Whether victim's right to be heard in sexual offences include obligation to be impleaded as party-respondent in criminal proceedings?

Discussion & Conclusions

23. On a conspectus of the foregoing therefore, on the one hand, there is the unbridled right of a victim to participate in all criminal proceedings relating to the crime; and on the other hand, in so far as sexual offences are concerned, there is also a legal mandate that the victim's identity must be kept confidential.

24. It is accordingly necessary for this court to explore as to how these two legal mandates must be effectuated, so that one does not negate the other.

25. It must be noticed that the mandate of Jagjeet Singh (supra) is that the victim has unbridled participatory rights in criminal proceedings, which is not to say that the victim must replace or substitute the State as the prosecuting agency; nor that the victim must be placed as an impleaded party to the proceedings so as to make the victim answerable in all aspects.

26. Furthermore, notice must also be taken of the fact that section 439(1A) Cr.P.C. requires the court to hear a victim at the stage of considering bail petitions and other similar matters; and nowhere does that provision require that the victim be made a party to such proceedings.

29. The role of the victim, even on being afforded the right to be heard, however must vary with the context and the stage of criminal proceedings. In relation to bail proceedings for e.g., the victim may assist the court in clarifying relevant facts, such as any threats received by the victim or other witnesses; or the possibility of evidence tampering; or even flight risk. However, the victim would have no role in determining, say, the necessity of custodial interrogation, which would be the job of the investigating agency.

30. To reiterate, the right to be represented and be heard is distinct from the right or the obligation to be a party to criminal proceedings.

31. Indeed, there may be times where a victim may not seek a hearing before the court, and making a victim a party to the proceedings, mandating them to appear and 'defend', so to speak, various proceedings that the State or the accused may initiate, may cause additional hardship and agony to the victim.

32. In a recent decision in X vs. State of Maharashtra and Anr. MANU/SC/0264/2023 cf. para 40, the Supreme Court had issued directions to its Registry to ensure that in sensitive matters, "... if the name of the prosecutrix is revealed in the petition, the same is returned to the learned counsel for redacting the name before the matter is cleared for being placed before the Court for appropriate orders". In another matter, taking exception to the name of the victim being mentioned in the judgment of the sessions court, in its order dated 30.06.2021 made in SLP (Crl) No. 4540/2021 titled Birbal Kumar Nishad vs. State of Chhattisgarh, the Supreme Court has made observations as to the necessity of anonymisation of the names of victims noting that "... It is well established that in cases like the present one, the name of the victim is not to be mentioned in any proceeding. We are of the view that all the subordinate courts shall be careful in future while dealing with such cases.".

33. Upon a conspectus of the foregoing, this court is persuaded to draw the following conclusions, which it is made clear, are restricted to criminal matters relating to or arising from or concerning sexual offences :

33.1. There is no requirement in law to implead the victim, that is to say, to make the victim a party, to any criminal proceedings, whether instituted by the State or by the accused;

33.2. In accordance with the mandate of the Supreme Court in Jagjit Singh (supra), a victim now has unbridled participatory rights in all criminal proceedings in relation to which the person is a victim, but that in itself is no reason to implead a victim as a party to any such proceedings, unless otherwise specifically so provided in the statute; Section 439(1A) Cr.P.C. mandates that a victim be heard in proceedings relating to bail, without however requiring that the victim be impleaded as a party to bail petitions;

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

Bail Appln. 3635/2022

Decided On: 19.04.2023

Saleem Vs. The State of NCT of Delhi and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Anup Jairam Bhambhani, J.

Citation: 2023:DHC:2622,MANU/DE/2515/2023

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Whether court can permit addition of third party in partition suit?

At this juncture it would be relevant to extract para 6 of the order of this Court dated 27.01.2009 made in C.R.P. No. 3438 of 2008 while allowing the impleading petitions of the revision petitioners, wherein this Court has held as follows:

"I would like to recollect and call up, the common or cardinal Principle of law that in partition suits, even third parties could be allowed to be impleaded as parties so that whatever shares the third parties acquired in the suit property from the co-sharers, they would be able to work out their equities. Such third parties cannot put forth any new plea, but only pray for equities and nothing more".

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS

CRP(PD) No. 1308 of 2013 and M.P. No. 1 of 2013

Decided On: 25.01.2017

 M. Ammasayappan and Ors. Vs. Muthusamy and Ors.

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Whether assignee can claim impleadment in suit for partition if property was assigned contrary to order of court?

