Whether claimant in motor accident claim petition can examine any witness who is not cited as witness in criminal case?

 Clearly, the evidence given by Bhagchand withstood
the respondents’ scrutiny and the respondents were unable
to shake his evidence. In turn, the High Court has failed to
take note of the absence of cross examination of this
witness by the respondents, leave alone the Tribunal’s
finding on the same, and instead, deliberated on the
reliability of Bhagchand’s (A.D.2) evidence from the
viewpoint of him not being named in the list of eye
witnesses in the criminal proceedings, without even
mentioning as to why such absence from the list is fatal to
the case of the appellants. This approach of the High Court
is mystifying, especially in light of this Court’s observation
[as set out in Parmeshwari (supra) and reiterated in
Mangla Ram (supra)] that the strict principles of proof in a
criminal case will not be applicable in a claim for
compensation under the Act and further, that the standard
to be followed in such claims is one of preponderance of

probability rather than one of proof beyond reasonable
doubt. There is nothing in the Act to preclude citing of a
witness in motor accident claim who has not been named in
the list of witnesses in the criminal case. What is essential
is that the opposite party should get a fair opportunity to
cross examine the concerned witness. Once that is done, it
will not be open to them to complain about any prejudice
caused to them. If there was any doubt to be cast on the
veracity of the witness, the same should have come out in
cross examination, for which opportunity was granted to the
respondents by the Tribunal.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1665 OF 2019

Sunita Vs  Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation 
A.M. Khanwilkar, J.
Dated:February 14, 2019.

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Whether claimant can be granted escalation charges proportionate to delay caused by other side?

This will require the Court to consider the additional plea urged on behalf of the Plaintiff, namely, that the High Court was not justified in reversing the decree passed by the learned trial Court so far as 50% of the escalation charges is concerned.

12. The High Court in coming to the aforesaid conclusion took the view that the specific clause in the agreement which obliges the Plaintiff to continue to offer his rates for the entire duration of the contract prohibits grant of the said claim. We have also noticed that it is the Defendant's own case that it was responsible for the delay to the extent of nineteen and half (19 1/2) months that had occurred in the execution of the contract whereas the Plaintiff was responsible for the delay of the remaining fifteen and half (15 1/2) months. The said specific admission on the part of the Defendant and the finding arrived at by the High Court on the aforesaid basis could not have permitted the High Court to reverse the decree passed by the learned trial Court on the aforesaid count which coincidentally entitled the Plaintiff to only 50% of the escalation charges, as claimed. The aforesaid percentage (50%) roughly corresponds to the percentage of the delay attributable to the Plaintiff out of the total delay of 35 months. The clause in the contract which obliged the Plaintiff to continue to offer the rates initially offered by him would, naturally, be for the duration of the contract and cannot work to his peril for the period of delay for which the Department was admittedly responsible. Such a construction of the clause in the contract would not be reasonable. We, therefore, reverse the aforesaid finding of the High Court and hold that the Plaintiff would be entitled to the 50% of the escalation charges as decreed by the learned trial Court.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

C.A. No. 1034/2008

Decided On: 21.03.2017

 Aries & Aries Vs.  Tamil Nadu Electricity Board

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Whether claimant in land acquisition proceeding can be denied statutory benefits on account of stay obtained by him?

