Showing posts with label certiorari. Show all posts
Showing posts with label certiorari. Show all posts

Wednesday, 26 June 2024

Under which circumstances the high court may issue writ of Habeas Corpus and certiorari against judicial order?

 Pronouncing upon the issue whether a writ of Habeas

Corpus would lie against an order of remand under Section 167,

by referring to the decision in case of Manibhai Ratilal Patel Vs.

State of Gujarat and ors, (2013) 1 SCC 314 which had taken a view that a writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be entertained when a person is committed to judicial custody or police custody by the Competent Court by an order which prima facie does not appear to be without jurisdiction or passed in an absolutely mechanical or wholly illegal manner, reference was made to a decision in case of SFIO Vs. Rahul Modi, 2019(5) SCC 260 which had laid down the position of law as below:-

“19 The law is thus clear that in a Habeas Corpus proceedings,

a Court is to have regard to the legality or otherwise of the detention

at the time of return and not with reference to the institution of the

proceedings”.

It is in this background the circumstances in which the writ

of Habeas Corpus shall lie, were clearly stipulated in the following

words:-

“If the remand is absolutely illegal or the remand is afflicted with the vice of lack of jurisdiction, a Habeas Corpus petition would indeed lie. Equally, if an order of remand is passed in an absolutely mechanical manner, a person affected can seek the remedy of Habeas Corpus. Barring such situations, Habeas Corpus petition will not lie.”


36] We have no hesitation in coming to a conclusion that in the

present case, both the conditions are clearly attracted, as the

remand of the CCL, by three distinct orders passed by the Board is absolutely illegal as the impugned order, are afflicted with vice of lack of jurisdiction and further orders of remand being passed by the Board, in an absolutely mechanical manner, without

considering the most significant and pivotal fact that the CCL

continue to be on bail and there is no cancellation or revocation of the order, enlarging him on bail.

37] The act of the respondent therefore, squarely fall within the

parameters laid down in Gautam Navlakha (supra) for

entertaining a writ in the nature of Habeas Corpus. 

Looking to the manner in which the entire matter has been

dealt with by the Investigating Agency and also the various orders passed by the Board upon the application preferred by it, we must clearly express that this is one of the fit case where we shall exercise our jurisdiction by issuing a writ in the nature of Habeas Corpus, as prayed for in prayer clause (a) and issue a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the subsequent orders remanding the CCL to Observation Home.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO.2372 OF 2024

Pooja Gagan Jain v. State of Maharashtra

CORAM : BHARATI DANGRE &

MANJUSHA DESHPANDE, J

DATED : 25th JUNE, 2024.

JUDGMENT :- (PER BHARATI DANGRE, J.)

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Friday, 8 March 2024

Leading Supreme Court Judgment on distinction between Article 226 and 227 of Constitution of India

The difference between Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution was well brought out in Umaji Keshao Meshram v. Radhikabai [MANU/SC/0132/1986 : 1986 Supp. SCC 401]. Proceedings Under Article 226 are in exercise of the original jurisdiction of the High Court while proceedings Under Article 227 of the Constitution are not original but only supervisory. Article 227 substantially reproduces the provisions of Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915 excepting that the power of superintendence has been extended by this article to tribunals as well. Though the power is akin to that of an ordinary court of appeal, yet the power Under Article 227 is intended to be used sparingly and only in appropriate cases for the purpose of keeping the subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. The power may be exercised in cases occasioning grave injustice or failure of justice such as when (i) the court or tribunal has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have, (ii) has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have, such failure occasioning a failure of justice, and (iii) the jurisdiction though available is being exercised in a manner which tantamounts to overstepping the limits of jurisdiction. {Para 24}


