Showing posts with label construction. Show all posts
Showing posts with label construction. Show all posts

Monday, 19 February 2024

Bombay HC: Electricity Connection On Particular Address Not Proof Of Ownership, Legality Of Construction

 We accept both these as being sufficient. It is our understanding that these statements disclaimers or clarifications are not newly introduced restrictions or conditions. They only make explicit that which was already a part of the law on the subject for the mere application for an electricity connection made to a distribution licensee or the issuance of a bill for power consumption by the distribution licensee has nothing at all to do with planning permissions for the construction and erection of a structure. An electricity connection application and a bill cannot be used to prove ownership because that is not even the demand of the distribution licensee. All that the licensee requires to know is the address to which power is to be supplied and in whose name it is to be billed. It is impossible to expect a distribution licensee to act beyond the remit of the statute to assess questions of title to the property in question let alone assess questions of whether the structure or structures or apartments or units do or do not have the requisite planning permissions. Notably, even under the planning statute, namely the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (“MRTP Act”), no distribution licensee is a planning authority for these purposes. It is not even a local authority for the purposes of the MRTP Act.{Para 6}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

SUO MOTU WRIT PETITION NO. 2 OF 2023

High Court On Its Own Motion Vs State of Maharashtra 

CORAM G.S. Patel & Kamal Khata, JJ.

DATED: 30th November 2023

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Saturday, 11 January 2020

Whether suit for injunction by co-owner for restraining construction is maintainable without claiming partition?

Once in possession, only remedy for the respondent would have been to file a suit for partition other than a simplicitor suit for an injunction, as has been held in Jai Karan Sharma cas'e (supra) by relying upon the judgment rendered in Bachan Singh v. Swarn Singh, (MANU/PH/0368/2000 : 2000 (3) RCR (Civil) 70 : 2000 (2) PLJ 143 : AIR 2001 P & H 112), this Court has laid down the following principles as and when a co-owner, can seek an injunction as against another co-owner and it has been laid down as under:-

"17. On a consideration of the judicial pronouncements on the subject, we are of the opinion that:

(i) A co-owner who is not in possession of any part of the property is not entitled to seek an injunction against another co-owner who has been in exclusive possession of the common property unless any act of the person in possession of the property amounts to ouster, prejudicial or adverse to the interest of co-owner out of possession.

(ii) Mere making of construction or improvement of, in the common property does not amount to ouster.

(iii) If by the act of the co-owner in possession the value or utility of the property is diminished, then a co-owner out of possession can certainly seek an injunction to present the diminution of the value and utility of the property.

(iv) If the acts of the co-owner in possession are detrimental to the interest of other co-owners, a co-owner out of possession can seek an injunction to present such act which is detrimental to his interest.

In all other cases, the remedy of the co-owner out of possession of the property is to seek partition, but not an injunction restraining the co-owner in possession from doing any act in exercise of his right to every inch of it which he is doing as a co-owner."

7. Once the appellant has been put in exclusive possession of a specific portion by virtue of a sale deed executed by one of the co-owners, any suit for injunction would not lie and the remedy would be to file a suit for partition. Sale of land by a co-sharer of a property which is in his. exclusive possession is subject to adjustment at the time of partition. Raising a construction or improvement in the area purchased by him even though it is common property, it would not be detrimental to the interest of the respondent. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

RSA No. 4541 of 2013 (O&M)

Decided On: 01.08.2019

Major Singh Vs.  Paramjit Singh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Jaishree Thakur, J.

Citation: AIR 2019 P&H 167
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Saturday, 9 November 2019

Whether provision of Maharashtra rent control Act is applicable if open space is given to tenant in which tenant has made construction?

1) The trial Court after considering the evidence on record held
that construction was carried out by the defendant and thereafter the
agreement dated 10.02.2005 at Exhibit 63 was entered into. After the
construction was made by the defendant, rights were conferred on him by
the plaintiff and the defendant was paying rent of Rs.400/per
month. It
was further held by considering the evidence on record that the defendant
was tenant of the open plot alongwith the structure standing thereon.
Thus, the provisions of the said Act were applicable and after finding that
the plaintiff had made out ground for eviction as pleaded, the suit came
to be decreed.

2) Referring to the agreement at Exhibit 63, it was submitted that on a plain
reading of the same, it was clear that on the entire plot admeasuring
1000 square feet, the defendant had erected construction to the extent of
10 Feet X 10 Feet at his expense and on the area admeasuring 6 Feet X
10 Feet a column alongwith plinth was constructed by the defendant.
The plaintiff agreed that whenever the constructed portion would be sold,
it would be only to the defendant and not anybody else. The property

was thus given to the defendant on monthly rent of Rs.400/.

