Showing posts with label defence. Show all posts
Showing posts with label defence. Show all posts

Friday, 29 May 2026

S.311 CrPC Power Can't Be Invoked To Fill Up Lacunae In Defence : Supreme Court Quashes Order To Recall Rape Victim For Cross Examination

By the time the recall application was moved, 19 other prosecution witnesses had already been examined and the trial had substantially progressed. The trial has already been prolonged unduly, and the Court has a duty to ensure its expeditious conclusion. The trial in this case has been pending for over eight years.

16. Secondly, the principal ground urged in support of the

application under Section 311 CrPC is that certain facts arising

from the CDRs of the relevant mobile numbers could not be

brought on record during the earlier cross-examination due to

inadvertence. However, it is an admitted position that the said

CDRs were filed by the prosecution itself along with the chargesheet and formed part of the record throughout the course of the trial. The defence was thus aware of the said material and had adequate opportunity to examine the prosecutrix with reference thereto. The power under Section 311 CrPC cannot be exercised merely to fill up lacunae in the defence case.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2848 OF 2026

THE STATE OF TRIPURA Vs  PANNA AHMED 

Author: SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA, J.

Citation:  2026 INSC 584.

Dated: May 26, 2026.

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Sunday, 10 May 2026

Supreme Court: Whether the court can permit Accused to Exhibit Documents as per S.294 CrPC, Already Part Of Chargesheet Without Formal Proof Of Signature?

 In order to duly appreciate the provisions of

Section 294 Cr.P.C., it is necessary to refer to the

provision which is reproduced as under:

“294. No formal proof of certain

documents.—(1) Where any document is

filed before any Court by the

prosecution or the accused, the

particulars of every such document

shall be included in a list and the

prosecution or the accused, as the case

may be, or the pleader for the

prosecution or the accused, if any,

shall be called upon to admit or deny

the genuineness of each such document.

(2) The list of documents shall be in

such form as be prescribed by the State

Government.

(3) Where the genuineness of any

document is not disputed, such document

may be read in evidence in inquiry,

trial or other proceeding under this

Code without proof of the signature of

the person to whom it purports to be

signed:

Provided that the Court may, in its

discretion, require such signature to

be proved.”{Para 4}

5) After perusal thereof, it cannot be doubted

that in case any document has been filed by the

prosecution or the accused in any Court, such

document is required to be included in a list. The

genuineness of the documents included in the list

can be ascertained by the Court by calling upon the

prosecution or the accused, as the case may be. If

such document is not disputed, it can be read in

inquiry, trial or other proceedings under Cr.P.C.

without proving the signature of the person to whom

it purports to be. As per proviso thereto, if

necessary, it is on the discretion of the Court to

require such signature to be proved, while applying

the provision of Section 294 (3) Cr.P.C.

6) In the facts of the present case, it is clear

that the documents as sought to be marked as

exhibits by the appellant are part of the

chargesheet and of documents produced by the

prosecution. The appellant, through averments made

in the application, contends that these documents

were included in the list of documents of

prosecution. Learned Additional Solicitor General,

appearing for the CBI, disputes this fact, but on

prima facie examination of the record, it suggests

that the documents sought by accused formed part of

the list of documents produced by CBI. Nevertheless,

we reserve the CBI’s liberty to raise this objection

at the appropriate stage before court.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2026

(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 1383 of 2026)

R. GANESH Vs THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU 

Dated: April 27, 2026.

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Friday, 22 August 2025

Can Defense Prove Witness Statement Recorded Under Section 161 CrPC Without Examining the Witness? Recent Supreme Court Clarifications

In criminal trials, statements recorded by the police under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) serve as important investigative tools. However, these statements do not automatically have evidentiary value at the trial stage unless the witness who made the statement is produced and examined in court. A common question arises when the prosecution does not examine a witness whose Section 161 statement was recorded: Can the defense rely on the Investigating Officer’s (IO’s) testimony regarding that witness’s statement to prove the contents without examining the witness?

Legal Position on Section 161 Statements

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Saturday, 2 November 2024

Supreme Court: Prosecution Documents admitted As Genuine U/S 294 of CRPC By defence can be read as substantive evidence to prove the correctness of its contents without examining its author

 Also, this Court in the case of Akhtar vs.

