Supreme Court: Bail Cannot Be Granted To Murder Accused Merely Because No Overt Act Is Attributed To Him In FIR

 It can also safely be said that merely because no overt act was attributed to the respondent accused in the First Information Report the same cannot be the sole consideration for grant of bail to these respondents in a serious offence under Section 302 of IPC. Time and again, it is observed by this Court that First Information Report is not an encyclopaedia of facts. An FIR is a starter point to set the investigation in motion and subsequently, the investigating agency collects the necessary material in the course of investigation so as to unearth the real offenders. {Para 16}

Non-Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO._2573_OF 2025

AASHISH YADAV Vs  YASHPAL & ORS.

Author: PRASANNA B. VARALE, J.

Citation:  2025 INSC 666.

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Sikkim HC: Why an FIR Alone Can’t Prove Insurance Policy Breach in Motor Accident Claims?

The only evidence which the Appellants rely upon for the purpose of showing that there was a breach of a condition of the policy on the part of the insured of the vehicle having been given on hire to the deceased and her group, is the first information report lodged by Shrijana Pradhan, PW 2, who was also travelling in the same vehicle. No doubt, the statement recorded by the police of Manesar Police Station, Gurgaon, states that the vehicle was taken on hire, but this is in clear conflict with the statements made on oath before the Tribunal by the claimant No. 1 appearing as PW 1 and the maker of the F.I.R., the PW 2. It is a settled principle of law that an F.I.R. is not a substantive piece of evidence but only corroborative that can also be used for contradiction under Section 145 of the Evidence Act. The Appellants have not led any evidence at all, let alone produce evidence to prove that the vehicle was taken on hire by the deceased and her family. Therefore, the question of the F.I.R. corroborating the evidence of the insurers did not arise at all when they did not have any other evidence. The Appellant insurer also failed to confront the witness with the statement contained in the F.I.R. for the purpose of contradiction, an opportunity which was available to them under Section 145 of the Evidence Act. The Appellants could have easily produced the person who wrote down the F.I.R. as a witness to prove that the PW 2 had indeed made the statement before the police which had been denied by her in her deposition before the Tribunal. This having not been done, it is difficult for this Court to accept the contention of the insurer Appellant that the vehicle was given on hire. The sworn testimony of the witness made before the Tribunal, therefore, has to be given the necessary weight age over the one that is unsworn, and in this case unsigned statement, recorded by the police which in any case has only a corroborative value.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF SIKKIM AT GANGTOK

M.A.C. Appeal No. 3 of 2009

Decided On: 17.05.2010

Branch Manager, Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors. Vs. M.K. Subba and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sonam Phintso Wangdi, Actg. C.J.

Citation: 2011AIR Sikkim 28,2011 ACJ 1482, MANU/SI/0040/2010.

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Supreme court: Confessional FIR cannot be used against Accused and a co-accused

 In Faddi (supra), this Court stated that:

"If the FIR given by the Accused contains any admission as defined in Section 17 of the Evidence Act there is no bar in using such an admission against the maker thereof as permitted Under Section 21 of the Act, provided such admission is not inculpatory in character. In the judgment their Lordships distinguished Nisar Ali case [  MANU/SC/0032/1957 : 1957:INSC:17 : AIR 1957 SC 366] in the following lines:

But it appears to us that in the context in which the observation is made and in the circumstances, which we have verified from the record of that case, that the Sessions Judge had definitely held the first information report lodged by the co-accused who was acquitted to be inadmissible against Nisar Ali, and that the High Court did not refer to it at all in its judgment, this observation really refers to a first information report which is in the nature of a confession by the maker thereof. Of course, a confessional first information report cannot be used against the maker when he be an Accused and necessarily cannot be used against a co-accused. {Para 19}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 3343 of 2025

Decided On: 05.08.2025

Narayan Yadav Vs. State of Chhattisgarh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Citation:2025 INSC 927, MANU/SC/1018/2025

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SOP on Zero FIR & eFIR under BNSS 2023

 https://drive.google.com/file/d/1FjpxAZ_lixXT1DV78y476tySrX6obO7V/view?usp=sharing

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Bombay HC: FIR Won't Stand Quashed If Revision Court Sets Aside Magistrate's Order For Police Investigation Into Cognizable Offence

To equip the revisional court to exercise the discretion in a correct manner, it may be advantageous for the revisional court to ascertain whether, pursuant to the direction of the Magistrate, FIR has, in fact, been registered. Two situations are conceivable : pre and post-registration of FIR pursuant to the order by the Magistrate. {Para 125}

126. (a) If the FIR is yet not registered, an interim order passed by the revisional court, staying effect and operation of the impugned order Under Section 156(3), will have full play and the investigating agency cannot proceed to register the FIR and enter into investigation lest the order passed by the revisional court would be denuded of the meaning and content.

