Secondly, even under section 32 of the Evidence Act, the statement of the deceased would become relevant subject to one of the four conditions mentioned in the main section and for purposes of the eight circumstances spelt out in the later part of the section itself. Therefore, unless both these predicates are satisfied, at least ordinarily, the statement of the deceased cannot be treated as "evidence" under the Evidence Act.
23. Section 32 of the Evidence Act comprises two parts. The main section provides that the statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead, or who cannot be found, or who has become incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot be procured without an amount of delay or expense which, under the circumstances of the case, appears to the Court unreasonable, then such statements may themselves be relevant facts. The second part of section 32, however, states the circumstances, in which, such statements may be regarded as "evidence" of the relevant facts. They are as follows:
"(1) When it relates to the cause of his death.
(2) When it is made in the course of business, such as an entry in books, or acknowledgement or the receipt of any property, or date of a document.
(3) When it is against the pecuniary or proprietary interest of the person making it, or when it would have exposed him to a criminal prosecution or to a suit for damages.
(4) When it gives opinion as to a public right or custom or matters of general interest and it was made before any controversy as to such right or custom had arisen.
(5) When it relates to the existence of any relationship between persons as to whose relationship the maker had special means of knowledge, and it was made before the question in dispute arose.
(6) When it relates to the existence of any relationship between persons deceased and is made in any will or deed or family pedigree, or upon any tombstone or family portrait, and was made before the question in dispute arose.
(7) When it is contained in any deed, will, or other document.
(8) When it is made by a number of persons and expresses feelings relevant to the matter in question."
24. In the present case, the first part of section 32 of the Evidence Act was no doubt attracted because Mr. Desai died after filing his affidavit in lieu of examination-in-chief, but before his cross-examination could even commence. However, section 32 of the Evidence Act does not render the statements made by persons who cannot be called as witness admissible in all cases. The statements themselves may be regarded as "evidence" or relevant facts in the eight circumstances referred to in the second part of section 32 of the Evidence Act. The impugned judgment and order does not advert to the circumstances in second part of section 32 of the Evidence Act.
25. The statements in Mr. Desai's affidavit in lieu of examination-in-chief neither relate to cause of his death nor can they be said to be statements made in the course of his business. The statements can neither be said to be against Mr. Desai's pecuniary or proprietary interest nor can it said that such statements would have exposed to him some criminal prosecution or suit for damages. The statements obviously do not relate to any opinion as to public right or custom or matters of any general interest. The statements also do not relate to existence of any relationship between persons as to whose relationship Mr. Desai had any special means of knowledge. The statement in this case, was not made any will or deed or family pedigree in relation to existence of any relationship between persons deceased before any question or dispute arose. Mr. Desai's statement in the present case, was also not some statement and contained in any deed, will or other document. Finally, this is also not a case of statements made by several persons and expresses feelings relevant to the matter in question. This is the second reason why the statements in Mr. Desai's affidavit in lieu of examination in chief could not have been treated as "evidence" under the Evidence Act.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Appeal No. 333 of 2017 in Testamentary Suit No. 28 of 1995
Decided On: 22.10.2018
Anuradha Anil Bhagwat Vs. Kirit Navnitlal Damania and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Abhay Shreeniwas Oka and M.S. Sonak, JJ.
Citation: AIR 2019 Bom 41,2019(3) MHLJ 790
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