When Telephonic message given to police about commission of offence can not be treated as FIR?

One of the submission of learned counsel for the appellants is that
telephonic message by PW12 recorded at the police station should have
been treated as FIR. We have been taken through the said message which is
to the effect that A5 and other accused assaulted the complainant party.
Learned counsel relied upon the observation in Lalita Kumari (supra) to
the effect that a GD Entry can also be treated as FIR in an appropriate case.
From the said observation, it cannot be laid down that every GD Entry or
every cryptic information must be treated as FIR. In Anand Mohan versus
State of Bihar25 while referring to Section 154 Cr.P.C., this Court observed
that every cryptic information, even if not signed by the person giving the
information, cannot be treated as FIR. The information should sufficiently
disclose the nature of the offence and the manner in which the offence was
committed. It was observed :
“50. In Sk. Ishaque v. State of Bihar [(1995) 3 SCC 392] Gulabi
Paswan gave a cryptic information at the police station to the effect
that there was a commotion at the village as firing and brickbatting
was going on and this Court held that this cryptic information did not
even disclose the commission of a cognizable offence nor did it
disclose who were the assailants and such a cryptic statement of
Gulabi Paswan cannot be treated to be an FIR within the meaning of
Section 154 CrPC.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1516 OF 2011
BHAGWAN JAGANNATH MARKAD
& ORS. 
V
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 
Dated:OCTOBER 04, 2016.
Citation: 2017 CRLJ 578 SC

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Whether right of private defence is available even if there is no actual commission of offence?

 Having regard to the above, we are of the view that the appellant
reasonably apprehended a danger to his life when the deceased and his
brothers started strangulating him after pushing him to the floor.
As observed by this Court a mere reasonable apprehension is enough to put
the right of self-defence into operation and it is not necessary that there
should be an actual commission of the offence in order to give rise to the
right of private defence. It is enough if the appellant apprehended that such
an offence is contemplated and is likely to be committed if the right of
private defence is not exercised.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1548 OF 2011

SURESH SINGHAL  V  STATE (DELHI ADMINISTRATION) 

Dated:February 02, 2017

Citation:(2017)2 SCC 737

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Whether surety can be forfeited if accused commits another offence while on bail?

Let us take a case wherein a condition has been

incorporated in the order granting bail that he shall not

involve in any offence while on bail. In such a case, even if

such an accused who is enlarged on bail through that order

happens to become an accused in another case, it will not

be just in forfeiting the bond executed by the sureties and

asking them to pay the penalty. There can be breach of

other similar conditions also.         Except the violation of the

condition for the appearance of the accused in that case,

the sureties cannot be called upon to pay the penalty afterforfeiting their bonds.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

                                                    PRESENT:

                        THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE B.KEMAL PASHA

           TUESDAY, THE 17TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 2015

                                           Crl.MC.No. 6222 of 2015 

           INTELLIGENCE OFFICER,

           NARCOTIC CONTROL BUREAU,

           SUB ZONE, KAKKANAD, KOCHI.

Vs

           LIJO K.JOSE, 

          B. KEMAL PASHA, J.

Citation; 2016 ALLMR(CRI)JOURNAL)121

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Whether prosecution for perjury U/S 340 of crpc can be quashed on ground that no finding was recorded by court on commission of offence?

