Showing posts with label basic principle for grant of injunction in case of dispossession. Show all posts
Showing posts with label basic principle for grant of injunction in case of dispossession. Show all posts

Sunday, 20 November 2016

Whether court can grant an injunction to the tenant of agricultural land against dispossession even if it has no jurisdiction to decide the issue of agrarian tenancy?

The abovementioned judgment reflects the correct position in law in the light of the provisions contained in Order XXXIX Rule 1 of the Code, though a specific reference to the same has not been made. That such is the legal position is also evident from the judgment of M. N. Chandurkar, Acting C.J. (as he then was) in Maruti Sambha v. Parshuram, 1983 Mah LJ 958. In paragraph 5 of the judgment it is stated as follows:-
"Now, in a suit for injunction simpliciter by a plaintiff who claims to be in possession, the plaintiff will be entitled to injunction only if he proves his possession on the date of the suit. It the plaintiff proves his possession on the date of the suit, the status of the defendant, who is alleged to be disturbing the possession of the plaintiff, is wholly irrelevant, because a tenant is not entitled to forcibly dispossess any person in possession against whom the tenant may have a right to claim possession."
8. The question is not ultimately what the other reliefs are claimed in the suit. If the plaintiff is alleging that he is in possession and therefore he wants his possession to be protected by an appropriate order made under O. XXXIX R. 1 of the Code, then the Court, considering whether he is prima facie in possession and other such factors as the balance of convenience, can give interim relief by way of injunction restraining the drefendant from disturbing the plaintiffs possession. If other issues which can be decided only by the authorities under the Tenancy Act arise, then those issues may be referred to the appropriate tenancy authorities, but it cannot be said that unless those issues are answered by the proper tenancy authorities no interim relief can be given by the Civil Courts under O. XXXIX R. 1 of the Code.
Bombay High Court
Laxmi And Ors. vs Savanta Bapu Mali on 31 January, 1985
Equivalent citations: AIR 1986 Bom 169, 1988 (4) BomCR 278, (1985) 87 BOMLR 159,1985 MHLJ 324
Bench: Jahagirdar
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Sunday, 9 October 2016

When person in possession of property can get injunction to restrain other side from dispossessing him?

It is settled position of law laid down by the Privy Council in Perry v. Clissold 1907 AC 73,-
It cannot be disputed that a person in possession of land in the assumed character of owner and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against all the world but the rightful owner. And if the rightful owner does not come forward and assert his title by the process of law within the period prescribed by the provisions of the statute of Limitation applicable to the case, his right is forever extinguished and the possessory owner acquires an absolute title.
The above statement was quoted with the approval by this Court in Nair Service Society Ltd. v. K.C. Alexander and Ors. MANU/SC/0144/1968 : AIR 1968 SC 1165. Their Lordships at para 22 emphatically stated:
The cases of the Judicial Committee are not binding on us but we approve of the dictum in 1907 AC 73.
14. The question, therefore, is that in view of the concurrent finding recorded by all the three courts below that the Appellant has been in possession of the property (at least from the year 1959) whether the injunction as prayed for by the Appellant can be denied? As can be seen from the judgment of the Privy Council referred to supra, a person such as the Appellant in possession of land has a perfectly good title against the entire world except the rightful owner. However, the rightful owner must assert his title by the process of law within the period prescribed by the statutes of limitation applicable to the case.
 We have carefully scanned through the written statement. There is no assertion that the Respondent is the real owner of the property though it is very boldly submitted before us that the State of Rajasthan is the owner of the property.
16. However, the Respondent is not the State of Rajasthan. What exactly is the legal character of the Respondent is not known? Assuming that the State of Rajasthan is the real owner of the property in question, whether the Respondent is legally authorized by the State of Rajasthan to recover possession of the suit scheduled property is not clear from the record.
17. Assuming for the sake of argument that the Respondent has some authority to evict the Appellant, the eviction must be by a process known to law, i.e., either by filing a suit to evict the Appellant or by resorting to some other procedure duly authorized by law.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Civil Appeal No. 7119 of 2014 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 8767 of 2012)
Decided On: 01.08.2014
 Ram Daan
Vs.
 Urban Improvement Trust
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:Jasti Chelameswar and A.K. Sikri, JJ.
Citation:2015(1) MHLJ 34
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Wednesday, 6 April 2016

When court should not grant Injunction in case of construction?

 While disposing of the injunction application, Court has to see following basic three ingredients:-
a) Prima-facie case;
b) balance of convenience; and
c) irreparable loss.
8. If the other party is allowed to do the act, which cannot be compensated in terms of money and the case has to be decided on preponderance of the documentary evidence and not the actual and factual aspect at the spot. The revenue record, as noticed above, clinches the issue that all the three khasra numbers are in joint khata and in the absence of partition, other party cannot be permitted to transfer the share in excess and, thus, this Court is of the opinion that in case the trial Court is directed to expedite the trial as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of ten months by giving 4-4 effective opportunities to the parties, no harm would be caused in case defendant Nos. 1 and 2 are restrained from raising the construction of Petrol Pump.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
Civil Revision No. 1991 of 2016 (O&M)
Decided On: 31.03.2016
Harbhajan Singh and Ors.
Vs.
 Parminder Singh and Ors.
Coram:Amit Rawal, J.
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Wednesday, 6 May 2015

Whether subsequent purchaser can be restrained from dispossessing co-oparcener from joint family property?