25. Upon a review of decided cases and a survey of the occasions, wherein the High Courts have exercised jurisdiction to command a writ of certiorari or to exercise supervisory jurisdiction Under Article 227 in the given facts and circumstances in a variety of cases, it seems that the distinction between the two jurisdictions stands almost obliterated in practice. Probably, this is the reason why it has become customary with the lawyers labelling their petitions as one common Under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, though such practice has been deprecated in some judicial pronouncement. Without entering into niceties and technicality of the subject, we venture to state the broad general difference between the two jurisdictions. Firstly, the writ of certiorari is an exercise of its original jurisdiction by the High Court; exercise of supervisory jurisdiction is not an original jurisdiction and in this sense it is akin to appellate, revisional or corrective jurisdiction. Secondly, in a writ of certiorari, the record of the proceedings having been certified and sent up by the inferior court or tribunal to the High Court, the High Court if inclined to exercise its jurisdiction, may simply annul or quash the proceedings and then do no more. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, the High Court may not only quash or set aside the impugned proceedings, judgment or order but it may also make such directions as the facts and circumstances of the case may warrant, maybe, by way of guiding the inferior court or tribunal as to the manner in which it would now proceed further or afresh as commended to or guided by the High Court. In appropriate cases the High Court, while exercising supervisory jurisdiction, may substitute such a decision of its own in place of the impugned decision, as the inferior court or tribunal should have made. Lastly, the jurisdiction Under Article 226 of the Constitution is capable of being exercised on a prayer made by or on behalf of the party aggrieved; the supervisory jurisdiction is capable of being exercised suo motu as well.


20. It is the above holding, correctness of which was doubted in the referring order already mentioned above.


21. It is true that this Court has laid down that technicalities associated with the prerogative writs in England have no role to play under our constitutional scheme. There is no parallel system of King's Court in India and of all other courts having limited jurisdiction subject to supervision of King's Court. Courts are set up under the Constitution or the laws. All courts in the jurisdiction of a High Court are subordinate to it and subject to its control and supervision Under Article 227. Writ jurisdiction is constitutionally conferred on all High Courts. Broad principles of writ jurisdiction followed in England are applicable to India and a writ of certiorari lies against patently erroneous or without jurisdiction orders of Tribunals or authorities or courts other than judicial courts. There are no precedents in India for High Courts to issue writs to subordinate courts. Control of working of subordinate courts in dealing with their judicial orders is exercised by way of appellate or revisional powers or power of superintendence Under Article 227. Orders of civil court stand on different footing from the orders of authorities or Tribunals or courts other than judicial/civil courts. While appellate or revisional jurisdiction is regulated by statutes, power of superintendence Under Article 227 is constitutional. The expression "inferior court" is not referable to judicial courts, as rightly observed in the referring order in paras 26 and 27 quoted above.


22. The Bench in Surya Dev Rai also observed in para 25 of its judgment that distinction between Articles 226 and 227 stood almost obliterated. In para 24 of the said judgment distinction in the two articles has been noted. In view thereof, observation that scope of Article 226 and 227 was obliterated was not correct as rightly observed by the referring Bench in Para 32 quoted above. We make it clear that though despite the curtailment of revisional jurisdiction Under Section 115 Code of Civil Procedure by Act 46 of 1999, jurisdiction of the High Court Under Article 227 remains unaffected, it has been wrongly assumed in certain quarters that the said jurisdiction has been expanded. Scope of Article 227 has been explained in several decisions including Waryam Singh and Anr. v. Amarnath and Anr.

65. We would like to make it clear that in view of the law referred to above in cases of property rights and in disputes between private individuals writ court should not interfere unless there is any infraction of statute or it can be shown that a private individual is acting in collusion with a statutory authority.


66. We may also observe that in some High Courts there is a tendency of entertaining petitions Under Article 227 of the Constitution by terming them as writ petitions. This is sought to be justified on an erroneous appreciation of the ratio in Surya Dev and in view of the recent amendment to Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1999. It is urged that as a result of the amendment, scope of Section 115 Code of Civil Procedure has been curtailed. In our view, even if the scope of Section 115 Code of Civil Procedure is curtailed that has not resulted in expanding the High Court's power of superintendence. It is too well known to be reiterated that in exercising its jurisdiction, High Court must follow the regime of law.

23. Thus, we are of the view that judicial orders of civil courts are not amenable to a writ of certiorari Under Article 226.

We are also in agreement with the view of the referring Bench that a writ of mandamus does not lie against a private person not discharging any public duty. Scope of Article 227 is different from Article 226.

25. Accordingly, we answer the question referred as follows:

(i) Judicial orders of civil court are not amenable to writ jurisdiction Under Article 226 of the Constitution;

(ii) Jurisdiction Under Article 227 is distinct from jurisdiction from jurisdiction Under Article 226.