(b) Such an interim order before the registration of the FIR will operate with full force and vigor, irrespective of the nature of the infirmity in the impugned order which weighed with the revisional court to stay such an order.

(c) On the other hand, if the FIR has already been registered, before the revisional court passes an interim order, then the nature of the infirmity in the impugned order may become relevant.

(d) If the revisional court finds that the impugned order suffers from jurisdictional error, (of the nature referred to in Para Nos. 119, 120 and 122 above), in our considered view, the revisional court must be construed to have the power to stay further proceedings pursuant to the registration of the FIR if the matter is still at the stage of investigation.

(e) We hasten to add that while passing such an order of stay of the proceedings at the stage of investigation, the revisional Court ought to record reasons which weighed with the court to hold that there appears a jurisdictional error in passing an order Under Section 156(3) of the Code and thereupon, in terms, direct that the further proceedings be stayed.

(f) However, where the investigation culminates into lodging of the chargesheet and/or cognizance has been taken by the jurisdictional court, the interim order or final order passed by the revisional court setting aside the order passed by the Magistrate Under Section 156(3), will not have the effect of quashing the resultant prosecution.

127. We are unable to persuade ourselves to agree with the submission of Mr. Desai that the view that after FIR is registered revision is not an efficacious remedy, would render the statutory remedy of revision redundant. The order passed by the revisional Court setting aside a direction for investigation, even after registration of the FIR, cannot be said to be bereft of any utility. If such an order is passed before the completion of investigation, the investigating agency may take the same into account in determining the course the investigation shall culminate into. If such an order is passed, post lodging of the chargesheet, the jurisdictional Magistrate may have the benefit of the said order at the stage of taking cognizance or during the course of the inquiry, as envisaged by the Code. The High Court may also have due regard to the order of the revisional Court while considering the prayer for quashing the FIR and/or prosecution in exercise of writ or inherent jurisdiction.

128. The conspectus of aforesaid discussion is that in our view, the decision of the Division Bench in the case of Kailash Dattatraya Jadhav (supra), that in a case where on the basis of an order Under Sub-section (3) of Section 156 of the Code, FIR is registered, the remedy of revision under the Code, is not an efficacious remedy, lays down the correct position in law.

[O] ANSWERS

129. We are, therefore, inclined to answer question (i) in the negative. As regards question (ii), in our view, the revisional Court can interfere with an order Under Section 156(3) at the stage and to the extent indicated in paragraph 126 above. The Reference is answered accordingly.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition Nos. 2517 of 2022, 

Decided On: 10.04.2024

Arun P. Gidh and Ors. Vs. Chandraprakash Singh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Revati Mohite Dere, N.J. Jamadar and Sharmila U. Deshmukh, JJ.

Author: N.J. Jamadar, J.

Citation:  MANU/MH/2292/2024.

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Whether defence counsel can make out contradictions from statement made in FIR without putting its contents to informant at the time of his evidence?

Some contradictions were sought to be pointed out in the statement as given in the First Information Report and in the evidence of the witness P.W. 11 but we do not think it is open to the learned advocate to comment upon it because none of those contradictions have been put to the witness at the time of his giving evidence. According to the F.I.R. it would appear that Indradeo Singh accompanied by Chait Ahir, Vikrama Singh, Musan Pandey, Billar Ahir and Mongru Ahir resident of the village went there and forbade the accused persons from cutting paddy crops from his field, but the accused persons did not listen to them. Indradeo Singh made many entreats requested them not to commit such high handedness nor did he say Indradeo Singh fell in the field of Sumer Singh. In the first place it may be noticed that F.I.R. is not a substantial piece of evidence. It is an information of a cognizable offence given under Section 154 of the Criminal Procedure Code and if there is any statement made therein it can only be used for the purposes of contradicting and discrediting a witness under Section 145 of the Evidence Act. In the second place the statement given by the informant need not necessarily be an eye witness account of what he has actually seen. There were others who had gone along with him who could have furnished him with information as to what transpired in so far as it was in their knowledge. If these aspects had been put to P.W. 11, he would have had an opportunity of explaining the statement made in the F.I.R. but since that opportunity was not given, any comment based on the statement given by P.W. 11 in the F.I.R. would be without effect.

