Showing posts with label constructive res judicata. Show all posts
Showing posts with label constructive res judicata. Show all posts

Saturday, 14 June 2025

Res Judicata vs Constructive Res Judicata: Key Differences

 Res Judicata

Meaning and Definition

Res Judicata is derived from Latin where "Res" means "subject matter" and "judicata" means "adjudged" or decided, together meaning "a matter adjudged". The principle ensures that once a matter is finally decided by a competent court, no party can be permitted to reopen it in subsequent litigation.

Legal Basis

Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) embodies the doctrine of Res Judicata. The section provides that "No court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a court competent to try such subsequent suit".

Print Page

Tuesday, 3 June 2025

Supreme Court: K.V. George v. Secretary: Cementing Res Judicata in Indian Arbitration Law

 The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Arbitration: An Analysis of K.V. George v. Secretary (AIR 1990 SC 53)

Introduction

Arbitration is widely recognized as an efficient alternative to traditional litigation, offering parties a streamlined and final resolution to their disputes. However, the question often arises: can issues already decided in one arbitration be re-litigated in another? The Supreme Court of India, in the landmark case of K.V. George v. Secretary to Government, Water and Power Department (AIR 1990 SC 53), addressed this very issue by affirming the applicability of the doctrine of res judicata to arbitration proceedings. This article explores the facts, legal principles, and far-reaching implications of this judgment.

Background of the Case

Print Page

Sunday, 22 December 2024

Supreme Court Explains 'Henderson Doctrine' : Re-Litigation of Issues That Could Have Been Raised Earlier Is Barred

b. The 'Henderson' Principle as a corollary of Constructive Res- Judicata.

135. The 'Henderson Principle' is a foundational doctrine in common law that addresses the issue of multiplicity in litigation. It embodies the broader concept of procedural fairness, abuse of process and judicial efficiency by mandating that all claims and issues that could and ought to have been raised in a previous litigation should not be relitigated in subsequent proceedings. The extended form of res-judicata more popularly known as 'Constructive Res Judicata' contained in Section 11, Explanation VII of the Code of Civil Procedure originates from this principle.


136. In Henderson v. Henderson reported in MANU/ENRP/1168/1843 : [1843] 3 Hare 999, the English Court of Chancery speaking through Sir James Wigram, V.C. held that where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation and the adjudication of a court of competent jurisdiction, the parties so litigating are required to bring forward their whole case. Once the litigation has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction, the same parties will not be permitted to reopen the lis in respect of issues which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest but were not, irrespective of whether the same was due to any form of negligence, inadvertence, accident or omission. It was further held, that principle of res judicata applies not only to points upon which the Court was called upon by the parties to adjudicate and pronounce a judgement but to every possible or probable point or issue that properly belonged to the subject of litigation and the parties ought to have brought forward at the time. The relevant observations read as under: -


In trying this question I believe I state the Rule of the Court correctly when I say that, where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a Court of competent jurisdiction, the Court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward, only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case. The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the Court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time. [...]

140. The fundamental policy of the law is that there must be finality to litigation. Multiplicity of litigation benefits not the litigants whose rights have been determined, but those who seek to delay the enforcement of those rights and prevent them from reaching the rightful beneficiaries of the adjudication. The Henderson Principle, in the same manner as the principles underlying res judicata, is intended to ensure that grounds of attack or defence in litigation must be taken in one of the same proceeding. A party which avoids doing so does it at its own peril. In deciding as to whether a matter might have been urged in the earlier proceedings, the court must ask itself as to whether it could have been urged. In deciding whether the matter ought to have been urged in the earlier proceedings, the court will have due regard to the ambit of the earlier proceedings and the nexus which the matter bears to the nature of the controversy. In holding that a matter ought to have been taken as a ground of attack or defence in the earlier proceedings, the court is indicating that the matter is of such a nature and character and bears such a connection with the controversy in the earlier case that the failure to raise it in that proceeding would debar the party from agitating it in the future. The doctrine itself is based on public policy flowing from the age-old legal maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium which means that in the interest of the State there should be an end to litigation and no party ought to be vexed twice in a litigation for one and the same cause.

141. The Henderson Principle was approvingly referred to and applied by this Court in State of U.P. v. Nawab Hussain reported in MANU/SC/0032/1977 : (1997) 2 SCC 806 as the underlying principle for res-judicata and constructive res-judicata for assuring finality to litigation. The relevant observations read as under: -

3. The principle of estoppel per rem judicatam is a Rule of evidence. As has been stated in Marginson v. Blackburn Borough Council [(1939) 2 KB 426 at p. 437], it may be said to be "the broader Rule of evidence which prohibits the reassertion of a cause of action". This doctrine is based on two theories: (i) the finality and conclusiveness of judicial decisions for the final termination of disputes in the general interest of the community as a matter of public policy, and (ii) the interest of the individual that he should be protected from multiplication of litigation. It therefore serves not only a public but also a private purpose by obstructing the reopening of matters which have once been adjudicated upon. It is thus not permissible to obtain a second judgment for the same civil relief on the same cause of action, for otherwise the spirit of contentiousness may give rise to conflicting judgments of equal authority, lead to multiplicity of actions and bring the administration of justice into disrepute. It is the cause of action which gives rise to an action, and that is why it is necessary for the courts to recognise that a cause of action which results in a judgment must lose its identity and vitality and merge in the judgment when pronounced. It cannot therefore survive the judgment, or give rise to another cause of action on the same facts. This is what is known as the general principle of res judicata.