Section 340 of CrPC, prior to amendment in 1973, was
Section 479-A in the 1898 Code and it was mandatory under the
pre-amended provision to record a finding after the preliminary
inquiry regarding the commission of offence; whereas in the 1973
Code, the expression ‘shall’ has been substituted by ‘may’
meaning thereby that under 1973 Code, it is not mandatory that
the court should record a finding. What is now required is only
recording the finding of the preliminary inquiry which is meant
only to form an opinion of the court, and that too, opinion on an
offence ‘which appears to have been committed’, as to whetherthe same should be duly inquired into. We are unable to
appreciate the submission made by the learned Senior Counsel
that the impugned order is liable to be quashed on the only
ground that there is no finding recorded by the court on the
commission of the offence. Reliance placed on Har Gobind v.
State of Haryana(1979) 4 SCC 482
 is of no assistance to the appellant since it
was a case falling on the interpretation of the pre-amended
provision of the CrPC. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Pritish
v. State of Maharashtra ( 2002) 1 SCC 253
 has even gone to the extent of
holding that the proceedings under Section 340 of CrPC can be
successfully invoked even without a preliminary inquiry since the
whole purpose of the inquiry is only to decide whether it is
expedient in the interest of justice to inquire into the offence
which appears to have been committed. To quote:
 “9. Reading of the sub-section makes it clear that
the hub of this provision is formation of an opinion
by the court (before which proceedings were to be
held) that it is expedient in the interest of justice
that an inquiry should be made into an offence
which appears to have been committed. In order
to form such opinion the court is empowered to

hold a preliminary inquiry. It is not peremptory that
such preliminary inquiry should be held. Even
without such preliminary inquiry the court can
form such an opinion when it appears to the court
that an offence has been committed in relation to
a proceeding in that court. It is important to notice
that even when the court forms such an opinion it
is not mandatory that the court should make a
complaint. This sub-section has conferred a power
on the court to do so. It does not mean that the
court should, as a matter of course, make acomplaint. But once the court decides to do so,
then the court should make a finding to the effect
that on the fact situation it is expedient in the
interest of justice that the offence should further
be probed into. If the court finds it necessary to
conduct a preliminary inquiry to reach such a
finding it is always open to the court to do so,
though absence of any such preliminary inquiry
would not vitiate a finding reached by the court
regarding its opinion. It should again be
remembered that the preliminary inquiry
contemplated in the sub-section is not for finding
 whether any particular person is guilty or not . Far
from that, the purpose of preliminary inquiry, even
if the court opts to conduct it, is only to decide
whether it is expedient in the interest of justice to
inquire into the offence which appears to have

been committed.”

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 9-10 OF 2016
(Arising from S.L.P. (Criminal) Nos. 7153-7154/2013)

PREM SAGAR MANOCHA V STATE (NCT OF DELHI) 

Citation; 2016 CRLJ1090 SC

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When court can grant police custody remand?

Conditions for grant of police custody remand

1) There are strong and reasonable grounds for believing that accusation or information against accused is well founded.

2)Detention of accused in police custody is necessary.

3) To ensure the continuity,speed and swiftness of investigation immediately after commission of offence or registration of crime under reference.

4)To secure invaluable piece of incriminating material  or get clues of crime.

5) To secure incriminating material from information likely to be received from offender himself.

6)To recover some incriminating property from accused.

7) To find out whether there are other conspirators along with accused who have taken part in the crime.

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Whether police has power to seize or prohibit operation of bank account of accused?

 We see no justification to give any narrow interpretation to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. It is well known that corruption in public offices has become so rampant that it has become difficult to cope up with the same. Then again the time consumed by the Courts in concluding the trials is another factor which should be borne in mind in interpreting the provisions of Section 102 of the Criminal Procedure Code and the underlying object engrafted therein, inasmuch as if there can be no order of seizure of the bank account of the accused then the entire money deposited in a bank which is ultimately held in the trial to be the outcome of the illegal gratification, could be withdrawn by the accused and the Courts would be powerless to get the said money which has any direct link with the commission of the offence committed by the accused as a public officer. We are, therefore, persuaded to take the view that the bank account of the accused or any of his relation is `property' within the meaning of Section 102 of the Criminal Procedure Code and a police officer in course of investigation can seize or prohibit the operation of the said account if such assets have direct links with the commission of the offence for which the police officer is investigating into.

Supreme Court of India

State Of Maharashtra vs Tapas D. Neogy on 16 September, 1999

Citation;1999 AIR SCW3389

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