Whether high court can entertain criminal revision at the instance of third party?

So far as the first question as to the maintainability of the revision at the instance of the complainant is concerned, we think the said argument has only to be noted to be rejected. Under the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the court has suo moto power of revision, if that be so, the question of the same being invoked at the instance of an outsider would not make any difference because ultimately it is the power of revision which is already vested with the High Court statutorily that is being exercised by the High Court. Therefore, whether the same is done by itself or at the instance of a third party will not affect such power of the High Court. In this regard, we may note the following judgment of this Court in the case of Nadir Khan v. The State (Delhi Administration),   MANU/SC/0176/1975 : 1976CriLJ1721 . {Para 6}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1682, 1683, 1684 and 1685 of 1996

Decided On: 18.09.2003

K. Pandurangan and Ors. Vs. S.S.R. Velusamy and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

N. Santosh Hegde and B.P. Singh, JJ.

Author: N. Santosh Hegde, J.

Citation: (2003) 8 SCC 625,MANU/SC/0736/2003.

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Is the high court bound to issue notice in a writ petition if another high court bench has issued a notice in a similar writ petition?

Thus, I am not in a position to agree that merely issuance of a notice by a Coordinate Bench, under which provision of law, can be considered to be a binding precedent as it does not lay down any proposition of law to be followed in future. Question of judicial discipline will arise when a decision is rendered by a

forum of superior or concurrent jurisdiction while adjudicating the rights of the parties to a lis embodying a declaration of law. I do not see any declaration of law in the discretion of a Coordinate Bench to issue notice in the matter.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH

AT JABALPUR

WRIT PETITION No. 21169 of 2022

M/S KESHAV KANSHKAR  Vs THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY MANTRALAYA VALLABH BHAWAN

BEFORE

HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VIVEK AGARWAL

Dated:  20th OF SEPTEMBER, 2022

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When the high court should not consider a complaint against Judicial Officer in his transfer, promotion and compulsory retirement?

  In context of the three complaints filed against the appellant, it is important to note that the same were never communicated to the petitioner during his service tenure and that the complaints had been subsequently closed. Moreover, two out of the three complaints were closed prior to the meeting of the Higher Judicial Committee and therefore, could not have been the basis of the decision of the Committee. Additionally, in so far as the complaint dated 20.10.2015 (bearing No. R/V/JP/PIN/118/2015) is concerned, it is neither supported by any affidavit nor has any address been provided in it and importantly, was also closed by the respondent prior to the appellant’s discharge order. In this context, it is pertinent to refer to the Standing Order No. 03./S.O./2015 dated 10.06.2015 which directed that:

“The complaint making allegations against members of the subordinate judiciary in the states should not be entertained and no action should be taken thereon, unless it is accompanied by a duly sworn affidavit and verifiable material to substantiate the allegations made therein

……..

……..

……..

The entry of the complaint in the pre-institution register for inward number will not be treated as pendency of Vigilance matter against the Judicial Officer and will not be taken into consideration against the Judicial Officer in any service matter including transfer, promotion and for compulsory retirement.”

(emphasis supplied)

In the present case, the record clearly showcases that no verifiable complaint was filed against the appellant that could form the basis of the disciplinary proceeding against him. {Para 55}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

 CIVIL APPEAL NO.2029 OF 2022

 ABHAY JAIN Vs THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AND ANR.

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Whether high court should remove a Judicial officer if he passes a wrong order without extraneous reason?

  Hence, in light of the above judicial pronouncement, we hold that the accused K.K. Jalia had the right to file bail application at any stage when undergoing imprisonment as an under-trial prisoner. The fact that the two other co-accused had already been enlarged on bail was a valid reason for granting bail to accused K.K. Jalia. If the High Court was to initiate disciplinary proceedings based on a judicial order, there should have been strong grounds to suspect appellant’s bona fides and the order itself should have been actuated by malice, bias or illegality. This is clearly not the case in the present matter. The appellant was competent and well within his right to grant bail to the accused in discharge of his judicial functions. {Para 64}