 In the present matter, the original plaintiff No.1
claimed that from the properties of the family, the suit property
had come to him while defendant Nos.1 to 3 claimed that it was
joint property which had not been divided. In such
circumstance, even if defendant Nos.1 to 3 sold what they
claimed to be their share to defendant Nos.4 and 5 during the
pendency of the suit, possession cannot be handed over by them
to the subsequent purchaser without following due procedure of
law. In the matter of "Gajara Vishnu Gosavi" (supra), Hon'ble
Supreme Court held that:-
"11. Thus, in view of the above, the law emerges to
the effect that in a given case an undivided share of a
co-parcener can be a subject matter of sale/ transfer,
but possession cannot be handed over to the vendee
unless the property is partitioned by metes and
bounds, either by the decree of a Court in a partition
suit, or by settlement among the co-sharers."
Thus, even if defendant Nos.1 to 3 could originally
claim to be in joint possession, the subsequent purchasers
cannot simply step into their shoes as far as regards joint
possession of the defendant Nos.4 and 5. They would have to
seek their own remedy. Once defendant Nos.1 to 3 have
admittedly given up their claim of joint possession by executing
the sale deed, the possession of plaintiff of the property, as
clearly appearing from the long standing 7/12 extracts, will have

to be protected. Plaintiffs do make out a prima facie case for
injunction in their favour. The appellants- plaintiffs, in the
application for temporary injunction to the District Judge, raised
apprehension that the defendant Nos.4 and 5 may enter their
names into record of rights on the basis of the alleged sale deeds
in respect of suit property. The plaintiffs expressed
apprehension that they may lose possession of suit property and
so, the defendant Nos.4 and 5 are required to be restrained by
issuing preventive injunction. Plaintiffs claimed that, balance of
convenience is in favour of plaintiffs and in the circumstances, if
injunction is not granted, they will suffer irreparable loss.
 The injunction sought is only against respondent
Nos.4 and 5. Looking to the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court as above, such subsequent purchasers cannot simply push
in the property. The status of defendant Nos.1 to 3 as joint
owners claimed by them was different and cannot be compared
with defendant Nos.4 and 5, who may have purchased share of
defendant Nos.1 to 3. In fact, the suit of plaintiffs claiming that
suit property came to plaintiff No.1 is still in dispute, which is to
be decided in the appeal. Defendants themselves appear to have
claimed that there are other heirs like those of Krishnabai, who
are not made party. Still they appear to have calculated their
share and executed sale deed of undivided property. Even the
claim of defendant Nos.1 to 3 that suit property is joint, the
matter is still to be finally decided and there is no reason why

possession of plaintiffs should not be protected. If the plaintiffs
lose possession of suit property or part of it, (which has not been
divided by metes and bounds), plaintiffs would suffer irreparable
injury. In such circumstance, to avoid further litigation and
looking to the rival claims, balance of convenience lies in favour
of plaintiffs.
15. (A) For the above reasons, the Appeal is allowed with
costs. The impugned order passed by the District Judge is set
aside. Respondent Nos.4 and 5 are restrained by themselves or
anybody on their behalf, from disturbing possession of the
appellants in suit property till decision of Regular Civil Appeal
No.298/2013.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
APPEAL FROM ORDER NO.4 OF 2014 WITH
CIVIL APPLICATION NO.274 OF 2014
 Baburao s/o Namdeo Nalwade,

VERSUS
 Tukaram s/o Keshav Nalwade,

CORAM: A.I.S. CHEEMA, J.
DATED: 19th March, 2014.

Citation;2015(2) ALLMR277
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Sunday, 1 April 2012

basic principle for grant of injunction in case of dispossession

Supreme Court of India
Maria Margadia Sequeria ... vs Erasmo Jack De Sequeria (D) ... on 21 March, 2012
Bench: Dalveer Bhandari, H.L. Dattu, Deepak Verma
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2968 OF 2012
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 15382 of 2009)
Maria Margarida Sequeria Fernandes and Others ...Appellants Versus
Erasmo Jack de Sequeria(Dead) through L.Rs. ...Respondents JUDGEMENT
Dalveer Bhandari, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal emanates from the judgment and order dated 5.5.2009 passed by the High Court of Bombay, Bench at Goa in Civil Revision Application No.3 of 2009.

3. Appellant No.1 and respondent No.1, Erasmo Jack de Sequeira (now dead) were sister and brother, hereinafter referred to as appellant and respondent respectively.
4. According to the appellant, she is the sole owner and is in exclusive possession of the suit property. Her title of the said suit property was clearly admitted, and never disputed by the respondent, Erasmo Jack de Sequeira. According to the appellant, the suit property was given to her brother as a caretaker. The respondent has kept appellant, his own sister, out of her suit property for about two decades by suppressing relevant material and pertinent information from the Court and abusing the process of law.
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