Supreme court: Limitation To Execute Mandatory Injunction decree is 3 Years From Decree Date If No Performance Date Fixed

An Execution Application was filed on 12.08.2010 seeking implementation of mandatory injunction part of the decree. The Execution Court dismissed said Application as barred by limitation by relying on Article 135 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 which provides limitation for enforcement of a decree granting a mandatory injunction. The limitation period provided therein is three years commencing from the date of the decree or where a date is fixed for performance, such date.

{Para 4}

5. As the decree passed by the First Appellate Court did not specify any date for performance, the limitation period would commence from the date of the decree, as was held by the Execution Court.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal C No. 4284/2023

Date of Order: 17.02.2026

Babu Singh Vs. Jalandhar Improvement Trust and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Manoj Misra and Manmohan, JJ.

Citation: MANU/SCOR/8600/2026.

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Breaking the Chains of Time: How Courts Navigate Delayed Criminal Revisions

 

When Justice Cannot Wait for Perfect Timing

In the intricate world of criminal law, timing can make the difference between justice served and justice denied. The Limitation Act of 1963 sets clear boundaries, but what happens when these temporal constraints threaten to undermine the very essence of legal remedy? The answer lies in a judicial principle that prioritizes substance over technicality.

The 90-Day Window: Understanding the Framework

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Madras HC: Under which circumstances Motor accident claim tribunal should not refuse to entertain Claim petition as barred by limitation?

The Parliament in its wisdom has ensured that the hapless victims of motor accidents need not depend upon stakeholders in Court for the purpose of initiation of proceedings. The proceeding itself is initiated on the basis of the report filed by the Police Authorities. In effect, the petition under Section 166 is only a reminder to the Court that the police have already filed the Detailed Accident Report containing all the requisite details like the First Information Report, Interim Accident Report, First Accident Report and therefore, it has to take up the said report as a claim petition. In other words, the claim petition is only a reminder to the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal to perform its duty under Rule 21 Annexure XIII of Central Motor Vehicles Rules and to process the claim petition. {Para 28}

29. In view of the above discussion, it is clear that in cases where any request is filed and accessible by the Tribunal, then there will be no question of six months limitation arising. The issue of six months limitation will arise only in case where no FIR has been registered by the Police and no report has been sent/uploaded.

30. The members of the Bar represented that the Police are not sending the report and hence, there arises a problem.

31. A reading of Section 166(4) shows that if any report of the accident is forwarded to it under Section 159, the same shall be treated as an application for compensation. It is no more the discretion of the police. Rule 4(A)(5)(1) of the Tamil Nadu Rules read with the Central rules make it mandatory. It has now become a statutory duty of the Police to sent a report. It is pertinent to point out that the amendment under Section 166(4) does not speak about the Interim Accident Report (IAR), First Accident Report (FAR) and Detailed Accident Report (DAR) but speaks about “any report that has been sent by the police”. Therefore, even if an FIR sent by the police to the Tribunal, the same should be treated a Claim Petition.

32. The upshot of the discussion is that on registration of an FIR, a claimant is entitled to present the petition without the fear of it being thrown out, on the ground of limitation. This would be the correct reading of the present legal dispensation in all cases where FIR is registered within six months, of the date of any motor accident which takes place after 01.04.2022.

In the High Court of Madras

(Before V. Lakshminarayanan, J.)

Malaravan Vs  Praveen Travels Private Limited and Others 

C.R.P. No. 2558 of 2023

Decided on August 18, 2023, 

Citation: 2023 SCC OnLine Mad 5467 : (2023) 2 TN MAC 416 : (2023) 5 Mad LJ 57 : 2023 ACJ 2062.