State of Uttaranchal (2009) 13 SCC 722 has held in para 21 as

under:

“21. It has been argued that nonexamination of the

 concerned medical

officers is fatal for the prosecution. However,

there is no denial of the fact that the defence

admitted the genuineness of the injury

reports and the poot-mortem examination

reports before the trial court. So the

genuineness and authenticity of the

documents stands proved and shall be

treated as valid evidence under Section 294

of the CrPC. It is settled position of law that

if the genuineness of any document filed by

a party is not disputed by the opposite party

it can be read as substantive evidence under

sub-section (3) of Section 294 CrPC.

Accordingly, the post-mortem report, if its

genuineness is not disputed by the opposite

party, the said post-mortem report can be

read as substantive evidence to prove the

correctness of its contents without the doctor

concerned being examined.”{Para 20}

Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. OF 2024

SHYAM NARAYAN RAM Vs STATE OF U.P. & ANR.

Author: VIKRAM NATH, J.

Citation: 2024 INSC 800.

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Saturday, 26 October 2024

Supreme Court: if the genuineness of any document filed by prosecution is not disputed by defence it can be read as substantive evidence U/S 294(3) CrPC

  Also, this Court in the case of Akhtar vs. State of Uttaranchal (2009) 13 SCC 722 has held in para 21 as

under:

“21. It has been argued that non-examination of the

 concerned medical officers is fatal for the prosecution.

 However, there is no denial of the fact that the defence

admitted the genuineness of the injury

reports and the post-mortem examination

reports before the trial court. So the

genuineness and authenticity of the

documents stands proved and shall be

treated as valid evidence under Section 294

of the CrPC. It is settled position of law that

if the genuineness of any document filed by

a party is not disputed by the opposite party

it can be read as substantive evidence under

sub-section (3) of Section 294 CrPC.

Accordingly, the post-mortem report, if its

genuineness is not disputed by the opposite

party, the said post-mortem report can be

read as substantive evidence to prove the

correctness of its contents without the doctor

concerned being examined.” {Para 20}

21. On a plain reading of section 294 CrPC

and its interpretation by this Court in the above

judgments, we do not find any error in the

judgment of the Trial Court and particularly

considering the facts of the present case where

the defence repeatedly continued to admit the

genuineness of the prosecution documents

exempting them from formal proof.

Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. OF 2024

SHYAM NARAYAN RAM Vs  STATE OF U.P. & ANR. ETC.

Coram: VIKRAM NATH, J.

Citation: 2024 INSC 800.

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Monday, 17 June 2024

Whether in claim petition, the Insurance company can take the defence that they are not liable to pay compensation as their agent has committed the fraud?

When admittedly Ganesan is the Agent of the Insurance Company and received the premium from Gurusamy and in fact that Gurusamy was also given a policy, we are shocked and surprised to see, how the Insurance Company can disown its liability, more so when it does not suspect the bona fides on the part of Gurusamy. It is not the case of the Insurance Company that as per rules/conditions of the Policy, whenever a client receives a Policy from the agent, he has to go over to the office and contact the -manager or any named officer to show the policy which he has received to ascertain its genuineness.{Para 9}

10. Let us turn to analyse the legal position. The word 'agent' is derived from the Latin word "agere" which means 'to do'. Thus, an agent is a person, who acts for another whether by express or implied consent. The general rule is that whatever a person may do himself, he may authorize another to do for him in accordance with the maxim "qui facit per alium facit per se " meaning he who does anything by another, does it by himself.

In Krishna v. Ganapathi, MANU/TN/0264/1955 : AIR1955Mad648 , a Division Bench of this Court explained the concept of agency in the following terms:

"An agent is thus a person either actually or by law held to be authorized and employed by any person to bring him into contractual or other legal relations with a third party. He is a representative vested with authority, real or ostensible to create voluntary primary obligations for his principal by making promises or representations to third person calculated to induce them to change their legal relations. Representative character and derivative authority may briefly be said to be the distinguishing feature of an agent."

(a) What House of Lords ruled way back on 19th July, 1912 in Lloyd v. Grace, Smith & Co. 1912 AC 716 would be relevant.  In that case, Lord Macnaghten expressed his view in the following terms,

"The only difference in my opinion between the case where the principal receives the benefit of the fraud, and the case where he does not, is that in the latter case the principal is liable for the wrong done to the person defrauded by his agent acting within the scope of his agency; in the former case he is liable on that ground and also on the ground that by taking the benefit he has adopted the act of his agent; he cannot approbate and reprobate."