65. This court in P.C. Joshi vs State of U.P. [(2001) 6 SCC 491] held that:

“That there was possibility on a given set of facts to arrive at a different conclusion is no ground to indict a judicial officer for taking one view and that too for alleged misconduct for that reason alone. The enquiry officer has not found any other material, which would reflect on his reputation or integrity or good faith or devotion to duty or that he has been actuated by any corrupt motive. At best, he may say that the view taken by the appellant is not proper or correct and not attribute any motive to him which is for extraneous consideration that he had acted in that manner. If in every case where an order of a subordinate court is found to be faulty a disciplinary action were to be initiated, the confidence of the subordinate judiciary will be shaken and the officers will be in constant fear of writing a judgment so as not to face a disciplinary enquiry and thus judicial officers cannot act independently or fearlessly. Indeed the words of caution are given in K.K. Dhawan case [(1993) 2 SCC 56 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 325 : (1993) 24 ATC 1] and A.N. Saxena case [(1992) 3 SCC 124 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 861 : (1992) 21 ATC 670] that merely because the order is wrong or the action taken could have been different does not warrant initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the judicial officer. In spite of such caution, it is unfortunate that the High Court has chosen to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the appellant in this case.”

66. We concur with the view of this Court in the aforesaid case that merely because a wrong order has been passed by the appellant or the action taken by him could have been different, this does not warrant initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the judicial officer.

67. This court in Krishna Prasad Verma vs State of Bihar [(2019) 10 SCC 640], while setting aside the High Court’s order, quashed the charges against the officer therein and granted him consequential benefits while holding that:

“No doubt, there has to be zero tolerance for corruption and if there are allegations of corruption, misconduct or of acts unbecoming of a judicial officer, these must be dealt with strictly. However, if wrong orders are passed, that should not lead to disciplinary actions unless there is evidence that the wrong orders have been passed for extraneous reasons and not because of the reasons on the file.

….…..

……...

………

………

The main ground to hold the appellant guilty of the first charge is that the appellant did not take notice of the orders of the High Court whereby the High Court had rejected the bail application of one of the accused vide order dated 26-11-2001 [Shivnath Rai v. State of Bihar, Criminal Misc. No. 30563 of 2001, order dated 26-11-2001 (Pat)] . It would be pertinent to mention that the High Court itself observed that after framing of charges, if the non-official witnesses are not examined, the prayer for bail could be removed, but after moving the lower court first. The officer may have been guilty of negligence in the sense that he did not carefully go through the case file and did not take notice of the order of the High Court which was on his file. This negligence cannot be treated to be misconduct. It would be pertinent to mention that the enquiry officer has not found that there was any extraneous reason for granting bail. The enquiry officer virtually sat as a court of appeal picking holes in the order granting bail.

…….

…….

…….

…….

We would, however, like to make it clear that we are in no manner indicating that if a judicial officer passes a wrong order, then no action is to be taken. In case a judicial officer passes orders which are against settled legal norms but there is no allegation of any extraneous influences leading to the passing of such orders then the appropriate action which the High Court should take is to record such material on the administrative side and place it on the service record of the judicial officer concerned. These matters can be taken into consideration while considering career progression of the judicial officer concerned. Once note of the wrong order is taken and they form part of the service record these can be taken into consideration to deny selection grade, promotion, etc., and in case there is a continuous flow of wrong or illegal orders then the proper action would be to compulsorily retire the judicial officer, in accordance with the Rules. We again reiterate that unless there are clear-cut allegations of misconduct, extraneous influences, gratification of any kind, etc., disciplinary proceedings should not be initiated merely on the basis that a wrong order has been passed by the judicial officer or merely on the ground that the judicial order is incorrect.”

(emphasis supplied)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

 CIVIL APPEAL NO.2029 OF 2022

  ABHAY JAIN Vs THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AND ANR.

Coram: UDAY UMESH LALIT; VINEET SARAN, JJ. 

Dated: March 15, 2022

Author: Vineet Saran, J.

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Supreme Court: High Court Exercising Bail Jurisdiction should not Pass Directions which will affect trial on merit

A perusal of the impugned order indicates that the

directions regarding the CCTV footage were made by the

High Court on submissions by the counsel for the

Respondents-accused before the High Court that they

wished to rely on the same to prove their nonparticipation

in the alleged incident. While the learned

counsel for the Respondents-accused have attempted to

submit before us that such an exercise is necessary, we

are not in agreement with the same. When only the limited

issue of grant of regular bail to

the accused is pending consideration before the High

Court, it was not appropriate for it to pass

the aforesaid directions which will have a direct bearing

upon the trial.

