in relation to operation of the relevant device or management of the relevant activities. If the said conditions are satisfied, it promotes and establishes the trustworthiness. In such cases, presumption of fact regarding genuineness and authenticity of the content can be invoked at the discretion of the court under Section 114 of the Evidence Act.

54. In Anwar P.V. (supra) in paragraph 1 itself the Supreme Court noticed the difference between relevancy and admissibility, which is examined at the initial stage; and genuineness, veracity and reliability of the evidence, which is seen by the court subsequently. Thus, the ratio and dictum in Anwar P.V. (supra) is based and predicated on the difference between admissibility and veracity or evidentiary value. The Supreme Court dealt with the aspect of admissibility in strict legal sense, not to be confused with evidentiary value or correctness of contents. Of course, when the conditions mentioned in Section 65B are satisfied, in terms of Section 114 of the Evidence Act, the court may presume existence of certain facts for the computer output would have data and information collected or derived in common course of human conduct and in public and private business.

55. In terms of sub-section (1) to Section 65B, original evidence need not be produced when conditions of Section 65B are satisfied. The computer output in relation to the information and computer in question are admissible as secondary evidence, when certificate under Section 65B is produced. However, Section 65B nowhere states that the contents of the computer output shall be treated as the truth of the statement. Section 65B deals with admissibility of secondary evidence in the case of "electronic records" and not with the truthfulness or veracity of the contents. However, when a certificate under Section 65B is produced the Court may presume or form a prima facie opinion, which is rebuttable and may not be accepted.

56. Electronically generated record is entirely a product of functioning of a computer system or computer process, like call record details or a report generated on a fax, which shows the number from and to which the fax were sent, time, etc. is generated electronically. It does not contain any assertion. Therefore, as noticed above it is not hearsay. These are not writings made by a person (see United States versus Khorozian, 333 F. 3d 498, 506). Normally non-assertive conduct is more reliable, provided there has been no fraud and interpolation in the preparation of the record. Computer generated telephone records are not similar to a statement by a human declarant and, therefore, cannot be treated as hearsay and the credibility and evidentiary value is determined on the reliability and accuracy of the process involved. Ergo, in these cases when conditions of Section 65B are satisfied, the probative value or weight can be substantial of course, subject to verification as to the credibility and integrity of the contents.

57. We have already referred to the distinction between factum of a statement and truth of a statement and the concept of presumption of memorandum or records maintained in normal course of business and the credibility or trustworthiness of electronic records. However, it must be understood that mere admission or admissibility of the electronic record would not mean that the contents of the electronic record have been proved beyond doubt and debate and are automatically proved when the document is marked exhibit. Mere marking of a document as exhibit does not dispense with the proof of its contents (see Sait Tarajee Khimchand versus Yelamarti Satyam, MANU/SC/0022/1971 : AIR 1971 SC 1865, Narbada Devi Gupta versus Birendra Kumar Jaiswal, MANU/SC/0862/2003 : (2003) 8 SCC 745 and Mohd. Yusuf versus D. and Another, MANU/MH/0106/1968 : AIR 1968 Bombay 112). Provisions of Section 65 of Evidence Act are apposite on the said legal principle and reference can also be made to Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act. The latter sections deal with exclusion of oral evidence by documentary evidence in certain cases and in which cases oral evidence can be led even when there are documents recording terms of contract, grant or any other disposition of property or when a matter is required by law to be reduced to a form of a document. The effect of the aforesaid provisions is that when a certificate under Section 65B authenticates the computer output, it will only show and establish that the computer output is the paper print out or media copy, etc. of the computer from which the output is obtained. The court has still to rule out when challenged or otherwise, the possibility of tampering, interpolation or changes from the date the record was first stored or created in the computer till the computer output is obtained. The focus over here is not so much on the creation of the out-put as stipulated under sub-section (2) to Section 65B, but rather on the preservation and sanctity of the record after it was originally created. It extends beyond identification of the particular computer equipment and the process or equipment used for computer output, etc. It would relate to the policies, procedures for use of the equipment that stored the said information since creation and data base and integrity of the same. Questions which would arise and have to be answered is whether data base was protected and had no or limited access, which permits modification/alteration; whether the data base could be wrongly lodged or created or could be transferred or changed when the data base was transferred and stored in the backup systems. These are questions which are pertinent and have to be examined to ascertain whether or not there was possibility of change, alteration or manipulation in the initial or original data after it was created. The courts must rule out that the records have not been tampered and read the data or information as it originally existed. These are aspects which are not codified as such, for probative value is examined on the case to case basis keeping in mind the relevant facts.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

Crl. A. 711/2014

Decided On: 24.11.2015

 Kundan Singh  Vs.  The State

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sanjiv Khanna and R.K. Gauba, JJ.

