Leading Supreme court judgment on distinction between administrative decision and judicial decision

 Question whether a decision is judicial or is purely administrative, often arises when jurisdiction of the superior courts to issue writs of certiorari is invoked.

Often the line of distinction between decisions judicial and administrative is thin : but the principles for ascertaining the true character of the decisions are well-settled. A judicial decision is not always the act of a judge or a tribunal invested with power to determine questions of law or fact : it must however be the act of a body or authority invested by law with authority to determine questions or disputes affecting the rights of citizens and under a duty to act judicially. A judicial decision always postulates the existence of a duty laid upon the authority to act judicially. Administrative authorities are often invested with authority or power to determine questions, which affect the rights of citizens. The authority may have to invite objections to the course of action proposed by him, he may be under a duty to hear the objectors, and his decision may seriously affect the rights of citizens but unless in arriving at his decision he is required to act judicially, his decision will be executive or administrative. Legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of citizens, does not make the determination judicial : it is the duty to act judicially which invests it with that character. What distinguishes an act judicial from administrative is therefore the duty imposed upon the authority to act judicially. Mukherjea, J., in The Province of Bombay v. K. S. Advani MANU/SC/0034/1950 : [1950]1SCR621 observed at p. 670 "there cannot indeed be a judicial act which does not create or imposes obligations; but an act, x x x x x is not necessarily judicial because it affects the rights of subjects. Every judicial act presupposes the application of judicial process. There is well marked distinction between forming a personal or private opinion about a matter, and determining it judicially. In the performance of an executive act, the authority has certainly to apply his mind to the materials before him; but the opinion he forms is a purely subjective matter which depends entirely upon his state of mind. It is of course necessary that he must act in good faith, and if it is established that he was not influenced by any extraneous consideration, there is nothing further to be said about it. In a judicial proceeding, on the other hand, the process or method of application is different. "The judicial process involves the application of a body of rules or principles by the technique of a particular psychological method", vide Robson's Justice and Administrative Law, p. 33. It involves a proposal and an opposition, and arriving at a decision upon the same on consideration of facts and circumstances according to the rules of reason and justice, vide R. v. London County Council [1931] 2 K.B. 215. It is not necessary that the strict rules of evidence should be followed : the procedure for investigation of facts or for reception of evidence may vary according to the requirements of a particular case. There need not be any hard and fast rule on such matters, but the decision which the authority arrives at, must not be his 'subjective', 'personal' or 'private' opinion. It must be something which conforms to an objective standard or criterion laid down or recognised by law, and the soundness or otherwise of the determination must be capable of being tested by the same external standard. This is the essence of a judicial function which differentiates it from an administrative function; and whether an authority is required to exercise one kind of function or the other depends entirely upon the provisions of the particular enactment. x x x x x x Generally speaking where the language of a statute indicates with sufficient clearness that the personal satisfaction of the authority on certain matters about which he has to form an opinion finds his jurisdiction to do certain acts or make certain orders, the function should be regarded as an executive function."

12. It may be observed that Mukherjea, J., was on the ultimate decision in the case, in the minority, but the principle enunciated by him had substantially the approval of the Court. Das, J., in the same case at p. 719 observed : "a person entrusted to do an administrative act has often to determine questions of fact to enable him to exercise his power. He has to consider facts and circumstances and to weigh pros and cons in his mind before he makes up his mind to exercise his power just as a person exercising a judicial or quasi-judicial function has to do. Both have to act in good faith. A good and valid administrative or executive act binds the subject and affects his rights or imposes liability on him just as effectively as a quasi-judicial act does. The exercise of an administrative or executive act may well be and is frequently made dependent by the Legislature upon a condition or contingency which may involve a question of fact, but the question of fulfilment of which may, nevertheless, be left to the subjective opinion or satisfaction of the executive authority".

13. To make a decision or an act judicial, the following criteria must be satisfied :

(1) it is in substance a determination upon investigation of a question by the application of objective standards to facts found in the light of pre-existing legal rule;

(2) it declares rights or imposes upon parties obligations affecting their civil rights; and

(3) that the investigation is subject to certain procedural attributes contemplating an opportunity of presenting its case to a party, ascertainment of facts by means of evidence if a dispute be on questions of fact, and if the dispute be on question of law on the presentation of legal argument, and a decision resulting in the disposal of the matter on findings based upon those questions of law and fact.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 37 and 38 of 1961

Decided On: 25.09.1962

Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd., Meerut Vs. Lakshmichand and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.P. Sinha, C.J., J.C. Shah, K.C. Das Gupta, K.N. Wanchoo and P.B. Gajendragadkar, JJ.