Thus, we are of the considered view that the

direction of the High Court directing the Investigating

Officer to examine the CCTV footage and to submit a

report, is not sustainable in the eyes of law and

deserves to be set aside.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.55-56/2021

PRASHANT DAGAJIRAO PATIL  VS  VAIBHAV@SONU ARUN PAWAR AND ANR.ETC

Dated: 19-01-2021

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Whether lower court must record reasons if it is having any difficulty in complying order of high court?

 When directions are issued by this Court, the lower

judiciary is bound to obey the same. If there is any reason for

not complying the orders, it should be specifically mentioned

by the learned Magistrate. I do not want to make any

observation in this case, because it is a matter to be looked

into by the Registrar (Subordinate Judiciary) and other

authorities on the administrative side. If the contention raised

by the counsel for the petitioner is correct, it is a serious

matter. This Court directed to consider the bail application

preferably on the date of filing of the same. But the learned

Magistrate adjourned the matter twice without mentioning

anything about the order passed by this Court. Admittedly the

order of this Court is produced before the Magistrate. The

learned Magistrate is free to dismiss or allow the bail

application because, there is no direction in the order to allow

or dismiss the bail application. But, there is a direction to consider

the bail application preferably on the date of surrender itself.

Without assigning any reason, the learned Magistrate adjourned the

bail application on two occasions. If there was any other

inconvenience to the learned Magistrate for passing the order, the

same ought to have been mentioned in the order. I leave it there.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

PRESENT

 MR. JUSTICE P.V.KUNHIKRISHNAN

Dated:  04TH DAY OF DECEMBER 2020 

Bail Appl..No.8112 OF 2020

CRIME NO.562/2020 OF Vanitha Cell , Pathanamthitta

ABDUL REHMAN Vs STATE OF KERALA

Dated this the 4th day of December, 2020

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Whether Magistrate can issue an arrest warrant against accused if anticipatory bail granted by High court is in force?

 For the aforesaid backdrop, this Court notices that it is a

case where on remand from the District Judge, the Court has

taken cognizance of the offences relating to allegations under

Sections 418, 420, 465, 467, 468, 471, 406 & 120-B IPC. The

High Court vide its order dated 29.4.2003 had granted

anticipatory bail to the petitioners with the condition that in the

event of arresting the petitioners, they shall be released on bail.

Keeping in view the conditions laid down in Sushila Agarwal &

Others (supra), this Court is of the firm view that the action of

the learned Magistrate from the date, it has taken cognizance and

upto passing of the impugned order dated 3.9.2020 has acted in

clear violation of the orders passed by the High Court after having

granted anticipatory bail. There was no occasion for the learned

Magistrate to have issued the arrest warrants and such course or

power was not available with it in spite of having been given to it.

Learned Magistrate has insisted on issuing of the arrest warrants

and it is also seen that the provisions of Section 362 Cr.P.C.

cannot come into operation while deciding the application under

Section 70(2) Cr.P.C. The action of the learned Magistrate is

clearly wanting and shows scant respect to the High Court’s order

as well as having little knowledge relating to criminal law.

 HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN

BENCH AT JAIPUR

S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition) No.4317/2020

 Nanuram Saini S/o Mangal Chand Saini,  Vs  State Of Rajasthan

Coram: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV PRAKASH SHARMA

Order:  09/11/2020

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Whether lower court can refuse to proceed with the trial of case after expiry of six months if high court has not vacated the stay?

we are

constrained to point out that in our directions contained in the

judgment delivered in Criminal Appeal Nos. 1375-1376 of 2013 [Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. vs. Central Bureau of Investigation] and, in particular, para 35, it is stated thus:

“35. … …. In cases where stay is granted in future,

the same will end on expiry of six months from the

date of such order unless similar extension is

granted by a speaking order. The speaking order must

show that the case was of such exceptional nature

that continuing the stay was more important than

having the trial finalized. The trial Court where

order of stay of civil or criminal proceedings is

produced, may fix a date not beyond six months of

the order of stay so that on expiry of period of

stay, proceedings can commence unless order of

extension of stay is produced.”

Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Pune, by his

order dated 04.12.2019, has instead of following our judgment in

letter as well as spirit, stated that the Complainant should move

an application before the High Court to resume the trial. The

Magistrate goes on to say: “The lower Court cannot pass any order

which has been stayed by the Hon’ble High Court, Bombay with due

respect of ratio of the judgment in Asian Resurfacing of Road

Agency Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. (supra).” We must remind the Magistrates

all over the country that in our pyramidical structure under the

Constitution of India, the Supreme Court is at the Apex, and the

High Courts, though not subordinate administratively, are certainly

subordinate judicially. This kind of orders fly in the face of

para 35 of our judgment. We expect that the Magistrates all over

the country will follow our order in letter and spirit. Whatever

stay has been granted by any court including the High Court

automatically expires within a period of six months, and unless

extension is granted for good reason, as per our judgment, within

the next six months, the trial Court is, on the expiry of the first

period of six months, to set a date for the trial and go ahead with

the same.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. 1577 OF 2020

IN

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 1375-1376 OF 2013

ASIAN RESURFACING OF ROAD AGENCY PVT. LTD. Vs 

CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 

Dated: October 15, 2020.

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Supreme Court: General guidelines issued by the High Court cannot override the specific directions given by Supreme Court

One common reason mentioned by the concerned

court is about the guidelines issued by the High

Court for functioning of Court(s) within the State

during the pandemic period for taking up only

urgent cases. Thus, the trials in the concerned

case could not proceed despite the peremptory

direction given by this Court. This reason, in our

opinion, is unacceptable. For, general guidelines

issued by the High Court cannot override the

direction(s) given by this Court on the judicial

side in the given case, which the concerned

Court(s) and all concerned are expected to comply

with without any demur in its letter and spirit,

unless relaxed by this Court.

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO.1338/2020

IN

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO.11315/2019

ANKIT MAHESHWARI ALIAS CHINTOO Vs  THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

Date : 14-08-2020 These matters were called on for hearing today.

CORAM :

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.M. KHANWILKAR

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DINESH MAHESHWARI

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJIV KHANNA

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Supreme Court: High court should not direct registration of first information report

This Court has held in Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P., that if a person has a grievance that his FIR has not been registered by the police, or having been registered, proper investigation is not being done, then the remedy of the aggrieved person is not to go to the High Court Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, but to approach the Magistrate concerned Under Section 156(3) Code of Criminal Procedure. If such an application Under Section 156(3) Code of Criminal Procedure is made and the Magistrate is, prima facie, satisfied, he can direct the FIR to be registered, or if it has already been registered, he can direct proper investigation to be done which includes in his discretion, if he deems it necessary, recommending change of the investigating officer, so that a proper investigation is done in the matter. We have said this in Sakiri Vasu case because what we have found in this country is that the High Courts have been flooded with writ petitions praying for registration of the first information report or praying for a proper investigation.

3. We are of the opinion that if the High Courts entertain such writ petitions, then they will be flooded with such writ petitions and will not be able to do any other work except dealing with such writ petitions. Hence, we have held that the complainant must avail of his alternate remedy to approach the Magistrate concerned Under Section 156(3) Code of Criminal Procedure and if he does so, the Magistrate will ensure, if prima facie he is satisfied, registration of the first information report and also ensure a proper investigation in the matter, and he can also monitor the investigation.

4. In view of the settled position in Sakiri Vasu case, the impugned judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained and is hereby set aside.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 102 of 2011

Decided On: 20.03.2020

 M. Subramaniam  Vs.  S. Janaki 

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

N.V. Ramana, Mohan M. Shantanagoudar and Sanjiv Khanna, JJ.

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Whether oath taken by high court judge can be disclosed under RTI?

Respondent No.1 herein in the application filed under Section 6(1)

of the Act of 2005 had only stated that he wish to have the copy of

the oath taken and subscribed by the Hon'ble Judges of the High

Court which is exempted from being disclosed under Section 8(1)(j)

of the Act of 2005, as respondent No.1 herein did not disclose any

public interest much less larger public interest involved in seeking

such information of the Hon'ble Judges in the said application nor

was any finding recorded by the second appellate authority i.e. the

Chhattisgarh State Information Commission as to the involvement

of any larger public interest in directing supply of such information

to respondent No.1 under Section 19(8)(a)(i) of the Act of 2005.

The application as filed by respondent No.1 is blissfully silent in that

regard. There is no averment in the application, how the public

interest requires disclosure of such information and the application

is silent in this regard.Therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court, the application

filed by respondent No.1 under Section 6 of the Act of 2005 was

bereft and fails to fulfill the requirement under Section 8(1)(j) of the

Act of 2005 and thus, grant of such information by the learned

Information Commission simply holding that oath is taken by the

Hon'ble Judges in public in presence of respectable persons as

such, the information sought for is granted under Sections 8 and

19(8)(a)(iv) of the Act of 2005, runs contrary to the law and is liable

to be quashed.