Citation: MANU/DE/3674/2015

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Latest Supreme Court Judgment on dying declaration

 A survey of the decisions would show that the
principles can be culled out as follows:
a. Conviction of a person can be made solely on
the basis of a dying declaration which inspires
confidence of the court;
b. If there is nothing suspicious about the
declaration, no corroboration may be necessary;
c. No doubt, the court must be satisfied that
there is no tutoring or prompting;

d. The court must also analyse and come to the
conclusion that imagination of the deceased was
not at play in making the declaration. In this
regard, the court must look to the entirety of
the language of the dying declaration;
e. Considering material before it, both in the
form of oral and documentary evidence, the court
must be satisfied that the version is compatible
with the reality and the truth as can be gleaned
from the facts established;
f. However, there may be cases where there are
more than one dying declaration. If there are
more than one dying declaration, the dying
declarations may entirely agree with one another.
There may be dying declarations where
inconsistencies between the declarations emerge.
The extent of the inconsistencies would then have
to be considered by the court. The
inconsistencies may turn out to be reconciliable.

g. In such cases, where the inconsistencies go to
some matter of detail or description but is
incriminatory in nature as far as the accused is
concerned, the court would look to the material
on record to conclude as to which dying
declaration is to be relied on unless it be shown
that they are unreliable;
h. The third category of cases is that where there
are more than one dying declaration and
inconsistencies between the declarations are
absolute and the dying declarations are
irreconcilable being repugnant to one another. In
a dying declaration, the accused may not be
blamed at all and the cause of death may be
placed at the doorstep of an unfortunate
accident. This may be followed up by another
dying declaration which is diametrically opposed
to the first dying declaration. In fact, in that
scenario, it may not be a question of an
inconsistent dying declaration but a dying

declaration which is completely opposed to the
dying declaration which is given earlier. There
may be more than two.
i. In the third scenario, what is the duty of the
court? Should the court, without looking into
anything else, conclude that in view of complete
inconsistency, the second or the third dying
declaration which is relied on by the prosecution
is demolished by the earlier dying declaration or
dying declarations or is it the duty of the court
to carefully attend to not only the dying
declarations but examine the rest of the
materials in the form of evidence placed before
the court and still conclude that the
incriminatory dying declaration is capable of
being relied upon?
OUR CONCLUSION ON MULTIPLE DYING DECLARATION
31. We would think that on a conspectus of the law as
laid down by this court, when there are more than one

dying declaration, and in the earlier dying
declaration, the accused is not sought to be roped in
but in the later dying declaration, a summersault is
made by the deceased, the case must be decided on the
facts of each case. The court will not be relived of
its duty to carefully examine the entirety of materials
as also the circumstances surrounding the making of the
different dying declarations. If the court finds that
the incriminatory dying declaration brings out the
truthful position particularly in conjunction with the
capacity of the deceased to make such declaration, the
voluntariness with which it was made which involves, no
doubt, ruling out tutoring and prompting and also the
other evidence which support the contents of the
incriminatory dying declaration, it can be acted upon.
Equally, the circumstances which render the earlier
dying declaration, worthy or unworthy of acceptance,
can be considered.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 967 OF 2015

JAGBIR SINGH Vs  STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI) 

K.M. JOSEPH, J.
Dated:September 4, 2019.

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Whether family court can admit hearsay evidence?

 The Family Courts though not bound by the sophisticated
rules of relevancy or admissibility of evidence by virtue of Section 14
of the Act, in our opinion, should not, however be understood to
possess unregulated or unbridled power or freedom to receive in
evidence indiscriminately all matters that are brought before them.
Any undue and excessive liberal interpretation put on Section 14 of
the Act may only produce mischievous and disaster result and even
do disservice to the system. While interpreting Section 14, only the
true legislative object should be given effect to and promoted and any
mischief suppressed. The hearsay which is inherently inadmissible
cannot be therefore acknowledged as an evidence in any proceeding
before a Family Court also.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT


OP (FC).No. 513 of 2018

PRAMOD E.K. Vs LOUNA V.C.