3) On a plain reading of the aforesaid agreement it was clear that
the same was entered into after the construction in question was carried
out by the defendant and therefore the suit property was 'premises' as
defined under the said Act. The trial Court rightly held the suit to be
governed by the provisions of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999

and had rightly decreed the same. 

4) The observations in Kamla Devi (supra) to the effect that if a plot
with a structure is let out, the same would fall within the meaning of the
term “premises” but if an open plot is given without any structure, it
would not fall within the meaning of the term “premises” support the case
of the plaintiff. The evidence on record indicates the open plot along
with structure being let out to the defendant as per Exhibit 63. For same
reason, the ratio of the decision in Ram Sarup Gupta (supra) does not

assist the case of the defendant.

5) It is thus held that the appellate Court erred in holding that it
was only the open plot that was given on lease to the defendant and
hence the provisions of the said Act were not applicable. Instead, it is
held that portion of the open plot alongwith structure standing thereon
had been given to the defendant at monthly rent of Rs.400/.
The subject
matter of the suit was premises within the meaning of Section 7(9) of the
said Act. The suit was therefore, maintainable and adjudication on merits
was necessary.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.
CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION No. 51/2018

Shaikh Wasim Shaikh Ismail, Vs Mohammad Faiyyaz Noor Mohammad,

CORAM : A.S. CHANDURKAR, J.

DATED:  02 TH NOVEMBER, 2018
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Sunday, 6 January 2019

Whether lessee is liable to be evicted even if he has made construction in tenanted premises with permission of municipal corporation?

 The question whether the construction by itself is a violation of the terms and conditions of the lease deed and whether for such violation any right has accrued to the defendant to terminate the lease or not, is a legal question and in my considered view, is not a triable issue for which no evidence is required. The argument advanced by the learned Counsels appearing for the defendant that inasmuch as permission obtained from the Kolkata Municipal Corporation before making construction the construction cannot be said to be illegal or unauthorized. The word 'unauthorized' should be interpreted not in the context of Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, but in the context of the agreed terms between the parties. In the present case, the terms and conditions incorporated in the lease deed were agreed by the parties and for any breach thereof, the defaulting party is bound to suffer the consequences. Therefore, legality of the construction need not be considered through evidence inasmuch as the defendant has admitted that they have made construction.

17. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Thimmappa Rai (supra) an admission made by a party to the suit in an earlier proceeding is admissible as against him provided such an admission is a relevant fact. The admission made by the defendant is with regard to the construction at the demised premises and this construction has a direct nexus with the prohibition contained under the lease deed which entitles the lessor to re-enter into possession upon termination of lease. Therefore, the defendant is bound to suffer consequence of making such construction in violation of the terms of the lease deed.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA

G.A. No. 1058 of 2016 and C.S. No. 100 of 2009

Decided On: 14.02.2018

Kanak Projects Limited  Vs.  Hooghly Printing Company Limited

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Sahidullah Munshi, J.

Citation: AIR 2018 (NOC) 792 Cal
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Sunday, 2 December 2018

Whether municipal corporation can issue notice for demolition if there is no sanction for construction?

 If the structures are standing from 1961-62, then they are protected structures and the Corporation cannot issue notices to demolish them on the ground that there is no sanction for the construction.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Appeal From Order No. 276 of 2018,

Decided On: 27.06.2018

 Suresh Shankar Rokade Vs. Municipal Corporation of Gr. Mumbai and Ors.

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Sunday, 23 April 2017

Whether irrevocable licence is created even if construction is made without consent of landlord?

The contention of the appellant that, in view of construction erected by the defendant and permitted on the suit plot, the defendant became irrevocable licensee in view of Section 60(b) of the Easement Act. This contention has been strongly opposed on the ground that the construction in question is neither permanent nor pucca nor such intention was expressed by the appellant (defendant) at any time. No permission was obtained from the landlord for erecting the construction on the suit plot. The Courts below have rightly rejected this contention of the defendant. Section 60(b) of the Indian Easement Act is not attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case because there is no evidence of a licence coupled with transfer of property in operation nor there is evidence to establish that the appellant had, acting upon licence, executed a work of permanent character and incurred expenses in execution of the construction of permanent character. In the absence of such evidence, no irrevocable licence was created in favour of the defendant. Substantial question of law at No. (iii) is thus answered in the negative against the appellant.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)
Second Appeal No. 79 of 1999
Decided On: 21.07.2010
 Haribhau  Rajaramji Rewasekar, 
Vs.
 Shri Swami Narayan Mandir.