{Para 7}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 279 of 1968

Decided On: 21.04.1972

Nanhku Singh and Ors. Vs. State of Bihar

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

K.K. Mathew and P. Jaganmohan Reddy, JJ.

Author: P. Jaganmohan Reddy, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0185/1972.

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What is the Difference between a General Diary Entry and an FIR?

General diary (GD) entry or Daily diary entry is made when any kind of complaint is lodged & police enter the details in their records.Thereafter,if police believe that there is some prima facie evidence of a cognizable offense being committed, it is registered as FIR.

If the complaint made is relating to non-cognizable offense, General diary entry will still be made,but thereafter,it will be entered into a non-cognizable report.General diary entry is, therefore, a stage prior to FIR or non-cognizable report.General diary entry is an internal police record,while in case of FIR or non-cognizable report,a copy of these will be provided to the Complainant.

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Under which circumstances the claim Tribunal should treat FIR as claim petition in case of motor accident?

  If they are read so, then it is no more the right of an accident victim to file a claim petition under Section 166 but it has bloomed into a full fledged duty on the part of the police. The police on investigation have to file an FAR (First Accident Report), IAR (Interim Accident Report) and DAR (Detailed Accident Report). As per Rule 18 of Annexure XIII, it has been mandatory on the Claims Tribunal to kick start the compensatory mechanism. Rule 21 of the Central rules ensures that the DAR filed by the police shall be treated as a Claim Petition.

20.Taking note of all these developments, the Supreme

Court of India rendered a Judgment in Gohar Mohammed v.

Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation and others in

S.L.P.(C).No.32448 of 2018. A reading of this Judgment goes to

show that the Police are no more playing a mere role of an

Investigating Authority and stopping with mere parting of

information. They are mandated by the Parliament to file reports with the Claims Tribunal, which should treat the same as a claim petition. The claimants have been freed from the shackles and are no more burdened to search for the documents necessary for filing a claim. The duty to report is now the police and the duty to process the said information given by the police and uploaded on to the website lies on the Tribunal. When access is given to the Tribunal to an FIR and the other details which have been uploaded by the police the claimant need not be made to run around or suffer from a fear that his petition is barred by time. It is the duty of the Claims Tribunal to access the information available to it and process the claim and give succour to the victims. It is not an adversarial system as was practiced before 01.04.2022 other parts of India (before 12.09.1979 in Tamil Nadu) but today it is a people oriented justice delivery Tribunal.

30.A reading of Section 166(4) shows that if any report of the

accident is forwarded to it under Section 159, the same shall be treated as an application for compensation. It is no more the discretion of the police. Rule 4(A)(5)(1) of the Tamil Nadu Rules read with the Central rules make it mandatory. It has now become a statutory duty of the Police to sent a report. It is pertinent to point out that the amendment under Section 166(4) does not speak about the

Interim Accident Report (IAR), First Accident Report (FAR) and

Detailed Accident Report (DAR) but speaks about “any report that has been sent by the police”. Therefore, even if an FIR sent by the police to the Tribunal, the same should be treated a Claim

Petition.

31.The upshot of the discussion is that on registration of an

FIR, a claimant is entitled to present the petition without the fear

of it being thrown out, on the ground of limitation. This would

be the correct reading of the present legal dispensation in all cases where FIR is registered within six months, of the date of any motor accident which takes place after 01.04.2022.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

CORAM

 MR. JUSTICE V. LAKSHMINARAYANAN

C.R.P.No.2558 of 2023

Malaravan  Vs Praveen Travels Private Limited,

Pronounced on : 18.08.2023.

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Whether Magistrate can summon a person Not Named In Police Report Or FIR as per S 190 (1)(b) of CRPC?