Citation:  AIR 1963 SC 677

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Whether Registry Can Exercise Judicial Powers To Decide Maintainability Of Petitions?

 The nature of judicial function is well settled under our legal
system. Judicial function is the duty to act judicially, which
invests with that character. The distinguishing factor which
separates administrative and judicial function is the duty
and authority to act judicially. Judicial function may thus
be defined as the process of considering the proposal,

opposition and then arriving at a decision upon the same on
consideration of facts and circumstances according to the
rules of reason and justice. A Constitution Bench of five
judges in Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd., Meerut vs.
Lakshmichand and Ors., AIR 1963 SC 677, formulated
the following criteria to ascertain whether a decision or an
act is judicial function or not, in the following manner(
1) it is in substance a determination upon
investigation of a question by the application
of objective standards to facts found in the
light of preexisting
legal rule;
(2) it declares rights or imposes upon parties
obligations affecting their civil rights; and
(3) that the investigation is subject to certain
procedural attributes contemplating an
opportunity of presenting its case to a party,
ascertainment of facts by means of evidence
if a dispute be on questions of fact, and if the
dispute be on question of law on the
presentation of legal argument, and a decision
resulting in the disposal of the matter on
findings based upon those questions of law
and fact.
(emphasis added)
The act of numbering a petition is purely administrative.
The objections taken by the Madras High Court Registry on

the aspect of maintainability requires judicial application of
mind by utilizing appropriate judicial standard. Moreover,
the wordings of Section 18A of the SC/ST Act itself indicates
at application of judicial mind. In this context, we accept
the statement of the Attorney General, that the
determination in this case is a judicial function and the
High Court Registry could not have rejected the numbering.
10. Therefore, we hold that the High Court Registry could not
have exercised such judicial power to answer the
maintainability of the petition, when the same was in the
realm of the Court. As the power of judicial function cannot
be delegated to the Registry, we cannot sustain the order,
rejecting the numbering/registration of the Petition, by the
Madras High Court Registry. Accordingly, the Madras High
Court Registry is directed to number the petition and place
it before an appropriate bench.

Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SLP (CRL.) No. 1832 of 2019
P. SURENDRAN  Vs STATE BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE

Dated:March 29, 2019

N. V. RAMANA, J.,

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Precaution to be taken by magistrate prior to issuance of search warrant

8. A brief reference to Section 93 (1) would be profitable to

appreciate the contentions:

“Section 93 - When search-warrant may be issued

(1) (a) Where any Court has reason to believe that a

person to whom a summons or order under section 91

or a requisition under sub-section (1) of section 92 has

been, or might be, addressed, will not or would not

produce the document or thing as required by such

summons or requisition, or

(b) where such document or thing is not known to the

Court to be in the possession of any person, or

(c) where the Court considers that the purposes of any

inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code will be

served by a general search or inspection, it may issue a

search-warrant; and the person to whom such warrant is

directed, may search or inspect in accordance therewith

and the provisions hereinafter contained.

(2) xxxx xxxx

(3) xxxx xxxx”

9. As is evident from the wording of the section, it arms the

jurisdictional Magistrate with very wide powers. Issuance of a search

warrant is a very drastic step with serious consequences and it cannot

be gainsaid that such drastic powers should not be exercised without

fully appreciating the gravity of the step. It is for that reason, the

words "reason to believe" is incorporated in the said section. This

function being judicial, it necessarily follows that the Magistrate has

to apply his mind judicially.

10. It is evident from the provision that clause (a) of sub-

Section (1) requires, as a condition precedent, to the issue of a search

warrant, that the court must have reason to believe that the person,

against whom the search warrant is issued, is likely not to produce

the document or thing in his possession as required by a summons or

order under Section 91 or a requisition under Section 92(1) of the

Code, served on him, or that he is not likely to produce it, should such

summons or order or requisition be served. No such situation had

arisen in the instant case. It does not appear from the order that the

petitioners were called upon to produce the document and they had

refused. Section 93(1)(b) comprehends a situation where a search

warrant may be issued to procure a document or thing not known to

the court to be in the possession of any person. In other words, a

general search warrant may be issued to procure the document or

thing and it can be recovered from any person who may be ultimately

found in possession of it if it was not known to the court that the

person from whose possession it was found, was in possession of it.

The said provision has no application as it is evident from the

application itself that the document was in the possession of the

relevant office bearer of the Tennis Club. Under clause (c), a search

warrant can be issued where the court considers that the purposes of

any enquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code will be served

by a general search or inspection. A Magistrate must, under this

provision, apply her mind to the question whether the purposes of any

enquiry, trial or other proceeding under the Code will be served by a

general search, and, unless there are materials before her, connecting

the person against whom the warrant is applied for with the offences

alleged, upon which it can come to an independent decision on the

point, it has no power to issue a search warrant. I have no doubt in my

mind that none of the situations contemplated in clauses (a) to (c) of

Section 93(1) had arisen in the instant case.