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR

Writ Petition (Art. 227) No.19 of 2017

The Public Information Officer, High Court of Chhattisgarh, Bilaspur, Vs Arun Kumar Gupta, 

Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal

Order delivered on: 5-8-2019

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Whether judgment of high court shall remain precedent if said judgment is stayed by Supreme Court?

"Therefore, the effect of the order of stay in a pending appeal before the Apex Court does not amount to 'any declaration of law' but is only binding upon the parties to the said proceedings and at the same time, such interim order does not destroy the binding effect of the judgment of the High Court as a precedent because while granting the interim order, the Apex Court had no occasion to lay down any proposition of law inconsistent with the one declared by the High Court which is impugned."

IN THE HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA

G.A. No. 102 of 2018 and C.S. No. 152 of 2017

Decided On: 30.01.2019

 Bahubali Promoters Private Limited  Vs.  Shyam Sel & Power Limited

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Moushumi Bhattacharya, J.

Citation: 2019(1) RCR(Rent) 386

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Who is competent authority to dismiss judicial officer from service without disciplinary enquiry?

 Learned counsel appearing for Komal Ram and Jitendra Nath

Singh had raised another contention relating to the power of the

High Court to dispense with the inquiry under clause (b) of the

second proviso to Article 311 of the Constitution. The contention is

that this power exclusively vests with the Governor alone who has

to satisfy himself and record in writing the reasons why it is not

reasonably practical to hold an inquiry. Reliance was placed on

the following observations in the Constitutional Bench judgment of

this Court in State of West Bengal v. Nripendra Nath Bagchi,11:

“...within the exercise of the control vested in the High

Court, the High Court can hold enquiries, impose

punishments other than dismissal or removal, subject

however to the conditions of service, to a right of

appeal if granted by the conditions of service, and to

the giving of an opportunity of showing cause as

required by clause (2) of Article 311 unless such

opportunity is dispensed with by the Governor acting

under the provisos (b) and (c) to that clause.”

17. The contention misreads the ratio in Nripendra Nath Bagchi

(supra), which rather holds to the contrary. Interpreting Articles

233 and 235 of the Constitution, and on the aspect of ‘control’ of

the High Court in matters relating to the subordinate judiciary in

Nripendra Nath Bagchi (supra), it was held:

“13. […] the history which lies behind the enactment of

these Articles indicate that “control” was vested in the

11 AIR 1966 SC 447

High Court to effectuate a purpose, namely, the

securing of the independence of the subordinate

judiciary and unless it included disciplinary control as

well the very object would be frustrated. This aid to

construction is admissible because to find out the

meaning of a law, recourse may legitimately be had to

the prior state of the law, the evil sought to be removed

and the process by which the law was evolved. The

word “control”, as we have seen, was used for the first

time in the Constitution and it is accompanied by the

word “vest” which is a strong word. It shows that the

High Court is made the sole custodian of the control

over the judiciary. Control, therefore, is not merely the

power to arrange the day to day working of the court

but contemplates disciplinary jurisdiction over the

presiding Judge. Article 227 gives to the High Court

superintendence over these courts and enables the

High Court to call for returns etc. The word “control” in

Article 235 must have a different content. It includes

something in addition to mere superintendence. It is

control over the conduct and discipline of the judges.

This conclusion is further strengthened by two other

indications pointing clearly in the same direction. The

first is that the order of the High Court is made subject

to an appeal if so provided in the law regulating the

conditions of service and this necessarily indicates an

order passed in disciplinary jurisdiction. Secondly, the

words are that the High Court shall “deal” with the

judge in accordance with his rules of service and the

word “deal” also points to disciplinary and not mere

administrative jurisdiction.