4. But it may be that the same set of facts may give rise to two or more causes of action. If in such a case a person is allowed to choose and sue upon one cause of action at one time and to reserve the other for subsequent litigation, that would aggravate the burden of litigation. Courts have therefore treated such a course of action as an abuse of its process and Somervell, L.J., has answered it as follows in Greenhalgh v. Mallard [(1947) All ER 255 at p. 257]: "I think that on the authorities to which I will refer it would be accurate to say that res judicata for this purpose is not confined to the issues which the court is actually asked to decide, but that it covers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject-matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them. This is therefore another and an equally necessary and efficacious aspect of the same principle, for it helps in raising the bar of res judicata by suitably construing the general principle of subduing a cantankerous litigant. That is why this other Rule has some times been referred to as constructive res judicata which, in reality, is an aspect or amplification of the general principle.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Contempt Petition (C) Nos. 158-159 of 2024.

Decided On: 13.12.2024

Celir LLP Vs. Sumati Prasad Bafna and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Citation: 2024 INSC 978,MANU/SC/1343/2024.
Print Page

Wednesday, 26 October 2022

How to distinguish whether a particular endowment is public or private?

  In Deoki Nandan v. Murlidhar and Others,8 a bench of five Judges of this Court has held that:

“the true beneficiaries of religious endowments are not the idols but the worshippers, and that the purpose of the endowment is the maintenance of that worship for the benefit of the worshippers, the question whether an endowment is private or public presents no difficulty. The cardinal point to be decided is whether it was the intention of the founder that specified individuals are to have the right of worship at the shrine, or the general public or any specified portion thereof. In accordance with this theory, it has been held that when property is dedicated for the worship of a family idol, it is a private and not a public endowment, as the persons who are entitled to worship at the shrine of the deity can only be the members of the family, and that is an ascertained group of individuals. But where the beneficiaries are not members of a family or a specified individual, then the endowment can only be regarded as public, intended to benefit the general body of worshippers.

Endowment can validly be created in favour of an idol or temple without the performance of any particular ceremonies, provided the settlor has clearly and unambiguously expressed his intention in that behalf. Where it is proved that ceremonies were performed, that would be valuable evidence of endowment, but absence of such proof would not be conclusive against it.”

 {Para 19}

20. Following the above ratio in The Commissioner for Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, Mysore v. Sri Ratnavarma Heggade (Deceased) by his L. Rs.,9 this Court has observed that:

“Neither a document nor express words are essential for a dedication for a religious or public purpose in our country. Such dedications may be implied from user permitted for public and religious purposes for sufficient length of time. The conduct of those whose property is presumed to be dedicated for a religious or public purpose and other circumstances are taken into account in arriving at the inference of such a dedication. Although religious ceremonies of Sankalpa and Samarpanam are relevant for proving a dedication, yet, they are not indispensable”

Thus, extinction of private character of a property can be inferred from the circumstances and facts on record, including sufficient length of time, which shows user permitted for religious or public purposes.

Where the beneficiaries of a trust or charity are limited to a finite group of identifiable individuals, the trust or charity is of a private character. However, where the beneficiaries are either the public at large or an amorphous and fluctuating body of persons incapable of being specifically identifiable, the trust or charity is of a public character.”

25. Therefore, in view of the judgments quoted above and the aforesaid statutory provisions, it must be held that the case of the appellant that there was no endowment or specific endowment must fail and has no legs to stand on. The dedication of the suit jewellery does not require an express dedication or document, and can be inferred from the circumstances, especially the uninterrupted and long possession of the suit jewellery by the respondent/Temple. The private character of the jewels had extinguished long back and the appellant has no basis to claim that the suit jewellery was inherited by him from his adoptive parents. The endowment is clearly public in nature and for the purposes of performing religious ceremonies. As confirmed by three courts, with which we are in agreement, the suit jewellery was dedicated for a specific purpose and can only be used during the performance of the religious ceremony during the Adipooram festival.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 3964-3965 OF 2009; 

R.M. SUNDARAM @ MEENAKSHISUNDARAM Vs  SRI KAYAROHANASAMY AND NEELAYADHAKSHI AMMAN TEMPLE 

Coram: AJAY RASTOGI; J., SANJIV KHANNA; J. 

Dated: JULY 11, 2022.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

Print Page

How to prove that a subsequent suit is barred by O 2 R 2 of CPC?

 In this regard, we would like to refer to judgment of this Court in Gurbux Singh v. Bhooralal AIR 1964 SC 1810 wherein it has been observed:

“In order that a plea of a Bar under Order 2 Rule 2(3) of the Civil Procedure Code should succeed the defendant who raises the plea must make out; (i) that the second suit was in respect of the same cause of action as that on which the previous suit was based; (2) that in respect of that cause of action the plaintiff was entitled to more than one relief; (3) that being thus entitled to more than one relief the plaintiff, without leave obtained from the Court omitted to sue for the relief for which the second suit had been filed. From this analysis it would be seen that the defendant would have to establish primarily and to start with, the precise cause of action upon which the previous  suit was filed, for unless there is identity between the cause of action on which the earlier suit was filed and that on which the claim in the latter suit is based there would be no scope for the application of the bar. No doubt, a relief which is sought in a plaint could ordinarily be traceable to a particular cause of action but this might, by no means, be the universal rule. As the plea is a technical bar it has to be established satisfactorily and cannot be presumed merely on basis of inferential reasoning. It is for this reason that we consider that a plea of a bar under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code can be established only if the defendant files in evidence the pleadings in the previous suit and thereby proves to the Court the identity of the cause of action in the two suits.

