Andhra Pradesh HC: Legal Heirs Can Claim Compensation under S.163A MV Act even If Deceased Driver Was Negligent

It is evident that the accident resulted in the death of the deceased and, therefore, the claim petition under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is maintainable, having regard to the object of the Act, which is a beneficial and welfare legislation. Even assuming that the deceased was negligent and contributed to the accident, in view of the amendment brought by Act 32 of 2019, the claimants would be entitled to compensation of Rs. 5,00,000/- in the case of death as contemplated under Section 164 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Though the accident had occurred prior to the said amendment, at the time of final adjudication by this Court, the claimants are entitled to be granted the maximum benefit so as to ensure award of just and reasonable compensation.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI

MACMA No. 262 of 2023

Decided On: 07.05.2026

Veerapaneni Venkata Subhashini and Ors. Vs. Arikatla Venkata Rathnam and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Venkateswarlu Nimmagadda, J.

Citation:  MANU/AP/1296/2026.

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Andhra Pradesh HC: Whether the Session court can permit prosecution to examine witnesses whose names are not mentioned in list of witnesses of chargesheet?

 The learned Special Assistant Public Prosecutor contends that the proposed witnesses are not new witnesses and they were examined by the police during investigation of the case and their statements were also recorded under Section 161 CrPC., but due to inadvertently, their names were not mentioned in the list of witnesses filed with the Police Report (charge sheet) and therefore, only to assist the Court to arrive at a just decision, the prosecution intends to examine them and copies of the statements recorded under Section 161 CrPC., of the said witnesses were also been provided to the accused, and the accused has a right of cross-examination and therefore, it would not cause any prejudice to the accused. {Para 4}

22. In the case on hand, there is no dispute that the prosecution has provided copies of the statements of the proposed witnesses recorded by the Investigating Officer during investigation, to the accused. The contention of the prosecution is that the proposed two witnesses are the eye-witnesses to the occurrence of the incident in the case and the Investigating Officer recorded their statements under Section 161 CrPC during investigation but, inadvertently they were not filed along with the Report (Charge Sheet) under Section 173 CrPC and hence, the prosecution intends to produce the said witnesses in support of the prosecution as evidence for prosecution. Hence, the contention of the accused that the proposed evidence produced by the prosecution which is not mentioned in the list of witnesses and documents filed by the prosecution along with the police report (charge sheet) would cause prejudice to him if allowed, is not tenable in law.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI

Criminal Petition No. 1499 of 2020

Pattivada Balaji Vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.V.L.N. Chakravarthi, J.

Decided On: 23.09.2023.

Citation:  MANU/AP/1650/2023.

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AP HC: What action Insurance Company should take if it comes to its knowledge that claimant has put up a false motor accident claim petition in collusion with police?

Admittedly, in this case, the claimants have filed the claim petition on 17.10.2001. The Insurance Company filed counter thereafter. This means, the Insurance Company had knowledge that an allegation is made by the claimant with regard to the involvement of the lorry bearing registration No. ABT 3 in this accident. When the Insurance Company had knowledge that the claimants have alleged involvement of the lorry bearing registration No. ABT 3 in the accident, the Insurance Company should verify the facts. The possibility of falsely involving the vehicle in an accident cannot be ruled out. But as seen from the recitals of the counter, the Insurance Company had not taken any specific stand. At one stage, it doubted the involvement of the offending vehicle in the accident and at another stage, the insurance company had pleaded that the deceased himself had contributed to the accident. Thus, the insurance company had no clear view with regard to the involvement of the offending vehicle in the accident. When the Insurance Company entertains a doubt with regard to the involvement of a vehicle in the accident, it should appoint an investigator to enquire into the allegations as to whether a particular vehicle had plied on the particular route at particular time on a particular day or not. Fact should be verified. If the Insurance Company collects any such evidence to establish that the vehicle was not involved in the accident, then, they must contest the matter and adduce evidence in support of their case. When they come to know that the police investigation is false or that a vehicle is falsely implicated in a case, they must approach the superior police officers and see that necessary action is taken against the erring police officers who have filed a false charge-sheet implicating the vehicle which has no involvement in the accident. They must also challenge the charge-sheet in appropriate proceedings. What happened during the course of investigation and how the police have come to know about the involvement of the vehicle and whether it is due to Finding of the driving licence of the driver of the offending vehicle at the place of accident or due to the version of the eye witnesses, all those aspects cannot be gone into at this stage. The possibility of police coming to know about the involvement of a vehicle or an accused through some unknown source also cannot be ruled out. The police officers do commit certain mistakes and involve innocent persons in criminal cases. Due to over enthusiastic attitude also, they commit mistakes. What is the fact is to be ascertained. It has to be seen whether police investigation resulted in finding the truth or not. If at all the findings of the police are found to be totally incorrect, it is for the insurance company to adduce some evidence to show that the contents of the charge-sheet are false. It is a fact that P.W. 2 deposed that the offending vehicle was not stopped at the place of accident. If that version is correct, there is no possibility of falling of driving licence at the place of accident. Admittedly, the accident occurred during the night time. Even if P.W. 2 had witnessed the accident and noted the offending vehicle number, admittedly he did not get down from the lorry in which he was travelling. It appears that it being night time, he could not have observed the place of accident and he might not have observed each and every object fallen at the place of accident. It is only during the course of preparation of panchanama at the place of accident that the panchas and the police are expected to observe each and every item and note them in their panchanama. The very purpose of conducting panchanama and the scene of offence is to show the location of the dead body, location of offending vehicle, time, marks or falling of any other objects at the place of accident.