 In the present case, the name of the accused had transpired from the statement made by the victim under Section 164 of the Code. In the case of Dharam Pal (supra), it has been laid down in clear terms that in the event the Magistrate disagrees with the police report, he may act on the basis of a protest petition that may be filed and commit the case to the Court of Session. This power of the Magistrate is not exercisable only in respect of persons whose names appear in column (2) of the chargesheet, apart from those who are arraigned as accused in the police report. In the subject-proceeding, the Magistrate acted on the basis of an independent application filed by the de facto complainant. If there are materials before the Magistrate showing complicity of persons other than those arraigned as accused or named in column 2 of the police report in commission of an offence, the Magistrate at that stage could summon such persons as well upon taking cognizance of the offence. As we have already discussed, this was the view of this Court in the case of Raghubans Dubey (supra). Though this judgment dealt with the provisions of the 1898 Code, this authority was followed in the case of Kishun Singh (supra). For summoning persons upon taking cognizance of an offence, the Magistrate has to examine the materials available before him for coming to the conclusion that apart from those sent up by the police some other persons are involved in the offence. These materials need not remain confined to the police report, charge sheet or the F.I.R. A statement made under Section 164 of the Code could also be considered for such purpose. {Para 21}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 443 OF 2022;

 NAHAR SINGH Vs THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.

Author: ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.

Coram: VINEET SARAN; ANIRUDDHA BOSE, JJ.

Dated: 16th March, 2022 

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Whether the court can discharge the accused if there is discrepancy between FIR and statement U/S 164 of CRPC?

The learned counsel for the petitioner emphatically argued that the FIR does not disclose offence under Section 376 of the IPC. The FIR is the initial document. In her statement given by the prosecutrix under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) after the prosecutrix attained majority, she categorically made statements which tantamount to offence under Section 376 of the IPC. Discrepancies between the FIR and any subsequent statement under Section 164 of the CrPC may be a defence. However, the discrepancies cannot be a ground for discharge without initiation of trial.There is no infirmity in the order of the High Court rejecting the criminal revisonal application.

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s). 9552/2021

HAZRAT DEEN  Vs THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 

Date : 06-01-2022 This petition was called on for hearing today.

CORAM : HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE INDIRA BANERJEE

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE J.K. MAHESHWARI

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Supreme Court: In Motor Accident Claim, evidence Recorded Before Tribunal To Be Given Weightage Over Contents Of FIR In Case Of Contradiction

 It is clear from the evidence on record of PW–1 as well as PW–3 that the Eicher van which was going in front of the car, has taken a sudden right turn without giving any signal or indicator. The evidence of PW–1 & PW–3 is categorical and in absence of any rebuttal evidence by examining the driver of Eicher van, the High Court has rightly held that the accident occurred only due to the negligence of the driver of Eicher van. It is to be noted that PW–1 herself travelled in the very car and PW–3, who has given statement before the police, was examined as eye–witness. In view of such evidence on record, there is no reason to give weightage to the contents of the First Information Report. If any evidence before the Tribunal runs contrary to the contents in the First Information Report, the evidence which is recorded before the Tribunal has to be given weightage over the contents of the First Information Report. {Para 8}

Supreme Court

JUSTICE R. SUBHASH REDDY JUSTICE HRISHIKESH ROY

National Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Chamundeswari & Ors.

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6151 OF 2021

1st October 2021

Author: R.SUBHASH REDDY, J.

Citation: 2021 ALL SCR (ONLINE) 523

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Whether a statement made by accused to investigating officer before registration of FIR is hit by S 162 of CRPC?

The appellant is said to have admitted to the sub inspector of police that be was the driver of the autorikshaw. The sub inspector in his deposition has said that the appellant told him like that when he went to the spot for seizing the contraband oil. The lower court relied on that part of the testimony of the sub inspector (P. W. 4) for concluding that the appellant was the driver of the vehicle. Learned Public Prosecutor argued that the said statement made to sub inspector is only an admission and the same could be used as evidence in this case since investigation bad not been commenced during the time when the statement was made by the appellant. If the said statement was made during investigation, is cannot be used for any purpose in view of the embargo contained till Sec. 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. So the question to be considered is whether the step taken by the sub inspector in proceeding to the spot was part of investigation in the case.