Just as in the case of a plea of res judicata which cannot be established in the absence on the record of the judgment and decree which is pleaded as estoppel, we consider that a plea under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code cannot be made out except on proof of the plaint in the previous suit the filing of which is said to create the bar. As the plea is basically founded on the identity of the cause of action in the two suits the defence which raises the bar has necessarily to establish the cause of action in the previous suit. The cause of action would be the facts which the plaintiff had then alleged to support the right to the relief that he claimed.”

The cardinal requirement for application of the provisions contained in Order 2 Rules 2(2) and (3), therefore, is that the cause of action in the later suit must be the same as in the first suit.”

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 3964-3965 OF 2009; 

R.M. SUNDARAM @ MEENAKSHISUNDARAM Vs  SRI KAYAROHANASAMY AND NEELAYADHAKSHI AMMAN TEMPLE 

Coram: AJAY RASTOGI; J., SANJIV KHANNA; J. 

Dated: JULY 11, 2022.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

Print Page

Is the plea of res judicata, constructive res judicata, and Order II Rule 2 of CPC available if the civil court lacked subject matter jurisdiction in the previous suit?

 In fact, this argument would also recoil on the appellant insofar as he has raised the plea of res judicata and constructive res judicata/ Order II Rule 2 of the Code, for the said pleas would not be available in case the civil court had lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 3964-3965 OF 2009; 

R.M. SUNDARAM @ MEENAKSHISUNDARAM Vs  SRI KAYAROHANASAMY AND NEELAYADHAKSHI AMMAN TEMPLE 

Coram: AJAY RASTOGI; J., SANJIV KHANNA; J. 

Dated: JULY 11, 2022.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

Print Page

When rule of res judicata / constructive res judicata is not applicable to any subsequent proceeding?

 Where the former suit is dismissed by the trial court for want of jurisdiction, or for default of the plaintiff’s appearance, or on the ground of non-joinder or mis-joinder of parties or multifariousness, or on the ground that the suit was badly framed, or on the ground of a technical mistake, or for failure on the part of the plaintiff to produce probate or letter of administration or succession certificate when the same is required by law to entitle the plaintiff to a decree, or for failure to furnish security for costs, or on the ground of improper valuation, or for failure to pay additional court fee on a plaint which was undervalued, or for want of cause of action, or on the ground that it is premature and the dismissal is confirmed in appeal (if any), the decision, not being on the merits, would not be res judicata in a subsequent suit. Sheodan Singh v. Daryao Kunwar (SMT) AIR 1966 SC 1332The reason is that the first suit is not decided on merits.

32. In the present case, the suit filed in 1981 for appointment of the receiver for preparing an inventory of the suit jewellery was not decided on merits but was dismissed on the ground that the respondent had prayed for mandatory injunction and had not made a prayer for declaration of title. Thus, the suit was dismissed for technical reasons, which decision is not an adjudication on merits of the dispute that would operate as res judicata on the merits of the matter. Further, to succeed and establish a prayer for res judicata, the party taking the said prayer must place on record a copy of the pleadings and the judgments passed, including the appellate judgment which has attained finality. In the present case, the appellant did not place on record a copy of the appellate judgment and it is accepted that the second appeal filed by the respondent was dismissed, giving liberty to the respondent to file a fresh suit with a prayer of declaration of title/endowment in respect of the suit jewellery. The liberty granted was not challenged by the appellant. The right to file a fresh suit to the Temple, therefore, should not be denied. The bar of constructive res judicata/ Order II Rule 2 of the Code is not attracted.

33. The plea of constructive res judicata/Order II Rule 2 of the Code also fails as the cause of action in the first suit filed in 1981 was limited and predicated on account of the failure of the appellant to open the locks of the safe and the main door of the Kudavarai, the keys of which were available with the appellant and required joint operation. Here again, the party claiming and raising the plea of constructive res judicata/Order II Rule 2 of the Code must place on record in evidence the pleadings of the previous suit and establish the identity of the cause of actions, which cannot be established in the absence of record of judgment and decree which is pleaded to operate as estoppel.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 3964-3965 OF 2009; 

R.M. SUNDARAM @ MEENAKSHISUNDARAM Vs  SRI KAYAROHANASAMY AND NEELAYADHAKSHI AMMAN TEMPLE 

Coram: AJAY RASTOGI; J., SANJIV KHANNA; J. 

Author: SANJIV KHANNA, J.

Dated: JULY 11, 2022

Print Page

Saturday, 25 September 2021

When subsequent suit will not be barred by constructive res judicata?

