Showing posts with label Article 226 of constitution of India. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Article 226 of constitution of India. Show all posts

Wednesday, 2 July 2025

Supreme Court: If a High Court strikes down a Central Act as unconstitutional, that decision would have effect throughout India, unless stayed or overruled by the Supreme Court.

 This question is rooted in the following observation of the Supreme Court in Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India 2004 (6) SCC 254 : An order passed on writ petition questioning the constitutionality of a Parliamentary Act whether interim or final keeping in view the provisions contained in Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, will have effect throughout the territory of India subject of course to the applicability of the Act.

The landmark Supreme Court judgment in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India (2004) clarified a crucial question of territorial jurisdiction of High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution, particularly when challenging the validity of Central laws.

Key Facts and Issue:
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Friday, 8 March 2024

Leading Supreme Court Judgment on distinction between Article 226 and 227 of Constitution of India

The difference between Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution was well brought out in Umaji Keshao Meshram v. Radhikabai [MANU/SC/0132/1986 : 1986 Supp. SCC 401]. Proceedings Under Article 226 are in exercise of the original jurisdiction of the High Court while proceedings Under Article 227 of the Constitution are not original but only supervisory. Article 227 substantially reproduces the provisions of Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915 excepting that the power of superintendence has been extended by this article to tribunals as well. Though the power is akin to that of an ordinary court of appeal, yet the power Under Article 227 is intended to be used sparingly and only in appropriate cases for the purpose of keeping the subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. The power may be exercised in cases occasioning grave injustice or failure of justice such as when (i) the court or tribunal has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have, (ii) has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have, such failure occasioning a failure of justice, and (iii) the jurisdiction though available is being exercised in a manner which tantamounts to overstepping the limits of jurisdiction. {Para 24}


25. Upon a review of decided cases and a survey of the occasions, wherein the High Courts have exercised jurisdiction to command a writ of certiorari or to exercise supervisory jurisdiction Under Article 227 in the given facts and circumstances in a variety of cases, it seems that the distinction between the two jurisdictions stands almost obliterated in practice. Probably, this is the reason why it has become customary with the lawyers labelling their petitions as one common Under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, though such practice has been deprecated in some judicial pronouncement. Without entering into niceties and technicality of the subject, we venture to state the broad general difference between the two jurisdictions. Firstly, the writ of certiorari is an exercise of its original jurisdiction by the High Court; exercise of supervisory jurisdiction is not an original jurisdiction and in this sense it is akin to appellate, revisional or corrective jurisdiction. Secondly, in a writ of certiorari, the record of the proceedings having been certified and sent up by the inferior court or tribunal to the High Court, the High Court if inclined to exercise its jurisdiction, may simply annul or quash the proceedings and then do no more. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, the High Court may not only quash or set aside the impugned proceedings, judgment or order but it may also make such directions as the facts and circumstances of the case may warrant, maybe, by way of guiding the inferior court or tribunal as to the manner in which it would now proceed further or afresh as commended to or guided by the High Court. In appropriate cases the High Court, while exercising supervisory jurisdiction, may substitute such a decision of its own in place of the impugned decision, as the inferior court or tribunal should have made. Lastly, the jurisdiction Under Article 226 of the Constitution is capable of being exercised on a prayer made by or on behalf of the party aggrieved; the supervisory jurisdiction is capable of being exercised suo motu as well.


20. It is the above holding, correctness of which was doubted in the referring order already mentioned above.


21. It is true that this Court has laid down that technicalities associated with the prerogative writs in England have no role to play under our constitutional scheme. There is no parallel system of King's Court in India and of all other courts having limited jurisdiction subject to supervision of King's Court. Courts are set up under the Constitution or the laws. All courts in the jurisdiction of a High Court are subordinate to it and subject to its control and supervision Under Article 227. Writ jurisdiction is constitutionally conferred on all High Courts. Broad principles of writ jurisdiction followed in England are applicable to India and a writ of certiorari lies against patently erroneous or without jurisdiction orders of Tribunals or authorities or courts other than judicial courts. There are no precedents in India for High Courts to issue writs to subordinate courts. Control of working of subordinate courts in dealing with their judicial orders is exercised by way of appellate or revisional powers or power of superintendence Under Article 227. Orders of civil court stand on different footing from the orders of authorities or Tribunals or courts other than judicial/civil courts. While appellate or revisional jurisdiction is regulated by statutes, power of superintendence Under Article 227 is constitutional. The expression "inferior court" is not referable to judicial courts, as rightly observed in the referring order in paras 26 and 27 quoted above.


22. The Bench in Surya Dev Rai also observed in para 25 of its judgment that distinction between Articles 226 and 227 stood almost obliterated. In para 24 of the said judgment distinction in the two articles has been noted. In view thereof, observation that scope of Article 226 and 227 was obliterated was not correct as rightly observed by the referring Bench in Para 32 quoted above. We make it clear that though despite the curtailment of revisional jurisdiction Under Section 115 Code of Civil Procedure by Act 46 of 1999, jurisdiction of the High Court Under Article 227 remains unaffected, it has been wrongly assumed in certain quarters that the said jurisdiction has been expanded. Scope of Article 227 has been explained in several decisions including Waryam Singh and Anr. v. Amarnath and Anr.