5. Sec. 2(h) of the Cr. P. C. defines "investigation" as including "all i the proceedings under this Code for the collection of evidence conducted by a police officer". S. 137 of the Code says that, if, from information received "or otherwise" an officer in charge of a police station has reason to suspect the commission of an offence which he is empowered to investigate; he shall forthwith send a report of 'he same to the Magistrate concerned and proceed in person to the spot to investigate the facts and circumstances of the case. If he does not send a report to the Magistrate, that does not mean that his proceeding to the spot is not for investigation. In order to bring such proceedings within the ambit of investigation it is not necessary that a formal registration of the case should have been made before proceeding to the spot. It is enough that he has some information to afford him reason even to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence. Any step taken by him pursuant to such information, towards, detection etc., of the said offence, would be part of investigation under the Code. In Maha Singh v. State (Delhi Administration) ((1976) 5. C. C. 644) the Supreme Court considered a case in which a police officer arranged a raid after recording a complaint, but before sending it for registration of the case. It was held in that case that "the moment the inspector had recorded the complaint with a view to take action to track the offender, whose name was not even known at that stage, and proceeded to achieve the object, visited the locality, questioned the accused, searched his person, seized the note and other documents, turns the entire process into an investigation under the Code." Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) has observed in State of U. P. v. Bhagwant Kiskore (MANU/SC/0066/1963 : AIR. 1964 S. C. 221): "Though ordinarily investigation is undertaken on information received by a police officer, the receipt of information is not a condition precedent for investigation". It was held by a single Judge of the Gujarat High Court (Shelat, J.) in Kantilal v. State (MANU/GJ/0065/1970 : AIR 1970 Guj 218) that the police officer in charge of a police station is empowered to investigate any information received from which he has reason to suspect the commission of an offence which he is empowered to investigate. It has been observed by the learned Judge that "it makes no difference whether that information was reduced to writing or not at that particular stage"

6. I, therefore, conclude that the statement allegedly made by the appellant to the sub inspector of police was during investigation of the case.

7. The embargo contained in Sec. 162 has a wide sweep that no statement made by any person to a police officer in the course of investigation shall be used for any purpose except for the limited purpose mentioned therein. The limited purpose envisaged in the section has no application to the facts of this case. Hence the alleged statement of the appellant to the sub inspector is excluded form legal consideration in this case.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA

Crl. A No. 149 of 1985

Decided On: 04.08.1988

C. Chandrababu  Vs.   Sub Inspector of Police

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

K.T. Thomas, J.

Citation: MANU/KE/0410/1988,1988(3)Crimes757(Ker.), 1988(2)KLJ389

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Whether Magistrate can direct police to register FIR for an offence punishable under the Mines Act U/S 156 of CRPC?

After giving our thoughtful consideration in the matter, in the light of the relevant provisions of the MMDR Act and the Rules made thereunder vis-à-vis the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Penal Code, and the law laid down by this Court in the cases referred to hereinabove and for the reasons stated hereinabove, our conclusions are as under:

i) that the learned Magistrate can in exercise of powers Under Section 156(3) of the Code order/direct the concerned In-charge/SHO of the police station to lodge/register crime case/FIR even for the offences under the MMDR Act and the Rules made thereunder and at this stage the bar Under Section 22 of the MMDR Act shall not be attracted;

ii) the bar Under Section 22 of the MMDR Act shall be attracted only when the learned Magistrate takes cognizance of the offences under the MMDR Act and Rules made thereunder and orders issuance of process/summons for the offences under the MMDR Act and Rules made thereunder;

iii) for commission of the offence under the Indian Penal Code, on receipt of the police report, the Magistrate having jurisdiction can take cognizance of the said offence without awaiting the receipt of complaint that may be filed by the authorised officer for taking cognizance in respect of violation of various provisions of the MMDR Act and Rules made thereunder; and

iv) that in respect of violation of various provisions of the MMDR Act and the Rules made thereunder, when a Magistrate passes an order Under Section 156(3) of the Code and directs the concerned In-charge/SHO of the police station to register/lodge the crime case/FIR in respect of the violation of various provisions of the Act and Rules made thereunder and thereafter after investigation the concerned In-charge of the police station/investigating officer submits a report, the same can be sent to the concerned Magistrate as well as to the concerned authorised officer as mentioned in Section 22 of the MMDR Act and thereafter the concerned authorised officer may file the complaint before the learned Magistrate along with the report submitted by the concerned investigating officer and thereafter it will be open for the learned Magistrate to take cognizance after following due procedure, issue process/summons in respect of the violations of the various provisions of the MMDR Act and Rules made thereunder and at that stage it can be said that cognizance has been taken by the learned Magistrate.