 Once the land value is fixed by the Court, it refers
to the value of the land as per the Award passed by the
Collector. That should carry all eligible statutory
benefits. It appears that in the case before us,
statutory benefits have been denied for a short period on
the ground that the proceedings initiated at the instance
of the appellants, remained stayed before the Reference
Court. To quote from Paragraph-4 of the impugned
judgment:
“Learned Counsel for the appellant,
however, had submitted that the learned
trial court was not justified in declining
the relief of interest on the enhanced
compensation for the period during which
the reference proceedings had remained
stayed sine die and that relief at least
should be given by this Court. However,
this prayer of the appellant cannot be
accepted since he himself had got his
reference proceedings before the trial
Court stayed sine die and the Government
cannot be burdened with the liability of
interest for the delay in disposal of the
reference proceedings caused by the
appellant himself.”
3. We fail to understand how the appellants could be
denied the statutory benefits available under the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as “the
Act”) in respect of the value of this land fixed, merely
because there was a period of stay operating, may be in a
proceeding at the instance of the appellants. Those are
not relevant considerations or factors at all for the
purpose of grant of statutory benefits available to a
person, whose land has been acquired in terms of Section
28 of the Act. Section 28 reads as under:
“28. Collector may be directed to pay
interest on excess compensation. If the
sum which, in the opinion of the Court,
the Collector ought to have awarded as
compensation is in excess of the sum
which the Collector did award as
compensation, the award of the Court may
direct that the Collector shall pay
interest on such excess at the rate of
nine per centum per annum from the date
on which he took possession of the land
to the date of payment of such excess
into Court:
Provided that the award of the Court may
also direct that where such excess or
any part thereof is paid into Court
after the date of expiry of a period of
one year from the date on which
possession is taken, interest at the
rate of fifteen per centum per annum
shall be payable from the date of expiry
of the said period of one year on the
amount of such excess or part thereof
which has not been paid into Court
before the date of such expiry.”
4. There is no exclusion of any period contemplated on
whatever account under Section 28 of the Act. The only
reference is to the date of dispossession. Liability to
pay interest starts to run from that date. Therefore,
these appeals are allowed. It is directed that the
appellants shall be entitled to interest for the
compensation, as per Section 28 r/w Section 23(1A), in
respect of the land acquired from the appellants, on
value at the rate of Rs. 76, 550/- per Bigha for the
period of stay also, i.e., from 24.04.1997 to 27.09.2001.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO 11177 OF 2011
RATTI RAM
V
UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER
Dated:February 17, 2016.
Citation: 2016(5) ALLMR471 SC

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When claimant is entitled to claim damages from insurer of offending vehicle?

 I have gone through the claim petition,
replies and the evidence on record. The case of the
claimant before the Tribunal was that in the said
accident his truck got totally damaged and it was
insured with his own insurance company, i.e. Oriental
Insurance Company, which has granted only

Rs.2,02,000/- as assessed by the insurer. He has also
received Rs.60,000/- as salvage but claimed that he
was also entitled to balance amount as compensation
from the insured of the offending Tata Mobile, which
has not been paid to him by his own insurance
company, for the reasons that the vehicle was
damaged and market value of the vehicle was
Rs.3,50,000/- at the time of the accident but the
insurance agency restricted his claim to the tune of
Rs.2,02,000/-, as per the insurance cap read with the
terms and conditions of the insurance policy. He has
obtained the loan from the Corporation, as mentioned
supra, details of which is already given in para 21 of
the claim petition.
 The Tribunal, after examining all the facts
of the case held that the insurer of the Tata Mobile has
to pay the said amount. Thus, it can be safely
concluded that the claimant has not made claim for the
loss of income. He has claimed damages and loss
suffered by him.
14. The Truck was insured and insurer has
granted the claim only viz-a-viz the risk covered, within

the insurance cap. The said amount plus the amount of
salvage cannot be claimed from another insurance
company. But at the same time he has suffered loss
because his vehicle has totally damaged and he is not
in a position to ply it and earn income, in order to adjust
the loan, the market value of which is stated to be
Rs.3,50,000/-. He has claimed the balance amount of
compensation from another insurance company which
is the insurer of Tata Mobile in terms of a different
insurance contract. Both the insurance contracts are
different and claimant has laid claim for difference of
amount and was entitled to the same. The insurance
contracts are different and the claimant has to claim
balance amount/difference of amount. My this view is
fortified by the judgment delivered by the Andhra
Pradesh High Court in case United India Insurance
Co. Ltd. versus K. Chandrasekharachari and
another reported in 2008 ACJ 640. It is apt to
reproduce paras 13 and 15 of the said judgment
herein.
“13. From a reading of Sections 165 and 166 of the Act
it is clear that the State Government may constitute
Claims Tribunal for the purpose of adjudicating claims

for compensation in respect of accidents involving the
death of or bodily injury to persons arising out of the
use of motor vehicles or damages to any property of a
third party or both and such application can be filed by
person sustain injury or by the owner of the property. In
the present case, the claimant who is the owner of the
damaged van who is a third party, filed petition for
damages and in view of the above provisions, there
cannot be any dispute with regard to the claim petition
being filed under Section 166 of the Act and the same
is maintainable.
14. …… ……. …….
15. The Tribunal has recorded finding of fact that the
accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of
the lorry by its driver. This being a finding of fact,
cannot be interfered within the appeal. Because of the
accident, the van of the claimant got damaged and the
insurer of the lorry is jointly and vicariously liable to pay
compensation along with the owner of the lorry and as
per Sections 165 and 166, the claimant is entitled to
claim damages. As the van of the claimant was
covered under a comprehensive insurance policy with
the National Insurance Company, the claim of the
claimant was settled. As rightly observed by the
Tribunal, with regard to the present accident, which
was the result of the negligent driving of the driver of
the lorry, the contract is between the insured and
insurer and the insurer has to indemnify the insured.
Further there is no contract between the National
Insurance Company, which is the insurer of the van
and the United Indian Insurance Company, which is the
insurer of the lorry that in case of settlement of claim by
the claimant with the National Insurance Company for
repairs, he is not entitled to claim damages from the
United India Insurance Company which is the insurer of
the lorry responsible for the accident. Both the
contracts are for different purposes and operate in

