Supreme Court : Borrower of vehicle can not claim compensation from owner or insurer of vehicle U/S 163A of MV Act

 An identical question came to be considered by this Court in

the case of Ningamma (supra). In that case, the deceased was

driving a motorcycle which was borrowed from its real owner and

met with an accident by dashing against a bullock cart i.e. without

involving any other vehicle. The claim petition was filed under

Section 163A of the Act by the legal representatives of the deceased

against the real owner of the motorcycle which was being driven by

the deceased. To that, this Court has observed and held that since

the deceased has stepped into the shoes of the owner of the vehicle,

Section 163A of the Act cannot apply wherein the owner of the

vehicle himself is involved. Consequently, it was held that the legal

representatives of the deceased could not have claimed the

compensation under Section 163A of the Act. Therefore, as such, in

the present case, the claimants could have even claimed the

compensation and/or filed the claim petition under Section 163A of

the Act against the driver, owner and insurance company of the

offending vehicle i.e. motorcycle bearing registration No. RJ 29 2M

9223, being a third party with respect to the offending vehicle.

However, no claim under Section 163A was filed against the driver,

owner and/or insurance company of the motorcycle bearing

registration No. RJ 29 2M 9223. It is an admitted position that

the claim under Section 163A of the Act was only against the owner

and the insurance company of the motorcycle bearing registration

No. RJ 02 SA 7811 which was borrowed by the deceased from the

opponentowner

Bhagwan Sahay. Therefore, applying the law laid

down by this Court in the case of Ningamma (supra), and as the

deceased has stepped into the shoes of the owner of the vehicle

bearing registration No. RJ 02 SA 7811, as rightly held by the High

Court, the claim petition under Section 163A of the Act against the

owner and insurance company of the vehicle bearing registration

No. RJ 02 SA 7811 shall not be maintainable.

5.5 It is true that, in a claim under Section 163A of the Act, there

is no need for the claimants to plead or establish the negligence

and/or that the death in respect of which the claim petition is

sought to be established was due to wrongful act, neglect or default

of the owner of the vehicle concerned. It is also true that the claim

petition under Section 163A of the Act is based on the principle of

no fault liability. However, at the same time, the deceased has to be

a third party and cannot maintain a claim under Section 163A of

the Act against the owner/insurer of the vehicle which is borrowed

by him as he will be in the shoes of the owner and he cannot

maintain a claim under Section 163A of the Act against the owner

and insurer of the vehicle bearing registration No. RJ 02 SA 7811.

In the present case, the parties are governed by the contract of

insurance and under the contract of insurance the liability of the

insurance company would be qua third party only. In the present

case, as observed hereinabove, the deceased cannot be said to be a

third party with respect to the insured vehicle bearing registration

No. RJ 02 SA 7811. There cannot be any dispute that the liability

of the insurance company would be as per the terms and conditions

of the contract of insurance. As held by this Court in the case of

Dhanraj (supra), an insurance policy covers the liability incurred

by the insured in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person

(including an owner of the goods or his authorized representative)

carried in the vehicle or damage to any property of a third party

caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle. In the said

decision, it is further held by this Court that Section 147 does not

require an insurance company to assume risk for death or bodily

injury to the owner of the vehicle.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9393 OF 2019

Ramkhiladi  Vs The United India Insurance Company 

Dated:January 7, 2020.

M. R. Shah, J.

Citation: (2020) 2 SCC 550

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Whether award passed by motor accident tribunal will be vitiated if driver is not made party to proceeding?

Thus, the law is that the claimant while filing a claim application is under no obligation to ensure that all necessary and proper parties are impleaded as opponents to the claim petition. Considering the nature of the proceedings, the responsibility is of the Tribunal to ensure that the notices are issued to all the necessary parties. This power can be exercised by the Tribunal at any stage of the proceedings.

