Mr. Nedumpara, learned Counsel for the Respondents, argues that the order passed by this court on 27 September 2012 is a consent order. Learned Counsel submits that a consent order merely records an agreement between the parties. Learned Counsel submits that merely because in its body, the word 'undertaking' is included, the order does not undergo any change; it is still a consent order passed on a compromise between the parties. Learned Counsel submits that no contempt can be alleged of any such order; such order can only be executed by the court. This controversy has finally been laid to rest by the Supreme Court in case of Rama Narang Vs. Ramesh Narang MANU/SC/1960/2006 : (2006) 11 Supreme Court Cases 114. The definition of civil contempt under Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, as noted by the court in that case, provides for two categories of cases, first, any willful disobedience to a process of court, and second, any breach of an undertaking given to a court. The Supreme Court held that the word 'any' indicated the wide nature of the power. No distinction could be statutorily drawn in this behalf between an order passed after adjudication and an order passed by consent. Any wilful violation of any order or decree would be tantamount to contempt. A compromise decree or order is as much a decree or order as a decree or order passed on adjudication, and not merely an agreement between the parties; in passing a decree by consent, the court adds its mandate to the consent so that the consent decree may be said to be composed of both command and contract. A consent decree, in other words, is a contract with the imprimatur of the court added to it. By passing a decree in terms of consent terms, the court authorises and approves the course of action consented to. Just as an order or decree passed on adjudication is executable under the Code of Civil Procedure, even a consent order or decree is of course executable, but merely because of that, it does not take away the jurisdiction of the court to deal with its violation or breach under the Contempt of Courts Act, provided the court is satisfied that the violation or breach complained of is such as would warrant a punishment under Section 13 of that Act. The present consent order is no different. Besides, the breach alleged in the present case is not merely of the consent order, but of an express undertaking given to the court and which was recorded and accepted by it in the consent order. A willful breach of an undertaking given to a court clearly and unequivocally attracts its contempt jurisdiction.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Contempt Petition No. 29 of 2016 in Suit No. 2503 of 2012
Decided On: 31.10.2018
Swaranjeet Singh Vs. Melco Technologies India Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
S.C. Gupte, J.
Citation: 2019(2) MHLJ 277