{Para 19}

20. During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the respondents/insurance company submitted that the version of P.W. 2 that the offending vehicle was not stopped at the place of accident supports the version of the insurance company that there is no possibility of falling of the driving licence of the driver of the offending vehicle at the place of accident. As discussed above, since there is no clear evidence to show the distance between the offending lorry and the lorry in which P.W. 2 was travelling, the version of P.W. 2 that the offending vehicle did not stop at the place of accident need not be given much importance. Of course, this circumstance indicates that P.W. 2 also did not see the occurring of the accident. Even if we discard the evidence of P.W. 2, charge-sheet shows that there are two other eye-witnesses. Unless it is shown that police investigation is false, we cannot reach to a definite conclusion. When there is reasonable doubt in a claim petition arising out of the motor accidents, the benefit of doubt should go to the claimants. The possibility of the driver of the offending lorry stopping the offending vehicle at the place of the accident and looking at the scene and fleeing away from the place of accident also cannot be ruled out. Unless there is reliable evidence to show that the contents of the charge-sheet are false, on mere surmise, it cannot be said that the contents of the charge-sheet or the police investigation is false.

21. Learned standing counsel for the insurance company submitted that the insurance company has appointed the investigator, but however, the report of the said investigator is not available in the records of the insurance company. When such an important document is not filed by the insurance company, normally, adverse inference has to be drawn against the insurance company. Admittedly, none were examined on behalf of the insurance company. Mere taking a plea that the offending vehicle was not involved in the accident or that there is contributory negligence would not help the insurance company in the absence of any reliable evidence in support of their contentions, A pleading cannot be taken as proved unless there is evidence to prove the same.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD

M.A.C.M.A. No. 2128 of 2005

Decided On: 26.03.2014

K. Rajani Vs. M. Satyanarayana Goud

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B. Chandra Kumar, J.

Citation: 2014 ALT 6 3312015 ANWR AP 1 52015 ACC AP 3 2932015 ACJ 7972014 SCC ONLINE AP 418, MANU/AP/0828/2014

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Andhra Pradesh HC: Whether the court can summon discharged or acquitted accused as witness U/S 311 of CRPC in the same case?

A plain reading of Sec. 311 does not place any restrictions on the power of the Court to issue summons to a witness if the Magistrate is of the opinion that the evidence of those witnesses is essential to the just decision of the case. After the complainant compounded the offences with Subbarayan and Kannan the latter two persons were acquitted as a result of the compounding and no longer figure as co-accused in the case to be tried along with the revision petitioner. It can no doubt be said that having figured as co-accused at an earlier point of time, the evidence which those witnesses are likely to give is in the nature of an accomplice evidence but then the court will naturally be on its guard in not acting on such evidence unless their evidence is corroborated in material particulars. The absence of evidence corroborating the evidence of these two persons in material particulars cannot impinge in any manner on the power of the court to summon them as witnesses. Sec. 311, therefore, gives ample power to the court to summon witnesses who are no longer accused before him if the Magistrate felt that their evidence is essential to the just decision of the case. {Para 2}

3. A few cases which have been relied upon can now be noticed. In Banu Singh v. Emperor I.L.R. 33 Cal. 1353 a Division Bench expressed itself:

"The law, however, is well settled, and there can be no controversy on the point that an accomplice, if he is not an accused under trial in the same case is a competent witness and may, as any other witness, be examined on oath.........On such a discharge or acquittal he becomes a competent witness against other persons accused of the same offence. The disability to be examined as a witness on oath against the persons who are brought before the court on the same indictment, may thus cease on the withdrawal of the indictment, against him".

The Supreme Court in Jamatraj v. State of Maharashtra MANU/SC/0063/1967 : A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 178, while considering the sweep of Sec. 540. Cr.P.C. (Repealed Code) expressed itself:

"Statutory law confers a power in absolute terms to be exercised at any stage of the trial to summon a witness provided the just decision of the case demands it............If the Court has acted without the requirements of a just decision, the action is open to criticism but if the Court's action is supportable as being in aid of a just decision, the action cannot be regarded as exceeding the jurisdiction."

The Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision referred to Dora Harrig's case 1927-2KB 587. In that case five persons were tried, two for stealing and they pleaded guilty and three others for receiving who pleaded not guilty. The first two remained in the dock and the trial proceeded against the other three. They gave evidence on their own behalf and the prosecution case was not quite strong. The Recorder then asked one of the other two accused to give evidence and allowed the prisoner Dora, against whom the evidence went, to cross-examine him but Dora was not asked to enter the Box again to contradict the new evidence. This was held by the Court of Criminal Appeal to be a wrong exercise of the power of the Court. It was an extreme example of the exercise of the power.

4. The observations made in the aforesaid decisions go to indicate that once the court's action is supportable as being in aid of a just decision, no exception can be taken if the Magistrate ordered issue of summons to persons who were no longer before him as accused to be tried in the case against the revision petitioner alone. The learned Magistrate has expressed himself that the witnesses appear to be just witnesses and the petition is worth allowing to meet the ends of justice. These expressions can, in the context, be only construed to mean that the Magistrate felt that the examination of these witnesses is essential to the just decision of the case. This objection raised by the revision petitioner is accordingly rejected.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD

Crl. R.C. No. 803/82

Decided On: 17.12.1983

N. Chennimaliay Vs. The Andhra Pradesh Marketing Corporation

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

P. Ramachandra Raju, J.

 Citations

1984 MLJ CRI 1 4651984 ALT 1 3151984 APLJ HC 1 2371983 SCC ONLINE AP 1971984 AP LJ 1 2371984 CRI LJ NOC 139 531984 MLJ CRL 1 4651984 APLJ 1 237, MANU/AP/0245/1983

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Andhra Pradesh HC: Procedure for disposal of National flag

 If the National Flag is in a damaged or soiled condition, it shall be destroyed as a whole in private, preferably by burning or by any other method consistent with the dignity of the National Flag.

ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT

 CASE NO.PIL No. 20 of 2012

M. Rajkumar v. Government Of Andhra Pradesh And Others.

Pinaki Chandra Ghose, A.C.J.

Equivalent Citations

2013 ALD 2 4442013 ALT 1 6142012 SCC ONLINE AP 882

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What is distinction between concept of cruelty U/S 498A of IPC and Under Civil law or Matrimonial law?

 C. Veerudu Vs. State Of A.P.(1989) CR. L.J. NOC 52(A.P.)

• S. 498 A The sole constituent of offence u/s 498 A is cruelty which means 'wilful conduct'. The Word wilful contemplates obstinate and deliberate brhaviour on part of offender for it to amount to cruelty. Thus 'Mensrea' is an esssential ingredient of the offence.
• The principles are that the standard of proof of cruelty are higher in degree in criminal law than in civil law under the matrimonial causes.
• The intention or mensrea on the part of one spouse to injure the other is not a necessary element of cruelty in civil law for martimonial causes while it is an essential element in criminal law.
• It is enough if crulety is proved by preponderance of probabilities in civil law while in criminal trials the coduct of cruelty has to be proved beyond all resonable doubt.
• It is immaterial in civil law whether respondent's conduct was aimed at the other spouse or is due to unwarranted indifference attributable perhaps to selfishness or laziness while it is very much material in criminal proceeding and for relief of matrimonial causes in civil law the conduct of spouse need not necessarily result in danger to life, limb or health but a reasonable apprehension of such danger is enough, whereas section 498 A contemplates such a conduct besides being wilful to result in the likelihood of driving the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health.

[ In the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No. 756 of 1987. ] 1

VEERULU V/S STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, decided on Friday, June 10, 1988.  Judge(s) : BHASKARA RAO. Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Whether widow is entitled to get compensation under workman compensation Act if she remarries?

 Section 2(d) of the Employees' (Workmen's) Compensation Act, 1923 (for short referred to as the Act)defines "dependents". The provision reads as under: {Para 11}

2(d). 'Dependant' means any of the following relatives of a deceased employees namely; (i) a widow, a minor legitimate or adopted son, an unmarried legitimate or adopted daughter, or a widowed mother; and

12. A plain reading of the above definition makes it clear that as on the date of death; wife of the deceased who becomes a widow is treated as a dependant and is made eligible to receive compensation. The Act does not make a distinction between a person who remains widow or who re-marries again.

14. Similar question has fallen for consideration before the High Court of Rajasthan in case of R.B. Moondra and Company Vs. Bhanwari and Others Contention that widow is debarred from claiming the compensation on account of re-marriage is rejected. Para 19 reads as under:

The last contention that the widow became debarred from claiming compensation on account of her remarriage has also no force because in the Act there is no such provision that after remarriage widow of the deceased would not be regarded as a dependent. Under Section 21 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, a widow remains a dependant, within the meaning of that section so long as she is not remarried. But the definition of the 'dependant' under the Act is not so restricted and the fact that she has remarried will not disentitle her to claim compensation under the Act.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD

Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 3122 of 2002

Decided On: 24.04.2013

Mandadi Adilakshmi Vs. Vallabhaneni Siva Prasad and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

P. Naveen Rao, J.

Citation: 2014 ACJ 950 (AP), MANU/AP/0562/2013.

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Under which circumstance the court can reject application of defendant for production of document at the stage of their evidence?

 The revision-petitioners though stated that they referred

the documents during the cross-examination of P.W.1, did not

produce the said documents at that time, but filed the

documents when the suit is at the stage of defendants evidence

and sought the leave of the Court. As already stated above,

except the document No.6, no other document is referred in the

written statement by the revision-petitioners. No reason was also

assigned in the written statement for retaining the said

documents with the defendants at that time.{Para 11}

12. The affidavit filed by the revision-petitioners before the

Trial Court would show that documents were very much available with the defendants at the time of filing the written statement, but they did not file and now, they want to show that they retained them as they were required for taking loan from banks or getting benefits from the Government. But, no material is coming forthwith to support the same.

13. This Court in Ravi Satish and Voruganti Narayana Rao

cases (supra) held that grant of leave is not for mere asking, nor

is the Court a mere Post-Office to receive documents even in the

absence of any reasons being furnished for failure to file the said

documents along with the written statement.

14. In those circumstances, there are no grounds to interfere

with the Order of the Trial Court, as this Court did not find any

material irregularity in the impugned Order of the learned Trial

Court and the revision-petition is deserved to be dismissed.

 HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI

CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO.4776 of 2016

Kottakota Lakkappa  Vs B.Lakkappagari Chikkaiah 

DATE OF ORDER PRONOUNCED : 18.08.2023

Coram:  SRI JUSTICE B.V.L.N.CHAKRAVARTHI

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Whether conduct of defendant who is seeking vacation of interim order should also be fair and honest?

