Showing posts with label conducting agreement. Show all posts
Showing posts with label conducting agreement. Show all posts

Wednesday, 23 June 2021

Whether court can treating conducting agreement as a leave and license agreement relying on rent receipt?

 In line with the law laid down, it is clear that the contract mandated continuation of the business in the name of ‘Karandikar Brothers’ by paying royalties of Rs. 90 per month. Once the parties have accepted the recitals and the contract, the respondent could not have adduced contrary extrinsic parole evidence, unless he portrayed ambiguity in the language. It may not be out of context to note that the extension of the contract was on same conditions.

{Para 16}

17. On consideration of the matter, the High Court erred in

appreciating the ambit of Section 95, which led to consideration of evidence which only indicates breach rather than ambiguity in the language of contract. The evidence also points that the license was created for continuation of existing business, rather than

license/lease of shop premises. If the meaning provided by the High Court is accepted, then it would amount to Courts substituting the bargain by the parties. The counsel for respondent has emphasized much on the receipt of payment, which mentions the term ‘rent received’. However, in line with the clear unambiguous language of the contract, such evidence cannot be considered in the eyes of law.

REPORTABLE

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10827 of 2010

Mangala Waman Karandikar Vs Prakash Damodar Ranade

Author: N.V. RAMANA, CJI

Dated: MAY 07, 2021

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Saturday, 8 May 2021

Whether court can treat conducting agreement as a leave and license agreement if the word rent is used in said agreement?

 In line with the law laid down, it is clear that the contract mandated continuation of the business in the name of ‘Karandikar Brothers’ by paying royalties of Rs. 90 per month. Once the parties have accepted the recitals and the contract, the respondent could not have adduced contrary extrinsic parole evidence, unless he portrayed ambiguity in the language. It may not be out of context to  note that the extension of the contract was on same conditions. {Para 16}


17. On consideration of the matter, the High Court erred in

appreciating the ambit of Section 95, which led to consideration of

evidence which only indicates breach rather than ambiguity in the

language of contract. The evidence also points that the license was

created for continuation of existing business, rather than

license/lease of shop premises. If the meaning provided by the High Court is accepted, then it would amount to Courts substituting the bargain by the parties. The counsel for respondent has emphasized much on the receipt of payment, which mentions the term ‘rent received’. However, in line with the clear unambiguous language of the contract, such evidence cannot be considered in the eyes of law.

REPORTABLE

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10827 of 2010

Mangala Waman Karandikar (D) TR. LRS. Vs  Prakash Damodar Ranade 

N.V. RAMANA, CJI

Dated:  MAY 07, 2021

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Friday, 19 February 2021

Whether the City civil court can entertain an eviction suit if the plaintiff had given suit premises to the defendant for conducting business?

  Section 41(1) of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act would apply

only to the suit and proceedings between the licensor and licensee or

landlord and tenant relating to recovery of the possession of any immovable

property situated in Greater Bombay or relating to the recovery of license

fees or charges or rent therefor irrespective of the value of the subject matter

of the suit suits or proceedings. In my view, since the Small Causes Court

has already recorded the finding that the suit business was given by the husband of the plaintiff to the predecessor of the defendants on conducting

and there being no relationship of a landlord and tenant or licensor or

licensee, Section 41(1) of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882

would not apply to the facts of this case. Perusal of the prayers in the plaint

and more particularly, prayer clause (a) clearly indicates that the plaintiff

had applied for declaration that the defendants were trespassers and have no

right, title or interest in the suit premises or in her business after the period

prescribed under the Conducting Agreement was over. In prayer clause (b),

the plaintiff had prayed for an order and direction against the defendants to

vacate the suit premises and its business being carried therein.

65] In my view, the reliefs sought in prayer clause (b) is incidental to the

prayer clause (a) and more particularly, would depend upon whether the

plaintiff had given the suit business to the defendants on conducting suit

business. The premises were given to the defendants for conducting the suit

business. In my view, prayer clause (b) thus, even otherwise could not be

considered as a suit for recovery of possession of the licensee premises. The

period of Conducting Agreement was admittedly over much before the date

of filing suit by the plaintiff. The alleged rights and interest claimed by the

defendants in the suit premises were already rejected by the Small Causes

Court by recording detailed findings of fact which findings have admittedly,

attained finality. The defendants thus being trespassers in respect of the suit

business and also the premises, the Suit filed by the plaintiff for various reliefs claimed in the plaint was thus maintainable.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

FIRST APPEAL NO. 1791 OF 2007

Shri Purshottam Shankar Shetye  Vs  Abhay Shridhar Shetye

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Is finding recorded by small cause court upheld by the high court is binding on the party before city civil court in a parallel proceeding?