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Whether family court can admit CD in evidence even in absence of certificate as per S 65B of Evidence Act?

The core question to be addressed in the present case is

whether the CD produced before the Family Court could be admitted

in evidence in the absence of certification under Section 65-B(4) of

the Indian Evidence Act.

9. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is

that the Family Court failed to notice and to give effect to Section 14

of the Family Courts Act (for short 'the Act') which empowers the

Family Courts to dispense with the application of the rigid rules of the

relevancy and admissibility of evidence incorporated in the Indian

Evidence Act 1872 to the proceedings before them and further erred

in refusing to receive the uncertified CD in evidence. The argument,

according to us, is legally sound and merits acceptance.

10. Section 14 of the Act reads as follows:

“Application of Indian Evidence Act, 1872:- A Family court

may receive as evidence any report, statement, documents,

information or matter that may, in its opinion, assist it to deal

effectually with a dispute, whether or not the same would be

otherwise relevant or admissible under the Indian Evidence

Act, 1872 (1 of 1872).”

The words employed in the Section make it abundantly clear that, any

matter, information etc., placed before a Family Court may be

admitted in evidence uninhibited by the rules of relevancy and

admissibility prescribed by the Evidence Act, provided the Family

Court is of the opinion that the matter before it is essential for the

effective resolution of the dispute in the proceeding. Understood in

the light of the object and scheme of the Act, Section 14 of the Act

seems to convey the legislative intention that Family Court has

absolute freedom to depart from adopting the sophisticated and strict

rules of relevancy and admissibility applicable to the regular civil

courts in the country. The freedom of partial departure from the

Evidence Act helps the Family Courts prevent valuable information

and materials necessary for effective adjudication of disputes from

being shut out in the enquiries and trial. In effect, the rules of

relevancy and admissibility in the Evidence Act ought to be read

subject only to Section 14 of the Act. In the event of any

inconsistency emerging between the provisions of these two Acts,

Family Courts Act 1984 alone will prevail, thanks to Section 20 of the family courts Act.

In view of the overriding effect of the Section 14 of the Act on

the rules of admissibility in the Evidence Act, we hold that the CD

produced before the Family Court, Thalassery is admissible in

evidence, despite the fact that it was not certified as mandated by

Section 65-B(4) of the Act.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

PRESENT

OP (FC).No. 513 of 2018

PRAMOD E.K. Vs LOUNA V.C.

Coram:

C.K.ABDUL REHIM

&

T.V.ANILKUMAR, JJ.

Dated:14th day of January 2019

Citation: 2019 SCC OnLine Ker 165, AIR 2019 Ker 85 

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Leading Supreme Court judgment on admissibility of hearsay evidence

The following is the evidence of which the Courts below have acted. First, there is the 5th plaintiff Khantar Jha (P.W. 6). He proves the entire genealogy. It is true he has not got personal knowledge of every step in the sense that he knew each one of the persons named; that would be impossible as many died before he was born. But personal knowledge is not necessary in these cases.

A member of the family can speak in the witness box of what he has been told and what he has learned about his own ancestors, provided what he says is an expression of his own independent opinion (even though it is based on hearsay derived from deceased, not living, persons) and is not merely repetition of the hearsay opinion of others, and provided the opinion is expressed by conduct. His sources of information and the time at which he acquired the knowledge (for example, whether before the dispute or not) would affect its weight but not its admissibility. This is therefore legally admissible evidence which, if believed, is legally sufficient to support the finding.

11. However, the lower Courts have not rested their decision solely on the 5th plaintiffs testimony. They have used certain Panjis as corroboration and the question is, are they admissible in evidence?

The attack made on them is that the 5th plaintiff admits as P.W. 6 that it was he who dictated the genealogy to Nirsoo Jha (P.W. 29) and to another Panjikar, Raghunath Jha (P.W. 40) after the dispute arose. He says he told Nirsoo about five years before he was speaking (that is to say, in or about the year 1939) and Raghunath eight to ten years before (that is, in 1934 or 1936). This was admittedly after the dispute, so it was said that the entries are inadmissible in evidence.