Lord Shaw of Dunfermline agreed with Lord Macnaghten and further added the following,

"The case is in one respect the not infrequent one of a situation in which each of two parties has been betrayed or injured by the fraudulent, conduct of a third. I look upon it as a familiar doctrine as well as a safe general rule, and one making for security instead of uncertainty and insecurity in mercantile dealings, that the loss occasioned by the fault of a third person in such circumstances ought to fall upon the one of the two parties who clothed that third person as agent with the authority by which he was enabled to commit the fraud.


... I am aware of the approval given to this language in subsequent cases, as for instance in Ruben v. Great Fingall Consolidated, 1906 AC 439, by Lord Davey, and in British Mutual Banking Co. v. Charnwood Forest Rv. Co., 18 O.B.D. 714, by Lord Bowen. If I may respectfully do so, I tender my entire concurrence in the opinion Just delivered by my noble and learned friend Lord Macnaghten upon the dicta of Lords Davey and Bowen in these cases. But I do so subject to this - that I cannot bring myself to think that it was ever distinctly meant to be announced or suggested as law that, on the assumption that a person deals with an agent in good faith, and that the conduct of the agent is fully within the scope of his authority, then the principal of that agent is not responsible for the agent's fraud, by reason of the fact that the agent did not mean to 'benefit his principal by the fraud, but to benefit himself. That, in my opinion, is not the law. On the contrary, the principal is, in such circumstances, legally responsible for his agent's conduct."

The principal is liable for the fraud of his agent acting within the scope of his authority, whether the fraud is committed for the benefit of the principal or for the benefit of the agent.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS

C.M.A. No. 55 of 1997

Decided On: 27.10.2003

The National Insurance Company Limited Vs. M. Nandan and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.S. Venkatachala Moorthy and S.R. Singaravelu, JJ.

Citations: II(2004)ACC645, 2004ACJ1449, 2004(2)CTC522, (2004)1MLJ146, MANU/TN/1923/2003.

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Sunday, 26 May 2024

Supreme court: Witness Who Was Shown In Prosecution List But Not Examined By Prosecution Can Be Summoned As Defence Witness

The question which arises for consideration in this appeal is

as to whether a witness which has been shown in the

prosecution list but not examined on behalf of the

prosecution, can be permitted to be examined as a defence

witness. {Para 2}

3. In our considered view, both the Courts are wrong in declining

the request of the appellant, as factually, the witness sought

to be examined on the side of the defence has not been

examined by the prosecution. In other words, the prosecution

has consequentially chosen to discharge the said witness and,

therefore, he has not been put in the witness box to depose on

behalf of the prosecution.

4. In such view of the matter, there is no bar in the law for

examining the said witness as defence witness. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2024 (@ SLP(CRL.) No.10756/2023)

SUNDER LAL Vs THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR. 

Dated: 2nd FEBRUARY, 2024.
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Saturday, 25 May 2024

Supreme court : The court should not accept defence taken by accused in his statement U/S 313 of CRPC if he has not cross examined prosecutrix in that respect

We have carefully perused the cross-examination of the prosecutrix. In the cross-examination, the case put to her was that she had voluntarily accompanied the Accused Vijay. There was no suggestion given by the Accused that the sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix was with her consent. The evidence of the prosecutrix in her examination-in-chief that the Accused committed sexual intercourse with her has not been shaken. The case of Accused Vijay made out in his statement Under Section 313 of Code of Criminal Procedure was that he was in a relationship with the victim for one year and was paying money to the victim for maintaining a sexual relationship. This case has not been put to the prosecutrix. Even the case made out by Accused Sunil and Ravi that they were keeping a physical relationship with the prosecutrix by paying money has not been put to the prosecutrix.

{Para 10}

11. If the relationship between Accused Vijay and the prosecutrix was really continuing for one year, there was no reason for him to take the prosecutrix to a remote place near a Nullah and have sexual intercourse near a boulder. The same is the case with the other two Accused. The manner in which the prosecutrix was taken initially near the Nullah and after that to another place establishes the case of the prosecutrix of forcible sexual intercourse. Few insignificant contradictions have been brought on record in the cross-examination of the prosecutrix. However, the version of the prosecutrix about the acts of forcible sexual intercourse by the Accused has been hardly tested in the cross-examination.


12. In this view of the matter, the High Court's conclusion was the only possible conclusion based on the evidence on record. Therefore, we find no merit in the appeal preferred by the Accused Vijay.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 2567 of 2024 and 2568 of 2024

Decided On: 15.05.2024

State of Himachal Pradesh Vs. Raghubir Singh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Abhay Shreeniwas Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.