different fields. In view of this reasoning, I answer the
issue in favour of the claimant holding that the claimant
is not barred from claiming damages from the insurer of
the lorry which is responsible for the accident.”
 [emphasis supplied]
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH
SHIMLA
FAO (MVA) No. 3 of 2008.

 Date of decision: 01.1.2016.
National Insurance Co. Ltd.  V Shri Jhenta Ram and others 
Coram:
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Mansoor Ahmad Mir, Chief justice.
Citation;(2016) 3 ALLMR(JOURNAL)46

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Whether claimants are entitled to get compensation for death of victim by murder while travelling in motor vehicle?

 The   question   is   ­   whether   the   death/murder   of
Dharam Pal is out of use of vehicle in the given circumstances of
the case?   The answer is in the affirmative for the following
reasons:
 The legal representatives of the driver of the vehicle
have not made any claim.  The claim, which is being adjudicated
upon,   is   by   the   legal   representatives/heirs/dependents   of
deceased­Dharam Pal.  
 As   discussed   hereinabove   and   as   recorded   by   the
Tribunal, the entire offence was committed inside the vehicle,
thus, out of 'use of motor vehicle'.   The claimants have filed
claim petition under Section 163A of the MV Act and not under
Section  166  of  the  MV  Act.     In  a  claim   petition  filed   under
Section 166 of the MV Act, the claimants have to plead and
prove   that   the   accident   was   outcome   of   rash   and   negligent
driving of the vehicle by its driver.  Sine qua non for maintaining

the   claim   petition   under   Section   166   of   the   MV   Act   is   the
rashness and negligence on the part of the driver of the vehicle,
but   in   a   claim   petition   under   Section   163A   of   the   MV   Act,
rashness and negligence is not a sine qua non and it is also not
even an ingredient in the said provision.  
21. It is worthwhile to reproduce Section 163A of the MV
Act herein:
"163A. Special provisions as to payment
of compensation on structured formula
basis.   ­  (1)   Notwithstanding   anything
contained in this Act or in any other law for
the time being in force or instrument having
the   force   of   law,   the   owner   of   the   motor
vehicle   or   the   authorised   insurer   shall   be
liable   to   pay   in   the   case   of   death   or
permanent   disablement   due   to   accident
arising   out   of   the   use   of   motor   vehicle,
compensation,   as   indicated   in   the   Second
Schedule, to the legal heirs or the victim, as
the case may be.
Explanation. ­ For the purposes of this subsection,
"permanent disability" shall have the
same   meaning   and   extent   as   in   the
Workmen's   Compensation   Act,   1923   (8   of
1923).
(2) In any claim for compensation under subsection
(1), the claimant shall not be required
to   plead   or   establish   that   the   death   or
permanent disablement in respect of which
the   claim   has   been   made   was   due   to
any  wrongful  act or neglect or default of the

owner of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or
of any other person.
(3) The Central Government may, keeping in
view the cost of living by notification in the
Official Gazette, from time to time amend the
Second Schedule."
22. While going through this provision of law, the words
used are 'use of motor vehicle'.  
23. The Court has to be cautious and has to draw a fine
distinction.  If the motive, criminal intention and conspiracy was
to kill Dharam Pal, perhaps the remedy was anywhere else.
24. The facts, the final report and other circumstances
do  disclose  that   the  prima   facie  motive  and   intention  of  the
accused persons were to kill the driver of the vehicle and not
Dharam Pal.  Thus, Dharam Pal became the victim because of
travelling in the vehicle and his death is outcome of 'use of motor
vehicle'.
25. The   Apex   Court   in   the   case   titled   as  Shivaji
Dayanu Patil and another versus Vatschala Uttam More,
reported   in  1991   ACJ   777,  has   interpreted   the   words   and
expression 'use of motor vehicle' and held that these have a wide 