14. Articles 233 and 235 make a mention of two distinct

powers. The first is power of appointments of persons,

their postings and promotion and the other is power of

control. In the case of the District Judges,

appointments of persons to be and posting and

promotion are to be made by the Governor but the

control over the District Judge is of the High Court. We

are not impressed by the argument that the term used

is “District Court” because the rest of the Article clearly

indicates that the word “court” is used compendiously

to denote not only the court proper but also the

presiding Judge. The latter part of Article 235 talks of

the man who holds the office. In the case of the judicial

service subordinate to the District judge the

appointment has to be made by the Governor in

accordance with the rules to be framed after

consultation with the State Public Service Commission

and the High Court but the power of posting, promotion

and grant of leave and the control of the courts are

vested in the High Court. What is vested includes

disciplinary jurisdiction. Control is useless if it is not

accompanied by disciplinary powers. It is not to be

expected that the High Court would run to the

Government or the Governor in every case of

indiscipline however small and which may not even

require the punishment of dismissal or removal. These

Articles go to show that by vesting “control” in the High

Court the independence of the subordinate judiciary

was in view. This was partly achieved in the

Government of India Act, 1935 but it was given effect

to fully by the drafters of the present Constitution. This

construction is also in accord with the Directive

Principles in Article 50 of the Constitution which reads:

“50. The State shall take steps to separate

the judiciary from the executive in the public

services of the State”.

xx xx xx

17. […] That the Governor appoints District Judges and

the Governor alone can dismiss or remove them goes

without saying. That does not impinge upon the control

of the High Court. It only means that the High Court

cannot appoint or dismiss or remove District Judges. In

the same way the High Court cannot use the special

jurisdiction conferred by the two provisos. The High

Court cannot decide that it is not reasonably

practicable to give a District Judge an opportunity of

showing cause or that in the interest of the security of

the State it is not expedient to give such an

opportunity. This the Governor alone can decide. That

certain powers are to be exercised by the Governor

and not by the High Court does not necessarily take

away other powers from the High Courts. The provisos

can be given their full effect without giving rise to other

implications. It is obvious that if a case arose for the

exercise of the special powers under the two provisos,

the High Court must leave the matter to the Governor.

In this connection we may incidentally add that we

have no doubt that in exercising these special powers

in relation to inquiries against District Judges, the

Governor will always have regard to the opinion of the

High Court in the matter. This will be so whoever be

the inquiring authority in the State. But this does not

lead to the further conclusion that the High Court must

not hold the enquiry any more than that the Governor

should personally hold the enquiry.”

18. The expression/words “within the exercise of the control vested in

the High Court, the High Court can hold enquiries, impose

punishments other than dismissal or removal, subject however to

the conditions of service, to a right of appeal if granted by the

conditions of service, and to the giving of an opportunity of

showing cause as required by clause (2) of Article 311 unless

such opportunity is dispensed with by the Governor acting under

the provisos (b) and (c) to that clause” is not to deny the High

Court the authority to decide whether conditions for invoking

clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) are satisfied, but

recognises that the resolution and recommendation of dismissal,

removal or reduction in rank or for dispensing with the inquiry in

terms of clause (b) [also clause (c)] of the second proviso to

Article 311(2) would require an order of the Governor. The

observations do not hold that the Governor, and not the High

Court, is vested with the jurisdiction and is the competent authority

to decide whether the inquiry should be dispensed with upon

recording of satisfaction in terms of clause (b) of the second

proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution. The decision refers to

Article 235 of the Constitution and states that the control vests

with the High Court, albeit order of appointment, dismissal or

removal is passed and made in the name of the Governor who

passes the formal order be it a case of appointment, dismissal or

removal. This is clear from the last portion of paragraph 17 in

Nirpendra Nath Bagchi (supra) which records “that the Governor

will always have regard to the opinion of the High Court in the

matter. This will be the inquiring authority in the State. But this

does not lead to the further conclusion that the High Court must

not hold the enquiry any more than that the Governor should

personally hold the enquiry.”

This legal position with reference to Articles 233 to 236 and

‘control’ of the High Court is beyond doubt as was explained in

Ajit Kumar v. State of Jharkhand12 in the following words:

“15. The next contention raised by the appellant was

that the aforesaid power under Article 311(2)(b) of the

Constitution could not have been invoked by the High

Court. The aforesaid submission also cannot be

accepted in view of the fact that a Subordinate Judge is

also a Judge within the meaning of the provision of

Article 233 of the Constitution of India read with the

provisions of Articles 235 and 236 of the Constitution of

India.

12 (2011) 11 SCC 458

16. Article 233 clearly lays down that appointments and

promotions of District Judges in any State are to be

made by the Governor of the State in consultation with

the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to such

State. The aforesaid provision, like Articles 234 to 236,

has been incorporated in the Constitution of India inter

alia to secure the independence of the judiciary from

the executive and the same deals with the scope of

separation of power of the three wings of the State.

17. It cannot be disputed that the power under the

aforesaid articles [Articles 233-236] is to be exercised

by the Governor in consultation with the High Court.