Author: Abhay Shreeniwas Oka, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0430/2024.

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Sunday, 21 April 2024

Whether defence counsel can make out contradictions from statement made in FIR without putting its contents to informant at the time of his evidence?

Some contradictions were sought to be pointed out in the statement as given in the First Information Report and in the evidence of the witness P.W. 11 but we do not think it is open to the learned advocate to comment upon it because none of those contradictions have been put to the witness at the time of his giving evidence. According to the F.I.R. it would appear that Indradeo Singh accompanied by Chait Ahir, Vikrama Singh, Musan Pandey, Billar Ahir and Mongru Ahir resident of the village went there and forbade the accused persons from cutting paddy crops from his field, but the accused persons did not listen to them. Indradeo Singh made many entreats requested them not to commit such high handedness nor did he say Indradeo Singh fell in the field of Sumer Singh. In the first place it may be noticed that F.I.R. is not a substantial piece of evidence. It is an information of a cognizable offence given under Section 154 of the Criminal Procedure Code and if there is any statement made therein it can only be used for the purposes of contradicting and discrediting a witness under Section 145 of the Evidence Act. In the second place the statement given by the informant need not necessarily be an eye witness account of what he has actually seen. There were others who had gone along with him who could have furnished him with information as to what transpired in so far as it was in their knowledge. If these aspects had been put to P.W. 11, he would have had an opportunity of explaining the statement made in the F.I.R. but since that opportunity was not given, any comment based on the statement given by P.W. 11 in the F.I.R. would be without effect.

{Para 7}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 279 of 1968

Decided On: 21.04.1972

Nanhku Singh and Ors. Vs. State of Bihar

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

K.K. Mathew and P. Jaganmohan Reddy, JJ.

Author: P. Jaganmohan Reddy, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0185/1972.

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Friday, 28 April 2023

Should the court rely on the defence taken by the defendant if he fails to give his evidence before the court and gets cross-examined?

Having not entered into the witness box and having not presented himself for cross-examination, an adverse presumption has to be drawn against him on the basis of principles contained in illustration (g) of Section 114 of the Evidence Act.


16. As early as in 1927, the Privy Council in Sardar Gurbakhsh Singh v. Gurdial Singh and Anr. MANU/PR/0049/1927, took note of a practice prevalent in those days of not examining the parties as a witness in the case and leaving it to the other party to call that party so that the other party may be treated as the witness of the first party. Their Lordships of the Privy Council observed as under:


Notice has frequently been taken by this Board of this style of procedure. It sometimes takes the form of a manoeuvre under which counsel does not call his own client, who is an essential witness, but endeavours to force the other party to call him, and so suffer the discomfiture of having him treated as his, the other party's, own witness.


This is thought to be clever, but it is a bad and degrading practice. Lord Atkinson dealt with the subject in Lal Kunwar v. Chiranji Lal (1), calling it "a vicious practice, unworthy of a high-toned or reputable system of advocacy."


17. The true object to be achieved by a Court of justice can only be furthered with propriety by the testimony of the party who personally knowing the whole circumstances of the case can dispel the suspicions attaching to it. The story can then be subjected in all its particulars to cross-examination.

19. This decision was also relied upon by the Bombay High Court in Martand Pandharinath Chaudhari v. Radhabai Krishnarao Deshmukh MANU/MH/0063/1930 : (1930)32BOMLR924 , which observed as under:


It is the bounden duty of a party personally knowing the facts and circumstances, to give evidence on his own behalf and to submit to cross-examination and his non-appearance as a witness would be the strongest possible circumstance which will go to discredit the truth of his case.

21. The Madhya Pradesh High Court also relied upon the following observation of the Calcutta High Court in Pranballav Saha and Anr. v. Smt. Tulsibala Dassi and Anr. MANU/WB/0183/1958 : AIR1958Cal713 :

The very fact that the defendant neither came to the box herself nor called any witness to contradict evidence given on oath against her shows that these facts cannot be denied. What was prima facie against her became conclusive proof by her failure to deny.

The Allahabad High Court in Arjun Singh v. Virender Nath and Anr. MANU/UP/0007/1971 : AIR1971All29 , held that :

the explanation of any admission or conduct on the part of a party must, if the party is alive and capable of giving evidence, come from him and the court would not imagine an explanation which a party himself has not chosen to give.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

C.A. No. 1417 of 1982

Decided On: 16.03.1999

Iswar Bhai C. Patel  Vs.  Harihar Behera and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Saiyed Saghir Ahmad and M.B. Shah, JJ.