Coram:
A.P. Bhangale, J.



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Tuesday, 31 January 2017

Whether construction made in breach of status quo order can be protected from demolition?

 What is most distressing to note is that on the basis of the said status-quo order, which was binding on the appellant also, the appellant has gone ahead, demolished the existing structure and carried out and completed further construction of four floors. The photographs produced on record by respondent No.1-Municipal Corporation are self-speaking to reveal what was the condition of the suit structure in the year 2014, when  the status-quo order was obtained. It was completely demolished, whereas, now, in the year 2016, when the Officers of respondent No.1-
Municipal Corporation visited the suit premises, they found construction of four floors to be complete. Admittedly, there is not a single document under which the appellant has obtained the permission for construction of four floors. The building already existing was also only of 'ground + 1 floor'. In such situation, it is apparent that whatever construction, which is carried out by the appellant, upto four floors is in breach of the rules and regulations of respondent No.1-Municipal Corporation. It is starkly unauthorized, blatantly illegal and prima facie also in violation of the status-quo order passed by the Trial Court.
24. Needless to state that such illegal and unauthorized construction cannot be protected in any way. Moreover, as pointed out by learned counsel for respondent No.1-Municipal Corporation, the construction carried out is such that it is without plinth and also without usual slabs, but it is only on iron columns. Such construction is hazardous, to say the least, and dangerous to the lives of the occupants and also to the lives of the persons passing nearby or residing adjacent. At-least under the order of the Court, such construction can in no way be protected. Admittedly, this structure is also not occupied and is not in a position to be occupied, as is evident from the photographs dated 19th September 2016 produced  on record by respondent No.1-Municipal Corporation. Therefore, it goes without saying that, when the construction is apparently illegal, carried out in violation of the status-quo order passed by the Court, it is not qualified for protection from this Court.
25. As regards the submission of learned counsel for the appellant that the Notice of Motion and Contempt Petition preferred by respondent No.1-
Municipal Corporation, for breach of the status-quo order, are rejected by the Trial Court, the impugned orders passed by the Trial Court reveal that they were rejected it being the prima facie stage and the evidence will be necessary to prove that there was breach of such order, especially, because the contempt proceedings in the nature of Order XXXIX Rule 2A of CPC are having penal consequences, where it is required to be proved strictly so as to take the necessary penal action or criminal action against the contemnor. However, for the purpose of deciding this Appeal from Order in Notice of Motion, prima facie view has to be taken and this prima facie view is unequivocal that the appellant has carried out construction in violation of the order of status-quo and also against the 'Rules and Regulations of the Development', as prescribed in law. Such construction cannot be protected and hence the impugned order passed by the Trial Court of dismissing the Notice of Motion needs to be upheld and, accordingly, this Appeal from Order stands dismissed with costs.
Bombay High Court
M/S. United Construction vs Municipal Corporation For ... on 22 September, 2016
Bench: Dr. Shalini Phansalkar-Joshi
  Citation:2016(6) ALLMR 610,2017(2) MHLJ270
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Saturday, 23 July 2016

Supreme court:Land owner entering into contract with builder for construction is consumer


On a studied scrutiny of the aforesaid clauses, it is clear
as day that the appellant is neither a partner nor a
co-adventurer. He has no say or control over the construction.
He does not participate in the business. He is only entitled to,
as per the MOU, a certain constructed area. The extent of
area, as has been held in Faqir Chand Gulati (supra) does
not make a difference. Therefore, the irresistible conclusion is
that the appellant is a consumer under the Act.
22. As the impugned orders will show, the District Forum
had allowed the claim of the appellant. The State Commission
had dismissed the appeal holding that the claim of the
appellant was not entertainable under the Act, he being not a
consumer and the said order has been given the stamp of
approval by the National Commission. Therefore, there has to
be appropriate adjudication with regard to all the aspects
except the status of the appellant as a consumer by the
appellate authority. Consequently, the appeal is allowed, the
judgments and orders passed by the National Commission and
the State Commission are set aside and the matter is remitted
to the State Commission to re-adjudicate the matter treating
the appellant as a consumer.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 944 OF 2016
(@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.1633 of 2015)
BUNGA DANIEL BABU 
V
M/S SRI VASUDEVA CONSTRUCTIONS 
& ORS
DATED:July 22, 2016
Dipak Misra, J.
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Sunday, 15 May 2016

When court can pass order for demolition of construction in execution of decree for possession?

