Showing posts with label constitutional right. Show all posts
Showing posts with label constitutional right. Show all posts

Tuesday, 25 March 2025

KARNATAKA HC: Leave Encashment Is A Constitutional Property Right; It Cannot Be Denied Without Specific Statutory Authority

THE CONCLUSION:

11. The findings of both the High Courts would clearly cover the issue at hand on all its force, as those were also the cases were employees were dismissed from service on misconduct. The petitioner in the case at hand is also dismissed, on account of misconduct. Benefit of leave encashment to an employee is trite, a statutory right, but it has an imprimatur to the legal principle that right to receive terminal benefits is recognized as a right to property obtaining under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India.

"300-A. Persons not to be deprived of property save by authority of law.-No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law."

Article 300-A mandates that persons not to be deprived of property save by authority of law. Therefore, it becomes unmistakably clear that any attempt of the employer to take away the right of any part of terminal benefit, which in the case at hand is, leave encashment, without any umbrage of a statutory provision, such action is sans countenanced.

12. Therefore, it is a right of an employee not only under the statute, even under the fountainhead of all statutes - The Constitution of India. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA (DHARWAD BENCH)

Writ Petition No. 100339 of 2025 (S-RES)

Decided On: 19.02.2025

G. Linganagouda Vs. General Manager, Karnataka Gramina Bank

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Maheshan Nagaprasanna, J.

Citation:  2025:KHC-D:3366, MANU/KA/0674/2025.

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Sunday, 2 June 2024

Supreme Court: Right To Property | 7 Sub-Rights of land owner Which State Must Protect During Land Acquisition

 The Right to property: A net of intersecting rights: There is yet another aspect of the matter. Under our constitutional scheme, compliance with a fair procedure of law before depriving any person of his immovable property is well entrenched. {Para 24}


25. While it is true that after the 44th Constitutional Amendment4, the right to property drifted from Part III to Part XII of the Constitution, there continues to be a potent safety net against arbitrary acquisitions, hasty decision-making and unfair redressal mechanisms. Despite its spatial placement, Article 300A5 which declares that "no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law" has been characterized both as a constitutional and also a human right6. To assume that constitutional protection gets constricted to the mandate of a fair compensation would be a disingenuous reading of the text and, shall we say, offensive to the egalitarian spirit of the Constitution.


26.  The binary reading of the constitutional right to property must give way to more meaningful renditions, where the larger right to property is seen as comprising intersecting sub-rights, each with a distinct character but interconnected to constitute the whole. These sub-rights weave themselves into each other, and as a consequence, State action or the legislation that results in the deprivation of private property must be measured against this constitutional net as a whole, and not just one or many of its strands.


27. What then are these sub-rights or strands of this swadeshi constitutional fabric constituting the right to property? Seven such sub-rights can be identified, albeit non-exhaustive. These are:


i) duty of the State to inform the person that it intends to acquire his property - the right to notice, ii) the duty of the State to hear objections to the acquisition - the right to be heard, iii) the duty of the State to inform the person of its decision to acquire - the right to a reasoned decision, iv) the duty of the State to demonstrate that the acquisition is for public purpose - the duty to acquire only for public purpose, v) the duty of the State to restitute and rehabilitate- the right of restitution or fair compensation, vi) the duty of the State to conduct the process of acquisition efficiently and within prescribed timelines of the proceedings - the right to an efficient and expeditious process, and vii) final conclusion of the proceedings leading to vesting - the right of conclusion.


28. These seven rights are foundational components of a law that is tune with Article 300A, and the absence of one of these or some of them would render the law susceptible to challenge. The judgment of this Court in K.T. Plantations (supra)9 declares that the law envisaged Under Article 300A must be in line with the overarching principles of Rule of law, and must be just, fair, and reasonable. It is, of course, precedentially sound to describe some of these sub-rights as 'procedural', a nomenclature that often tends to undermine the inherent worth of these safeguards. These seven sub-rights may be procedures, but they do constitute the real content of the right to property Under Article 300A, non- compliance of these will amount to violation of the right, being without the authority of law.


29. These sub-rights of procedure have been synchronously incorporated in laws concerning compulsory acquisition and are also recognised by our constitutional courts while reviewing administrative actions for compulsory acquisition of private property. The following will demonstrate how these seven principles have seamlessly become an integral part of our Union and State statutes concerning acquisition and also the constitutional and administrative law culture that our courts have evolved from time to time.


30. Following are the seven principles:


30.1. The Right to notice: (i) A prior notice informing the bearer of the right that the State intends to deprive them of the right to property is a right in itself; a linear extension of the right to know embedded in Article 19(1)(a). The Constitution does not contemplate acquisition by ambush. The notice to acquire must be clear, cogent and meaningful. Some of the statutes reflect this right.

30.2. The Right to be heard: (i) Following the right to a meaningful and effective prior notice of acquisition, is the right of the property-bearer to communicate his objections and concerns to the authority acquiring the property. This right to be heard against the proposed acquisition must be meaningful and not a sham.

30.3. The Right to a reasoned decision: i) That the authorities have heard and considered the objections is evidenced only through a reasoned order. It is incumbent upon the authority to take an informed decision and communicate the same to the objector.

