What is distinction between appellate powers and revisional powers?

 The distinction between appellate powers and revisional powers under Indian law is fundamental to understanding judicial review mechanisms. Here is a detailed explanation as per Indian legal principles:

Appellate Powers

• Nature and Scope: Appellate power is the authority of a higher court to review, re-examine, and potentially overturn or modify the decision of a lower court. It is a statutory and substantive right; parties have a right to appeal if the statute provides for it.

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What conditions can be imposed by appellate court while staying decree of eviction?

 Appellate courts in India have significant discretionary power to impose reasonable conditions when granting stays on eviction decrees. The Supreme Court in Atma Ram Properties v. Federal Motors established the legal framework allowing appellate courts to impose such conditions to compensate landlords for losses due to delayed execution of eviction decrees.

Key Conditions That Can Be Imposed

Payment of Enhanced Rent or Compensation

Courts can require tenants to deposit amounts higher than the contractual rent during the pendency of the appeal. 

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Whether court exercises appellate nor supervisory in application filed U/S 34 of Arbitration Act?

It is mercifully unnecessary to repeat and quote the profusion of judicial authority on the issue that Section 34 jurisdiction is neither appellate nor supervisory; it is to ensure that awards are expressions of decisions of

agreed private judges, are broadly in conformity with law and are not preceded by an approach that betrays unreasonableness in procedure or outcome of the kind that would shock a court of law, or disclose patently erroneous understanding of law: [Ref Saw Pipes (supra) and Mc Dermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd., (2006) 11 SCC 181]. The decision in Associate Builders v Delhi Development Authority [2015 (3) SCC 49] cautioned courts from intervening with findings in Arbitral Tribunal awards, on public policy grounds unless there was a patent error of law or a manifestly unreasonable finding (which have now become precepts for the approach under Section 34) thus: “33. It must clearly be understood that when a court is applying the "public policy" test to an arbitration award, it does not act as a court of appeal and consequently errors of fact cannot be corrected. A possible view by the arbitrator on facts has necessarily to pass muster as the arbitrator is the ultimate master of the quantity and quality of evidence to be relied upon when he delivers his Arbitral Tribunal award. Thus an award based on little evidence or on evidence which does not measure up in quality to a trained legal mind would not be held to be invalid on this score. Once it is found that the arbitrators approach is not arbitrary or capricious, then he is the last word on facts.”

19. The second facet which Courts must be conscious of is that if the arbitrator commits an error in contract interpretation, that is an error within her jurisdiction (Ref MSK Projects (I) (JV) Ltd v State of Rajasthan and Anr. 2011 (10) SCC 53; G. Ramachandra Reddy v Union of India and Anr. 2009 (6) SCC 414; McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd. and Ors., (2006) 11 SCC 181 and Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co. and Anr. 1984 (4) SCC 679). In McDermott International (supra), the

Supreme Court clarified the Court’s inherent limitation by reason of Section 34 in such matters:

“112. It is trite that the terms of the contract can be express or implied. The conduct of the parties would also be a relevant factor in the matter of construction of a contract. The construction of the contract agreement is within the jurisdiction of the arbitrators having regard to the wide nature, scope and ambit of the arbitration agreement and they cannot be said to have misdirected themselves in passing the award by taking into consideration the conduct of the parties. It is also trite that correspondences exchanged by the parties are required to be taken into consideration for the purpose of construction of a contract. Interpretation of a contract is a matter for the arbitrator to determine, even if it gives rise to determination of a question of law. (See Pure Helium India (P) Ltd. v. ONGC [(2003) 8 SCC 593] and D.D. Sharma v. Union of India [(2004) 5 SCC 325]). 113. Once, thus, it is held that the arbitrator had the jurisdiction, no further question shall be raised and the court will not exercise its jurisdiction unless it is found that there exists any bar on the face of the award.” 20. Likewise, in Steel Authority of India v. Gupta Brothers 2009 (10) SCC 63, the Court held that Section 34 would be attracted in cases where an arbitrator “travels beyond the contract”, or makes an award “contrary to the terms of the contract”. Section 34, however, the Court stated, cannot be used to set aside awards in which there was an “error relatable to interpretation of the contract”, or if it was based on a “possible view of the matter”, or if it was based on a finding of law in a case where a “specific question of law [had been] submitted to the arbitrator.” In short, it is not the courts’ primary responsibility to examine the award as though they were sitting in appeal over it.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Decided on: 16.10.2018

 FAO (OS) 458/2012

POWER GRID CORPORATION OF INDIA  Vs L.S. CABLE 

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. RAVINDRA BHAT

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.K. CHAWLA

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Whether appellate court should allow production of additional evidence if it is public documents?

