Showing posts with label constructive liability. Show all posts
Showing posts with label constructive liability. Show all posts

Sunday, 9 November 2025

When Presence Becomes Culpability: Supreme Court Redefines the Line Between Bystander and Criminal in Mob Violence Cases

 Landmark 2025 Judgment Sets New Standards for Section 149 IPC Convictions

In a landmark judgment that promises to reshape criminal prosecutions involving mob violence across India, the Supreme Court in Zainul and Others v. State of Bihar (2025) has delivered authoritative guidance on one of the most contentious questions in Indian criminal jurisprudence: When does mere presence at a crime scene transform an innocent bystander into a culpable member of an unlawful assembly?

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Friday, 4 July 2025

What is basic concept of constructive liability and vicarious liability as provisions of indian penal code?

 The Indian Penal Code incorporates two important liability principles that hold individuals accountable for crimes committed by others: constructive liability and vicarious liability. While these concepts are closely related and often overlap, they operate under distinct legal frameworks.

Constructive Liability Under IPC

Constructive liability is the principle under which a person may be held liable for the consequences of another person's conduct, even if they did not actively participate in the act. This form of liability is based on the premise that their involvement in the criminal act, whether tacit or open, indirectly contributed to the outcome.

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Friday, 7 August 2020

Whether court can convict accused of an offence, U/S 302 read with S 149 of IPC if he was acquitted U/S 302 read with 148 of IPC?

Another grave illegality vitiating the judgment of the High Court is conviction of the appellants under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC even though appellants have been acquitted of the offence under Section 148 IPC.

28. All 77 accused, vide charge No. 1, were charged to the effect that they were members of the unlawful assembly and in prosecution of the common object of such assembly, to commit the murder of D-1, D-2, D-3, D-4 and D-5, committed the offence of rioting by pouring kerosene and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 148 IPC vide charge No. 4, all the accused were charged that they committed murder by intentionally causing the death of D-1 to D-5 and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 302 IPC. The Trial Court held that neither offence under Section 148 IPC nor under Section 302 IPC was established against the accused beyond any reasonable doubt. The High Court affirmed the finding of the Trial Court about the acquittal of the appellants under Section 148 IPC but convicted them for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC without their being any charge to this effect.

Section 149 IPC creates constructive liability i.e. a person who is a member of the unlawful assembly is made guilty of the offence committed by another member of the same assembly in the circumstances mentioned in the Section, although he may have had no intention to commit that offence and had done no overt act except his presence in the assembly and sharing the common object of that assembly. The legal position is also fairly well settled that because of a mere defect in language or in the narration or in form of the charge, the conviction would not be rendered bad if accused has not been affected thereby.
But in a case such as the present one where the appellants have been expressly charged for the offence punishable under Section 148 IPC and have been acquitted there under, they cannot be legally convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC. It is so because the offence of rioting must occur when members are charged with murder as the common object of the unlawful assembly.
Section 148 IPC creates liability on persons armed with deadly weapons and is a distinct offence and there is no requirement in law that members of unlawful assembly have also to be charged under Section 148 IPC for legally recording their conviction under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC. However, where an accused is charged under Section 148 IPC and acquitted, conviction of such accused under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC could not be legally recorded. We find support from a Four Judge Bench decision of this Court in the case of Mahadev Sharma v. State of Bihar MANU/SC/0078/1965 : (1966) 1 SCR 18
wherein this Court held thus:
...Of course, if a charge had been framed under s.147 or s.148 and that charge had failed against any of the accused then s.149 could not have been used against him. The area which is common to ss.147 and 149 is the substratum on which different degrees of liability are built and there cannot be a conviction with the aid of s.149 when there is no evidence of such substratum.
29. In view of the aforesaid legal position, the appellants having been acquitted under Section 148 IPC by the Trial Court as well as the High Court, they could not have been legally convicted by the High Court under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 120 of 2008

Decided On: 06.11.2009

 Md. Ankoos and Ors. Vs.  The Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P.
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Wednesday, 29 August 2018

Notes on S 34 {S 3(5) of BNS } and S149 IPC{S 190 of BNS }- Principle of constructive liability

S 34 of IPC {S 3(5) of BNS } Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention:-
When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.

Object of the section: S 34 of IPC {S 3(5) of BNS } is enacted to meet cases in which it may be difficult to distinguish between the acts of individual members of a party, or to prove exactly what part is played by each of them. The reason why all are deemed to be guilty in such cases is that presence of accomplices gives encouragement, support and protection for the persons actually committing the act.