  The Wander Ltd. v. Antox India P. Ltd. (supra) fell for consideration in Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co. MANU/SC/0472/1995 : (1995) 5 SCC 545 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that under Order 39 CPC the jurisdiction of the court to interfere with an order of interlocutory or temporary injunction is purely equitable and, therefore, the court, on being approached, will, apart from other considerations, also look to the conduct of the party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court, and may refuse to interfere unless his conduct was free from blame. Since the relief is wholly equitable in nature, the party invoking the jurisdiction of the court has to show that he himself was not at fault and that he himself was not responsible for bringing about the state of things complained of and that he was not unfair or inequitable in his dealings with the party against whom he was seeking relief. It is relevant to reproduce paragraph No. 47 as under:

"47. In this context, it would be relevant to mention that in the instant case GBC had approached the High Court for the injunction order, granted earlier, to be vacated. Under Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure, jurisdiction of the Court to interfere with an order of interlocutory or temporary injunction is purely equitable and, therefore, the Court, on being approached, will, apart from other considerations, also look to the conduct of the party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court, and may refuse to interfere unless his conduct was free from blame. Since the relief is wholly equitable in nature, the party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court has to show that he himself was not at fault and that he himself was not responsible for bringing about the state of things complained of and that he was not unfair or inequitable in his dealings with the party against whom he was seeking relief. His conduct should be fair and honest. These considerations will arise not only in respect of the person who seeks an order of injunction under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but also in respect of the party approaching the Court for vacating the ad interim or temporary injunction order already granted in the pending suit or proceedings". {Para 33}

34. In the present case, the trial court, while granting temporary injunction, has discussed that during the pendency of the suit the defendant No. 1, the appellant herein, transferred the suit schedule property in favour of defendants Nos. 2 and 3, and those defendants, in turn, transferred the part of the suit property in favour of third persons. The defendants/appellants invoking the jurisdiction of this court are therefore responsible for bringing about the state of things complained of by the plaintiff/respondent before the court below and cannot be prima facie said to be equitable in his dealings. In Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co. (supra) the Hon'ble Apex Court clearly laid down that the considerations of the conduct being fair and honest will arise not only in respect of an applicant seeking an order of injunction but also in respect of the party approaching the court for vacating the ad interim or temporary injunction already granted in the pending suit or proceeding.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI

Civil Miscellaneous Appeal Nos. 43 and 45 of 2021

Decided On: 25.01.2022

K. Ravi Prasad Reddy and Ors.  Vs.  G. Giridhar and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

C. Praveen Kumar and Ravi Nath Tilhari, JJ.

Author: Ravi Nath Tilhari, J.

Citation: MANU/AP/0075/2022.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

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Whether Section 52 of Transfer of Property Act operates as bar to grant of temporary injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of CPC?

In view of the submissions advanced, the following points arise for consideration and determination;

i) Whether Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act operates as a bar to the grant of temporary injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC? {Para 14}

24. From the aforesaid, we are of the considered view that Section 52 of T.P. Act although provides protection to the parties from transfers pendent lite, in as much as it makes such transfers subservient to the decree that may be passed in the suit, but it does not come in the way of passing an order of temporary injunction restraining alienation of the suit property during the pendency of the suit on the applicant satisfying all the three ingredients of prima facie, balance of convenience and causing irreparable loss or injury in his favour.

25. The distinction between Section 52 of T.P. Act and Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC, is that an order of temporary injunction is of preemptive nature restraining the act of alienation by party to the suit where there is such a danger, whereas Section 52 of T.P. Act comes into play after the alienation takes place during pendency of the suit. Section 52 of T.P. Act provides for the consequences of a transfer taking place pending litigation, i.e., that the pendent lite purchaser would be entitled to or suffer the same legal rights and obligations of his vendor(s) that may be finally determined by the court. Section 52 of T.P. Act does not come in the way of applicability of Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC. In other words, notwithstanding Section 52 of T.P. Act making the transfers during pendency of the suit subject to the ultimate decree that may be passed in the suit, the court may, pass an order of temporary injunction, if all the requisite pre-conditions for such grant are satisfied. If an order is passed and transfer is restrained, the question of applicability of Section 52 of T.P. Act will not arise as then there will be no transfer pending litigation. On the other hand, if the party does not apply for temporary injunction or if the application is rejected and the suit property is transferred pending litigation, Section 52 of T.P. Act shall come into play and those transfers would abide by the ultimate result of the suit.

28. For the aforesaid reasons, we are not inclined to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that in view of Section 52 of T.P. Act providing for the effect of transfers during pendency of the suit, the order of temporary injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 could not be passed. If such an argument is accepted, then the court cannot pass an order of temporary injunction to restrain alienation in spite of specific provision under Order 39 Rule 1(a) CPC, in any case, as in every case any alienation made pending litigation would abide by the doctrine of lis pendens embodied under Section 52 of T.P. Act. This will render the provisions of Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC ineffective.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI

Civil Miscellaneous Appeal Nos. 43 and 45 of 2021

Decided On: 25.01.2022

K. Ravi Prasad Reddy and Ors.  Vs.  G. Giridhar and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

C. Praveen Kumar and Ravi Nath Tilhari, JJ.

Author: Ravi Nath Tilhari, J.

Citation: MANU/AP/0075/2022,

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Whether a Court has got power to order unexamined witnesses out of Court until their evidence is taken?