The Apex Court in a case of B.Gangadhar, Petitioner
Vs.   B.G.Rajalingam,   Respondent  (supra),   in   paragraph
Nos.6 and 7 of the judgment, made following observations :­
“6.  Rule 35(3) of Order 21 itself manifests that when
a decree for possession of immovable property was
granted and delivery of possession was directed to be
done,   the   Court   executing   the   decree   is   entitled   to
pass such incidental, ancillary or necessary orders for
effective   enforcement   of   the   decree   for   possession.
That power also includes the power to remove any
obstruction   or   super­structure   made   pendente   lite.
The exercise of incidental, ancillary or inherent power
is consequential to deliver possession of the property
in execution of the decree.  No doubt, the decree does
not contain a mandatory injunction for demolition. But
when the decree for possession had become final and
the judgment debtor or a person interested or claiming
right through the judgment­ debtor has taken law in
his hands and made any construction of the property

pending suit, the decree­ holder is not bound by any
such construction. The relief of mandatory injunction,
therefore,   is   consequential   to   or   necessary   for
effectuation of the decree for possession.   It is not
necessary   to   file   a   separate   suit   when   the
construction   was   made   pending   suit   without
permission   of   the   court.     Otherwise,   the   decree
becomes in­executable driving the plaintiff again for
another round of litigation which the Code expressly
prohibits such multiplicity of proceedings.
7. It is also not necessary that the tenant should be
made party to  the  suit  when  the  construction was
made pending suit and the tenants were inducted into
possession without leave of the Court. It is settled law
that a tenant who claims title, right or interest in the
property  through  the  judgment  debtor or under the
colour  of  interest  through   him,   he  is   bound   by  the
decree   and   that,   therefore,the   tenant   need   not
econominee be impleaded as a party defendant to the
suit nor it be an impediment to remove obstruction put
up by them to deliver possession to the decree.  What
is relevant is only a warning by the bailiff to deliver
peaceful possession and if they cause obstruction, the
bailiff is entitled to remove the obstruction; cause the
construction   demolished   and   deliver   vacant
possession to the decree holder in terms of the decree.
Thus considered, we hold that the High Court and the
executing Court have not committed any error of law
in directing demolition of shops and delivery of the
possession to the decree­holder.”

22. The   High   Court   of   Andhra   Pradesh   in   the   case   of
Dongala  Venkaiah   and   another   Vs.  Dongala  Raji  Reddy
(supra) relying upon the Judgment of the Supreme Court in
the case of  B.Gangadhar,  Petitioner   Vs.   B.G.Rajalingam,
Respondent,   reported   in   AIR  1996  Supreme  Court  780
has made similar observations.
23. It is thus clear that the Court executing the decree is
entitled to pass such incidental, ancillary, necessary orders
for effective enforcement of the decree for possession.  This
power also includes the power to remove any obstruction, or
super­structure made pendente lite.  In the case in hand, the
decree   of   possession   had   become   final.     It   was   for   the
Respondent­Municipal Council, Purna not to allow any such
illegal constructions raised  pendente lite  by the side of the
road.  Thus, the petitioner/decree holder is not bound by any
such   illegal   constructions.     It   is   not   necessary   for   the
petitioner   to   file   a   separate   suit,   otherwise,   the   decree
becomes in­executable driving him again for another round
of   litigation   which   the   Code   expressly   prohibits   such
multiplicity of litigation.
24. In the given set of facts, it would be rather wise to say
that the approach of the Executing Court to some extent

disallowing   the   amendment,   which   is   in   the   nature   of
traveling beyond the decree, may be correct, but, certainly
the executing court ought to have taken care to execute the
decree   by   directing   the   removal   of   the   said   illegal
constructions by exercising the powers of Order XXI Rule 35
(3) of Code of Civil Procedure.
25. In light of the above discussion and observations made
by the Apex Court in case of  B.Gangadhar, Petitioner  Vs.
B.G.   Rajalingam,   Respondent,   reported   in   AIR   1996
Supreme   Court   780  (supra), Writ Petition is disposed of
with directions to the Executing Court to execute the decree
by  removing  the   illegal   construction   carried   out   over   the
additional area of 12R as shown in the map Exh.123, and
shall   order   delivery   of   vacant   possession   of   the   property
under execution to the petitioner within a period of three (03)
months from the date of this order. 
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
WRIT PETITION NO.2073 OF 2013
Iqbal Hussain s/o Ali Hussain,

VERSUS
Municipal Council, Purna,

CORAM : V. K. JADHAV, J.