connotation.     It   is   apt   to   reproduce   paras   31   to   36   of   the
judgment herein:
"31. The words "arising out of" have been
used   in   various   statutes   in   different
contexts   and   have   been   construed   by
Courts widely as well as narrowly, keeping
in view the context in which they have been
used in a particular legislation.
32. In Heyman v. Darwins Ltd., 1942 AC
356,   while   construing   the   arbitration
clause in a contract, Lord Porter expressed
the   view   that   as   compared   to   the   word
'under', the expression 'arising out of' has
a   wider   meaning.   In   Union   of   India   v.
E.B.   Aaby's   Rederi   A/S,   1975   AC   797,
Viscount   Dilhorne   and   Lord   Salmon
stated   that   they   could   not   discover   any
difference between the expression "arising
out   of"   and   "arising   under"   and   they
equated "arising out of" in the arbitration
clause   in   a   Charter   Party   with   "arising
under."
33. In Samick Lines Co. Ltd. v. Owners of
the Antonis P. Lemos, (1985) 2 WLR 468,
the   House   of   Lords   was   considering   the
question   whether   a   claim   for   damages
based   on   negligence   in   tort   could   be
regarded   as   a   claim   arising   out   of   an
agreement under section 20(2)(1)(h) of the
Supreme Court Act, 1981 and fell within
the   admiralty   jurisdiction   of   the   High
Court. The words "any claim arising out of
any agreement relating to the carriage of
goods in a ship or to the use of hire of a
ship" in section 20(2)(1)(h) were held to be
wide enough to cover claims, whether in
contract   or   tort   arising   out   of   any
agreement relating to the carriage of goods

in a vessel and it was also held that for
such   an   agreement   to   come   within
paragraph (h), it was not necessary that
the claim in question be directly connected
with some agreement of the kinds referred
to in it. The words "arising out of" were
not construed to mean "arising under" as
in   Union   of   India   v.   E.B.   Aaby's   A/S,
1975   AC   797,   which   decision   was   held
inapplicable   to   the   "The   words"   injury
caused by or ar ising out construction of S.
20(2)(1)(h)  and  it  was observed  by  Lord
Brandon: 
"With   regard   to   the   first   point,   I
would readily accept that in certain
contexts   the   expression   'arising   out
of' may, on the ordinary and natural
meaning   of   the   words   use,   be   the
equivalent of the expression 'arising
under',   and   not   that   of   the   wider
expression   'connected   with'.   In   my
view,   however,   the   expression
'arising   out   of'   is,   on   the   ordinary
and   natural   meaning   of   the   words
used,   capable,   in   other   contexts,   of
being   the   equivalent   of   the   wider
expression 'connected with'. Whether
the expression 'arising out of' has the
narrower   or   the   wider   meaning   in
any particular case must depend on
the context in which it is used."
Keeping in view the context in which the
expression was used in the statute it was
construed to have the wider meaning viz.
'connected with'.
34. In the context of motor accidents the
expressions 'caused by' and 'arising out of'
are often used in statutes. Although both
these   expressions   imply   a   causal
relationship between the accident resulting

in injury and the use of the motor vehicle
but they differ in the degree of proximity of
such   relationship.   This   distinction   has
been lucidly brought out in the decision of
the   High   Court   of   Australia   in
Government Insurance Office of N.S.W. v.
R.J. Green & Lloyd Pty. Ltd., 1967 ACJ
329   (HC,   Australia),   wherein   Lord
Barwick, C.J., has stated : 
"Bearing   in   mind   the   general
purpose   of   the   Act   I   think   the
expression'   arising   out   of'   must   be
taken   to   require   a   less   proximate
relationship   of   the   injury   to   the
relevant   use   of   the   vehicle   than   is
required to satisfy the words caused
by'. It may be that an association of
the injury with the use of the vehicle
while it cannot be said that that use
was   causally   related   to   the   injury
may   yet   be   enough   to   satisfy   the
expression 'arise out of' as used in
the Act and in the policy."
35.   In   the   same   case,   Windeyer,   J.   has
observed as under : 
"The words 'injury by or arising out
of the use of the vehicle' postulate a
causal relationship  between the use
of the vehicle and the injury. 'Caused
by' connotes a 'direct' or 'Proximate'
relationship   of   cause   and   effect.
'Arising   out   of'   extends   this   to   a
result that is less immediate; but it
still carries a sense of consequence." 
36. This would show that as compared to
the expression 'caused by', the expression
'arising out of' has a wider connotation.
The   expression   'caused   by'   was   used   in
sections  95(1)(b)(i) and (ii) and 96(2)(b)(ii)