 S 34 {S 3(5) of BNS }is only a rule of evidence and does not create any substantive offence.
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Wednesday, 27 December 2017

Landmark judgment on scope and applicability of S 34 of IPC

To apply Section 34 Indian Penal Code apart from the fact that there should be two or more accused, two factors must be established: (i) common intention and (ii) participation of the accused in the commission of an offence. If a common intention is proved but no overt act is attributed to the individual accused, Section 34 will be attracted as essentially it involves vicarious liability but if participation of the accused in the crime is proved and a common intention is absent, Section 34 cannot be invoked. In every case, it is not possible to have direct evidence of a common intention. It has to be inferred from the facts and circumstances of each case.
16. He has also relied on the decision in Suresh Sakharam Nangare (supra). In the said case, the Court after referring to Section 34 Indian Penal Code opined that a reading of the above provision makes it clear that to apply Section 34, apart from the fact that there should be two or more accused, two factors must be established: (i) common intention, and (ii) participation of the accused in the commission of an offence. It further makes clear that if common intention is proved but no overt act is attributed to the individual accused, Section 34 will be attracted as essentially it involves vicarious liability but if participation of the accused in the crime is proved and common intention is absent, Section 34 cannot be invoked.

17. In the said case, the Court after analyzing the evidence opined that there is no material from the side of the prosecution to show that the Appellant therein had any common intention to eliminate the deceased because the only thing against the Appellant therein was that he used to associate himself with the accused for smoking ganja. On this factual score, the Court came to hold that the Appellant could not be convicted in aid of Section 34 Indian Penal Code.

18. In this regard, we may usefully refer to a passage from the authority in Pandurang and Ors. v. State of Hyderabad MANU/SC/0048/1954 : AIR 1955 SC 216. The three-Judge Bench in the said case adverted to the applicability and scope of Section 34 Indian Penal Code and in that context ruled that:

32. ... It requires a pre-arranged plan because before a man can be vicariously convicted for the criminal act of another, the act must have been done in furtherance of the common intention of them all: Mahbub Shah v. King Emperor MANU/PR/0013/1945 : AIR 1945 PC 118. Accordingly there must have been a prior meeting of minds. Several persons can simultaneously attack a man and each can have the same intention, namely the intention to kill, and each can individually inflict a separate fatal blow and yet none would have the common intention required by the Section because there was no prior meeting of minds to form a pre-arranged plan. In a case like that, each would be individually liable for whatever injury he caused but none could be vicariously convicted for the act of any of the others; and if the prosecution cannot prove that his separate blow was a fatal one he cannot be convicted of the murder however clearly an intention to kill could be proved in his case: Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King Emperor MANU/PR/0064/1924 : AIR 1925 PC 1 and Mahbub Shah v. King Emperor (supra). As Their Lordships say in the latter case, "the partition which divides their bounds is often very thin: nevertheless, the distinction is real and substantial, and if overlooked will result in miscarriage of justice.
33. The plan need not be elaborate, nor is a long interval of time required. It could arise and be formed suddenly, as for example when one man calls on bystanders to help him kill a given individual and they, either by their words or their acts, indicate their assent to him and join him in the assault. There is then the necessary meeting of the minds. There is a pre-arranged plan however hastily formed and rudely conceived. But pre-arrangement there must be and premeditated concert. It is not enough, as in the latter Privy Council case, to have the same intention independently of each other, e.g., the intention to rescue another and, if necessary, to kill those who oppose.

19. And, again:

34. ... But to say this is no more than to reproduce the ordinary Rule about circumstantial evidence, for there is no special Rule of evidence for this class of case. At bottom, it is a question of fact in every case and however similar the circumstances, facts in one case cannot be used as a precedent to determine the conclusion on the facts in another. All that is necessary is either to have direct proof of prior concert, or proof of circumstances which necessarily lead to that inference, or, as we prefer to put it in the time-honoured way, "the incriminating facts must be incompatible with the innocence of the accused and incapable of explanation on any other reasonable hypothesis". (Sarkar's Evidence, 8th Edn., p. 30).