As said before, the assignment is by means of a registered deed. The assignment had taken place after the passing of the preliminary decree in which Pritam Singh has been allotted 1/3rd share. His right to property to that extent stood established. A decree relating to immovable property worth more than hundred rupees, if being assigned, was required to be registered. That has instantly been done. It is per se property, for it relates to the immovable property involved in the suit. It clearly and squarely fell within the ambit of the restraint order. In sum, it did not make any appreciable difference whether property per se had been alienated or a decree pertaining to that property. In defiance of the restraint order, the alienation/assignment was made. If we were to let it go as such, it would defeat the ends of justice and the prelavent public policy, When the Court intends a particular state of affairs to exist while it is in seizin of a lis, that state of affairs is not only required to be maintained, but it is presumed to exist till the Court orders otherwise. The Court, in these circumstances has the duty, as also the right, to treat the alienation/assignment as having not taken place at all for its purposes. Once that is so, Pritam Singh and his assignees, respondents herein, cannot claim to be impleaded as parties on the basis of assignment. Therefore, the assignees-respondents could not have been impleaded by the trial court as parties to the suit, in disobedience of its orders. The principles of lis pendens are altogether on a different footing. We do not propose to examine their involvement presently. All what is emphasised is that the assignees in the present facts and circumstances had no cause to be impleaded as parties to the suit. On that basis, there was no cause for going into the question of interpretation of paragraphs 13 and 14 of the settlement deed. The path treaded by the courts below was, in our view, out of their bounds. Unhesitatingly, we upset all the three orders of the courts below and reject the application of the assignees for impleadment under Order 22 Rule 10 C.P.C.

Supreme Court of India

Surjit Singh & Ors. Etc. Etc vs Harbans Singh & Ors. Etc. Etc on 6 September, 1995

Equivalent citations: 1996 AIR 135, 1995 SCC (6) 50

           
BENCH:
PUNCHHI, M.M.
MANOHAR SUJATA V. (J)

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Basic principles when court should permit impleadment of transferee pendents lite in suit for specific performance of contract

 Taking upon  the conspectus of the  view  taken by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the earlier judgments, in the   case of
Vidur Impex  & Traders Pvt.Ltd.  vs.   Tosh  Apartments Pvt.Ltd.
And others : (2012) 8 SCC 384 finally in paragraph 41, the Apex
Court  laid down the following principles:
“41. Though there is   apparent   conflict   in
the   observations   made   in   some   of   the
aforementioned   judgments,   the   broad   principles
which should  govern disposal of an application for
impleadment  are :

41.1 The   court   can,     at   any   stage   of   the
proceedings, either on an application made by the
parties or otherwise, direct   impleadment of any
person as party,  who ought to have been joined   as
plaintiff  or defendant or whose presence before the
court   is     necessary   for   effective       and   complete
adjudication  of the issues involved in the suit.
41.2 A   necessary  party  is  the person  who
ought to be joined as party to the suit and in whose
absence   an effective decree   cannot be passed by
the court.
41.3 A   proper   party   is     a   person   whose
presence   would   enable   the   court   to   completely,
effectively and properly adjudicate upon all matters
and   issues,   though   he   may     not   be   a   person   in
favour  of or against whom a decree is to be made.
41.4 If a person is not found to be  a proper
or   necessary   party,   the   court   does   not   have   the
jurisdiction to order his impleadment   against the
wishes  of the plaintiff.

41.5 In a  suit  for   specific performance,
the court can order impleadment   of a purchaser
whose   conduct   is   above   board,   and   who   files
application   for   being joined   as   party within
reasonable time of his acquiring knowledge about
the pending litigation. (emphasis supplied)
41.6 However,   if the applicant is guilty of
contumacious     conduct     or is     beneficiary   of a
clandestine   transaction or a transaction made   by
the owner   of the suit property   in violation of the
restraint   order   passed   by   the   court   or   the
application is unduly  delayed    then the court will
be   fully     justified   in   declining   the   prayer   for
impleadment.”
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
 BENCH AT NAGPUR 

WRIT PETITION NO: 5541 /2013 
 Shrikrushna   Narayan  Tupkari v Mahadeo   s/o Bansilal  Dahale

CORAM:   A.B.CHAUDHARI, J.
DATED  :   27th February,  2014 
Citation:2014 (4) MHLJ 393

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BomHC; Judges should not impleaded as party respondents in any petition