Author: Saiyed Saghir Ahmad, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0173/1999

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Saturday, 19 November 2022

Can the court allow an amendment of the written statement if the defendant takes the additional ground of defence by said amendment?

From a perusal of the amendment application we find that the appellant in their prayer for amendment has only taken an additional defence that in view of Section 230 of the Indian Contract Act, the suit itself is not maintainable. It is well settled, as noted herein earlier, that at the time of considering the prayer for amendment of the written statement it would not be open to the Court to go into the fact whether in fact the suit in view of Section 230 of the Indian Contract Act was or is not maintainable.

6. That apart it is permissible in law to amend a written statement of the defendant by which only an additional ground of defence has been taken.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 2946 of 2007 

Decided On: 10.07.2007

 Andhra Bank  Vs.  ABN Amro Bank N.V. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Tarun Chatterjee and Markandey Katju, JJ.

Author : Tarun Chatterjee, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/2907/2007, AIR 2007 SC 2511.
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Sunday, 30 October 2022

Whether Insurance Company Can Take A Defense Which Did Not Form The Basis Of Repudiation Of The Claim?

 Mr. Gopal Shankarnarayan, learned senior counsel for the

appellants has argued both on substantive and procedural

points to assail the aforesaid orders. His first submission is

that the insurance company cannot resist a claim petition on

grounds beyond those cited by them while repudiating a claim.

In support of this argument, a decision of this Court in the case

Saurashtra Chemicals Ltd. v. National Insurance Co. Ltd.

[(2019) 19 SCC 70] has been cited. In this judgement, it has

been held:

“23. Hence, we are of the considered opinion that the law, as

laid down in Galada [Galada Power & Telecommunication

Ltd. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (2016) 14 SCC 161 :

(2017) 2 SCC (Civ) 765] on Issue (2), still holds the field. It is

a settled position that an insurance company cannot travel

beyond the grounds mentioned in the letter of repudiation. If

the insurer has not taken delay in intimation as a specific

ground in letter of repudiation, they cannot do so at the

stage of hearing of the consumer complaint before NCDRC.”

{Para 10}

 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7630 OF 2022

JSK INDUSTRIES PVT. LTD. Vs ORIENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED 

Author: ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.

Dated: 18th October 2022

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Saturday, 25 December 2021

Whether the court would pass judgment on admission if the defendant fails to plead the date on which his adverse possession commenced?

  With regard to what are the necessary pleadings in a case where title through adverse possession is claimed, either as a shield or as a sword, the Supreme Court in Karnataka Board of Wakf (supra) has held that a person who claims adverse possession should show : (a) on what date he had come into possession; (b) what was the nature of his possession; (c) whether the factum of the possession was known to the other party; (d) how long his possession has continued and (e) his possession was open and undisturbed. It is a well settled principle that a party claiming adverse possession must prove that his possession is “nec vi, nec clam, nec precario”, that is, peaceful, open and continuous. This possession which is adequate in continuity, in publicity, and in extent must be to show that the possession is adverse to the true owner. It must start with wrongful dispossession of the rightful owner and the actual physical and hostile continued possession over a statutory period.{Para 27}

28. No doubt the defendants have accepted the fact that this suit property had fallen in the share of late Sudhir Kumar Tyagi, the plaintiffs' predecessor-in-interest, on partition of the suit property and he had been its owner since then. However, one fact that stands out is that in 2004, the defendants admit that defendant No. 1 requested late Sudhir Kumar Tyagi to allow them to use the plot which was adjacent to their Sports Complex. In view of the fact that the parties were on good terms, as per the averments in the written statement, late Sudhir Kumar Tyagi had permitted the defendant No. 1 to use the plot. Thus, the possession has not been a result of wrongful dispossession of the rightful owner, when the defendant No. 1 came into the premises.

29. It is trite that long possession will not affect the title of the true owner. Nor would the lack of use of the property by the owner, for a long time, affect his title. It is only when the defendants start asserting hostile title that the clock will start ticking. Strangely, in the entire written statement, the defendants have not stated with any definiteness as to the dates since when they had started asserting their hostile title. That alone would disclose a valid defence to the suit by asserting title by adverse possession. The mere fact that the boundary walls had been built by the defendants cannot be termed as a hostile act against the true owner as the walls had been constructed to define the properties of the defendants after the family partition took place. Nor for that matter, would the construction activities at the site be inferred as an assertion of hostility by the defendant No. 1, as nowhere it is stated that he had done so without the permission of the true owner late Sudhir Kumar Tyagi and in fact claimed title during his life time.