11. It is a matter of common knowledge that while defending a claim petition, diverse defences are raised in the written statements by the owners and especially the Insurers. However, in many cases, we find that all the defences pleaded are not pressed into service at the time of final hearing. Whenever a contention is pressed into service by any of the opponents to the claim petition or the persons to whom the notice of the claim petition is issued under Rule 260 that the driver of a vehicle is a necessary party, the Tribunal is under an obligation to examine the said contention and if found correct, issue a notice to the driver. It is obvious that if such contention is not pressed by the party to whom the notice is served, the said party cannot be allowed to raise the said contention for the first time in the appeal. A claimant cannot be allowed to suffer as he is under no obligation to implead any party as the opponent to the claim petition. In such a case, if the driver is aggrieved by the adverse finding recorded against him by the award of the Tribunal, he has a remedy of preferring an appeal against the award after obtaining a leave of the Appellate Court. If neither the owner nor the Insurer raises a contention before the Tribunal regarding the non-joinder of the driver, it is not open for them to contend in the appeal that the driver was a necessary party and that the award is vitiated because of non-joinder of the driver. The observations made by this Court in the case of New India Assurance Company Ltd., Aurangabad Vs. Suman Bhaskar Pawar and others (supra) in clause (iv) of paragraph No. 16 will apply only when specific defence of non- joinder of the driver is pressed into service either by the owner or by the Insurer. If they fail to raise the said contention, the same is not available for them in the appeal. Needless to say that the same will remain available to the driver who is not made party. As the law is that the responsibility of issuing the notice to the proper parties is entrusted to the Tribunal, if a contention regarding non-joinder is not raised, the claimant cannot be allowed to suffer on the ground that the Tribunal has failed to perform its duty. Even if a contention regarding non- joinder of driver is raised at the time of final hearing of a claim petition, if the said condition is correct, the Tribunal can issue notice to the driver at any stage.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

First Appeal No. 1731 of 2010

Decided On: 21.11.2011

The New India Assurance Company Limited  Vs.  Sitaram Devidayal Jaiswal and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Abhay Shreeniwas Oka, J.

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Whether insurer is bound to prove conclusively that intimation of cancellation of policy reached to insured prior to accident

 A period of one week from the date of dispatch can safely be adopted as the time necessary to serve the letter in the ordinary course after which the intimation is presumed to have been served on the addressee. The period is so fixed in the absence of any provision to the contrary for the limited purpose of the cases of this nature to avoid disputes as to the date of receipt of the intimation. The insured in some cases may try to evade the service of notice and the letter would be returned with postal remarks like 'addressee left', 'house locked', 'insufficient address' etc. The burden is on the addressee to rebut the presumption by conclusive evidence that he did not really receive the letter and it is not a case of deliberate avoidance. The burden is not on the insurer to establish conclusively that the intimation of cancellation of insurance coverage was in fact served on the insured or the registering authority. The judgment in M.A.C.A. No. 2471/2015 to the effect that it is the obligation of the insurer to establish the service of the intimation on the addressee is hereby overruled. Needless to say that no liability can be fastened on the insurer for any compensation payable in respect of an accident that occurs after the service of the intimation aforesaid.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA

M.A.C.A. No. 2017 of 2013

Decided On: 31.10.2018

 Prasanna  Vs.  Kabeer

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

V. Chitambaresh, P.B. Suresh Kumar and Sathish Ninan, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2019 Kerala 82

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Supreme Court: Motor accident tribunal can apply the doctrine of pay and recover

Since the reference to the larger bench in Parvathneni case

has been disposed of by keeping the questions of law open to be

decided in an appropriate case, presently the decision in Swaran

Singh case followed in Laxmi Narain Dhut and other cases hold

the field. The award passed by the Tribunal directing the insurance

company to pay the compensation amount awarded to the

claimants and thereafter, recover the same from the owner of the

vehicle in question, is in accordance with the judgment passed by

this Court in Swaran Singh and Laxmi Narain Dhut cases. While

so, in our view, the High Court ought not to have interfered with the

award passed by the Tribunal directing the first respondent to pay

and recover from the owner of the vehicle. The impugned judgment

of the High Court exonerating the insurance company from its

liability and directing the claimants to recover the compensation

from the owner of the vehicle is set aside and the award passed by

the Tribunal is restored.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8144 OF 2018

[Arising out of SLP(C) No.26955 of 2017]

SHAMANNA AND ANOTHER Vs THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER THE ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ORS.