Learned Counsel for the Appellants, however, argued that there was non-compliance of the provisions of Order 41 Rule 27-A of the Code and hence the application filed by the Respondent ought not to have been allowed by the High Court. The submission, in our opinion, has no merit for the following reasons.

28. In the first place, the documents sought to be filed by the Respondent, namely, notifications issued under the Act were relevant and also necessary for deciding the rights of the parties involved in the suit/appeal. Second, these documents did not require any proof being public documents in nature. Third, the Respondent had already made reference of these documents and laid foundation in the pleadings and lastly, the first Appellate Court has jurisdiction Under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code to allow the parties to file additional evidence, if such documents are required to decide the suit/appeal provided satisfactory explanation is given as to why the documents could not be filed in the suit and why they are filed in appeal. The Respondent, in this case, did give the explanation, which found acceptance to the High Court and, in our opinion, rightly.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 4412-4413 of 2018 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 28437-28438 of 2015)

Decided On: 25.04.2018

Y.P. Sudhanva Reddy Vs. The Chairman and Managing Director, Karnataka Milk Federation and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.K. Agrawal and Abhay Manohar Sapre, JJ.

Citation:(2018) 6 SCC 574

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Whether District Judge exercises appellate jurisdiction over award of arbitral tribunal?

The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of J.G. Engineers Private Limited Vs. Union of India and Another, MANU/SC/0527/2011 : (2011) 5 SCC 758 has held that the District Judge, exercising powers under Section 34 of the Act, exercises supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction, over the award of the Arbitral Tribunal.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA

Appeal Under Arbitration Act No. 8 of 2016

Decided On: 10.04.2018

Titagarh Wagons Limited Vs. Chowgule and Company Private Limited

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Good legal article on appellate jurisdiction

http://ijtr.nic.in/APPELLATE%20JURISDICTION.pdf

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How to ascertain error apparent on face of record for deciding review application?

It is well settled that the review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47, Rule 1, CPC. In connection with the limitation of the powers of the court under Order 47, Rule 1, while dealing with similar jurisdiction available to the High Court while seeking to review the orders under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court, in the case of Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharmal, speaking through Chinnappa Reddy, J., has made the following pertinent observations: (SCC p. 390, para

3) 1 (1979) 4 SCC 389: AIR 1979 SC 1047 "It is true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab2, there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude the High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate power which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court."

9. Now it is also to be kept in view that in the impugned judgment, the Division Bench of the High Court has clearly observed that they were entertaining the review petition only on the ground of error apparent on the face of the record and not on any other ground. So far as that aspect is concerned, it has to be kept in view that an error apparent on the face of record must be such an error which must strike one on mere looking at the record and would not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions. We may usefully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale3 wherein, K.C. Das Gupta, J., speaking for the Court has made the following observations in connection with an error apparent on the face of the record:

An error which has to be established by a long-drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. Where an alleged error is far from self-evident and if it can be established, it has to be established, by lengthy and complicated arguments, such an error cannot be cured by a writ of certiorari according to the rule governing the powers of the superior court to issue such a writ.

Supreme Court of India

Meera Bhanja vs Nirmala Kumari Choudhury on 16 November, 1994

Equivalent citations: 1995 AIR 455, 1995 SCC (1) 170

BENCH:

MAJMUDAR S.B. (J)
JEEVAN REDDY, B.P. (J)

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Whether Appeal Before DRT Maintainable Even If Amount Involved Is Less Than Rs 10 Lakh?

 In the instant case, we are concerned with the challenge to the proceedings initiated underSection 13 of the Act. There is a specific provision in the Act to the effect that the proceedings initiated under the Act cannot be challenged before a Civil Court because the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain any matter arising under the Act and in that event, the concerned debtor has to approach the Tribunal under the provisions of Section 17 of the Act.