30. In fact, there is no disclosure in this regard, except a bald assertion. But when the written statement is seen in totality, the fact that the parties were in a cordial relationship and the defendant No. 1 himself claims that the water and electricity meters continue to stand in the name of late Sudhir Kumar Tyagi and that he used to reimburse him when payments were made, would show that the defendant No. 1 did not assert independent and hostile title to late Sudhir Kumar Tyagi. It is in this background that a date had to be disclosed when assertion of hostile possession was first made, since limitation would then be counted from that date. An essential ingredient has thus not been pleaded.

31. The defendants had to specifically plead with sufficient clarity when the possession became adverse and the exact date when adverse possession commenced and whether this fact was let known to the real owner. Their only reliance is on construction activities but that fact alone does not establish hostile title, as the initial possession was permissive. It was deemed to have continued till the plaintiffs revoked that permission to the defendants to remain in the suit property. It is only when the required animus to hold the property in a manner hostile to the true owner that it would be possible to determine how many years have passed since such open and hostile possession continued. Without commencement, there cannot be continuation. In the present case, a fundamental plea to submit the claim of adverse possession is missing and the burden on the defendants has not been discharged.

 In the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

(Before Asha Menon, J.)


Monika Tyagi and Others  Vs Subhash Tyagi and Others 

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Whether court should pass judgment on admission if defence of defendant is moonshine?

 The Division Bench of this court in P.P.A. Impex Pvt. Ltd. (supra) after reference to T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal (1977) 4 SCC 467 observed as below:

“9. It appears to us that the approach to be taken under Order XII Rule 6 is akin to what has been enunciated by the Supreme Court in Mechalac Engineers & Manufacturers v. Basic Equipment Corporation, (1976) 4 SCC 687, in the context of Order 37 of the CPC with regard to granting leave to defend a summary suit. This is that if a defence amounting to moonshine has been presented, it should be summarily dismissed by not granting leave to defend and by decreeing the suit forthwith. The Courts are already groaning under the weight of bludgeoning and exponentially increasing litigation. The weight will unvaryingly increase if moonshine defences are needlessly permitted to go to trial.

(emphasis added) {Para 24}

25. It further went on to hold that if pleadings that were vague and were in the nature of total moonshine were taken note of, the provision of Order XII Rule 6 would be virtually annihilated.

26. Thus, while disposing of an application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC, the court is fully justified in considering the averments in the written statement to see whether essential facts have been pleaded or whether the defence is a complete moonshine, requiring the Court to not send the case for trial.

 In the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

(Before Asha Menon, J.)


Monika Tyagi and Others  Vs Subhash Tyagi and Others 

CS(OS) 230/2020 and I.As. 7755/2020 

Decided on December 17, 2021

Citation: 2021 SCC OnLine Del 5400

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Wednesday, 15 September 2021

Can the court convict the accused based on the falsity of his defense if the prosecution does not prove its case based on circumstantial evidence?

  Thus, Section 106 of the Evidence Act will apply to those cases where the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts which are within the special knowledge of the accused. When the accused fails to offer proper explanation about the existence of said other facts, the Court can always draw an appropriate inference.{para 20}

21. When a case is resting on circumstantial evidence, if the accused fails to offer a reasonable explanation in discharge of burden placed on him by virtue of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, such a failure may provide an additional link to the chain of circumstances. In a case governed by circumstantial evidence, if the chain of circumstances which is required to be established by the prosecution is not established, the failure of the accused to discharge the burden under Section 106 of the Evidence Act is not relevant at all. When the chain is not complete, falsity

of the defence is no ground to convict the accused.

NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1903 OF 2019

NAGENDRA SAH  Vs  THE STATE OF BIHAR 

AUTHOR: ABHAY S. OKA, J.

Dated: September 14, 2021.

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Friday, 10 September 2021

Whether a suggestion thrown by the defence counsel to a prosecution witness, amounts to an admission on the part of the accused?