Dated:August 08, 2018

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Whether insurer can be permitted to raise defence of negligence U/S 163A of Motor vehicles Act?

5 The issue which arises before us is no longer res integra and is covered by a recent judgment of three judges of this Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sunil Kumar & Anr.,1 wherein it was held that to permit a defence of negligence of the claimant by the insurer and/or to understand Section 163A of the Act as contemplating such a situation, would be inconsistent with the legislative object behind introduction of this provision, which is “final compensation within a limited time frame on the basis of the structured formula to overcome situations where the claims of compensation on the basis of fault liability was taking an unduly long time”. The Court observed that if an insurer was permitted to raise a defence of negligence under Section 163A of the Act, it would “bring a proceeding under Section 163A of the Act at par with the proceeding under Section 166 of the Act which would not only be self-contradictory but also defeat the very legislative intention”. Consequently, it was held that in a proceeding under Section 163A of the Act, the insurer cannot raise any defence of negligence on the part of the victim to counter a claim for compensation.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.2816 OF 2018

SHIVAJI  Vs  DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIA

INSURANCE CO. LTD.

Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD, J.

Dated:August 09, 2018

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Whether insurance claim for theft can be refused if there is delay in intimation of theft?

It is common knowledge that a person who lost his vehicle may not straightaway go to the Insurance Company to claim compensation. At first, he will make efforts to trace the vehicle. It is true that the owner has to intimate the insurer immediately after the theft of the vehicle. However, this condition should not bar settlement of genuine claims particularly when the delay in intimation or submission of documents is due to unavoidable circumstances.

The decision of the insurer to reject the claim has to be based on valid grounds. Rejection of the claims on purely technical grounds in a mechanical manner will result in loss of confidence of policy-holders in the insurance industry. If the reason for delay in making a claim is satisfactorily explained, such a claim cannot be rejected on the ground of delay.

It is also necessary to state here that it would not be fair and reasonable to reject genuine claims which had already been verified and found to be correct by the Investigator. The condition regarding the delay shall not be a shelter to repudiate the insurance claims 8 which have been otherwise proved to be genuine. It needs no emphasis that the Consumer Protection Act aims at providing better protection of the interest of consumers. It is a beneficial legislation that deserves liberal construction. This laudable object should not be forgotten while considering the claims made under the Act.

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Om Prakash Vs. Reliance General Insurance and ANR.

[Civil Appeal No. 15611 of 2017 arising out of SLP (C) No.742 of 2015]

S.ABDUL NAZEER, J.

Dated:October 4, 2017.

Citation:(2017) 9 SCC 724

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Whether joint appeal by owner of vehicle and insurer is maintainable in motor accident case?

In Shila Datta (supra), the point of maintainability
of a joint appeal by the owner of a vehicle and the insurer came
up for consideration. Their Lordships observed that there was
no dispute that when an award is made by the Tribunal, the
owner of the vehicle, being a person aggrieved, can file an
appeal challenging his liability on any ground or challenge the
quantum of compensation. An appeal which is maintainable
when the owner of the vehicle files it, does not become nonmaintainable
merely on account of the insurer being a co-
appellant with the owner. When the insurer becomes a coappellant,
the owner of the vehicle does not cease to be a
person aggrieved. This question had come up for consideration
in Narendra Kumar v/s. Yarenissa [1998(9) SCC 202] where
it was held that even in the case of a joint appeal of the insurer
and the owner of the offending vehicle if an award has been
made against the tortfeasor as well as the insurer, even though
an appeal filed by the insurer was not competent, it may not be
dismissed as such. The tortfeasor can proceed with the appeal
after the cause-title is suitably amended by deleting the name
of the insurer.
23] In Shila Datta (supra), Their Lordships also
considered the judgment in Chinnama George and others vs.
N.K. Raju and another [(2000)4 SCC 130] where it held that
a joint appeal would not be maintainable and specifically
observed that this issue did not arise for consideration of the
three Judge Bench in Nicolletta Rohtagi (supra), as the
question therein was whether an insurer could file an appeal.
Their Lordships on a careful consideration were of the view that
the decision in the Chinnama George (supra), to the extent it
holds that a joint appeal is not maintainable, did not lay down
the correct law. As observed in Narendra Kumar (supra), the
owner of the vehicle does not cease to be an aggrieved person
merely because the insurer was ultimately liable under the
terms of the policy or under Section 149 of the Act. If the
owner by himself, can file an appeal as an aggrieved person and
such an appeal is maintainable, we fail to understand how the
presence of the insurer as a co-appellant would make the
appeal not maintainable. Whether the owner joins the insurer
or the insurer joins the owner makes no difference to the fact
that the owner continues to be a person aggrieved. When a
joint appeal is filed, to say that the insurer is not an aggrieved
person and the owner of the vehicle would not be an aggrieved
person, would lead to an anomalous situation and border on an
absurdity. Without entering in the question whether an insurer
is an aggrieved person, Their Lordships made it clear that on
account of the insurer being a co-appellant, would not affect the
maintainability of the appeal.
 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA.
 First Appeal No.78/2009 WITH
Cross Objection No.14/2009

  UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO.LTD.

 Versus
SHRI GULAM MOHAMMAD,

 CORAM : NUTAN D.SARDESSAI, J.

 PRONOUNCED ON :22/09/2016.
Citation:2016(6) MHLJ 601

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Whether insurer is entitled to file appeal only on quantum of compensation?

Hon'ble the Supreme Court in a case of National Insurance Co.
Ltd vs. Nicolletta Rohtagi and others 2002(4) RCR (Civil) 464
wherein Hon'ble the Supreme Court had discussed in detail the
provisions of Section 149 of the Motor Vehicles Act and has held
that the Insurer is entitled to file an appeal only on the issues and
grounds prescribed under Section 149(2) or on satisfaction of the
conditions prescribed specified in Section 170 not to challenge
only quantum of compensation. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in
para Nos. 19, 20, 21, 22 & 31 observed as under:-
“19. In Shankarayya and Anr. v. United India
Insurance Co. Ltd. and Anr. [1998] 3 SCC 140, it
was held that an insurance company when impleaded
as a party by the Court can be permitted to contest the
proceedings on merits only if the conditions precedent
mentioned in Section 170 are found to be satisfied and
for that purpose the insurance company has to obtain

an order in writing from the Tribunal and which
should be a reasoned order by the Tribunal. Unless
this procedure is followed, the insurance company
cannot have a wider defence on merits than what is
available to it by way of statutory defences. In
absence of the existence of the conditions precedent
mentioned in Section 170, the insurance company was
not entitled to file an appeal on merits questioning the
quantum of compensation.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
FAO No.3601 of 2015 (O&M)
Date of decision: 14.12.2015
IFFCO Tokio General Insurance Company Limited

Versus
Suman Rani and others

CORAM: HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE RITU BAHRI
Citation:2016 (4) ALLMR(JOURNAL) 4

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When claimant is entitled to claim damages from insurer of offending vehicle?

 I have gone through the claim petition,
replies and the evidence on record. The case of the
claimant before the Tribunal was that in the said
accident his truck got totally damaged and it was
insured with his own insurance company, i.e. Oriental
Insurance Company, which has granted only

Rs.2,02,000/- as assessed by the insurer. He has also
received Rs.60,000/- as salvage but claimed that he
was also entitled to balance amount as compensation
from the insured of the offending Tata Mobile, which
has not been paid to him by his own insurance
company, for the reasons that the vehicle was
damaged and market value of the vehicle was
Rs.3,50,000/- at the time of the accident but the
insurance agency restricted his claim to the tune of
Rs.2,02,000/-, as per the insurance cap read with the
terms and conditions of the insurance policy. He has
obtained the loan from the Corporation, as mentioned
supra, details of which is already given in para 21 of
the claim petition.
 The Tribunal, after examining all the facts
of the case held that the insurer of the Tata Mobile has
to pay the said amount. Thus, it can be safely
concluded that the claimant has not made claim for the
loss of income. He has claimed damages and loss
suffered by him.
14. The Truck was insured and insurer has
granted the claim only viz-a-viz the risk covered, within