v) in a case where the violator is permitted to compound the offences on payment of penalty as per Sub-section 1 of Section 23A, considering Sub-section 2 of Section 23A of the MMDR Act, there shall not be any proceedings or further proceedings against the offender in respect of the offences punishable under the MMDR Act or any Rule made thereunder so compounded. However, the bar Under Sub-section 2 of Section 23A shall not affect any proceedings for the offences under the Indian Penal Code, such as, Sections 379 and 414 Indian Penal Code and the same shall be proceeded with further.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 824-825 of 2020 

Decided On: 03.12.2020

Jayant  Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Ashok Bhushan and M.R. Shah, JJ.

Citation: MANU/SC/0912/2020

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Chhattisgarh HC: Special Court Under SC-ST (Prevention Of Atrocities) Act Has Power To Direct Registration Of FIR U/s 156(3) CrPC

The Full Bench of the M.P. High Court in the matter

of Anand Swaroop Tiwari v. Ram Ratan Jatav and

others1996 MPLJ 141 relied upon the decision

 of the Supreme Court

in A.R. Antulay (supra) and other decisions and in

the result, clearly held as under: “(

a) Special Courts under the Act are not to

function as Sessions Court, but as Courts ‘

of original jurisdiction’.

(b) Proceedings of Special Court are governed

by Section 190, Chapters XV, XVI (other than

Section 209) as also Chapters XIX and XX as

the case may be and such other provisions of

the Code as are not inconsistent with the

scheme and provisions of the Act, reading

“Special Courts” wherever the expression

“Magistrate” occurs.

(c) Section 193 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure does not apply to proceedings under

the Act and committal orders are not

required.

(d) Special Court can take cognizance on

private complaints after following the

procedure provided in the Code in relation to

private complaints.

(e) Where cognizance has already been taken

on the basis of committal orders in Police

challan cases, it is not necessary for the

Courts to retrace their steps or to take

cognizance afresh.

(f) Where cognizance has already been taken

on the basis of committal orders in private

complaint cases, the Special Courts may deal

with the cases as if they are dealing with

private complaints under Section 200 of the

Code.”  {Para 30}

31.The decision rendered by the Full Bench of the M.P.

High Court in Anand Swaroop Tiwari (supra) has

further been followed by the M.P. High Court in the

matter of J.N. Fuloria v. Benibai and others 2000(1) MPLJ 459.

32.Thus, from the aforesaid proposition of law rendered

by the Supreme Court in A.R. Antulay (supra) and the

M.P. High Court in Anand Swaroop Tiwari (supra), it

is quite vivid that the Special Court constituted

under Section 14 of the Act of 1989 is the criminal

court of original jurisdiction and is not governed by

Section 193 of the Code, and the Special Court can

take cognizance in any of the circumstances referred

to in Section 190 of the Code and is governed by

Chapters XV & XVI of the Code and such other

provisions of the Code which are not inconsistent

with the status and functions as Courts of original

jurisdiction. Therefore, the Special Courts

constituted under the Act of 1989 will also have

power and jurisdiction to invoke Section 156(3) of

the Code to direct investigation in exercise of power

conferred, to the Station House Officer subject to

fulfillment of making two prior applications under

Section 154(1) and thereafter under Section 154(3) of

the Code by the complainant. As such, I do not find

any merit in the submission of learned Senior Counsel

for the petitioners that the Special Judge under SC &

ST Act has no power and jurisdiction to invoke

Section 156(3) of the Code and to direct registration

of FIR and investigation. Such a submission being

meritless and substanceless deserves to be and is

accordingly rejected.

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR

Criminal Misc Petition No.173 of 2018

Order delivered on:27-10-2020

 Jaisingh Agrawal, Vs  State of Chhattisgarh, 

Coram: Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal

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Whether police must register FIR If the offence is about to happen?

  Learned counsel for the petitioners have placed

reliance on the judgment in the case of Lalita Kumari vs

Government of Uttar Pradesh and Others [(2014) 2 SCC

1] in support of their argument that the seizure panchanama

conducted by the appellants without registration of FIR was

illegal.