Before parting, we must once again reiterate our strong
disapproval of the practice which appears to be prevailing in the
Registry of the Aurangabad Bench of this court. The Registry
there does not seem to think it necessary to object to the
impleadment of the Hon'ble Judges comprising a Division Bench
or a Judge sitting singly as party respondents to review petitions
or applications in that nature.
We have not been shown any rule which requires such
impleadment. We, therefore, strongly recommend that hereafter,
the Registrar (Judicial) shall insist upon parties/litigants and
their advocates deleting the names of Hon'ble Judges as party
respondents to review petitions and until such deletion, the
matter should be treated as not ready or under objections.
Despite opportunity being given to the litigants and their
advocates to delete such names and references to the Hon'ble
Judges and personal allegations against them, if the same are not
deleted by carrying out appropriate amendments, the Registry
shall append a note on the proceedings themselves stating clearly
that parties and lawyers were asked to delete such references,
but there being no compliance, the matter comes to be placed
before an appropriate court for directions. That would enable the
appropriate court to dismiss such proceedings only on this
ground. Just as there is enough justification for discontinuance of
such practice because none can insist on such impleadment, its
discontinuance upholds a salutary principle. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 10972 OF 2015
WITH
CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 3164 OF 2015
WITH
CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 3165 OF 2015
WITH
CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 428 OF 2016
 Common Citizen of India }
(Common Man) }
through Rakesh Omprakash }
Agarwal,
versus
 The Hon'ble High Court }
Judicature of Bombay through }
Registrar General, High Court, }
Mumbai, Fort area, Mumbai, }
Mumbai Tal. Dist. Mumbai. }

2. The Hon'ble Chief Justice, }
High Court, through Registrar }
General, High Court,

3. The Hon'ble Judge }
Shri. Abhay Shriniwasji Oka }
High Court, through Registrar }
General, High Court, 
4. The Hon'ble Judge }
Shri. Anil Kumar Menon }
High Court, through Registrar }
General, 
5. State Government of }
Maharashtra, through Chief }
Secretary, 
6. The Government of India }
through Chief Secretary, }

CORAM :- S. C. DHARMADHIKARI &
G. S. PATEL, JJ.

Pronounced on 6th May, 2016

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Whether suit or appeal is liable to be dismissed if assignee fails to make application for impleadment?

We have heard learned counsel for the parties and opine that the impugned
judgment is patently illegal. Merely due to the assignment or release of the rights
during the pendency of the appeal, the appellant did not in any manner lose the
right to continue the appeal. Merely by transfer of the property during the
pendency of the suit or the appeal, plaintiff or appellant, as the case may be,
ordinarily has a right to continue the appeal. It is at the option of the assignee to
move an application for impleadment. Considering the provisions contained in
Order 22 Rule 10 and Order 22 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the
impugned judgment and order of the High Court cannot be allowed to be sustained.
Order 22 Rule 10 and Order 22 Rule 11CPC are extracted hereunder :
ORDER XXII, RULES 10 AND 11.
“10. Procedure in case of assignment before final order in
suit.- (1) In other cases of an assignment, creation or devolution
of any interest during the pendency of a suit, the suit may, by
leave of the Court, be continued by or against the person to or
upon whom such interest has come or devolved.
(2) The attachment of a decree pending an appeal therefrom
shall be deemed to be an interest entitling the person who
procured such attachment to the benefit of sub-rule (1).
x x x x x
11. Application of Order to appeals.- In the application of this
Order to appeals, so far as may be, the word “plaintiff” shall be
held to include an appellant, the word “defendant” a
respondent, and the word “suit” an appeal.”
 A bare reading of the provisions of Order XXII Rule 10 makes it clear that
the legislature has not envisaged the penalty of dismissal of the suit or appeal on
account of failure of the assignee to move an application for impleadment and to
continue the proceedings. Thus, there cannot be dismissal of the suit or appeal, as
the case may be, on account of failure of assignee to file an application to continue
the proceedings. It would be open to the assignor to continue the proceedings
notwithstanding the fact that he ceased to have any interest in the subject-matter of
dispute. He can continue the proceedings for the benefit of assignee. 
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.7889 OF 2015
(Arising out of S.L.P. [C] No.36889 of 2013)
Sharadamma … Appellant
Vs.
Mohammed Pyrejan (D) through LRs. & Anr. … Respondents
Citation;(2016)1 SCC730
ARUN MISHRA, J.