65. We would like to make it clear that in view of the law referred to above in cases of property rights and in disputes between private individuals writ court should not interfere unless there is any infraction of statute or it can be shown that a private individual is acting in collusion with a statutory authority.


66. We may also observe that in some High Courts there is a tendency of entertaining petitions Under Article 227 of the Constitution by terming them as writ petitions. This is sought to be justified on an erroneous appreciation of the ratio in Surya Dev and in view of the recent amendment to Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1999. It is urged that as a result of the amendment, scope of Section 115 Code of Civil Procedure has been curtailed. In our view, even if the scope of Section 115 Code of Civil Procedure is curtailed that has not resulted in expanding the High Court's power of superintendence. It is too well known to be reiterated that in exercising its jurisdiction, High Court must follow the regime of law.

23. Thus, we are of the view that judicial orders of civil courts are not amenable to a writ of certiorari Under Article 226.

We are also in agreement with the view of the referring Bench that a writ of mandamus does not lie against a private person not discharging any public duty. Scope of Article 227 is different from Article 226.

25. Accordingly, we answer the question referred as follows:

(i) Judicial orders of civil court are not amenable to writ jurisdiction Under Article 226 of the Constitution;

(ii) Jurisdiction Under Article 227 is distinct from jurisdiction from jurisdiction Under Article 226.

Contrary view in Surya Dev Rai is overruled.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 2548 of 2009 and SLP (C) No. 25828 of 2013

Decided On: 26.02.2015

Radhey Shyam and Ors. Vs. Chhabi Nath and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

H.L. Dattu, C.J.I., A.K. Sikri and Adarsh Kumar Goel, JJ.

Citation:  Citation: 2015/INSC/160, MANU/SC/0200/2015,

AIR 2015 SUPREME COURT 3269.

Author: Adarsh Kumar Goel, J.

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What is distinction between Article 226 and 227 of Constitution of India?

  1. 1) Nature of Power:

    • Article 226 grants High Courts the power to issue writs for the enforcement of fundamental rights and for any other purpose. These writs include habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, and certiorari.
    • Article 227, on the other hand, confers upon High Courts the power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals within their jurisdiction. This power is more administrative in nature, ensuring proper functioning of the subordinate judiciary.
  2. 2) Scope of Authority:

    • Article 226 allows High Courts to intervene in individual cases where fundamental rights are at stake or for other legal issues that warrant the issuance of writs.
    • Article 227 provides High Courts with the authority to oversee the entire judicial machinery within their territorial jurisdiction, ensuring uniformity and proper administration of justice.
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Monday, 18 October 2021

Whether Municipal appeal is maintainable against issuance of property tax bill?

  It is now well-settled that the right to file an appeal is a creation of the statute. Section 406(1) provides of appeals against any rateable value or tax fixed or charged under this Act. Reference to rateable value in Sub-section (1) of Section 406, necessarily, pertains to tax on property. In view of the fact that under Section 127, other taxes such as taxes on vehicles, boats, animals, octroi, etc., are also levied, Sub-section (1) of Section 406 also refers to appeals against "tax fixed or charged" under the Act. Section 406(2)(b) specifically relates to appeal against a rateable value and Sub-clause (d) relates to appeal against any amendment made in the assessment book for property tax. It is not necessary to refer to Sub-clause (d) because that pertains to deposit of tax pending the entertainment of the appeal. Sub-clause (b) and (d), as we have already observed, postulate in relation to property tax appeals being filed only against rateable value. Sub-clause (c) of Section 406(2), no doubt, contemplates filing of an appeal against any tax. But, this sub-clause contemplates an appeal against such a tax in respect of which provisions exist for filing a complaint and the complaint being disposed of. Neither the Act, nor the Rules contemplate any complaint being filed against a bill a property tax and complaints, relating to property tax can only be filed against the rateable value. The Legislative intent, therefore, clearly is that it is only at the first stage, viz., the determination of the rateable value, that the appeals will be entertained and no appeal can be preferred against a bill levying tax as a consequence of the rateable value having been determined. The reason for this is obvious. The sending of a bill levying tax would amount to a mere mathematical calculation on the basis of the rateable value which is determined. If the determination of the rateable value can only be challenged by filing an appeal under Section 406(2)(b) or (d) and the same cannot be challenged once it has become final, then providing for appeal against the tax calculated on the basis of the rateable value would be meaningless.{Para 83}

84. It may happen that the rateable Value I may have been determined in gross violation of the provisions of the Act or the Rules and without following the procedure laid down in the Rules requiring giving the opportunity of filing a complaint by giving a public notice or a special notice. Where an owner has had an occasion or opportunity to file a complaint under the Rules against the proposed rateable value, but he fails to do so, no relief can be granted to him. If, on the other hand, in a rate case, such an opportunity has not at all been afforded, then merely for equitable reasons a Court should not and cannot entertain an appeal against the bill because such a provision does not exist. The appropriate remedy in such a case will be for the owner to take recourse to the constitutional remedies provided by Article 227 or Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Gujarat High Court
Municipal Corporation Of The City ... vs Oriental Fire & General Insurance ... on 8 September, 1994
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