20. In this context, we may refer with profit to the statement of law as expounded by the Constitution Bench in Mohan Singh (supra). In the said case, the Constitution Bench has held that Section 34 that deals with cases of constructive criminal liability provides that if a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such person is liable for the act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone. It has been further observed that the essential constituent of the vicarious criminal liability prescribed by Section 34 is the existence of common intention. The common intention in question animates the accused persons and if the said common intention leads to commission of the criminal offence charged, each of the person sharing the common intention is constructively liable for the criminal act done by one of them. The larger Bench dealing with the concept of constructive criminal liability Under Sections 149 and 34 Indian Penal Code, expressed that just as the combination of persons sharing the same common object is one of the features of an unlawful assembly, so the existence of a combination of persons sharing the same common intention is one of the features of Section 34. In some ways the two Sections are similar and in some cases they may overlap. The common intention which is the basis of Section 34 is different from the common object which is the basis of the composition of an unlawful assembly. Common intention denotes action-in-concert and necessarily postulates the existence of a prearranged plan and that must mean a prior meeting of minds. It would be noticed that cases to which Section 34 can be applied disclose an element of participation in action on the part of all the accused persons. The acts may be different; may vary in their character, but they are all actuated by the same common intention. Thereafter, the Court held:

It is now well-settled that the common intention required by Section 34 is different from the same intention or similar intention. As has been observed by the Privy Council in Mahbub Shah v. King-Emperor (supra) common intention within the meaning of Section 34 implies a pre-arranged plan, and to convict the accused of an offence applying the Section it should be proved that the criminal act was done in concert pursuant to the pre-arranged plan and that the inference of common intention should never be reached unless it is a necessary inference deducible from the circumstances of the case.
21. In Harshadsingh Pahelvansingh Thakore (supra), a three-Judge Bench, while dealing with constructive liability Under Section 34 Indian Penal Code has ruled thus:

Section 34 Indian Penal Code fixing constructive liability conclusively silences such a refined plea of extrication. (See Amir Hussain v. State of U.P. MANU/SC/0078/1975 : (1975) 4 SCC 247; Maina Singh v. State of Rajasthan MANU/SC/0138/1976 : (1976) 2 SCC 827) Lord Sumner's classic legal shorthand for constructive criminal liability, expressed in the Miltonic verse "They also serve who only stand and wait" a fortiori embraces cases of common intent instantly formed, triggering a plurality of persons into an adventure in criminality, some hitting, some missing, some splitting hostile heads, some spilling drops of blood. Guilt goes with community of intent coupled with participatory presence or operation. No finer juristic niceties can be pressed into service to nullify or jettison the plain punitive purpose of the Penal Code.
22. In Lallan Rai and Ors. v. State of Bihar MANU/SC/0998/2002 : (2003) 1 SCC 268 the Court relying upon the principle laid down in Barendra Kumar Ghosh (supra) has ruled that the essence of Section 34 is simultaneous consensus of the mind of persons participating in the criminal action to bring about a particular result.

23. In Goudappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka MANU/SC/0222/2013 : (2013) 3 SCC 675 the Court has reiterated the principle by opining that Section 34 Indian Penal Code lays down a principle of joint liability in doing a criminal act and the essence of that liability is to be found in the existence of common intention. The Court posed the question how to gather the common intention and answering the same held that the common intention is gathered from the manner in which the crime has been committed, the conduct of the accused soon before and after the occurrence, the determination and concern with which the crime was committed, the weapon carried by the accused and from the nature of the injury caused by one or some of them and for arriving at a conclusion whether the accused had the common intention to commit an offence of which they could be convicted, the totality of circumstances must be taken into consideration.

24. The aforesaid authorities make it absolutely clear that each case has to rest on its own facts. Whether the crime is committed in furtherance of common intention or not, will depend upon the material brought on record and the appreciation thereof in proper perspective. Facts of two cases cannot be regarded as similar. Common intention can be gathered from the circumstances that are brought on record by the prosecution. Common intention can be conceived immediately or at the time of offence. Thus, the applicability of Section 34 Indian Penal Code is a question of fact and is to be ascertained from the evidence brought on record. The common intention to bring about a particular result may well develop on the spot as between a number of persons, with reference to the fact of the case and circumstances of the situation. Whether in a proved situation all the individuals concerned therein have developed only simultaneous and independent intentions or whether a simultaneous consensus of their minds to bring about a particular result can be said to have been developed and thereby intended by all of them, is a question that has to be determined on the facts. (See: Kirpal and Bhopal v. State of U.P. MANU/SC/0176/1954 : AIR 1954 SC 706). In Bharwad Mepa Dana and Anr. v. The State of Bombay MANU/SC/0040/1959 : AIR 1960 SC 289, it has been held that Section 34 Indian Penal Code is intended to meet a case in which it may be difficult to distinguish the acts of individual members of a party who act in furtherance of the common intention of all or to prove exactly what part was taken by each of them. The principle which the Section embodies is participation in some action with the common intention of committing a crime; once such participation is established, Section 34 is at once attracted.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1448 and 1452 of 2010

Decided On: 04.01.2017

Vijendra Singh and Ors. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Dipak Misra and Rohinton Fali Nariman, JJ.
Citation:(2017) 11 SCC129.
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