10. Examined whether the ratio in Lalita Kumari

(supra) is applicable in a situation where a police officer only

receives a credible or secret information about an offence

which is about to be committed, I may with great respect

observe that the primary duty of police is to prevent an

offence from happening; immediately after receiving the

information, a police officer has to proceed to spot for

averting the crime, and taking such other measures as the

situation demands. In Lalita Kumari (supra), the focus is

on the duty of Station House Officer once he receives

information about commission of offence, that means the

information should disclose a crime being already

committed. And in such a situation, if the crime is

cognizable, the Station House Officer is bound to register FIR

without wasting time. But the secret information does not

disclose a crime being committed, it only alerts the police

about a crime which is about to occur. The police officer

who receives such information has to proceed to spot for

preventing the crime or to take such other measures that the

situation demands. Thereafter if he prepares a report, it may

be treated as FIR for further course of action. Sometimes,

offences do take place in the presence of the police officer. In

such a situation, his first duty is to arrest the accused and

collect the evidence, and not registration of FIR.

11. In the case on hand what the police officer

received was a report about likelihood of offences under

NDPS Act being committed, the informant only suspected

possession of contraband substances, regarding which no

FIR could be registered without ascertaining the truth in the

information. The seizure panchanama discloses that the

petitioners and other accused possessed contraband

substance for the purpose of selling them. He seized the

substances and made a report of the same. No error can be

found in it.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

CRIMINAL PETITION No.3073 OF 2020

Tasleem N.P @ Muhammed Thaslim N P  Vs State of Karnataka,

BEFORE

 MR. JUSTICE SREENIVAS HARISH KUMAR

DATED: 01ST DAY OF OCTOBER 2020

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Whether the court can release accused on bail if the complainant has failed to give material particulars about the incident in FIR?

  Perusal of the FIR would clearly reveal that there are no

details about any date and time of the incident. Vaguely the

incident is referred to have taken place in the month of

May/June, 2018, but without any specific date or time. The

complaint, which refers to four distinct occasions are again

without any date and time. Prima facie, the justification given

by the complainant, is a feeble attempt to explain the delay. The

complainant is a lady, aged 37 years. The applicant is aged 63

years. The allegations under the POCSO Act in respect of

the misbehaviour with the niece of the complainant also lack in

details about the date and time and is being reported after two

and half years.

6. The delay in lodging the complaint, at the time of trial may

not be considered as fatal and the prosecutrix may come up with

appropriate explanation at that time, but at present, proceeding

on the basis of the complaint and the version contained therein,

the custodial interrogation of the applicant, in my considered

opinion, is not necessary.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

ANTICIPATORY BAIL APPLICATION (ST) NO.2676 OF 2020

Ezzakk Shashikumar Naik Vs The State of Maharashtra 

CORAM: BHARATI DANGRE, J.

DATED : 7th OCTOBER, 2020

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Whether court should quash second FIR if it is based same facts with additional sections under IPC?

The Respondent then filed an application Under Section 156(3) Code of Criminal Procedure which was forwarded by the Magistrate to the police leading to registration of FIR dated 09.10.2008. The allegations are similar that the Appellant put up an imposter in place of the Respondent and along with one Sushil Kumar Singh and Arvind on the basis of a general power of attorney, which the Respondent had never executed, sold his lands. The FIR itself recites that earlier also the Appellant had sold the lands of the Respondent on the basis of same general power of attorney, but conceals the order of acquittal dated 07.08.1998, and also the institution of Civil Suit No. 353 of 2007 for annulment of the same.

11. It is, therefore, apparent that the subject matter of both the FIRs is the same general power of attorney dated 02.05.1985 and the sales made by the Appellant in pursuance of the same. If the substratum of the two FIRs are common, the mere addition of Sections 467, 468 and 471 in the subsequent FIR cannot be considered as different ingredients to justify the latter FIR as being based on different materials, allegations and grounds.

12. Section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides as follows:

300. Person once convicted or acquitted not to be tried for same offence.

(1) A person who has once been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such conviction or acquittal remains in force, not be liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made Under Sub-section (1) of Section 221, or for which he might have been convicted Under Sub-section (2) thereof.