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Supreme Court: Power Of Attorney Impliedly Revoked When Principal Acts Independent Of Agency With Knowledge To Agent & Third Parties

 A con-joint reading of Sections 201 and 207 of the Contract Act and especially the illustrations appended to these Sections, I am of the view that the principal viz., Thelma Cecelia Pereira was well within her right and authority to deal with the suit property, dehors the Power of Attorney and during its subsistence and the moment the settlement deed was executed by the principal herself, it resulted in an automatic implied termination of the Power of Attorney given to the power agent.(Emphasis supplied) {Para 27}

21. In the absence of a particular mode suggested for revocation of the authority of an agent, the manner adopted by the principal to revoke the authority of the agent must be one which clearly and unequivocally communicates to the parties i.e., to be affected by such revocation, that the agent's authority has been withdrawn. In the framework of Sections 207 and 208 of the Act, the revocation/renunciation of authority may be made by express words or may be implied from the words and conduct of the principal, viz., which is inconsistent with the continuance of the agency. This is one facet of renunciation or revocation of authority of an agent; the other facet is governed by Section 208 of the Act. Section 208 provides for the effective time and date of termination of the agent's authority and third parties. From a plain reading, Section 208 infers and gives effect to revocation upon the twin conditions being satisfied, (i) communication to the agent and (ii) knowledge to a third party i.e., one who deals with or is likely to deal with the agent. Then, the revocation of authority becomes known to the agent and the said third parties. In other words, an idea in the mind of the principal to revoke cannot be construed as implied revocation or renunciation of agency. There ought to be an act or conduct of the principal which implies that the agency is revoked or withdrawn. If the revocation is expressed, such as by publication in newspapers, public notice or advertisement, communication to the agent etc., the parties who deal with the agent have a reasonable opportunity to know the revocation of agency by the principal. Two stages of revocation are, firstly, one dealing with the agent, and secondly, one which applies to the third parties. For attracting the consequence of revocation to either of the situations, the revocation of the agent's authority is made by the principal in a manner that clearly implies that the principal has withdrawn the authority to act on his or her behalf by the agent. Followed by knowledge to third parties, let us examine the circumstances of the case on whether implied revocation coupled with communication is established.

22. The Power of Attorney (Ex. A-4) was executed on 04.12.2003. The Appellant, on 30.11.2007, claims to have retired from service and settled in India. A power of attorney confers power for the execution of deeds in situations of necessity, including in the absence of the Appellant in the country. From the record, it can be noted that from 2007 onwards, the Appellant was not entirely absent from India or residing exclusively in the U.S.A. Therefore, the Appellant and Respondent No. 1 executed the sale deed dated 18.01.2008 (Ex. A-3). Respondent No. 2 is one of the witnesses to Ex. A-3. The execution of sale deed dated 16.04.2008 (Ex. A-5) is inconsistent with and contradictory to the power granted to Respondent No. 1 in Ex. A-4. This is an explicit conduct of the Appellant to act for herself on the share she holds in the property purchased in 1991. In Deb Ratan Biswas (supra), this Court held that the signing of a compromise by the Defendants themselves would amount to implied revocation of power of attorney. In a case where the principal chooses to act for himself, particularly to the agent's knowledge and a person to be affected, then it can be held that Section 207 of the Act is attracted. We have no doubt in holding that the Appellant, in terms of Section 207, impliedly revoked the authority of Respondent No. 1, and as required by Section 208, Respondent No. 2 had the knowledge of the independent dealing with the property by the Appellant. Therefore, the revocation takes effect on 18.01.2008. Ex. A-5 was executed on 16.04.2008. Thus, with the operation of implied revocation of authority, Respondent No. 1 cannot act as an agent of the Appellant and, hence, the sale deed insofar as the Appellant's share in the suit Schedule is held void ab initio.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 6495 of 2023

Decided On: 09.07.2024

Thankamma George Vs. Lilly Thomas and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

C.T. Ravikumar and S.V. Bhatti, JJ.

Author: S.V. Bhatti, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0582/2024,2024 INSC 494.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme Court: Under which circumstances limitation for setting aside sale deed will not commence inspite of its registration?