 The Trial Court dealt with the orders passed by the Small Causes

Court in the declaratory suit filed by the defendants, order passed by the

Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court and the order passed by this

Court in Writ Petition No. 3521 of 1999 filed by the original defendant

recording various findings in favour of the plaintiff herein and against the

defendants. The Trial Court, accordingly, rightly held that the original

defendant was judicially held to be just conductor of the business and

nothing more, which finding had attained the finality. In view of the fact that

various issues which were raised by the defendants in this Suit were already

concluded by the Small Causes Court and upheld by the Appellate Bench

and this Court, those submissions made by both parties were rightly not

considered by the Trial Court once again in the impugned judgment and

decree. In my view, the findings rendered by the Small Causes Court,

Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court and this Court in respect of the

suit premises were binding on the parties in the parallel proceedings raising

similar issues.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

FIRST APPEAL NO. 1791 OF 2007

Shri Purshottam Shankar Shetye  Vs  Abhay Shridhar Shetye


CORAM : R.D. DHANUKA, J.


PRONOUNCED ON : 19th MAY 2020

Citation: 2020(6) MHLJ 86

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Sunday, 4 March 2018

Whether small cause court has jurisdiction to try eviction suit based on conducting agreement?

 The above averments itself are sufficient to consider such Ejectment proceedings before the Small Causes Court at Bombay in view of Section 41 of the Presidency Small Causes Court Act, 1882 (for short 'PSCC Act'). These averments further make it clear that the parties have also referred to the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (for short 'The Bombay Rent Act') and raised the disputed issue about the protection, as available under the said Bombay Rent Act. The Trial Court, after considering the rival contentions framed the following Issue:
"Issue No. 5: Does the respondent prove that he is protected under the provisions of Section 15-A of the Bombay Rent Act in respect of the suit premises."
Therefore, the parties, based on the pleadings, invoked the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act. Having once invoked the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act and the protection as contemplated under the Bombay Rent Act has been prayed for, there remains no doubt that the Small Causes Court has jurisdiction to consider and deal with such application for Ejectment even though the basic possession of the premises has a foundation of a Conducting Agreement, as contemplated. In view of the above and in the facts and circumstances of the case, therefore, the preliminary objection as raised by the petitioners counsel and opposed by the counsel appearing for the respondent, is rejected.


Bombay High Court
Rasiklal Kumbha Gala, By His ... vs Manilal Ravji on 10 August, 2005
Equivalent citations: 2006 (1) BomCR 425, (2005) 107 BOMLR 40

Bench: A V Mohta
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Whether licensee can be denied protection of Rent Act saying that he was given premises under conducting agreement?