13. In view of the conclusion that the substratum of the two FIRs are the same and that the Appellant has already stood acquitted on 07.08.1998 of the charge with regard to forging any general power of attorney of the Respondent, we are of the considered opinion that the subsequent prosecution of the Appellant in FIR No. 114 of 2008 dated 09.10.2008 is completely unsustainable. In the result, the FIR dated 09.10.2008, the orders dated 18.12.2015, 31.05.2016 and the impugned order dated 01.03.2017 are set aside.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 237 of 2020 

Decided On: 07.02.2020

Prem Chand Singh  Vs.  The State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Navin Sinha and Krishna Murari, JJ.

Citation: (2020) 3 SCC 54,MANU/SC/0136/2020

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Supreme Court: Court can frame charge under appropriate section even if the first information report mentions the wrong section

Where two information are recorded and it is contended before the Court that the one projected by the prosecution as the F.I.R. is not really the F.I.R., but some other information recorded earlier is the F.I.R., that is a matter which the Court trying the accused has jurisdiction to decide. Similarly, the mentioning of a particular Section in the F.I.R. is not by itself conclusive as it is for the Court to frame charges having regard to the material on record. Even if a wrong Section is mentioned in the F.I.R., that does not prevent the Court from framing appropriate charges.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 938 of 1995

Decided On: 10.04.2003

Superintendent of Police, C.B.I.  Vs.  Tapan Kr. Singh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

N. Santosh Hegde and B.P. Singh, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2003 SC 4140,(2003) 6 SCC 175

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Whether court can rely on evidence of victim if her evidence is in variance with FIR?

Once, the evidence of the prosecutrix, in given facts of the present case, is examined, this court does not find that she has tried to improve her case to such an extent to make it suspicious.

Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant-Surinder

Singh @ Shinda was empathic that there is lot of improvements in the  statement of the prosecutrix and therefore, the case of the prosecution should be rejected by the Court. It may be noted here that slight change in the facts or alleged improvements are bound to happen being natural. One cannot be expected to have eidetic/photographic memory. Natural variation do happen and such depositions are considered and relied upon by the courts after its careful analysis.

Still further, it is well settled that FIR is not expected to be an

encyclopedia of the entire case of the prosecution. An FIR is a mere first

information sent to the prosecuting agency for setting criminal law in

motion. In these circumstances, it is wrong to expect that in the FIR, complete detail of all the incidents must be disclosed. An FIR is not expected to contain the proposed evidence to be produced by the prosecution.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT AT CHANDIGARH

(1) CRA-S-644-SB-2017 (O&M)

Date of decision: 02nd July, 2020

Surinder Singh @ Shinda Vs  Union Territory, Chandigarh

CORAM:  MR. JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL

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Whether prosecution under Prevention of Corruption Act can be quashed if no preliminary inquiry was conducted prior to registration of offence?

The scope and ambit of a preliminary inquiry being necessary before lodging an FIR would depend upon the facts of each case. There is no set format or manner in which a preliminary inquiry is to be conducted. The objective of the same is only to ensure that a criminal investigation process is not initiated on a frivolous and untenable complaint. That is the test laid down in Lalita Kumari.

33. In the present case, the FIR itself shows that the information collected is in respect of disproportionate assets of the Accused Officer. The purpose of a preliminary inquiry is to screen wholly frivolous and motivated complaints, in furtherance of acting fairly and objectively. Herein, relevant information was available with the informant in respect of prima facie allegations disclosing a cognizable offence. Therefore, once the officer recording the FIR is satisfied with such disclosure, he can proceed against the Accused even without conducting any inquiry or by any other manner on the basis of the credible information received by him. It cannot be said that the FIR is liable to be quashed for the reason that the preliminary inquiry was not conducted. The same can only be done if upon a reading of the entirety of an FIR, no offence is disclosed. Reference in this regard, is made to a judgment of this Court reported as State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal MANU/SC/0115/1992 : 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 wherein, this Court held inter alia that where the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the Accused and also where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the Accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.

34. Therefore, we hold that the preliminary inquiry warranted in Lalita Kumari is not required to be mandatorily conducted in all corruption cases. It has been reiterated by this Court in multiple instances that the type of preliminary inquiry to be conducted will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. There are no fixed parameters on which such inquiry can be said to be conducted. Therefore, any formal and informal collection of information disclosing a cognizable offence to the satisfaction of the person recording the FIR is sufficient.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1662 of 2019  and Criminal Appeal No. 1663 of 2019 

Decided On: 06.12.2019

 The State of Telangana  Vs.  Managipet

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

L. Nageswara Rao and Hemant Gupta, JJ.

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