 We examine the plea of limitation raised by the Respondents. The Respondents' case is that the suit was filed on 11.05.2011, and in effect, the suit seeks to set aside the sale deed dated 16.04.2008 (Ex. A-5). The suit was filed beyond the limitation period and should have been dismissed. Limitation is a question of law and fact. The period of limitation and the time from which the period begins to run, depend on the Article in the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act of 1963. The case falls under "Part III - Suits Relating to Declarations". Article 58 reads thus:

{Para 15}

15.1. The words "when the right to sue first accrues" have been interpreted and held by this Court in Smt. Neelam Kumari and Anr. v. U.P. Financial Corporation MANU/UC/0123/2008 : AIR 2009 Utt 5. The starting point for the limitation in the case of setting aside sale deeds has two limbs: the date of execution and the date of knowledge. There is no difficulty in applying the period of limitation expiring three years from the date of execution, provided that the Appellant had knowledge of Ex. A-5 on the date of registration and the right to sue first accrued. The Respondents, in the circumstances of the case, failed to establish the Appellant's knowledge of the execution of Ex. A-5. In the final analysis, Ex. A-5 is held as without authority and void. The applicability of limitation has a different perspective. So, the starting point is when the right to sue first accrued to the Appellant. The admitted case of the Respondents is that the Appellant is a US citizen and she stayed abroad. Therefore, unless it is clearly established as a fact that the Appellant had knowledge of Ex. A-5, it cannot be inferred that the Appellant had contemporaneous knowledge of Ex. A-5 and the limitation started running from the date of execution of Ex. A-5. 

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 6495 of 2023

Decided On: 09.07.2024

Thankamma George Vs. Lilly Thomas and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

C.T. Ravikumar and S.V. Bhatti, JJ.

Author: S.V. Bhatti, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0582/2024,2024 INSC 494.

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When plea that suit is barred by limitation is not tenable in suit for partition?

Article 110
deals with the suit by a person excluded from a joint family
property to enforce a right of share therein and the period of
limitation prescribed is of 12 years from the date when the
section becomes known to the plaintiff. 
17] In the decision of the Apex Court in the case of
Md. Mohammad Ali vrs. Jagdish Kalita and others,  reported
in  (2004) 1 SCC 271,   the Court was concerned with the
applicability of Article 65 of the Limitation Act and it was held
that the plaintiff will succeed if he proves his title over the suit
property and it would be for the defendant to plead and prove
the plea of adverse possession to defeat the claim of the

plaintiff. This decision has been followed by the Apex Court in
the case of Mohammadbhai Kasambhai Sheikh and ors  vrs.
Abdulla Kasambhai Sheikh,  reported in  (2004) 13 SCC 385,
wherein it is held that unless the defendant raises defence of
adverse possession to  claim for a  share by a heir to be
ancestral property,  he cannot also raise an issue relating to
limitation of the plaintiff's claim.   The Court held that in the
absence of such plea of adverse possession being raised in
the written statement, the plea of limitation was not available.
Both these decisions are applicable to the facts of this case
and in the absence of any plea of adverse possession by any
of the parties, the suit cannot be dismissed as barred by
limitation.
18] Article 110 of the Limitation Act relied upon by
Shri Mardikar deals with the suit by a person excluded from a
joint family property to enforce a right to share therein. In the
present case,  the shares are devolved upon the parties to
the   suit   in   accordance   with   Section   8   of   the   Hindu
Succession Act and it is not a suit where the partition has
already taken place and the plaintiff is excluded from the joint
family   property.     It   is   also   not   a   suit   for   enforcement   of

partition   and   separate   possession,   as   contemplated   by
Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, though it is styled as
such. The decision has no application to the facts of this
case.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR
SECOND APPEAL NO. 567 OF 2004 
Pandurang Sitaram Pande,

V
 Avinash Ramkrishna Pande,

­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­
CORAM: R. K. DESHPANDE, J.

Dated:   04.08.2016
Citation:2016(6) ALLMR 273

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