23. Thus, the Tribunal would be exercising its appellate jurisdiction when the action initiated under the provisions of Section 13 of the Act is challenged before the Tribunal. There is a difference between the Tribunal’s original jurisdiction under the provisions of the DRT Act and the appellate jurisdiction under the Act.

24. The issue with regard to availability of a forum for challenging the action under the provisions of the Act had been dealt with by this Court in the case of Mardia Chemicals Ltd. (supra). This Court, in the said case, unequivocally held that the aggrieved debtor can never be without any remedy and we firmly believe that the legislature would normally not leave a person without any remedy when a harsh action against him is initiated under the provisions of the Act.

25. So as to know the appellate jurisdiction of the Tribunal, one has to look at the provisions of the Act as Section 17 of the Act specifically provides a right to the aggrieved debtor to challenge the validity of an action initiated under Section 13(4) of the Act before the Tribunal. Moreover, the Act was enacted in 2002 and the legislature is presumed to have knowledge about the provisions of Section 1(4) of the DRT Act. So harmonious reading of both the aforestated Sections would not be contrary to any of the legal provisions.

26. For the aforestated reasons, we are of the view that the application submitted by the appellant bank under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC should have been granted by the trial Court as, according to Section 34 of the Act, a Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain any appeal arising under the Act.

27. Thus, we hold that the Debt Recovery Tribunal constituted under the DRT Act has jurisdiction to entertain an appeal as per Section 17 of the Act even if the amount involved is less than Rs.10 lakh. But, the said appellate jurisdiction need not be misunderstood with the original jurisdiction of the Tribunal.

Reportable

Supreme Court of India

State Bank Of Patiala vs Mukesh Jain & Anr on 8 November, 2016

Bench: Anil R. Dave, L. Nageswara Rao

Citation: (2017)1 SCC 53

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Whether high court exercises appellate powers in petition under article 226 of constitution?

In “State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. –vs M.V.Vyavsaya and Company” [(1997) 1 SCC 156] it was held -

“15. - It has been repeatedly held by this Court that the

power of the High Court Under Article 226 of the

Constitution is not akin to appellate power. It is a

supervisory power. While exercising this power, the

Court does not go into the merits of the decision taken

by the authorities concerned but only ensures that the

decision is arrived at in accordance with the procedure

prescribed by law and in accordance with the

principles of natural justice wherever applicable.

Further, where there are disputed questions of fact, the

High Court does not normally go into or adjudicate

upon the disputed questions of fact.

IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA

(Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction)

 Original Side

Present:

The Hon’ble Justice Sudip Ahluwalia

W.P. No. 493 of 2011

With

G.A No. 2776 of 2012

Angel Distribution Co. Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.

Vs.

Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. & Ors.

Judgement On : 20-05-2016

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What is distinction between appellate powers and revisional powers?

Section 50 of the Code deals with revision. The revisional authority for the purpose of satisfying itself as to legality or propriety of any order passed by or as to the regularity of the proceedings of any Revenue Officer subordinate to it call for, and examine the record of any case pending before, or disposed of by such officer. He is equipped with the power to pass such order in reference thereto as he thinks fit. Justice Gulab Gupta in 1985 RN 181 (Ghurwa Ram & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. & Ors.) opined that there is distinction between appellate powers and revisional powers. It is held that appeal is considered to be a continuation of the proceedings and the entire proceedings are before the appellate authority which has the power of reviewing evidence. There is no such power with the revisional authority. Indeed the revisional powers vested in an authority are similar to the power of issuing certiorari vested in the High Court and is limited to keeping the subordinate court within the bounds of their jurisdiction. It is apposite to mention here that in Ghurwa Ram (supra) this Court opined that the propriety that has to be considered is the propriety of the order challenged in revision and not of the original order.

Madhya Pradesh High Court

Ramgopal Sharma vs Kamla Bai on 28 October, 2015

                                 WP.6949/2014                             

             HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
                         BENCH AT GWALIOR
                       JUSTICE SUJOY PAUL.
                  Citation;AIR 2016(NOC)161 MP

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