 Plea of res judicata is a restraint on the right of a plaintiff to have an adjudication of his claim. The plea must be clearly established, more particularly where the bar sought is on the basis of constructive res judicata. The plaintiff who is sought to be prevented by the bar of constructive res judicata should have notice about the plea and have an opportunity to put forth his contentions against the same. In this case, there was no plea of constructive res judicata, nor had the appellant-plaintiff an opportunity to meet the case based on such plea.{Para 20}

26. In the instant case, the High Court has not stated what was the ground of attack that the appellant-plaintiff ought to have raised in the first suit but had failed to raise, which she raised in the second suit, to attract the principle of constructive res judicata. The second suit is not barred by constructive res judicata.”

(emphasis supplied)

20. The finding of the trial judge on the applicability of the principles of res judicata was set aside on the ground that the plea was not clearly established and the plaintiff was not given the opportunity to contest the plea. Thus, in Alka Gupta (supra), this court set aside the decision of the High Court on the above ground.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Civil Appeal No. 10946 of 2014

The Jamia Masjid Vs  Sri K V Rudrappa

Print Page

When would adverse findings given on any particular issue not be res judicata?

 E.2.3 Conclusive decision and Res Judicata

36. The locus classicus on the point of determining if an issue was ‘directly and substantially’ decided in the previous suit is the decision of Justice M Jagannadha Rao (writing for a two judge bench) in Sajjadanashin Syed MD B.E. Edr. (D) by Lrs. v. Musa Dadabhai Ummer.25 (2000) 3 SCC 350. During the course of the judgment, the Court analysed the expression “directly and substantially in issue” in Section 11 and laid down the twin test of essentiality and necessity:

“12. It will be noticed that the words used in Section 11 CPC are “directly and substantially in issue”. If the matter was in issue directly and substantially in a prior litigation and decided against a party then the decision would be res judicata in a subsequent proceeding. Judicial decisions have however held that if a matter was only “collaterally or incidentally” in issue and decided in an earlier proceeding, the finding therein would not ordinarily be res judicata in a latter proceeding where the matter is directly and substantially in issue.”

PART E

18. In India, Mulla has referred to similar tests (Mulla, 15th Edn., p. 104). The learned author says: a matter in respect of which relief is claimed in an earlier suit can be said to be generally a matter “directly and substantially” in issue but it does not mean that if the matter is one in respect of which no relief is sought it is not directly or substantially in issue. It may or may not be. It is possible that it was “directly and substantially” in issue and it may also be possible that it was only collaterally or incidentally in issue, depending upon the facts of the case. The question arises as to what is the test for deciding into which category a case falls? One test is that if the issue was “necessary” to be decided for adjudicating on the principal issue and was decided, it would have to be treated as “directly and substantially” in issue and if it is clear that the judgment was in fact based upon that decision, then it would be res judicata in a latter case (Mulla, p. 104). One has to examine the plaint, the written statement, the issues and the judgment to find out if the matter was directly and substantially in issue (Ishwer Singh v. Sarwan Singh [AIR 1965 SC 948] and Syed Mohd. Salie Labbai v. Mohd. Hanifa [(1976) 4 SCC 780 : AIR 1976 SC 1569] ). We are of the view that the above summary in Mulla is a correct statement of the law.

19. We have here to advert to another principle of caution referred to by Mulla (p. 105):

“It is not to be assumed that matters in respect of which issues have been framed are all of them directly and substantially in issue. Nor is there any special significance to be attached to the fact that a particular issue is the first in the list of issues. Which of the matters are directly in issue and which collaterally or incidentally, must be determined on the facts of each case. A material test to be applied is whether the court considers the adjudication of the issue material and essential for its decision.”

(emphasis supplied)

37. Adverting to the decision in Mahant Pragdasji Guru Bhagwandasji (supra) and two earlier decisions26, the Court held that these were instances where in spite of adverse findings in an earlier suit, the finding on that specific issue was not treated as res judicata as it was purely incidental, auxiliary or collateral to the main issue in each of these cases and not necessary in the earlier case.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Civil Appeal No. 10946 of 2014

The Jamia Masjid Vs  Sri K V Rudrappa

Author: Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J

Dated:September 23, 2021

Print Page

Monday, 20 April 2020

When subsequent application for setting aside exparte order shall not be barred by res judicata?

 In State of Maharashtra and others (supra) while considering the provisions of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure it was observed in para 6 as under:

6. The important words are "has been heard and finally decided". The bar applies only if the matter directly and substantially in issue in the former suit has been heard and finally decided by a Court competent to try such suit. That clearly means that on the matter or issue in question there has been an application of the judicial mind and a final adjudication made. If the former suit is dismissed without any adjudication on the matter in issue merely on a technical ground of non-joinder, that cannot operate as res judicata."
In State of Uttar Pradesh and another (supra) it was held that dismissal of a suit for non-prosecution was not a decision on merit and hence, would not as par res judicata.

In Govindbhai Patel (supra) proceedings filed under the Tenancy Act were not entertained on the ground that the requisite certificate that was required to be filed along with the application had not been filed. In that context it was observed that dismissal of proceedings by an Authority not on merits but on account of some formal defect would not attract the principles of res judicata.