 The submission made by the learned counsel deserves consideration. The learned counsel is right when he says that major position (portion) of trial Court's discussion is devoted to the suggestions made by the defence counsel in cross-examination. But before considering the defence-stand and the evidence in support thereof, it is essential for the court to reach a conclusion and record a positive finding about the proof of the prosecution case. The falsity of a suggestion, as in the instant case-consent thrown to a witness would not by itself prove the prosecution case and the guilt of the accused, though in a given case, depending on circumstances, it may be an additional circumstances along with other duly established and proved circumstances against the accused. Since it was suggested to the prosecutrix Surli in her cross-examination that the act was committed with her consent, what the trial Court appears to have done is sharing with assumption of proof of rape and negativing consent convicted the appellant. This aproach, considering the defence plea first, before dealing with the prosecution evidence and reaching a conclusion based thereon is completely wrong. What is its effect is another matter but such an approach on the part of the trial Court cannot be approved of as it does not augur well with well established and well-recognised concepts of criminal jurisprudence.

Whether a suggestion thrown by the defence counsel to a prosecution witness, amounts to an admission on the part of the accused is a crucial question which requires consideration. It is a common practice to suggest to a witness while he or she is under cross-examination, the case of the defence when such evidence or suggestion is denied, it does not constitute any evidence. Suggestions put. are no evidence at all against the accused and on the basis of such suggestion no interference can be drawn against the accused that he admitted the fact suggested in the cross-examination as has been erroneously done by the learned Judge of the trial Court in the instant case. The proof of guilty required of the prosecution does not depend on the suggestion thrown to a witness.

15. On the basis of mere suggestion about consent thrown to the prosecutrix, the learned Judge of the trial Court has virtually dispensed with proof of offence of rape. An accused, as has been discussed above, is not bound by such a situation or implied admission made by the counsel.

19. In criminal cases a suggestion thrown to a prosecution witness under cross-examination by defence counsel cannot be used as an implied admission so as to dispense with proof of the prosecution case. It is only the plea of guilty, pleaded by an accused which can relieve the prosecution of its burden of proof. The learned Judge of the trial Court contrary to these settled principles of criminal jurisprudence has acted upon the suggestion made to the prosecutrix, about her being consenting party to the act.

28. In view of the infirmities pointed above, and the erroneous approach of the trial Court, in construing the suggestion as an implied admission, on the part of the accused, the conviction as recorded by it, circumstance of quick-sand, it is liable to be set aside.

Madhya Pradesh High Court
Sakariya vs State Of M.P. on 16 March, 1989
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Friday, 30 July 2021

Whether the accused can seek quashing of prosecution on the ground that he made imputation for the public good?

The only contention which is sought to be canvassed

to challenge the proceedings is that the offence under

Section 499 I.P.C. is not made out inasmuch as the case is

covered under the first exception to the section which

provides that if the imputation is made for public good,

the same would not amount to defamation.

11. Defamation i.e. an injury to a person's reputation, is

both a crime and a civil wrong. In a civil action for

defamation in tort, truth is a defence, but in a criminal

action, the accused would be required to prove both the

truth of the matter and also that its publication was for

public good and no amount of truth would justify a

defamatory act unless its publication is proved to have

been made for public good. The defence of truth is not

satisfied merely by proving that the publisher honestly

believed the statement to be true, he must prove that the

statement was in fact true.

12. Truth by itself, would be not a defence to an action

for criminal defamation if other ingredients are present,

unless it can be shown that imputation in question besides

being truthful was made for the public good. As to what is

public good would be a question of fact depending upon

the facts and circumstances of the case and the onus of

proving two ingredients, namely, truth of the imputation

and the publication of the imputation for the public good,

would be on the accused.

13. The question whether or not the imputation was

made for public good would therefore be a question of fact

which would be required to be proved by the accused to

seek the benefit of the first exception to Section 499. The

defence in this regard being a question of fact, can be

decided during trial only and the benefit of the first

exception cannot be claimed at the stage of issuance of

summons.

ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT

Case :APPLICATION

U/S 482 No. 10431  of 2021

Rajesh Churiwala Vs State  of U.P. 

Hon'ble Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava,J.

Dated: Order Date :14.7.2021

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Saturday, 10 October 2020

Whether court can convict accused relying on the evidence of related witness?