For claiming protection under section 15-A of the Bombay Rent Act, three requirements are necessary to be proved by licensee :---
(i) the person must be in possession on 1st day of February, 1973 ;
(ii) he must be in occupation of premises or part thereof which is not less than a room, and
(iii) he should be in possession as a licensee.
There is no dispute that the first two conditions are satisfied by defendant No. 1. The question is whether he is a licensee as contemplated by the provisions of section 5(4-A) of the Bombay Rent Actor not? Section 5(4-A) defines 'licensee' as follows :---
"5(4-A) "licensee", in respect of any premises or any part thereof, means the person who is in occupation of the premises or such part, as the case may be, under a subsisting agreement for licence given for a licence fee or charge; and includes any person in such occupation of any premises or part thereof in a building vesting in or leased to a co-operative housing society registered or deemed to be registered under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 but does not include a paying guest, a member of a family residing together, a person in the service or employment of the licensor, or a person having and accommodation in a hotel, lodging house, hostel, guest house, club, nursing home, hospital sanatorium, Dharmashala, home for widows, orphans or like premises, marriage or public hall or like premises, or in a place of amusement or entertainment or like institution, or in any premises belonging to or held by any employee or this spouse who or account of the exigencies of service or provision of a residence attached to his of her post or office is temporarily not occupying the premises, provided that he on she charges licence fee or charge for such premises of the employee or spouse not exceeding the standard rent and permitted increases for such premises, and any additional sum for services supplied with such premises, or a person having accommodation in any premises or part thereof for conducting a canteen, crache, dispensary or other services as amenities by any undertaking or institution; and the expressions "licence", "licensor" and "premises given on licence" shall be construed accordingly".
This definition can conveniently be divided into three parts-(1) general; (2) inclusionary part and (3) exclusionary part. In this matter, I am concerned with the exclusionary part. The first part suggests the category of licensees who are in possession and control of the premises entirely. In other words, where a licensor does not retain any control over the premises and the dominant object in creating the license is to give the premises in occupation of the licensee entirely. The third part deals with those cases where possession is not given entirely to other party. It suggests that some control is retained by the licensor over the premises. This part mentions 'a person conducting a running business belonging to the licensor'. In such a case, the dominant object is not to give the premises in possession of the other party but to give the business for running the same and incidentally possession of the premises is handed over. The licensor does not lose his control over the premises entirely. The Chambers 20th Century Dictionary gives the meaning of 'conduct' as follows :---
"to lead or guide, to direct, to manage act or method of leading or managing, escort, management".
Similarly the New World Dictionary of Webster's gives the meaning of 'conduct' as "conducting skill supervising by using by one's executive skill, knowledge or wisdom - the process or way of managing or directing, management, handling."
This indicates that where the licensor primarily wants to take the advantage of the skill of the other party and, therefore, the business is given for the purpose of running, it can be said to be given for conducting. In effect, in all those cases, conductor is put in possession only for the purpose of running in view of his skill. In the present case, I find that it is not the case of the plaintiff that defendant No. 1 was given the business in view of his skill. Further, the premises were given entirely in the control of defendant No. 1. The plaintiff or his father did not retain any control whatsoever either in the premises or in the business. The business run in the shop was of the licensees. The plaintiff has not given one reason or mentioned any motive why the running business was given to defendant No. 1. All this indicates the dominant object in putting the defendant No. 1 in possession was to create licence in respect of the premises and not to give the running business for the purpose of mere conducting. In my view, the business was given in possession of defendant No. 1 incidentally along with certain articles. However, this does not obliterate the real intention and object of the parties i.e., to give the premises on license.
12. In my view, there must be some reason in giving the running business for conducting to the other person such as disability to conduct the business or the intention must be to give the business temporarily in possession of another for some reason. In that case one can say that the business belongs to licensor. If this is not so then the original landlord and licensor can collude to take advantage of shortage of accommodation and share in the benefits by putting the licensee out of reach of the provisions of Bombay Rent Act, or the licensor himself may pocket those benefits and in the process real landlord shall be deprived on the one hand and on the other such licensee shall be deprived of statutory protection completely. However, in both the cases the licensee shall be at the mercy of the other party. The sword of losing possession shall ever remain hanging on his head unless he satisfies the whims and demands of the other party. He may be in possession exclusively for decades and carry on business on his own, but he will have no protection. The very object of giving protection to licensees can be defeated with impunity if this is allowed. The present case can be a good illustration where no reason has been pleaded or pointed out why business was given for conducting. The licensor has acted as middleman only. This is not at all contemplated by the exclusionary clause of section 5(4-A).
13. In my opinion, it is necessary to give restricted meaning to this exclusionary clause contained insection 5(4-A) in view of the object of the Bombay Rent Act. The object of the Act is to give statutory protection to persons who are exclusively in possession of the premises. In fact, section 15-A was introduced by the Maharashtra Act 17 of 1973 with a view to widen protection and to include the licensees who were in possession on 1st February, 1973 of premises which was not less than a room under its protective umbrella. If restricted meaning is not given to this exclusionary clause, then the distinction between the licensee and the persons mentioned in that clause would be blurred and even those who were put in possession of the premises exclusively and doing their own business for years shall be excluded. It is not desirable. It is necessary to consider the dominant object or intention of the parties against the background of all the factors mentioned above. The courts below have failed in this.
14. In my view, the reasons given by the learned Judge of the Court below for holding that defendant No. 1 falls in the exclusionary part i.e., (i) name of the shop was not changed : (ii) some furniture and stock-in-trade was given to defendant No. 1 when he started business in the premises; (iii) the shop license stood in the name of plaintiff and (iv) defendant No. 1 never insisted that rent receipts should be issued in his name, are such that they do not militate against holding the defendant No. 1 as licensee failing in first part and protected. In fact, it was not necessary for defendant No. 1 to change the shop name since business was done in that name for long. He might have taken some furniture and stock-in-trade when started the business instead of buying new one. Further, in view of close relations the shop license might have continued in the name of plaintiff. It is not possible for me to accept these facts as indicating that the defendant No. 1 was a person merely conducting the running business belonging to the licensor and was falling under the exclusionary part of section 5(4-A).
15. In my view, therefore, the defendant No. 1 was a licensee squarely falling within the first part ofsection 5(4-A) and was entitled to get the protection under the Bombay Rent Act in view of section 15-A(i) as he has fulfilled all the three requirements as mentioned above by me.
Bombay High Court
Varisalli Mohammed Ilias vs Abdul Sattar Gulam Hussein (Since ... on 6 August, 1991
 citations: 1992 (1) BomCR 27

Bench: P Patankar
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Sunday, 23 July 2017

Whether licensee is entitled to get protection of Rent Act if licence is granted for conduct of business?

 Under the Bombay Rent Act, the definition of the word 'licensee' specifically excludes the 'conducting business'. This exclusion, if taken note of, whatever may be the reason for occupying the premises in question, but if it is based on the foundation of conducting business, I am of the view that the occupant or such person is not entitled for the protection as available under the Bombay Rent Act, either as a licensee or sub-tenant. The exclusion of the word 'conducting business' makes the provision amply clear.

7. The long and exclusive possession is the basic foundation to claim the protection of lease or licence. But if the possession of the premises has a foundation of the conducting business, it is difficult to accept that in each and every case, the intention was to create licence or lease. The agreement, as referred above, made the conditions very clear which were well within the knowledge of the parties. The parties, having once accepted these terms and conditions, cannot turn around to say later on that the intention was to create lease.


IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 5495 of 1988

Decided On: 10.08.2005

 Rasiklal Kumbha Gala, Vs. Manilal Ravji

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Anoop V. Mohta, J.
Citation: 2006(1) BomCR 425
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