11. In the present case, as noted above both the earlier applications were not entertained on merits on account of failure to comply with the mandate of Section 17 of the Act of 1887. There was no adjudication on merits on the prayer for setting aside the ex parte decree. Thus, a vital ingredient for the applicability of the bar of constructive res judicata was missing. While deciding both the earlier applications, the Trial Court specifically observed that the applications were not maintainable due to non-compliance with the requirements of Section 17 of the Act of 1887. In the light of law referred to above it is therefore, clear that in absence of any adjudication on merits, the rejection of the earlier two applications would not operate as constructive res judicata and the subsequent application that was filed after complying with the provisions of Section 17 of the Act of 1887 was required to be considered on merits. Both the Courts were not justified in holding that as the earlier orders had attained finality, the proceedings were not tenable.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Writ Petition No. 385 of 2014

Decided On: 18.06.2015

Paramveersingh Santoshsingh Saini  Vs.  Tarachand

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
A.S. Chandurkar, J.

Citation: 2015(4)ALLMR 862,2015(5) MHLJ 747
Print Page

Thursday, 29 August 2019

Question and answer in law Part 3

Q.1. What is meaning of endorsement of cheque in blank?

Ans;In the case of a check payable to John Smith (the payee), a blank endorsement would be the signature of John Smith on the back side of the check without any other words above or below his signature. ... The blank endorsement indicates that whoever is in possession of the endorsed check is considered to be the owner.See S 16 of NI Act.

Q.2. Define constructive res judicata?

Ans. Constructive res judicata is a subset of the doctrine of res judicata. Constructive res judicata sets to bar any claims being raised in a later proceeding if the claim should / ought to have been raised and decided in an earlier proceeding.


Q 3. Why there are different orders and sections in Civil Procedure Code?
Ans.The Code is divided into two parts: the first part contains 158 sections and the second part contains the First Schedule, which has 51 Orders and Rules. The sections provide provisions related to general principles of jurisdiction whereas the Orders and Rules prescribe procedures and method that govern civil proceedings in India.

4. Which article in constitution provides right against self incrimination?
A.Clause (3) of Article 20 of Indian constitution declares that no person accused of an offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. 3. it is a protection against such compulsion resulting in his giving evidence against himself.

5.What is Civil contempt and criminal contempt?


A. Contempt refers to the offence of showing disrespect to the dignity or authority of a court.  The Act divides contempt into civil and criminal contempt.  Civil contempt refers to the wilful disobedience of an order of any court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court;.  Criminal contempt includes any act or publication which: (i) ‘scandalises’ the court, or (ii) prejudices any judicial proceeding, or (iii) interferes with the administration of justice in any other manner.  ‘Scandalising the Court’ broadly refers to statements or publications which have the effect of undermining public confidence in the judiciary. 
Print Page

Thursday, 21 February 2019

Whether court is required to see issue of maintainability and enforceability of foreign arbitration award simultaneously?

 Be that as it may, the grounds urged by the petitioner in
the earlier round regarding the maintainability of the
execution case could not have been considered in isolation
and de hors the issue of enforceability of the subject foreign
awards. For, the same was intrinsically linked to the question
of enforceability of the subject foreign awards. In any case, all
contentions available to the petitioner in that regard could and
ought to have been raised specifically and, if raised, could
have been examined by the Court at that stage itself. We are of
the considered opinion that the scheme of Section 48 of the
Act does not envisage piecemeal consideration of the issue of
maintainability of the execution case concerning the foreign
awards, in the first place; and then the issue of enforceability
thereof. Whereas, keeping in mind the legislative intent of

speedy disposal of arbitration proceedings and limited
interference by the courts, the Court is expected to consider
both these aspects simultaneously at the threshold. Taking
any other view would result in encouraging successive and
multiple round of proceedings for the execution of foreign
awards. We cannot countenance such a situation keeping in
mind the avowed object of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996, in particular, while dealing with the enforcement of
foreign awards. For, the scope of interference has been
consciously constricted by the legislature in relation to the
execution of foreign awards. Therefore, the subject application
filed by the petitioner deserves to be rejected, being barred by
constructive res judicata, as has been justly observed by the
High Court in the impugned judgment.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 540 OF 2018

LMJ International Ltd. Vs Sleepwell Industries Co. Ltd. 

Dated:February 20, 2019.

A.M. Khanwilkar, J.
Print Page

Thursday, 8 November 2018

How doctrine of constructive res judicata is applicable to execution of decree?

 As per provisions of Order XXI Rule 23(1) of the Code, on receiving notice issued under provisions of Order XXI Rule 22 (1) of the Code the judgment-debtor can show cause as to why the decree in question should not be executed. In other words it is open for the judgment-debtor to appear pursuant to the show cause notice and contest the executability of the decree. It is undisputed that such notice was issued to the judgment-debtor and that no objection was raised to the executability of the decree. On account of failure to raise such objection it was not permissible for the judgment-debtor to raise such objection at a later stage. The Division Bench in Laxman Bala Surve and ors. (supra) has held in clear terms that if despite notice issued under provisions of Order XXI Rule 22 of the Code the judgment-debtor fails to appear and show cause against the execution, the Court is bound under Rule 23(1) to order execution. That order would operate as constructive res judicata against the judgment-debtor even at the subsequent stage of the execution proceedings. This position of law has been affirmed in Barkat Ali and anr. (supra). It is thus clear that failure to raise any objection to the executability of the decree thereafter precludes the judgment-debtor from raising such objection.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Writ Petition No. 1210 of 2018

Decided On: 17.04.2018

 Mahadeo  Vs. Anandrao

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
A.S. Chandurkar, J.