of   the   Act.   In   section   92­A,   Parliament,
however,   chose   to   use   the   expression
'arising out of' which indicates that for the
purpose of awarding compensation under
section   92­A,   the   causal   relationship
between the use of the motor vehicle and
the   accident   resulting   in   death   or
permanent disablement is not required to
be direct and proximate and it can be less
immediate.   This   would   imply   that
accident should be,connected with the use
of   the   motor   vehicle   but   the   said
connection   need   not   be   direct   and
immediate.   This   construction   of   the
expression   "arising   out   of   the   use   of   a
motor vehicle" in section 92­A enlarges the
field  of protection made available to the
victims   of   an   accident   and   is   in
consonance   with   the   beneficial   object
underlying the enactment."
26. While   going   through   the   judgment   (supra),   one
comes   to   an   inescapable   conclusion   how   the   accident   and
injury/death have relationship with use of motor vehicle.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
      FAO No.         537 of 2008
   
Decided on:    18.12.2015
United India Insurance Company Ltd. …Appellant.
      Versus
Sh. Talaru Ram and others …Respondents.
Coram
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Mansoor Ahmad Mir, Chief Justice.
Citation;2016(3) ALLMR(JOURNAL)30

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Whether claimant are entitled to get compensation towards loss of consortium for death of bachelor?

However, since it is a case of death of a bachelor, the claimants are not entitled to any compensation towards loss of consortium. The Tribunal has grossly erred in awarding a sum of ` 20,000/- under this head. The same is not permissible and is accordingly set aside.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

M.F.A. No. 8139 of 2015 (MV)

Decided On: 15.12.2015

Appellants: H.P. Rajakumar and Ors. 
Vs.
Respondent: Madaraje Ars and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:N.K. Patil and P.D. Waingankar, JJ.

Citation;2016(3) ALLMR(Journal) 26

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Whether tribunal can reject claim petition on ground that claimant was not understanding content of affidavit of examination in chief?

In   the   present   case   the   appellant   had   no   knowledge   of
English   but   her   affidavit   had   been   prepared   in   English.     In   such

situation   it   was   necessary   for   the   Tribunal   to   have   taken   into
consideration said aspect and it could have directed the appellant to
prove her case on the basis of an affidavit prepared either in Hindi or
in vernacular.   The Tribunal could have insisted for filing an affidavit
in   a   language   understood   by   the   claimant.     Merely   because   the
claimant's counsel  had prepared the affidavit in English, a language not
understood by the appellant, same would  be no reason to dismiss the
claim by holding that claimant had not proved her case.  
It is to be noted that the provisions of Chapter XIII of the Act
of 1989 are beneficial provisions aimed at awarding compensation on
account of untoward incidents to ensure that compensation is granted
in  a  deserving  case.   It  is always open  for  the  Claims Tribunal  in
exercise of the powers conferred under Section 18(1) of the   Act of
1987 to regulate its own procedure and insist for filing an affidavit in a
language understood by the claimant especially when it is the mandate
of   Section   18(1)   that  the   Claims   Tribunal    has   to   be   guided   by
principles of natural justice.   In that view of the matter the Claims
Tribunal was not justified in non­ suiting the appellant on the ground
that her affidavit was filed in English and that she was not aware of its
contents.  The impugned order therefore cannot be sustained on that
count.  The point as framed is answered accordingly.  
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY NAGPUR
BENCH NAGPUR.
APPEAL   AGAINST   ORDER  NO.    49    OF     2004
Shilabai wd/o Raghunath Hemne,
V
Union of India 
CORAM:   A. S. CHANDURKAR  J.
Dated    :   SEPTEMBER  14, 2015.
Citation;2016(3) MHLJ345

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Madras HC: Account payee cheque in name of claimant should be issued by Motor Accident Claim Tribunal

It has been brought to the attention of this Court that in the crossed cheques which are issued to the claimants, it is mentioned as & Co. instead of A/c payee .  Such practice has to be avoided by all the Trial Courts and crossing should be made in the cheques only with the endorsement A/c payee and not with the endorsement & Co.  It is made clear that if any violation of the same is brought to the notice of this Court, appropriate action will be initiated against the erring officials.  
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

DATE: 26.02.2016

CORAM:

THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE S.VAIDYANATHAN

C.M.A.No. 466 of 2011


N. Dileep @ Dileepkumar
   Vs.


 M/s. Royal College of Engineering
          and Technology
  

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Whether claimant can get impleaded directly in reference court under land acquisition Act?