 The first question for consideration is whether a Court has got power to order unexamined witnesses out of Court until their evidence is taken. Neither the Evidence Act nor the Code of Civil and Criminal Procedure contain any section or rule for ordering witnesses out of court although it is generally done by the courts as a matter of practice. In my view, the court has inherent power to regulate the business of the court in the way it thinks best or to make any order that may be necessary for the ends of justice.

I am also of the opinion that even in the absence of any specific provision in any enactment, the Court has power to order that no witness who has to give evidence should be present when the depositions of other witnesses are being taken until he himself is examined as a witness in full. In Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 15, Simonds Edn. at page 439, the rule of Practice is stated to be that at any time during the course of a trial, on an application of any party, the Judge may order witnesses in the case to leave the Court until called for.

The authority for this is stated to be Selfe v. Issaccson, (1858) 1 P and F 194 : 175 ER 688. Again in Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 10, at p. 470, it is stated that unexamined witnesses may be ordered out of court at the request of either party. It is therefore clear that the court has power to order unexamined witnesses out of court at any time during the trial on the application of either party.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH

C.R.P. No. 1346 of 1960

Decided On: 06.01.1961

Achyutana Pitchaiah Sarma Vs.  Gorantla Chinna Veerayya and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges:

G. Chandrasekhara Sastry, J.

 Citations: AIR 1961 AP 420,MANU/AP/0169/1961

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What is duty of municipal commissioner if he issues notice for removal of unauthorized construction?

A perusal of the impugned notice shows that respondent No. 1 has not dealt with the explanation of the petitioner and has rejected the same with a cryptic observation that the same is not satisfactory and "it may not be considered". In the opinion of this Court, the very purpose of issuing a notice under Section 452(1) of the Act is to give an opportunity for a person, who has constructed the building in an illegal or unauthorised manner, to submit his explanation. It is, therefore, obligatory on the part of respondent No. 1 to consider the explanation. If satisfactory explanation is offered by the owner of the building, respondent No. 1 shall drop further proceedings. It is only in cases where such explanation is not offered, respondent No. 1 is not entitled to proceed further. Unless the Commissioner refers to the contents of the explanation and gives reasons for coming to the conclusion that the explanation is not satisfactory, he cannot proceed with further action and issue notice under Section 636 of the Act. Failure to deal with the explanation renders the very purpose of issuing notice nugatory.{Para 7}

8. As noted above, the Commissioner failed to deal with the plea of the petitioner raised in the explanation that the additions or alterations or repairs effected by him do not fall under Section 433 of the Act. The Commissioner, therefore, ought to have referred to the nature of the structure raised by the petitioner in comparison with the pre-existing structure and given his reasons for his satisfaction that construction made by the petitioner falls under Section 433 of the Act warranting action under Sections 452(1) and 636 of the Act. As the Commissioner failed to give any such reasons, the impugned notice cannot be sustained in law and the same is accordingly set aside.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD

Writ Petition No 18839 of 2011,

Poonamchand and Ors.  Vs.  Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Hon'ble Sri Justice C.V. Nagarjuna Reddy

Decided On: 19.09.2011

Citation: MANU/AP/0712/2011

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Under which circumstances Judgment of court will not operate as res judicata?

  One other aspect which has to be considered in this connection is whether the finding in the civil proceedings that the zoning regulations of 1981 and multi-storeyed building regulations, 1981 are not retrospective and they will not be applicable to the application of the petitioner filed on 28-6-1980 operates as res judicata or not and in any event binding on the parties. In this connection, it would be necessary to understand the scope and ambit of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is well settled that a decision rendered on questions of fact between the parties in a former suit will operate as res judicata and binds the parties or persons claiming under it in a subsequently instituted proceeding. Similar is the position insofar as findings recorded in the former suit in respect of mixed questions of law and fact. It is also well settled that pure questions of law relating to the jurisdiction of the Court/Tribunal will not operate as res judicata, and cannot be deemed to have been finally determined. This is because of the fact that if erroneous interpretation of statute, the Court which has no jurisdiction holds that it has jurisdiction, that decision will not operate as res judicata between the parties, even if the cause of action in the subsequently instituted proceeding is the same. What is the position with regard to a decision rendered on a pure question of law? On the said question, it has been held in Mathura Prasad v. Dossibai, MANU/SC/0420/1970 : [1970] 3 SCR 830 that if the cause of action is the same both in the former and subsequent proceedings, then the decision on an issue of law will be res judicata between the same parties, if the cause of action is not the same in both the proceedings, it will not operate as res judicata. It is also held therein that when the law has since the earlier decision been altered by a competent authority, that will not operate as res judicata.

Where, however, the question is one purely of law and it relates to the jurisdiction of the Court or a decision of the Court sanctioning something which is illegal, by resort to the rule of res judicata a party affected by the decision will not be precluded from challenging the validity, of the order under the rule of res judicata, for a rule of procedure cannot supersede the law of the land.

Therefore, from this decision, it is clear that a decision on pure question of law will not operate as res judicata if the law has changed or altered by a competent Court or authority subsequent to the earlier decision. In fact, the learned Judges in para 7 of their Judgment reiterate the decision in the following manner.

Where the law is altered since the earlier decision, the earlier decision will not operate as res judicata between the same parties.