the insurance cap. The said amount plus the amount of
salvage cannot be claimed from another insurance
company. But at the same time he has suffered loss
because his vehicle has totally damaged and he is not
in a position to ply it and earn income, in order to adjust
the loan, the market value of which is stated to be
Rs.3,50,000/-. He has claimed the balance amount of
compensation from another insurance company which
is the insurer of Tata Mobile in terms of a different
insurance contract. Both the insurance contracts are
different and claimant has laid claim for difference of
amount and was entitled to the same. The insurance
contracts are different and the claimant has to claim
balance amount/difference of amount. My this view is
fortified by the judgment delivered by the Andhra
Pradesh High Court in case United India Insurance
Co. Ltd. versus K. Chandrasekharachari and
another reported in 2008 ACJ 640. It is apt to
reproduce paras 13 and 15 of the said judgment
herein.
“13. From a reading of Sections 165 and 166 of the Act
it is clear that the State Government may constitute
Claims Tribunal for the purpose of adjudicating claims

for compensation in respect of accidents involving the
death of or bodily injury to persons arising out of the
use of motor vehicles or damages to any property of a
third party or both and such application can be filed by
person sustain injury or by the owner of the property. In
the present case, the claimant who is the owner of the
damaged van who is a third party, filed petition for
damages and in view of the above provisions, there
cannot be any dispute with regard to the claim petition
being filed under Section 166 of the Act and the same
is maintainable.
14. …… ……. …….
15. The Tribunal has recorded finding of fact that the
accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of
the lorry by its driver. This being a finding of fact,
cannot be interfered within the appeal. Because of the
accident, the van of the claimant got damaged and the
insurer of the lorry is jointly and vicariously liable to pay
compensation along with the owner of the lorry and as
per Sections 165 and 166, the claimant is entitled to
claim damages. As the van of the claimant was
covered under a comprehensive insurance policy with
the National Insurance Company, the claim of the
claimant was settled. As rightly observed by the
Tribunal, with regard to the present accident, which
was the result of the negligent driving of the driver of
the lorry, the contract is between the insured and
insurer and the insurer has to indemnify the insured.
Further there is no contract between the National
Insurance Company, which is the insurer of the van
and the United Indian Insurance Company, which is the
insurer of the lorry that in case of settlement of claim by
the claimant with the National Insurance Company for
repairs, he is not entitled to claim damages from the
United India Insurance Company which is the insurer of
the lorry responsible for the accident. Both the
contracts are for different purposes and operate in

different fields. In view of this reasoning, I answer the
issue in favour of the claimant holding that the claimant
is not barred from claiming damages from the insurer of
the lorry which is responsible for the accident.”
 [emphasis supplied]
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH
SHIMLA
FAO (MVA) No. 3 of 2008.

 Date of decision: 01.1.2016.
National Insurance Co. Ltd.  V Shri Jhenta Ram and others 
Coram:
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Mansoor Ahmad Mir, Chief justice.
Citation;(2016) 3 ALLMR(JOURNAL)46

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Whether insurer is liable to pay compensation even though there is transfer of vehicle?

 In view of the decision in HDFC Bank Limited v. Reshma & Ors.
(supra), the insurer cannot escape the liability, when ownership changes due
to the hypothecation agreement. In the case of hire also, it cannot escape the
liability, even if the ownership changes. Even though, KSRTC is treated as
owner under Section 2(30) of the Act of 1988, the registered owner
continues to remain liable as per terms and conditions of lease agreement
lawfully entered into with KSRTC.

Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.5293 OF 2010
Managing Director, K.S.R.T.C. ... Appellant
Versus
New India Assurance Co.Ltd. & Anr. ... Respondents
With
Civil Appeal No.6641 of 2010
MD Karnataka Road Transport Corpn. & Anr. … Appellants
Versus
Thippamma & Ors. … Respondents
Dated;October 27, 2015. 

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Whether insurer can avoid his liability if validity of fitness certificate or permit of vehicle has expired?