Under the scheme of the Indian Constitution the High

Court is vested with the power to take decision for

appointment of the subordinate judiciary under Articles

234 to 236 of the Constitution. The High Court is also

vested with the power to see that the high traditions

and standards of the judiciary are maintained by the

selection of proper persons to run the District Judiciary.

If a person is found not worthy to be a member of the

judicial service or it is found that he has committed a

misconduct he could be removed from the service by

following the procedure laid down. Power could also be

exercised for such dismissal or removal by following

the preconditions as laid down under Article 311(2)(b)

of the Constitution of India. Even for imposing a

punishment of dismissal or removal or reduction in

rank, the High Court can hold disciplinary proceedings

and recommend such punishments. The Governor

alone is competent to impose such punishment upon

persons coming under Articles 233-235 read with

Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. Similarly,

such a power could be exercised by the High Court to

dispense with an enquiry for a reason to be recorded in

writing and such dispensation of an enquiry for valid

reasons when recommended to the Governor, it is

within the competence of the Governor to issue such

orders in terms of the recommendation of the High

Court in exercise of power under Article 311(2)(b) of

the Constitution of India.” (emphasis supplied)

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3105 OF 2017

HARI NIWAS GUPTA Vs  STATE OF BIHAR 

SANJIV KHANNA, J.

Dated:NOVEMBER 08, 2019.

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Supreme Court: High court should not impose costs on Judge of subordinate court

Having held so, the High Court made certain observations against
the appellant questioning his bona fide and casting aspersions on
his integrity and also accused him of favouring Mr. R.M. Singh.
The High Court also directed on the judicial side that the matter
be referred on the administrative side for an appropriate action.
As far as the remarks are concerned, we are clearly of the view
that all the adverse remarks in the judgment made against
appellant, whereby his integrity has been questioned or whereby
aspersions have been cast on his character, judicial orders or
otherwise are bound to be expunged.
This Court in a number of cases has cautioned that
remarks against judicial officers should normally not be passed in
judgments. We follow a system where the judgment of a Court is
subject to judicial scrutiny by Higher Courts. The judgment may be
right or wrong, but the Higher Courts should not pass scathing
remarks against the presiding officer of the lower courts only
because they do not agree with the point of view of the Trial
Court.

In the present case, the remarks especially those in para 15
cast aspersions on the integrity of the judicial officer. Even if
the High Court felt as strongly as it did that action needed to be
taken, then the proper course was to place the matter before the
Chief Justice on the administrative side with a request that action
be taken against the concerned judicial officer. In this case, the
High Court did that but in addition passed the scathing remarks
which virtually meant that the appellant stood condemned even
before any disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him.
The High Court can definitely say that the order passed shows
total lack of knowledge of law. But when the High Court went
further and virtually castigated the judicial officer as an
unworthy and corrupt person then the High Court, in our view,
over-stepped its boundaries and such remarks need to be expunged.
We, accordingly, expunge all such remarks and direct deletion
of para 15 of the judgment.
We also set aside the order in so far as the imposition of
costs of Rs.10,000/- on the appellant is concerned. Normally,
costs are not imposed on the presiding officer of the Court and
this practice should not be encouraged.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 6634 of 2019

SURENDRA PRASAD MISHRA Vs  SMT. RAMAWATI & ORS. 
Dated: August 16, 2019.

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Whether HC Can Initiate Disciplinary Proceedings Against Judicial Officer Facing Sexual Harassment Allegations?

 The provisions of the Act, complaint mechanism and
mechanism for constitution of the Internal Complaints
Committee, mechanism to inquire the complaint are all for
protection of dignity and welfare of women at workplace.
The provisions of Sections 11 and 13 in no manner affect
the control of the High Court under Article 235, which it
has with respect to judicial officers as noted above.
The power to suspend the judicial officer vests in the
High Court. The Full Court of the High court is in no

manner precluded from initiating disciplinary inquiry
against the petitioner and placing the petitioner under
suspension on being satisfied that sufficient material
existed. The High Court in its meeting dated 19.07.2016
has resolved to send the complaint of the employee to the
Internal Complaints Committee and the Internal Complaints
Committee having opined that inquiry need to be held,
further steps were taken in accordance with Act, 2013.
We, thus, are of the view that there is no error in the
decision of the Full Court dated 13.07.2016 to suspend
the petitioner and initiate the inquiry proceedings
against the petitioner.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITOIN (CIVIL) NO.705 OF 2018

P.S. MALIK  Vs  HIGH COURT OF DELHI 

ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.
Dated:August 21, 2019.