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When dealer,manufacturer or distributor can be impleaded in food adulteration case?

 In this connection, the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in M/s. Omprakash Shivaprakash v. Kuriakose (1999(3) KLT

861) that:

"The essential conditions for invoking the power under section 20A are that: (1) the trial should have begun already;

(2) the trial must be of any offence under the Act allegedly committed by a person other than the manufacturer or distributor or dealer of the food article;

(3) the Court must have been satisfied that such manufacturer or dealer or distributor is also concerned with the offence;

(4) such satisfaction must have been formed "on the evidence adduced before the Court"."

The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Court can proceed against the manufacturer, distributor or dealer only if the Court is satisfied from the "evidence adduced before it during the trial".

5. In Govinda Rao v. Food Inspector (2002(1) KLT

843) this court has held:

"A reading of section 20A would make it clear that the power given to the Court under that Section can be exercised only after taking evidence in the case. The section says that only when the Court is satisfied on the evidence adduced before it that manufacturer, distributor or dealer is also concerned with that offence, the Court may proceed against him as though prosecution had been instituted against him under section

20. Then the Court has the power to implead the manufacturer, distributor or dealer under section 20A of the Act. Court's power to implead a dealer, manufacturer or distributor under section 20A can neither be invoked before the stage of adducing evidence in the trial nor after the conclusion of trial."

Kerala High Court

M/S.RADHAKRISHNA TRADERS  vs C.V.Saseedharan on  27th day of September, 2012 

Citation: 2013CriLJ937, 2013(3)Crimes220, 2012 (4) KHC 647, 2012(4)KLJ670

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Whether claimant can get impleaded directly in reference court under land acquisition Act?

In our view, it was not open to the appellants (other than Ajjam Linganna) to have applied directly to the reference Court for impleadment and to seek enhancement under Section 18 for compensation. The only person for whom some consideration can be shown is Ajjam Linganna who had atleast filed an application on 14-9-93 before Land Acquisition Officer seeking reference.

Supreme Court of India

Ajjam Linganna And Ors. vs Land Acquisition Officer, ... on 28 November, 2000

Equivalent citations: 2001 (1) ALT 50 SC, (2002) 9 SCC 426

Bench: M Rao, D Raju

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Whether a party can be impleaded in appeal when appeal has become time barred against him?

If the remedy of appeal against the two objectors, Haji Ismail and

Hamid Khan, has become barred by law of limitation, question of
granting any permission to implead the objectors as party respondents in
the proceedings before the lower Courts by relegating the matter to them
would not arise. No doubt, this Court has adequate power to remand the
case to the lower Court under Order 41 Rule 23-A as held in the case of
Setu Madhavrao Vyankatapatulu V/s. Food Corporation of India
reported in AIR 1985 Gujarat 27, referred to me by the learned Counsel
for the appellants, but the question of remand would not arise as the
belated stage.
objectors, for the the reasons stated earlier, cannot be impleaded at this
The third substantial question of law is, therefore,
answered as in the negative.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR

SECOND APPEAL NO.441 OF 2011
S.A. No.441 of 2011


Sheikh Yusuf  V Haji Mohammad Jamil Ahemad, 
CORAM : S.B. SHUKRE, J.

Pronounced On : 23rd APRIL, 2014
Citation; 2015(2) MHLJ

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SC has deprecated practice of impleading judicial officer as party in writ petition

Before parting with this case it is necessary for us to point out one aspect of the matter which is rather disturbing. In the writ petition filed in the High Court as well as the Special Leave Petition filed in this Court, the District Judge, Gorakhpur and the 4th Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division) Gorakhpur arc shown as respondents and in the Special Leave Petition they are shown as contesting respondents. There was no necessity for impleading the judicial officers who disposed of the matter in a civil proceeding when the writ petition was filed in the High Court; nor is there any justification for Impleading them as parties in the Special Leave Petition and describing them as contesting respondents. We do not approve of the course adopted by the petitioner which would cause unnecessary disturbance to the functions of the concerned judicial officers. They cannot be in any way equated to the officials of the Government. It is high time that the practice of impleading judicial officers disposing of civil proceedings as parties to writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or Special Leave Petitions under Article 138 of the Constitution of India was stopped. We are strongly deprecating such a practice.

Supreme Court of India

Savita Devi vs District Judge, Gorakhpur And ... on 18 February, 1999

Bench: C.J.I., M Srinivasan, S Phukan.

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