Citation: 2018(5) MHLJ 727
Print Page

Saturday, 16 June 2018

When issue of ownership in injunction suit will constitute res judicata?

To summarise, the position in regard to suits for prohibitory injunction relating to immovable property, is as under:

(a) xxx xxx xxx

(b) xxx xxx xxx

(c) But a finding on title cannot be recorded in a suit for injunction, unless there are necessary pleadings and appropriate issue regarding title (either specific, or implied as noticed in Annaimuthu Thevar v. Alagammal, MANU/SC/0416/2005 : (2005) 6 SCC 202). Where the averments regarding title are absent in a plaint and where there is no issue relating to title, the court will not investigate or examine or render a finding on a question of title, in a suit for injunction. Even where there are necessary pleadings and issue, if the matter involves complicated questions of fact and law relating to title, the court will relegate the parties to the remedy by way of comprehensive suit for declaration of title, instead of deciding the issue in a suit for mere injunction."

The Court has noted that a finding of title cannot be recorded in a suit for injunction unless there are necessary and appropriate issues regarding title. This presupposes that it is not impermissible to do so. Further, where the averments regarding title are absent in a plaint and where there is no issue relating to title, the Court will not investigate or examine or render a finding on a question of title in a suit for injunction. In the present case, however, we find that not only there are clear pleadings relating to title but both sides proceeded with the trial on that assertion and invited the Court not only to frame issue regarding ownership and title in the suit property but also produced evidence in support of their respective claim in that behalf, which has been duly analysed by the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court. In the last sentence in paragraph 21(c) of the reported decision, no doubt, this Court has observed that the parties must be relegated to the remedy of a comprehensive suit by way of title instead of deciding that issue in a suit for injunction. However, that may be necessary in matters involving complicated questions of fact and law relating to title. In the present case, as observed earlier, the issue regarding title and ownership was directly put in issue and was a substantial issue adjudicated by the Court albeit in a suit for simpliciter injunction. It was not a complicated issue either on facts or in law. It has been rightly answered on the basis of admitted and indisputable facts discerned from the registered documents, admission deed, declaration deed and other documents. The decision in the case of Gram Panchayat of Village Naulakha (supra), is on the facts of that case, as is discerned from paragraphs 3 and 9 to 11 of the reported decision. The decision in the case of Purshottam Das Tandon, MANU/SC/0691/2014 : (2014) 9 SCC 344, is also on the facts of that case. The Court found that the claim of ownership of land was a contentious issue and was left open by the High Court in writ jurisdiction to be adjudicated by a competent civil court. In the present case, the fact situation leaves no manner of doubt that the issue of ownership of the suit property was directly and substantially put in issue before the civil court and was made subject matter of the suit.
37. Notably, on a close reading of the liberty given by the High Court to the Plaintiff, it is plain that the liberty is limited to raise the issue of title relating to the suit property in the event any eviction proceedings are resorted to by the Appellant. Such liberty, as is well settled will be hit by principles of constructive res judicata in the fact situation of this case.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 16949-16950 of 2017 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos. 15836-15837 of 2009)

Decided On: 23.10.2017

 Union of India (UOI)  Vs. Vijay Krishna Uniyal (D) through L.Rs.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Kurian Joseph and A.M. Khanwilkar, JJ.

Citation: (2018) 11 SCC 382
Print Page

Monday, 7 May 2018

Whether one of cause of action for eviction of tenant which was given up can be revived?

Applying the aforesaid principles laid down by the Privy Council we find that none of the conditions mentioned by the Privy Council are applicable in this case. The plaintiff had first based her suit on three distinct causes of action but later confined the suit only to the first cause of action, namely, the one mentioned in Section 14A(1) of the Act and gave up the cause of action relating to Section 14(1)(e) and (f). Subsequently, by virtue of an amendment she relinquished the first cause of action arising out of Section 14A(1) and sought to revive her cause of action based on Section 14(1)(e). At the time when the plaintiff relinquished the cause of action arising out of Section 14(1)(e) the defendant was not in the picture at all. Therefore, it was not open to the defendant to raise any objection to the amendment sought by the plaintiff. For these reasons, we are satisfied that the second amendment application was not barred by the principles of Order 2 Rule 2 C.P.C. and the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant must fail.

8. Secondly, as regards the question of constructive res judicata it has no application whatsoever in the instant case. It is well settled that one of the essential conditions of res judicata is that there must be a formal adjudication between the parties after full hearing. In other words, the matter must be finally decided between the parties. Here also at a time when the plaintiff relinquished her first cause of action the defendant was no where in the picture, and there being no adjudication between the parties the doctrine of res judicata does not apply.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 1291 of 1978

Decided On: 04.10.1979

Kewal Singh Vs. Smt. Lajwanti

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
A.N. Sen, P.S. Kailasam and S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, JJ.

Citation: AIR 1980 SC 161,
Print Page

Sunday, 25 February 2018

When subsequent suit for eviction of tenant will not be barred by principle of constructive res judicata?