Contrary view in Surya Dev Rai is overruled.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 2548 of 2009 and SLP (C) No. 25828 of 2013

Decided On: 26.02.2015

Radhey Shyam and Ors. Vs. Chhabi Nath and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

H.L. Dattu, C.J.I., A.K. Sikri and Adarsh Kumar Goel, JJ.

Citation:  Citation: 2015/INSC/160, MANU/SC/0200/2015,

AIR 2015 SUPREME COURT 3269.

Author: Adarsh Kumar Goel, J.

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What is distinction between Article 226 and 227 of Constitution of India?

  1. 1) Nature of Power:

    • Article 226 grants High Courts the power to issue writs for the enforcement of fundamental rights and for any other purpose. These writs include habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, and certiorari.
    • Article 227, on the other hand, confers upon High Courts the power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals within their jurisdiction. This power is more administrative in nature, ensuring proper functioning of the subordinate judiciary.
  2. 2) Scope of Authority:

    • Article 226 allows High Courts to intervene in individual cases where fundamental rights are at stake or for other legal issues that warrant the issuance of writs.
    • Article 227 provides High Courts with the authority to oversee the entire judicial machinery within their territorial jurisdiction, ensuring uniformity and proper administration of justice.
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Saturday, 18 April 2020

Bombay HC: Writ petition for issuance of writ of certiorari against order of Judicial/Civil Courtis not maintainable

 We are bound by the view taken by the Constitution Bench decision of the Apex Court in the case of Muhhamad Emanual and a three-Judge Bench decision in the case of Savitri Devi, cited supra. We, therefore, hold that in the proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, neither the Judicial/Civil Court nor the Presiding Officer over it, whose order is challenged, can be a necessary party and, therefore, in the absence of such party, a petition or an application cannot be dismissed as not maintainable. The question of law at Serial No. (3) is answered accordingly. We, however, clarify that there may be an exception where there are allegations of mala fides, partiality, bias, etc., where a Presiding Officer is required to be joined personally as party respondent so as to provide him an opportunity to meet the allegations, in such a case, a petition or an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India will have to be dismissed as not maintainable, if the order is to be set aside on any such ground.

We summarize our conclusions as under:

(1) A writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuance of a writ of certiorari to quash and set aside the order passed by the Judicial/Civil Court, subordinate to the High Court, is not maintainable.

(2) In view of the aforesaid conclusion, the question as to whether the Judicial/Civil Court or its Presiding Officer becomes a necessary party and in its absence a writ petition under Article 226 is maintainable or not, does not survive.

(3) A petition or an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the order passed by the Judicial/Civil Court, subordinate to the High Court, cannot be dismissed as not maintainable in the absence of such Court or its Presiding Officer being impleaded as a party respondent, subject to the exception carved out in the judgment.

(4) In view of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Jogendrasinhji, the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Ramchandra Dagoji Rangari, holding that the petition for issuance of a writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, would not be maintainable without impleading the tribunal or the authority, whose order is assailed before the High Court, as a party respondent, no longer remains a good law, subject to the exception carved out in the judgment.


IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Letters Patent Appeal No. 177 of 2012 in Writ Petition No. 1424 of 2012, 
Decided On: 21.11.2019

 Motilal  Vs.  Balkrushna Baliram Lokhande 

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
R.K. Deshpande, A.S. Chandurkar and Milind Narendra Jadhav, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2020 Bombay 39(FB)
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Saturday, 6 April 2019

Leading Supreme court judgment on distinction between administrative decision and judicial decision

 Question whether a decision is judicial or is purely administrative, often arises when jurisdiction of the superior courts to issue writs of certiorari is invoked.