30.4. The Duty to acquire only for public purpose: (i) That the acquisition must be for a public purpose is inherent and an important fetter on the discretion of the authorities to acquire. This requirement, which conditions the purpose of acquisition must stand to reason with the larger constitutional goals of a welfare state and distributive justice.

30.5. The Right of restitution or fair compensation: (i) A person's right to hold and enjoy property is an integral part to the constitutional right Under Article 300A. Deprivation or extinguishment of that right is permissible only upon restitution, be it in the form of monetary compensation, rehabilitation or other similar means. Compensation has always been considered to be an integral part of the process of acquisition.


30.6. The Right to an efficient and expeditious process: (i) The acquisition process is traumatic for more than one reason. The administrative delays in identifying the land, conducting the enquiry and evaluating the objections, leading to a final declaration, consume time and energy. Further, passing of the award, payment of compensation and taking over the possession are equally time consuming. It is necessary for the administration to be efficient in concluding the process and within a reasonable time. This obligation must necessarily form part of Article 300A.

30.7. The Right of conclusion: (i) Upon conclusion of process of acquisition and payment of compensation, the State takes possession of the property in normal circumstances. The culmination of an acquisition process is not in the payment of compensation, but also in taking over the actual physical possession of the land. If possession is not taken, acquisition is not complete. With the taking over of actual possession after the normal procedures of acquisition, the private holding is divested and the right, title and interest in the property, along-with possession is vested in the State. Without final vesting, the State's, or its beneficiary's right, title and interest in the property is inconclusive and causes lot of difficulties. The obligation to conclude and complete the process of acquisition is also part of Article 300A.

31. The seven principles which we have discussed are integral to the authority of law enabling compulsory acquisition of private property. Union and State statutes have adopted these principles and incorporated them in different forms in the statutes provisioning compulsory acquisition of immovable property. The importance of these principles, independent of the statutory prescription have been recognised by our constitutional courts and they have become part of our administrative law jurisprudence.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 6466 of 2024 


Kolkata Municipal Corporation and Ors. Vs. Bimal Kumar Shah and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Aravind Kumar, JJ.

Author: Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.

Decided On: 16.05.2024

Citation: MANU/SC/0450/2024.

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Wednesday, 31 October 2018

Whether right given to accused U/S 313 of CRPC is constitutional right?

 Section 313, Cr.P.C. cannot be seen simply as a part of
audi alteram partem. It confers a valuable right upon an
accused to establish his innocence and can well be considered
beyond a statutory right as a constitutional right to a fair trial
under Article 21 of the Constitution, even if it is not to be
considered as a piece of substantive evidence, not being on oath
under Section 313(2), Cr.P.C. The importance of this right has
been considered time and again by this court, but it yet remains
to be applied in practice as we shall see presently in the
discussion to follow. If the accused takes a defence after the
prosecution evidence is closed, under Section 313(1)(b) Cr.P.C.
the Court is duty bound under Section 313(4) Cr.P.C. to consider
the same. The mere use of the word ‘may’ cannot be held to

confer a discretionary power on the court to consider or not to
consider such defence, since it constitutes a valuable right of an
accused for access to justice, and the likelihood of the prejudice
that may be caused thereby. Whether the defence is acceptable
or not and whether it is compatible or incompatible with the
evidence available is an entirely different matter. If there has
been no consideration at all of the defence taken under Section
313 Cr.P.C., in the given facts of a case, the conviction may well
stand vitiated. To our mind, a solemn duty is cast on the court
in dispensation of justice to adequately consider the defence of
the accused taken under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and to either
accept or reject the same for reasons specified in writing.
17. Unfortunately neither Trial Court nor the High Court
considered it necessary to take notice of, much less discuss or
observe with regard to the aforesaid defence by the appellant
under Section 313 Cr.P.C. to either accept or reject it. The
defence taken cannot be said to be irrelevant, illogical or fanciful
in the entirety of the facts and the nature of other evidence
available as discussed hereinbefore. The complete nonconsideration
thereof has clearly caused prejudice to the

appellant. Unlike the prosecution, the accused is not required to
establish the defence beyond all reasonable doubt. The accused
has only to raise doubts on a preponderance of probability as
observed in Hate Singh Bhagat Singh vs. State of Madhya
Bharat, AIR 1953 SC 468 observing as follows :“
26. We have examined the evidence at length
in this case, not because it is our desire to
depart from our usual practice of declining to
the assess, the evidence in an appeal here,
but because there has been in this case a
departure from the rule that when an accused
person but for the word a reasonable defence
which is likely to be true,…… then the burden
on the other side becomes all the heavier
because a reasonable and probable story
likely to be true friend pitted against AV and
vacillating case is bound to raise a reasonable
doubts of which the accused must get the
benefit….”
A similar view is expressed in M. Abbas vs. State of Kerala,
(2001) 10 SCC 103 as follows :“
10….On the other hand, the explanation
given by the appellant both during the crossexamination
of prosecution witnesses and in
his own statement recorded under Section
313 CrPC is quite plausible. Where an
accused sets up a defence or offers an
explanation, it is well settled that he is not
required to prove his defence beyond a
reasonable doubt but only by preponderance
of probabilities….”
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1330 OF 2018
(arising out of SLP(Crl.) No.2440 of 2018)

REENA HAZARIKA Vs STATE OF ASSAM

NAVIN SINHA, J.
Dated:OCTOBER 31, 2018.
Citation: 2018 SCCONLINE SC2281

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