The said reasoning is against the principles laid down by the Full Bench in 'Harnam Singh v. Surjit Singh' MANU/PH/0222/1984 : 1984 PLR 104. The question which was referred to the Full Bench was that once an earlier petition if a plea could have been taken by the parties in the proceedings and the ground available was not taken would it on the subsequent occasion bar the landlord on the principle of constructive res judicata. It was, accordingly, held that the evidence to establish the two is clearly distinct and different and the cause of action is also different. Though the law disfavoured the multiplicity of the litigation, but the requirement of personal use and occupation was a distinct and separate cause of action, as that of the non-payment of the rent. Resultantly, the question and the answer posed were as under:-

"Is requirement of personal use and occupation by the landlord under section 3(a)(i) a distinct and separate cause of action from that of non-payment of rent under sub-section 2(i) for the eviction of the tenant as prescribed by section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 - has come to the fore as the spinal question in this reference to the Full Bench.

15. To finally conclude it must be held that on the larger scheme of Section 13 of the Act; the specific language of the respective provisions, on principle and precedent, the requirement of personal use and occupation by the landlord is a distinct and separate cause of action from that of non-payment of rent by the tenant. The answer to the question posed at the very outset is, therefore, rendered in the affirmative."

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

Civil Revision No. 7538 of 2012

Decided On: 16.03.2017

Daljit Singh Vs. Kulwant Rai & Sons and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Gurmeet Singh Sandhawalia, J.

Citation: 2017(2) RCR(Rent) 353
Print Page

Monday, 1 January 2018

Whether purchaser of property can remain in possession of joint family house if it is used for commercial purpose?

It is not disputed that the suit house was given on rent to Sheikhar Chand Jain in the year 1968. In first round of litigation a Civil Suit No. 147-A/1998, it is found proved that the suit house was let out for business purposes, where defendants were running an electrical shop. It is also found proved that this house is required for legal profession of plaintiff Hafizulla under Section 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act. In subsequent Civil Suit No. 11-A/2002 and RCA case No. 2-A/90(7)97-98, it is pleaded by plaintiff that suit house was let out for business purposes and it is bonafidely required for business/office of advocate. In the present suit plaintiff Hafizulla (PW-1) and his son M. Shafiqulla (PW-2) in evidence have not stated that the suit house is a dwelling house, used for residential purposes. Thus, from pleading and evidence of the parties, it is established that the suit house is being used for business purposes since, 1968 and still the plaintiff wants to use it for his profession of Advocacy. The house is not being used for residential purpose since more than 45 years and in future the plaintiff is not intending to use it as residence. It was completely let out to tenant and considering the long period of tenancy, it cannot be said that it had been given on rent temporarily. Therefore, it cannot be said that the disputed house is a dwelling house within the meaning of Section 4 of Partition Act and Section 44 of Transfer of Property Act. Hence, the provisions of above acts are not applicable in respect of disputed house. Therefore, the case law relied upon by plaintiff are not applicable in facts of present case because mainly they relates to dwelling house.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH (JABALPUR BENCH)

First Appeal No. 1194/2011

Decided On: 01.02.2017

 Hafizulla and Ors. Vs. Puran Chand Jain and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Rajendra Menon, Actg. C.J. and Anurag Shrivastava, J.
Citation: AIR 2017(NOC) 1086 MP
Print Page

Sunday, 3 September 2017

Whether principle of res judicata is applicable to consent order?

As far as the plea of res judicata is concerned, the fundamental principle requisite to its applicability is that the matter must have been heard and finally decided. This means that the matter must have been heard and decided by a competent court in the earlier proceedings. When a consent order is passed and the case is disposed of on the basis of consent, it cannot attract the principle of res judicata as such.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL

Special Appeal No. 14 of 2015

Decided On: 12.05.2017

Rajesh Goyal and Ors.Vs. State of Uttarakhand and Ors.
Print Page

Saturday, 4 June 2016

When doctrine of Res Judicata is not applicable in Public Interest Litigation?