DATE OF PRONOUNCING THE JUDGMENT :07.10.2015.
Citation;2016(2) ALLMR152
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Wednesday, 6 April 2016

When court should not grant Injunction in case of construction?

 While disposing of the injunction application, Court has to see following basic three ingredients:-
a) Prima-facie case;
b) balance of convenience; and
c) irreparable loss.
8. If the other party is allowed to do the act, which cannot be compensated in terms of money and the case has to be decided on preponderance of the documentary evidence and not the actual and factual aspect at the spot. The revenue record, as noticed above, clinches the issue that all the three khasra numbers are in joint khata and in the absence of partition, other party cannot be permitted to transfer the share in excess and, thus, this Court is of the opinion that in case the trial Court is directed to expedite the trial as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of ten months by giving 4-4 effective opportunities to the parties, no harm would be caused in case defendant Nos. 1 and 2 are restrained from raising the construction of Petrol Pump.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
Civil Revision No. 1991 of 2016 (O&M)
Decided On: 31.03.2016
Harbhajan Singh and Ors.
Vs.
 Parminder Singh and Ors.
Coram:Amit Rawal, J.
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Sunday, 18 October 2015

Whether tenant can be evicted from tenanted premises on that ground that he made permanent construction without written consent of landlord?


Tenancy - Eviction - Construction without Permission - Section 16(1)(b) of Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 - Whether petitioner-tenant is liable to be evicted from suit premises on account of construction having been made without written consent of respondent-landlord ? - Held, petitioner made construction without consent of respondent - Section 16(1)(b) of Act requires such consent in writing - Petitioner on his own made said construction in violation of building control rules and as result respondent received notice from Corporation for violation of those rules - Construction of mezzanine floor is obviously permanent structure - Therefore, case falls in petitioner was liable to be evicted

Equivalent Citation: 2008(5)MhLj955
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)
W.P. No. 2821 of 2008
Decided On: 03.07.2008

 Ravindra D. Ahirkar Vs.  Ravikishore S/o Ramkisanji Pashine and Anr.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
A.B. Chaudhari, J.
Read full judgment here;click here
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Sunday, 29 March 2015

Whether right of a person to construct residential houses can be taken away?

The law in this behalf is explicit. Right of a person to construct residential houses in the residential area is a valuable right. The said right can only be regulated in terms of a regulatory statute but unless there exists a clear provision the same cannot be taken away. It is also a trite law that the building plans are required to be dealt with in terms of the existing law. Determination of such a question cannot be postponed far less taken away. Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation in a case of this nature would have a role to play.
Rights of parties cannot be intermeddled so long as an appropriate amendment in legislation is not brought into force - Right of a person to construct residential houses in residential area is a valuable right and unless there exists a clear provision the same can not be taken away 


A statutory authority must exercise its jurisdiction within a reasonable time


Supreme Court of India


T. Vijayalakshmi & Ors vs Town Planning Member & Anr on 19 October, 2006

Bench: S.B. Sinha, Dalveer Bhandari
          
Citation;(2006)8 SCC502,AIR2007SC25,
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Sunday, 4 March 2012

When one co-owner can raise construction without consent of other co-owner?

A very important question has arisen as to whether the defendants could re-construct the building without plaintiff's consent when he alleged to be a co-owner of the property in question. Law on this point is well settled that a co-owner without the consent of the other owner can not raise construction to the exclusion of the other owner. But as discussed above, the position in the case in hand is not so. The plaintiff has admitted that the partition did take place by oral understanding. The only objection to such partition raised is that the same was not obtained through a decree from the Court. Prima facie the reading of the plan shows that because of mutual understanding the parties divided their properties in equal shares except the portion marked 'A' on the plan. Therefore, legal position that the co-owner can not appropriate the joint land to himself against the consent of the other co-owner does not apply to the facts of this case.
Delhi High Court
Ram Narain vs Ved Prakash on 8 November, 1994
Equivalent citations: 1994 IVAD Delhi 862, 56 (1994) DLT 692

Bench:Ms. Usha Mehra, J.
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