This is based on the premise that the rule of procedure indicated in Section 11, C.P.C. cannot supersede or override the law. This view has been followed and reiterated in the decisions reported in Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra, MANU/SC/0593/1989 : (1990) 1 SCC 193 and in Isabella Johnson v. M.A. Susai MANU/SC/0228/1991 : AIR 1991 SC 993 

{Para 18}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH

Writ Petn. No. 10019 of 1993

Decided On: 02.09.1994

3 Aces, Hyderabad Vs.  Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad

Hon'ble Judges:

S.S.M. Quadri, P.L.N. Sarma and B.S. Raikote, JJ.

Author: P.L.N. Sarma, J.

Citation:  MANU/AP/0002/1995.

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Guidelines of Andhra Pradesh High Court (Full bench) for demolition of unauthorized construction by Municipal Corporation

 Having regard to the rampant, illegal and unauthorised constructions raised in the country as observed in State of Maharashtra's case MANU/SC/0335/1991 : [1991] 2 SCR 745 a (supra) before parting with this case, we would like to formulate the following guidelines to be followed by the respondent in respect of illegal constructions. The guidelines should not be treated as exhaustive but only illustrative and the discretion to be exercised by the Corporation in any given case should not be arbitrary or, capricious.

1) In cases where applications having been duly filed in accordance with law, after fulfilling all requirements, seeking permission to construct buildings and permission was also granted by the Corporation, the power of demolition should be exercised by the Corporation only if the deviations made, during the construction are not in public interest or cause public nuisance or hazardous or dangerous to public safety including the residents therein. If the deviations of violations are minor, minimal or trivial which do not affect public at large, the Corporation will not resort to demolition.

2) whatever is stated in guideline number (1) will also equally apply to the permissions deemed to have been granted under Section 437 of "The Act".

3) If no application has been filed seeking permission and the construction is made without any permission whatsoever, it is open to the Corporation to demolish and pull down or remove the said unauthorised structure in its discretion. Otherwise, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, it will be putting a premium on the unauthorised construction.

When the Corporation comes to the conclusion, keeping the above guidelines in view, that the construction in question is required to be demolished or pull down, it should follow the procedure indicated below:

(i) The demolition should not be resorted to during festival days declared by the State Government as public holidays excluding Sundays. If the festival day declared by the Government as a public holiday falls on a Sunday, on that Sunday also, the Corporation should not resort to demolition.

(ii) In any case, there should not be any demolition after sun set and before sun rise.

(iii) The Corporation should give notice of demolition as required by the statute fixing the date of demolition. Even on the said date, before actually resorting to the demolition, the Corporation should give reasonable time, depending upon the premises sought to be demolished, for the inmates to withdraw from the premises. If within the time given the inmates do not withdraw, the Corporation may proceed with actual demolition;

These guidelines are laid down in view of the fact that the Corporation is a public authority and its action must be tested on the touchstone of fairness and reasonableness. {Para 36}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH

Writ Petn. No. 10019 of 1993

Decided On: 02.09.1994

3 Aces, Hyderabad Vs.  Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad

Hon'ble Judges:

S.S.M. Quadri, P.L.N. Sarma and B.S. Raikote, JJ.

Author: P.L.N. Sarma, J.

Citation:  MANU/AP/0002/1995

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What is duty of Municipal Corporation when it has issued demolition notice?

In a judicial review exercise, the court is concerned not by the decision per se so long as it is not perverse or illegal, but decision making process. The decision making process must be fair and reasonable. It is elementary that every decision must be based upon the reasons. Thus, reasons become the foundations for the conclusions. At best they will indicate clearly the lines on which the mind of the competent authority has been applied and in the worst they will indicate the exclusion from the zone of consideration of irrelevant factors. Therefore, the impugned order is ex facie illegal for not supplying the live links to the conclusion, which in turn indicates non-application of mind to the objections stated. When I say that there must be reasons assigned, I am not expecting the administrative authority to deal with the objections in the same manner as a very well trained court would have done. But, at least, the objections must be seriously taken into account and consideration and an appropriate answer should be furnished thereto. Then alone, the usual attack of non-application of mind on the part of the competent authority can be neutralized. For sheer lack of reasons assigned in the impugned order dated 16.10.2012, it is set aside after hearing Sri Radha Krishna Reddy, leaned Standing Counsel for GHMC who in spite of a valiant effort put in by him could not satisfy me that the impugned order contained any reasons.  {Para 3}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH

Writ Petition No. 35976 of 2012

Decided On: 22.11.2012

 K. Ashok Kumar  Vs. The Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Hon'ble Sri Justice Nooty Ramamohana Rao

Citation: MANU/AP/0908/2012

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AP HC: Municipal Corporations should not demolish construction if there are Minor Violations In the Construction Of a Building Which Do Not Affect the Public At Large

In cases where applications having been duly filed in accordance with law, after fulfilling all requirements, seeking permission to construct buildings and permission was also granted by the Corporation, the power of demolition should be exercised by the Corporation only if the deviations made during the construction are not in public interest or cause public nuisance or hazardous or dangerous to public safety including the residents therein. If the deviations or violations are minor, minimal or trivial which do not affect public at large, the Corporation will not resort to demolition.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI

Writ Petition No. 25816 of 2022

Decided On: 16.08.2022

 E.V. Rama Rao  Vs.  The State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Ravi Nath Tilhari, J.

Citation: MANU/AP/1331/2022

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Whether civil suit is maintainable if municipal corporation is fixing property tax without following proper procedure?