In order to enable the insurance company to take up the defence under Section 149(2)(a)(i)(c) it must be shown that the use of the transport vehicle was for a purpose not allowed by the permit under which the vehicle was used. Instances may occur where transport vehicles intended or permitted for a particular purpose are used for another purpose. For example, if a transport vehicle permitted only for carrying goods, carries passengers and capsizes en route causing injuries to the passengers, certainly, the insurer can take up the defence under Section 149(2)(a)(i)(c). However, if such a vehicle is used only for the permitted purpose, and the accident occurs when the permit or fitness certificate ceased to exist, it amounts to a technical violation only, which will not entitle the insurer to disown the liability to third parties. For avoiding the liability relying on Section 149(2)(a)(i)(c), the insurer should plead and prove that the offending vehicle was used for a purpose not authorised by the permit. It is true, that the vehicles in these cases ceased to have fitness certificate as well as permit on their expiry. We are unable to agree that the breach of condition in respect of non-renewal of certificate of fitness or permit would entitle the insurer to take up the defence under Section 149(2)(a)(i)(c) of the Act. We are of the definite view that Thara v. Syamala (cited Supra) does not lay down the correct law. In both these cases, there is no contention by the insurer that the vehicles were used for a purpose not allowed by the permit. There is nothing on evidence to show that the breaches alleged were fundamental breaches which have contributed to the cause of the accident. In the absence of any evidence to show that the breach was so fundamental as to lead to the accident, there cannot be an automatic direction to allow the insurance company to recover the amount from the owner. Therefore, on facts also the appellants are entitled to succeed.

In the result, the reference is answered and the appeals are disposed of as under:

(a) We hold that the insurer cannot claim exoneration from its liability to indemnify the owner of a vehicle in respect of injuries to third parties if the vehicle gets involved in the accident after the expiry of period of validity of fitness certificate or permit, merely on account of such technical violations.

Equivalent Citation: AIR2015Ker131, 2015 (2) KHC 219, 2015(2)KLJ392, 2015(2)KLT139

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA

M.A.C.A. Nos. 2526 of 2009 and 2507 of 2010

Decided On: 04.03.2015

Appellants: Augustine V.M.
Vs.
Respondent: Ayyappankutty and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:T.R. Ramachandran Nair, A.V. Ramakrishna Pillai and P.V. Asha, JJ.

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Distinction between “subrogation” and “assignment”

Supreme Court relied upon the standard textbook Insurance Law by MacGillivray and Parkington (7^th Edition) in which distinction between “subrogation” and “assignment” has been explained to mean as under: -

“1131. Difference between subrogation and assignment.-Both subrogation and assignment permit one party to enjoy the rights of another, but it is well-established that subrogation is not a species of assignment. Rights of subrogation vest by operation of law rather than as the product of express agreement. Whereas rights of subrogation can be enjoyed by the insurer as soon as payment is made, as assignment requires an agreement that the rights of the assured be assigned to the insurer. The insurer can-not require the assured to assign to him his rights against third parties as a condition of payment unless there is a special clause in the policy obliging the assured to do so. This distinction is of some importance, since in certain circumstances an insurer might prefer to take an assignment of an assured's rights rather than rely upon his rights of subrogation. If, for example, there was any prospect of the insured being able to recover more than his actual loss from a third party, an insurer, who had taken an assignment of the assured's rights, would be able to recover the extra money for himself whereas an insurer who was confined to rights of subrogation would have to allow the assured to retain the excess.

Another distinction lies in the procedure of enforcing the rights acquired by virtue of the two doctrines. An insurer exercising rights of subrogation against third parties must do so in the name of the assured. An insurer who has taken a legal assignment of his assured's rights under statute should proceed in his own name....”

NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION NEW DELHI

REVISION PETITION NO. 3027 OF 2003

BHARAT DIESELS    Vs PRATAP SINGH                                  

 Dated;28.07.2009

BEFORE: -

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK BHAN, PRESIDENT

HON’BLE MR. B.K. TAIMNI, MEMBER

 PRONOUNCED ON         :   29.07.2009

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