In our view, it was not open to the appellants (other than Ajjam Linganna) to have applied directly to the reference Court for impleadment and to seek enhancement under Section 18 for compensation. The only person for whom some consideration can be shown is Ajjam Linganna who had atleast filed an application on 14-9-93 before Land Acquisition Officer seeking reference.

Supreme Court of India

Ajjam Linganna And Ors. vs Land Acquisition Officer, ... on 28 November, 2000

Equivalent citations: 2001 (1) ALT 50 SC, (2002) 9 SCC 426

Bench: M Rao, D Raju

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Whether compensation under land acquisition Act can be paid to Society or other intermeddler, or power of attorney holder of claimant?

In order to protect the interest of the Scheduled Caste persons,
we further direct that the Society or other intermeddler, or power of

attorney holder shall not be paid compensation on their behalf and the
Collector/Land Acquisition Officer to ensure that the compensation is
disbursed directly to the Khatedars or their legal representatives, as
the case may be, and that they are not deprived of the same by any
unscrupulous devices of land grabbers etc. Let the compensation be
disbursed within a period of three months from today along with other
permissible statutory benefits.
The Apex Court has observed that the right to claim compensation is based on right, title or interest in the land and same cannot be transferred to a juristic person like the Society. It is the duty of the State to ensure that the benefit reaches to such persons directly and not usurped by intermeddlers as what is intended by the protection of the right to hold property of SC/ST, cannot be taken away by disbursing the compensation to Society. Persons of SC/ST, as the case may be, are the only rightful claimants to disbursal of compensation and such right cannot be tinkered with by void transaction as the purpose of compensation is the re-settlement of Scheduled Castes or tribes.

Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.1527-1536 OF 2013
Rajasthan Housing Board
... Appellant
- Vs –
New Pink City Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd.
& Anr.
... Respondents
WITH
Civil Appeal Nos.1557-1566/2013, 1577-1586/2013, 1597-1606/2013,
Dated;May 1, 2015.
Citation;(2015) 7 SCC601,AIR 2015 SC 2126

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Whether case of claimant is proved in land acquisition case if there is no effective cross examination by state?

Reliance has been placed by Mr. Khaladkar on P. Ram Reddy and Ors. vs. Land Acquisition Officer, Hyderabad Urban Development Authority, Hyderabad and Ors. [(1995) 2 SCC 305], wherein one of the 23

questions formulated was the effect of non-cross-examination or ineffective cross-examination of witnesses for the claimant. It was held: "It is, no doubt true, that whenever oral

evidence is adduced by parties on certain

matters in controversy, it may become difficult for Court to overlook such evidence, if it is not shown by effective cross-examination of such witnesses who have given such evidence or by adducing contra-evidence that the oral evidence was unreliable or the witnesses themselves are not credit worthy. But, in land acquisition references before Civil Courts, when witnesses give oral evidence in support of the claims of claimants for higher compensation the in-

effective cross-examination of such witness, is not an uncommon feature if regard is had to the manner in which claims for enhanced

compensation in land acquisition cases are

defended in courts on behalf of the Stale,

Indeed, when a question arose before this Court whether the Court is bound to accept the

statement of witnesses only because they have not been effectively cross-examined or evidence in rebuttal has not been adduce, it was observed by this Court in Chaturbhuj Pande and Ors. vs. Collector; Raigarh AIR (1969) S.C. 255, thus : `It is true that the witnesses examined on

behalf of the appellants have not been

effectively cross-examined. It is also true that the Collector had not adduced any

evidence in rebuttal; but that does not

mean that the court is bound to accept

their evidence. The Judges are not

computers......they are bound to call into

aid their experience of life and test the

evidence on the basis of probabilities.'"

Supreme Court of India

Navanath & Ors vs State Of Maharashtra on 15 April, 2009

Bench: S.B. Sinha, Cyriac Joseph

REPORTABLE

Citation: 2009(4)ALT17(SC), 2009 3 AWC(Supp)2543SC, 2009(4)BomCR182, JT2009(6)SC386, 2009(5)SCALE575, (2009)14SCC480, [2009]6SCR632

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