 The learned counsel for the respondent finally contended that S. 376 of the Municipalities Act bars the suit questioning the levy and assessment of municipal tax; and as such the plea of the defendants that the assessment cannot be enforced is not maintainable. {Para 18}

19. S. 376 of the Municipalities Act, to the extent relevant is as follows:

(1) No assessment or demand made, and no charge imposed under the authority of this Act shall be questioned or affected by reason of any clerical error or by reason of any mistake (a) in respect of the name, residence, place of business or occupation of any person or (b) in the description of any property or thing or (c) in respect of the amount assessed, demanded or charged, provided that the provisions of this Act have been, in substance and effect complied with and no proceedings under this Act shall, merely for defect in form be quashed, or set aside by any Court:

xx xx xx xx Section 376 bars the filling of the suit in respect of the procedure adopted and also any defect in form and mistakes with respect to the amount assessed, demanded or charged; but however, saves the disputes regarding the non-compliance or deviation of the provisions of the Act. In a situation where there is an infraction of the provisions of the Act, it cannot be said that the suit is not maintainable. Further in a suit is not maintainable. Further in a suit for recovery of tax, it is open to the defendant to plead that both the levy and collection of tax are illegal. The plea of the defendants in this case is that the levy of assessment of tax deviates from the provisions of S. 87 of the Act. The essence of the plea is that the assessment is not in conformity with S. 87 (2) (b) which says that the rent received is the basis for assessing the rental value the estimate of value or the assessment on the basis of rent by the leesee or the tenant is far remote from the intention of S. 87 (2) (b) and as such the plea in defence is maintainable.

20. The learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the decision in Vizianagaram Municipality v. Bhaskara rao, where a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Satyanarayana Raju J. And Kumarayya. J. Held that the ouster of civil court's Jurisdiction under S. 364 of the Madras District Municipalities Act is only partial and is confined to the language and intendment of the provisions. The impeachment of the assessment or demand is not permissible on the ground that there is a clerical error or mistake in respect of the amount assessed. But in a situation where the provisions of the Act have not in substance and effect, complied with by the authority while making the assessment, the jurisdiction of the civil Court is unaffected.

22. It is also contended that the remedy is open to the defendants by way of an appeal under R. 22 of Sch. I of the Municipalities Act; and as such this plea is not maintainable. It must be borne in mind that the defendants have not initiated action and they are defending themselves against the onslaught of the illegal and invlaid assessment and collection pursuant to the same. They are not questioning the quantum of assessment as such; but the basis of assessment. In the circumstance,s the suit is not barred; much less the plea in defence against, the suit filed by the Municipality.

Andhra High Court

Shantilal Bazaz And Anr. vs Municipal Council, ... on 19 November, 1982

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Whether a party can refuse to pay damages for delay caused in the performance of the contract due to its conduct taking the defence of contractual term?

 Clause 59 prima facie prohibits the claim for compensation by the Contractor on account of the delays and defaults or whatever reasons and that only reasonable extension of time is permissible. The learned Arbitrator considering this issue interpreted the same to mean the escalation of prices is not covered by Clause 59 and what is contemplated under Section 59 is only compensation for the delays committed and it never prohibited the Contractor from claiming the escalation charges. When once the term of the contract has been interpreted, which is always permissible for the Arbitrator under Clause 73, which is widely worded, the interpretation placed by the Arbitrator has to be accepted. Therefore, when once the Arbitrator is clothed with the jurisdiction by virtue of Clause 73, temporary injunction is always open for him to interpret and construe the terms of the contract. The Department having failed to handover the site properly in accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract and having disabled the Contractor from executing the work as per the schedule on account of the various obstacles created including the non-initiation of the Land Acquisition proceedings, can it be said that still Clause 59 can be successfully invoked by the Department. It is well settled law that a person, who breaches the contract or who violates the contract is liable for damages or consequences and this clause cannot be interpreted to mean that whatever the defaults or breaches committed by the Department, the Department becomes immune from consequences. Such stipulation in the contract is highly arbitrary and unreasonable and the Division Bench of this Court has already held such a stipulation, even though it was agreed by the parties, but at the same time, when it is patently one sided and suppressed the Contractor, it cannot be said to be valid contract. Such a contract can be said to be opposed to the public policy. Obviously, it goes to establish that the Department cannot interfere with the integrity of the contract. While at the same time the Contractor cannot be allowed to interfere with the integrity of the contract, the primary intendment of the Clause 59 is not to allow the Contractor to go for compensation. On the other hand, the Department is entitled to grant reasonable extension which implies that reasonable extension of time without disturbing the work schedule is permissible, but when unreasonable extension is granted, it cannot be said that the Clause 59 also covers the situation. In case of a contract, which is liable to be executed within 12 months, a reasonable extension of one or two months can be granted by the authorities in which event, the Contractor will not be liable to claim compensation. But, if the extension is granted for a wholly unreasonable period and left asking the Contractor not to claim compensation is not contemplated under Section 59. The reasonable extension of time is sine qua non for invoking Clause 59, if the extension is unreasonable, Clause 59 will come into play. Admittedly, in the instant case, it was completed in 1985 and the work which was scheduled to be completed within 15 months has taken 5 years and which was accepted and the learned Arbitrator found that the delays were completely attributable to the Department. Therefore, even though extension was granted, since the extension is not a reasonable extension and in the guise of extending the time, the Contractor cannot be allowed to suffer the loss of escalation of the prices and connected liabilities. {Para 93}

Andhra High Court

T.A. Choudhary vs State Of A.P. And Ors. on 1 May, 2003

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Whether the court should recognize time-barred payment made by Judgment debtor outside the court?