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Whether HC Which Has Jurisdiction Over 'Venue' Of Arbitration Can Entertain Petition Seeking Appointment Of Arbitrator?

Where the contract specifies the jurisdiction of the court at

a particular place, only such court will have the jurisdiction to

deal with the matter and parties intended to exclude all other

courts. In the present case, the parties have agreed that the

“venue” of arbitration shall be at Bhubaneswar. Considering

the agreement of the parties having Bhubaneswar as the venue

of arbitration, the intention of the parties is to exclude all other

courts. As held in Swastik, non-use of words like “exclusive

jurisdiction”, “only”, “exclusive”, “alone” is not decisive and does

not make any material difference.

17. When the parties have agreed to have the “venue” of

arbitration at Bhubaneswar, the Madras High Court erred in

assuming the jurisdiction under Section 11(6) of the Act. Since

only Orissa High Court will have the jurisdiction to entertain the

petition filed under Section 11(6) of the Act, the impugned order

is liable to be set aside.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5850 2019

BRAHMANI RIVER PELLETS LIMITED Vs KAMACHI INDUSTRIES LIMITED

R. BANUMATHI, J.

Dated:July 25, 2019.

Citation: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 929

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High court reinstate compulsory retired Magistrate and imposes costs on high court administration

 Indeed, the handling of the matter by the High Court may have left the
appellant both bemused and betrayed. A possible union leader, P. K. Singh, led a
group of indisciplined railway employees to chant slogans against the Railway
Magistrate for the Railway Magistrate’s grievous fault of trying to correct what he
perceived was a wrong to the public. The disruption of train services appears to
have been after P. K. Singh was detained. P. K. Singh had been detained for his
unruly behaviour in the Railway Magistrate’s court for which separate
proceedings were instituted and neither charge brought against the appellant
referred to such matter. Rather than the judicial officer being protected by the
High Court against the act of insult and intimidation faced by him in the Railway
Magistrate’s court by unruly railway employees, it was the Railway Magistrate
who was pushed to the dock to suffer for wanting to remedy a public wrong. At
any rate, the appellant may have acted in error or in excess of the authority that
he perceived to possess but even the preliminary report said that it did not find
that the appellant acted in bad faith or with any malicious intention. The
preliminary report expressly said so. The inquiry report endorsed the preliminary
report. Even the disciplinary authority did not expressly find the appellant to
have acted in bad faith or with any malice.
69. In the light of the above, the order of the disciplinary committee finding the
appellant guilty of the charges brought against him cannot be sustained. As a
consequence, the punishment inflicted on the appellant, which is otherwise
found to be disproportionate and shocking even if the guilt was established, is set
aside. The decision of the appellate authority is quashed. The judgment and
order impugned dated July 14, 2017 is set aside and the writ petition is allowed
to such extent.
70. The appellant is to be reinstated in service immediately and the appellant
should be considered to have been in continuous service without any break. The
appellant will be entitled to all benefits and promotion as if no disciplinary
proceedings had been initiated against the appellant, save the full complement of
his salary. The appellant will be paid 75 per cent of the salary that he would have
earned had he remained in service, since it does not appear that the appellant
had taken up any alternative work in the interregnum. Though the appellant did
not render any service, his punishment was unjustified and, at any rate, grossly
disproportionate to the conduct complained of. The appellant appears to have
used some of the time to obtain a Master’s degree.
71. The court appreciates the erudite and impartial assistance rendered by
learned Advocate-General in the matter.
72. FMA 26 of 2019 is allowed as above with costs assessed at Rs.1 lakh to be
paid by the High Court to the appellant.

IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
 JUSTICE SANJIB BANERJEE
And
 JUSTICE SUVRA GHOSH
FMA 26 of 2019

MINTU MALLICK Vs  HON’BLE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA AND OTHERS

Date: July 4, 2019.
SANJIB BANERJEE, J. : –

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What is meant by court of record?

A court of record is a court whose acts and proceedings are enrolled for perpetual memory and testimony. These records are used with a high authority and their truth cannot be questioned. In Indian constitution article 129 make the Supreme Court the 'court of record”. Article 129 says: The Supreme Court shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself.Article 215 of Constitution of India declares High court to be court of Record.

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