12. These Panjis are maintained by Panjikars who are professional genealogists. They systematically maintain pedigree tables in the community of Naithal Brahmins. They go from place to place and periodically ascertain the genealogies of their clients and enter them in Panjis (palm leaf manuscripts of genealogy) and add to them such fresh additions as occur in the family from time to time. They are considered important in this community because questions of marriage (who may marry whom) and relationship and caste turn on them. Statements about pedigree are not therefore lightly made in such cases.

The weight to be attached to them may, in a given case, be nil; on the other hand, they may be regarded as important because a man in such a position would ordinarily hesitate before giving a false pedigree as so many unforeseen consequences of importance to him and his family may turn on it. But the question of weight is for the Courts of fact to determine; we are only concerned with the admissibility.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeals Nos. 34 and 35 of 1953

Decided On: 21.04.1954

Sitaji  Vs. Bijendra Narain Choudhary and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
M.C. Mahajan, C.J., Vivian Bose and Ghulam Hasan, JJ.

Citation:AIR 1954 SC 601
Vivian Bose, J.

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Whether Newspaper report is admissible in evidence unless proved in accordance with law?

The issue is no longer resintegra and came up before
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Laxmi Raj Shetty and another
vs. State of Tamil Nadu AIR 1988 SC 1274 wherein it was
categorically held that the newspaper item being in the nature of
hearsay secondary evidence in itself have no evidentiary value,

unless proved by evidence aliunde. It is apt to reproduce paras 25
and 26 of the judgment and relevant portion whereof reads thus:
“25. ….. We cannot take judicial notice of the facts stated in
a news item being in the nature of hearsay secondary
evidence, unless proved by evidence aliunde. A report in a
newspaper is only hearsay evidence. A newspaper is not one
of the documents referred to in Section 78 (2) of the Evidence
Act, 1872 by which an allegation of fact can be proved. The
presumption of genuineness attached under Section 81 of the
Evidence Act to a newspaper report cannot be treated as
proof of the facts reported therein.
26. It is now well settled that a statement of fact contained
in a newspaper is merely hearsay and therefore
inadmissible in evidence in the absence of the maker of the
statement appearing in Court and deposing to have
perceived the fact reported….” 
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
CWP No. 3231 of 2014

Date of decision: October 27, 2015.

Private Bus Operator Welfare Society V State of H.P. and others 

Coram
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge.
Citation;AIR2016(NOC)138HP

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When evidence of bystander is admissible?

Sec.6 of the Evidence Act is an exception to the general

rule whereunder the hearsay evidence becomes admissible. But for

bringing such hearsay evidence within the provisions of S.6, what is

required   to  be    established   is  that  it  must    be   almost

contemporaneous with the acts and there should not be an interval

which would allow fabrication. The statements sought to be

admitted, therefore, as forming part of res gestate, must have been

made contemporaneously with the acts or immediately thereafter

[(see Sukhar v. State of U.P. (1999 (9) SCC 507)].




       Where the transaction consists of different acts, in

order that the chain of such acts may constitute the same

transaction, they must be connected together by proximity of time,

proximity or unity of place, continuity of action and community of

purpose or design.      The spontaneity of the statement is the

guarantee of the truth.    The reasons for its admissibility under

Section 6 of the Evidence Act is that it is a part of the transaction

and not merely because it is spontaneous.         The statement is

relevant only if it is that of a person, who had seen the actual

occurrence and who uttered it simultaneously with the incident or

soon thereafter as to make it reasonably certain that the speaker is



still under the stress of the excitement caused by his having seen

the incident.   In order to make the statement of a bystander

admissible, it must have been made, at the time of transaction or

shortly before or after it. The statement uttered or the act done must

be a spontaneous reaction of the person witnessing the crime and

forming part of the transaction. The bystanders' declaration must

relate only to that which came under their observation.[See

Bhaskaran v. State of Kerala (1985 KLT 122)]. In the present

case, the declaration was made by the victim himself, immediately

after the incident     of sustaining     injury by him. In the said

circumstances, the      evidence of PW5 and PW6 about what the

victim/deceased said immediately after the incident, is admissible

under Section 6 of the Evidence Act. The above discussion would

make it clear that apart from Sec.32 (1) of the Evidence Act, the

aforesaid statement of the deceased can be admitted under Sec.6

of the Evidence Act on account of its proximity of time to the act of

murder. In either case, whether it is admissible under S.32 (1) or

under S.6 of the Evidence Act, it is substantive evidence, which can

be acted upon with or without corroboration in finding guilt of the

accused [(see Rattan Singh's case (supra)].


IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALAAT ERNAKULAM

                              PRESENT:

            THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.T.SANKARAN
                                  &
        THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE B.SUDHEENDRA KUMAR

        FRIDAY, THE 5TH DAY OF JUNE 2015

                    CRL.A.No. 1157 of 2010 (G)



       AHRAF, S/O.MOIDU,
           THARAYIL VEEDU, VELLARKAD,
           ERUMAPETTY, PUNNAYOOR,
           THRISSUR DISTRICT.

   Vs

           THE STATEOF KERALA,
           

Citation: 2015(3)KLJ201

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Complete study material on Evidence law

Oral & Documentary Evidence

CHAPTER-I

ORAL EVIDENCE

The facts judicially noticeable and facts admitted are need not to be proved. Oral and documentary evidence are not only media of proof. This chapter deals with the oral evidence only. It enacts two broad rules regard to oral evidence: firstly, that all facts except contents of documents may be proved by oral evidence, and secondly, that oral evidence in all cases must be direct and not hearsay.

The meaning of expression “oral evidence” is given along with the definition of the term “evidence” in Section 3 of Indian evidence act as-: “Evidence” means and includes -:

(1) All statements which the Court permits or requires to be made before it by witnesses, in relation to matters of fact under inquiry; such statements are called oral evidence.

(2) [1][All documents including records produced for the inspection of the Court] such documents are called documentary evidence.

Section 59 of the Indian evidence act reads as-: All facts, except the contents of documents, [or electronic records,][2]may be proved by oral evidence.

Principle: this section lays down that all facts may be proved by oral evidence, except the contents of a document. The section is rather loosely worded as it makes an unqualified statement as regards the exclusion of oral evidence to prove the contents of a document. The true position is that oral evidence can be led as evidence relating to documents under section 65.

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Whether Maintenance application of wife can be rejected if it is made after delay of nineteen years?

 For not claiming maintenance for long 19 years cannot by itself be a ground for disentitlement of maintenance to any legally married wife. 

29.  The allegation of elopement though tends to colour it with leading life in adultery but there is no evidence and the respondent in his representation admitted that the episode of elopement is based on hearsay and as such,  it has to be held that there is no evidence against the petitioner for living in adultery.  Therefore, the provisions of Section 125 (4), Cr.P.C. cannot disentitle the petitioner from getting the maintenance in the circumstances.    

2012 CRI.L.J.3743  (GAUHATI HIGH COURT )                          Smt. Prembala Das V. Laxmi Charan Das. Cri. Revn. P.No.30 of 2009 D/- 6.6.2012. 

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What is basic concept of presumption of continuity?

"If a thing or a state of things is
shown to exist, an inference of its
continuity within a reasonably
proximate time both forwards and
backwards may sometimes be drawn.
The presumption of future
continuance is noticed in illus.(d)
to S.114. In appropriate cases, an
inference of the continuity of a
thing or state of things backwards
may be drawn under this section,
though on this point the section
does not give a separate
illustration. The rule that the
presumption of continuance may
operate retorspectively has been
recognised both in India. This is
rule of evidence by which one can
presume the continuity of things
backwards. The presumption of
continuity weakens with the passage
of time. How far the presumption
may be drawn both backwards and
forwards depends upon the nature of
the thing and the surrounding
circumstances."
Evidence of a statement made to a
witness who is not himself called
as a witness may or may not be
hearsay. It is hearsay and
inadmissible when the object of the
evidence is to establish the truth
of what is contained in the
statement. It is not hearsay and is
admissible when it is proposed to
establish by the evidence, not the
truth of the statement but the fact
that it was made. The fact that it
was made quite apart from its
truth, is frequently relevant in
considering the mental state and
conduct thereafter of the witness
on some other persons in whose
presence these statements are
made'."

Supreme Court of India

Balram Prasad Agrawal vs The State Of Bihar & Ors on 10 December, 1996

Bench: G Ray, S Majmudar

JUDGMENT:
THE 10TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 1996

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