Often the line of distinction between decisions judicial and administrative is thin : but the principles for ascertaining the true character of the decisions are well-settled. A judicial decision is not always the act of a judge or a tribunal invested with power to determine questions of law or fact : it must however be the act of a body or authority invested by law with authority to determine questions or disputes affecting the rights of citizens and under a duty to act judicially. A judicial decision always postulates the existence of a duty laid upon the authority to act judicially. Administrative authorities are often invested with authority or power to determine questions, which affect the rights of citizens. The authority may have to invite objections to the course of action proposed by him, he may be under a duty to hear the objectors, and his decision may seriously affect the rights of citizens but unless in arriving at his decision he is required to act judicially, his decision will be executive or administrative. Legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of citizens, does not make the determination judicial : it is the duty to act judicially which invests it with that character. What distinguishes an act judicial from administrative is therefore the duty imposed upon the authority to act judicially. Mukherjea, J., in The Province of Bombay v. K. S. Advani MANU/SC/0034/1950 : [1950]1SCR621 observed at p. 670 "there cannot indeed be a judicial act which does not create or imposes obligations; but an act, x x x x x is not necessarily judicial because it affects the rights of subjects. Every judicial act presupposes the application of judicial process. There is well marked distinction between forming a personal or private opinion about a matter, and determining it judicially. In the performance of an executive act, the authority has certainly to apply his mind to the materials before him; but the opinion he forms is a purely subjective matter which depends entirely upon his state of mind. It is of course necessary that he must act in good faith, and if it is established that he was not influenced by any extraneous consideration, there is nothing further to be said about it. In a judicial proceeding, on the other hand, the process or method of application is different. "The judicial process involves the application of a body of rules or principles by the technique of a particular psychological method", vide Robson's Justice and Administrative Law, p. 33. It involves a proposal and an opposition, and arriving at a decision upon the same on consideration of facts and circumstances according to the rules of reason and justice, vide R. v. London County Council [1931] 2 K.B. 215. It is not necessary that the strict rules of evidence should be followed : the procedure for investigation of facts or for reception of evidence may vary according to the requirements of a particular case. There need not be any hard and fast rule on such matters, but the decision which the authority arrives at, must not be his 'subjective', 'personal' or 'private' opinion. It must be something which conforms to an objective standard or criterion laid down or recognised by law, and the soundness or otherwise of the determination must be capable of being tested by the same external standard. This is the essence of a judicial function which differentiates it from an administrative function; and whether an authority is required to exercise one kind of function or the other depends entirely upon the provisions of the particular enactment. x x x x x x Generally speaking where the language of a statute indicates with sufficient clearness that the personal satisfaction of the authority on certain matters about which he has to form an opinion finds his jurisdiction to do certain acts or make certain orders, the function should be regarded as an executive function."
12. It may be observed that Mukherjea, J., was on the ultimate decision in the case, in the minority, but the principle enunciated by him had substantially the approval of the Court. Das, J., in the same case at p. 719 observed : "a person entrusted to do an administrative act has often to determine questions of fact to enable him to exercise his power. He has to consider facts and circumstances and to weigh pros and cons in his mind before he makes up his mind to exercise his power just as a person exercising a judicial or quasi-judicial function has to do. Both have to act in good faith. A good and valid administrative or executive act binds the subject and affects his rights or imposes liability on him just as effectively as a quasi-judicial act does. The exercise of an administrative or executive act may well be and is frequently made dependent by the Legislature upon a condition or contingency which may involve a question of fact, but the question of fulfilment of which may, nevertheless, be left to the subjective opinion or satisfaction of the executive authority".

13. To make a decision or an act judicial, the following criteria must be satisfied :

(1) it is in substance a determination upon investigation of a question by the application of objective standards to facts found in the light of pre-existing legal rule;

(2) it declares rights or imposes upon parties obligations affecting their civil rights; and

(3) that the investigation is subject to certain procedural attributes contemplating an opportunity of presenting its case to a party, ascertainment of facts by means of evidence if a dispute be on questions of fact, and if the dispute be on question of law on the presentation of legal argument, and a decision resulting in the disposal of the matter on findings based upon those questions of law and fact.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 37 and 38 of 1961

Decided On: 25.09.1962

Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd., Meerut Vs. Lakshmichand and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
B.P. Sinha, C.J., J.C. Shah, K.C. Das Gupta, K.N. Wanchoo and P.B. Gajendragadkar, JJ.

Citation:  AIR 1963 SC 677
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Monday, 3 September 2018

Notes on various types of writs in India

Anything that is issued under an authority is a writ. Orders, warrants, directions etc. issued under authority are examples of writs. There are five major types of writs viz. habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari. Each of them has different meaning and different implications. In India, both Supreme Court and High Court have been empowered with Writ Jurisdiction.


Habeas Corpus
Habeas Corpus literally means ‘to have the body of’. Via this writ, the court can cause any person who has been detained or imprisoned to be physically brought before the court. The court then examines the reason of his detention and if there is no legal justification of his detention, he can be set free. Such a writ can be issued in following example cases:
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