 It is not disputed that the present petition was filed
immediately after the petitioners obtained an information about the
plans which were sanctioned by the concerned authorities in respect of
the hotel project of the respondent no.7. The respondent nos. 7 and 9
admittedly were not parties to the earlier petition. The petitioner no.2
also was not a party to the said petition. Even before the above Writ
Petition No. 115 of 1992 was finally disposed of on 15.07.1998, the
petitioners filed the present Writ Petition on 23.06.1993. Apart from
that, on perusal of the earlier judgment passed by this Court dated
15.07.1998, it is clearly stated therein that the grievance of the
petitioners was the approval of the projects along the coastal line
without preparing the coastal zone management plan. As in the
meanwhile, the Central Government had approved the management plan
on 27.09.1996, this Court disposed of the said Writ Petition. In such
circumstances, the contention of Mr. Dada, learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the respondent nos. 7 and 9 that the contentions sought
to be raised by the petitioners in the present Writ Petition were directly
and substantially in issue in the said Writ Petition cannot be accepted.
Apart from that, as already pointed out herein above, the respondent
nos. 7 and 9 nor the petitioner no.2 were parties to the said Writ
Petition. Besides, the petitioners filed the above Writ Petition by raising
the claims during the pendency of the earlier Writ Petition. In such
circumstances, the judgment of the Apex Court relied upon by the
learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondent nos. 7 and 9 reported
in 1985(2) SCC 670 in the case of Daman Singh and others Vs
State of Punjab is not applicable to the facts in the present case. The
Apex Court in the judgment reported in AIR 2001 SC 2134 in the case
of M/s International Woollen Mills V/s M/s. Standard Wool
(U.K.) Ltd., has observed at para 10 thus :
“10. …..........................Mr. Hingorani
however submitted that this case would
be covered by Explanation IV to Section
11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He
submitted that in the earlier Application
the defence regarding non -compliance of
Section 13(b) could have been taken but
had not been taken. He submitted that it
was not open to the Appellants to take
such a defence in a subsequent
Application. In our view there is no
substance in this submission. Explanation
IV to Section 11 of the Code of Civil
procedure would have come into play only
if some decision had been finally given
before the second Application was filed. In
that event it could have been urged that
all available points should have been
urged before that decision was given. In
this case the second Application was filed
before any decision on the first Application
was given. The Appellants could have,
instead of filing a second Application,
amended their first Application and taken
these pleas in that Application itself. Had
they amended the first Application there
would be no bar of res-judicata or
constructive res judicata. If that be so one
fails to understand how the second
Application was barred by principles of
res-judicata or constructive res- judicata.
To be remembered that the Orders were
passed after hearing arguments on both
the Applications. Under such
circumstances no question arises of their
being any res-judicata or constructive resjudicata.”
Admittedly, the present Writ Petition was filed disputing the
permissions granted to the respondent no.7 much prior to the disposal
of the earlier Writ Petition when there was no final decision therein and
as such the question of contending that the present Writ Petition is
barred by principle of constructive res judicata cannot be accepted. It is
also to be noted that the respondent no.7 did not take any steps, if at all
they were so interested to take up the above Writ Petition along with the
said Writ Petition No. 115 of 1992 though from the records in the
present petition they had knowledge about the pendency of such
petition. The judgment of the Apex Court relied upon by Mr. Dada,
learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondent nos. 7 and 9 reported
in (1986) 1 SCC 100 in the case of Forward Construction Co. and
others Vs Prabhat Mandal (Regd.) Andheri and others is not at all
applicable to the facts of the present case. The facts therein are that
after an earlier petition was finally disposed of, another petition came to
be filed by some parties under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
seeking almost the same relief. As pointed out herein above, in the
present case, the reliefs are different. Besides, the respondent nos. 7
and 9 nor petitioner no.2 were parties to the earlier petition. The
infringements pointed out by the petitioners in the present Writ Petition
were not directly and substantially in issue nor adjudicated in the said
Writ Petition No. 115 of 1992. The principles of res judicata are not
otherwise ordinarily applicable to Public Interest Litigation and in such
circumstances, we find that the contention of Mr. Dada, learned Senior
Counsel appearing for the respondent nos. 7 and 9 that the above Writ
Petition is barred by principle of res judicata cannot be accepted.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA
 WRIT PETITION NO. 333 OF 1993
 The Goa Foundation,

V e r s u s
 The North Goa Planning and Development
Authority,
 Coram:- F. M. REIS &
 K. L. WADANE, JJ

 Judgment pronounced on : 29.06.2015 
Citation; 2016 (2)MHLJ 566

Print Page

Sunday, 22 May 2016

What is concept of constructive Res Judicata?

Their   Lordships   of   the   Apex   Court   in   the   case   of    Forward
Construction Co. and others .vs. Prabhat Mandal (Regd.), Andheri (cited supra)
have observed thus in paragraph no. 20 :­
“20. So far as the first reason is concerned, the High Court in
our opinion was not right in holding that the earlier judgment would not
operate as res judicata as one of the grounds taken in the present
petition   was   conspicuous   by   its   absence   in   the   earlier   petition.
Explanation IV to s.11 C.P.C. provides that any matter which might and
ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former
suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in
issue in such suit. An adjudication is conclusive and final not only as to
the actual matter determined but as to every other matter which the
parties might and ought to have litigated and have had it decided as
incidental   to or   essentially   connected  with  the  subject   matter  of   the
litigation and every matter coming with the legitimate purview  of the
original action both in respect of the matters of claim or defence. The

principle underlying Explanation IV is that where the parties have had an
opportunity of controverting a matter that should be taken to be the
same thing as if the matter had been actually controverted and decided.
It is true that where a matter has been constructively in issue it cannot
be   said   to  have   been   actually  heard   and   decided.   It   could   only   be
deemed to have been heard and decided. The first reason, therefore,
has absolutely no force.” 
It could thus be seen that the Hon'ble Apex Court has clearly held that any matter
which might or ought to have been made a ground of defence or attack in the earlier
proceedings will be deemed to have been matter directly and substantially in issue in
such proceedings.  It has further been held that an adjudication is conclusive  and
final not only as to the actual matter determined but as to every other matter which
the parties might and ought to have litigated and have had it decided.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.
              WRIT PETITION     NO.    29   OF    2014


Deepak Yadavrao Gotefode,
  Vs  Dy. Director (R)  &  MemberSecretary, Scheduled Tribe Caste Certificate ScrutinyCommittee, 

   CORAM :  B.R. GAVAI & P.N. DESHMUKH, JJ.     
   DATED  :  DECEMBER 4, 2015.
    Citation;2016(3)ALLMR58

Print Page