  Now, the law says further that if money is paid or adjustment of decree of any kind is arrived at outside the Court, it should be promptly got recorded and certified as contemplated by Rule 2. This can be done either by the J. D. or by the decree-holder; but in the very nature of things, a judgment-debtor should be more concerned in having such payment or adjustment recorded and certified by the Court. Article 125 of the Limitation Act provides a period of 30 days for applying to the Court for recording; an adjustment or satisfaction of the decree, from the date of payment or adjustment. There is no provision for extending the said period. Since by virtue of Sub-rule (3) of Rule 2 of Order XXI "a payment or adjustment, which has not been certified or recorded as aforesaid (in accordance with Rule 2) shall not be recognized by any Court executing the decree", any payment or adjustment not certified or recorded in accordance with Rule 2 of Order XXI is no payment or adjustment in law. Any such payment or adjustment cannot be recognized by the Court executing the decree -- unless of course, the decree-holder himself admits the same. Therefore, when a decree-holder takes out execution, the judgment-debtor will not be entitled to plead -- if by the date of his plea a period of thirty days has expired from the date of payment or adjustment, as the case may be -- that he has paid the money due, or has otherwise adjusted the decree, outside the Court. It is, no doubt, true that the use of the expression 'may' - in Sub-rule (2) of Rule 2 has given room for controversy and argument; but, in my opinion, the said expression has to be construed and understood in the light of Sub-rule (3) of Rule 2, and if so read, the expression 'may' is liable to be construed and understood as 'shall'. By placing this construction no inconsistency arises between Order XXI, Rule 2 and Section 47. When Section 47 declares that all questions relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of a decree shall be enquired into and determined only by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit, it does not mean that the provisions in Order XXI, Rule 2 read with Article 125 of the Limitation Act should be ignored. Indeed, one should read them together harmoniously. As stated hereinbefore, the several Rules in Order XXI supplement, illustrate and elaborate the provisions contained in Part-II of the Code. The object behind Sub-rule (3) of Rule 2 of Order XXI is to shut out any plea of payment, or adjustment, which is not promptly got recorded and certified under the said Rule. The idea is to preclude any such pleas and leave no room for them.

20. For the above reasons, I hold, agreeing with Upendralal Waghray, J. that the payment allegedly made by the judgment-debtor on 5-1-1979 not having been recorded and certified in accordance with Order XXI, Rule 2(2), C.P.C., cannot be recognized by the executing Court in E.P. No. 73/1981, because the application alleging such payment was made, even in the earlier E.P., (E.P. No. 20/1979), beyond 30 days of the payment.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH

Civil Revn. Petn. No. 2413 of 1983

Decided On: 29.04.1988

P. Narasaiah  Vs. P. Rajoo Reddy

Hon'ble Judges:

B.P. Jeevan Reddy, K. Amareswari and Upendralal Waghray, JJ.

Citation: MANU/AP/0166/1989,AIR 1989 AP 264 (FB)

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Whether judgment debtor can plead payment of decretal amount outside court after expiry of thirty days?

1) whether a judgment-debtor, who does not get the payment made by him outside the Court recorded and certified under Sub-rule (2) of Rule 2 off Order XXI, C.P.C., can be permitted to plead such payment, after the expiry of period of 30 days prescribed by Article 125 of the Limitation Act, in the execution proceedings taken by the decree-holder? Amareswari, J. has held that by virtue of Section 47, C.P.C., the judgment-debtor is entitled to raise such a plea, while Upendralal Waghray, J. has held to the contrary.

2) Now, the law says further that if money is paid or adjustment of decree of any kind is arrived at outside the Court, it should be promptly got recorded and certified as contemplated by Rule 2. This can be done either by the J. D. or by the decree-holder; but in the very nature of things, a judgment-debtor should be more concerned in having such payment or adjustment recorded and certified by the Court. Article 125 of the Limitation Act provides a period of 30 days for applying to the Court for recording; an adjustment or satisfaction of the decree, from the date of payment or adjustment. There is no provision for extending the said period. Since by virtue of Sub-rule (3) of Rule 2 of Order XXI "a payment or adjustment, which has not been certified or recorded as aforesaid (in accordance with Rule 2) shall not be recognized by any Court executing the decree", any payment or adjustment not certified or recorded in accordance with Rule 2 of Order XXI is no payment or adjustment in law. Any such payment or adjustment cannot be recognized by the Court executing the decree -- unless of course, the decree-holder himself admits the same. Therefore, when a decree-holder takes out execution, the judgment-debtor will not be entitled to plead -- if by the date of his plea a period of thirty days has expired from the date of payment or adjustment, as the case may be -- that he has paid the money due, or has otherwise adjusted the decree, outside the Court.  

3) For the above reasons, I hold, agreeing with Upendralal Waghray, J. that the payment allegedly made by the judgment-debtor on 5-1-1979 not having been recorded and certified in accordance with Order XXI, Rule 2(2), C.P.C., cannot be recognized by the executing Court in E.P. No. 73/1981, because the application alleging such payment was made, even in the earlier E.P., (E.P. No. 20/1979), beyond 30 days of the payment.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH

Civil Revn. Petn. No. 2413 of 1983

Decided On: 29.04.1988

 P. Narasaiah Vs. P. Rajoo Reddy

Hon'ble Judges:

B.P. Jeevan Reddy, K. Amareswari and Upendralal Waghray, JJ.

Citation: AIR 1989 AP 264 (FB)

B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J.

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