11. There is yet another aspect of the matter. When the

law requires the sanction of Magistrate before the issue of a search

warrant, it means that the Magistrate should apply its mind to the

facts. This fact should be discernible from the order passed. It can be

argued that the provision does not contemplate recording of detailed

reasons prior to the issuance of an order in view of the urgency of the

situation. However, in a case of instant nature, wherein allegations

are levelled against the officer bearers of a club for wrongly

inducting a member against the provisions of the bye-laws, the

learned Magistrate ought to have applied her mind and should have

formed an opinion upon the materials placed before her. The

“reasons to believe” which weighed in the mind of the Court to take

such a drastic step should have been reflected in the order.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

PRESENT

 MR. JUSTICE RAJA VIJAYARAGHAVAN V

Crl.MC.No. 8672 of 2018

 K.P VIJAYA MOHAN, Vs  N. JAYA KUMAR,

Dated: 15TH DAY OF MARCH 2019 

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Whether judicial function can be delegated?

 It is evincible from the impugned order that the learned Judge has left both the aspects, that is, determination of the nature and character of the document and impounding of the same to the Registrar. Therefore, the sentinel question that arises for consideration is whether the learned Single Judge for the purpose of determining the character of the instrument could have delegated the authority to the Registrar. A judicial functioning has to be done in a judicial manner. The duty of determination of an instrument or, to explicate, to determine when there is a contest a particular document to be of specific nature, the adjudication has to be done by the Judge after hearing the counsel for the parties. It is a part of judicial function and hence, the same cannot be delegated. Be it noted, under the High Court Rules, in certain High Courts, the computation is done by the authorities in the Registry with regard to the court fees but that also is subject to challenge before the Court when the applicability of a particular provision of the Court-fees Act, 1870 is concerned. Thus analysed, we are inclined to think that the authority is not empowered to determine the nature and character of the document. He may at the best send a report to the Court expressing his views on a document which is subject to final determination by the Court.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 2973-2974 of 2017 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 10635-10636 of 2014)

Decided On: 17.02.2017

 Black Pearl Hotels (Pvt.) Ltd.

Vs.

 Planet M Retail Ltd.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dipak Misra, R. Banumathi and Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, JJ.

Citation:(2017) 4 SCC498

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Whether sending partition decree to collector for partition of property is ministerial act not a judicial function?

 The question whether a decree passed under O. 20, R. 18( 1), CPC directing partition by the Collector can be said to be a preliminary decree and whether such an order can be termed as an application in an execution petition and any order under the said provision is barred by time.-- came up for consideration before the Division Bench of this Court for the first time in Narasu v. Narayan Krishnaji, AIR 1959 Mys, 233. Though the main contention in that case was the maintainability of the appeal as it is a ministerial order, the Division Bench had an occasion to thrash out all the controversies including the one which is now canvassed in this revision. That was also a case where after the High Court decree, the decree holders filed some application to the trial Court to take steps to partition the properties in question. The objection raised by the contesting respondents was whether the application in execution was tenable etc. Incidentally it was contended in that case that the application filed amounts to execution petition which is filed after limitation. It is in this context it is held by the Division Bench that the application cannot be considered in law as an execution petition - a decree passed under Rule 18(1) of Order 20 directing partition by the Collector cannot be said to be a preliminary decree. Sofar as the Civil Courts are concerned it is final for all purposes, though the partition of the property may remain to be effected by the Collector. Sub-rule (1) of R. 18 does not contemplate any application to be filed by the parties for sending the papers to the Collector. It says that the Court "shall direct such partition or separation to be made by the Collector or any Gazetted subordinate of the Collector deputed by him in this behalf, in accordance with such declaration and with the provisions of S. 54." It is further held that "any application filed before the Court which passed the decree to send the papers to the Collector could only be considered as a reminder to the Court to follow up its direction given under sub-rule (1) of R. 18. No period of limitation is provided for such a reminder as the same is not one contemplated by law. In sending the papers to the Collector, the Court is not performing any judicial function; nor is it required to pass any judicial order. Its function could at best be described as ministerial. It will be inappropriate to call such an application as an execution application. The Court which passed the decree must be deemed to have become functus officio after passing the decree."

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA

Civil Revision No. 4010/1996

Decided On: 05.02.1997

Appellants: Sanna Palaiah alias Palaiah 
Vs.
Respondent: Soncha Boraiah and another

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