18. Let us now consider the law on evidentiary value of

a related witness. Commenting on the aspect, Justice

Vivian Bose in Dalip Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Punjab

 AIR 1953 SC 364 rightly opined that;

“25. We are unable to agree with the

learned Judges of the High Court that

the testimony of the two eye-witnesses

requires corroboration. If the

foundation for such an observation is

based on the fact that the witnesses

are women and that the fate of seven

men hangs on their testimony, we know

of no such rule. If it is grounded on

the reason that they are closely

related to the deceased we are unable

to concur. This is a fallacy common

to many criminal cases and one which

another Bench of this Court

endeavoured to dispel in Rameshwar vs.

The State of Rajasthan. We find,

however, that it unfortunately still

persists, if not in the judgments of

the Courts, at any rate in the

arguments of counsel.”

26. A witness is normally to be

considered independent unless he or she

springs from sources which are likely

to be tainted and that usually means

unless the witness has cause such as

enmity against the accused, to wish to

implicate him falsely. Ordinarily, a

close relative would be the last to

screen the real culprit and falsely

implicate an innocent person…….”

19. It may further be noted that Babu Lal(PW11)is an

unrelated witness. His testimony substantially supports

the evidence of PW3 and PW12 in all material

particulars. In any case, being related to the deceased

does not necessarily mean that they will falsely

implicate innocent persons. In this context, it was

appropriately observed by Justice H.R. Khanna in State

of Uttar Pradesh vs. Samman Dass (1972) 3 SCC 201

“23………………….It is well known that the close

relatives of a murdered person are most

reluctant to spare the real assailant and

falsely involve another person in place of

the assailant……………….”

20. Again in a later decision of this Court in

Khurshid Ahmed vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir

 (2018) 7 SCC 429  one of us, Justice N.V. Ramana

 on the issue of evidence of a

related witness was justified in declaring that:

“31. There is no proposition in law that

relatives are to be treated as untruthful

witnesses. On the contrary, reason has to

be shown when a plea of partiality is

raised to show that the witnesses had

reason to shield actual culprit and falsely

implicate the accused (See Harbans Kaur Vs.

State of Haryana)”

The above precedents make it amply clear that the

testimony of the related witness, if found to be

truthful, can be the basis of conviction and we have

every reason to believe that PW3 and PW12 were

immediately present at the spot and identified the

accused with various deadly weapons in their hands.

21. The learned counsel for the appellant next refers

to the defence version of the injuries being caused

through a fall on the Nullah and the old enmity being

the cause for implicating the accused. On this issue,

we may benefit by adverting to the observation of

Justice Faizan Uddin in Sushil & Ors. Vs. State of U.P.

(1995) Supp 1 SCC 363 where the learned Judge so

 correctly observed:

“8…………….It goes without saying that enmity

is a double-edged weapon which cuts both

ways. It may constitute a motive for the

commission of the crime and at the same time

it may also provide a motive for false

implication. In the present case there is

evidence to establish motive and when the

prosecution adduced positive evidence showing

the direct involvement of the accused in the

crime, motive assumes importance. The

evidence of interested witnesses and those

who are related to the deceased cannot be

thrown out simply for that reason. But if

after applying the rule of caution their

evidence is found to be reliable and

corroborated by independent evidence there is

no reason to discard their evidence but it

has to be accepted as reliable………….”

22. If the witnesses are otherwise trustworthy, past

enmity by itself will not discredit any testimony. In

fact the history of bad blood gives a clear motive for

the crime. Therefore this aspect does not in our

assessment, aid the defence in the present matter.

 [REPORTABLE]

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Criminal Appeal No. 316 of 2011

Karulal  Vs The State of Madhya Pradesh

Hrishikesh Roy, J.

Dated: OCTOBER 09, 2020

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Saturday, 12 September 2020

Whether defence of accused of alibi is proved if witness has not mentioned his name in his evidence?

 Learned counsel Shri Ghanekar argued that this witness
has proved the defence of alibi of accused No. 1 Shyamsundar. Shri
Ghanekar argued that PW 3 Manohar nowhere states that accused No. 1 Shyamsundar was there at the spot or not. Therefore, this clearly shows that accused No. 1 was not present at the scene of the offence.
We do not agree with the submission of learned counsel Shri Ghanekar.
PW 3 Manohar has nowhere stated that accused No. 1 Shyamsundar
was not present at the spot. What he has stated is that along with
deceased Ananda, there were two to three persons in the auto rickshaw.
In the cross-examination also, it was not brought on record that this
witness knew accused No. 1 Shyamsundar and despite that he did not mention his name. Therefore, his testimony nowhere suggests the absence of accused No. 1 at the spot of the incident.
{Para 43}
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 268 OF 2014

 Shyamsundar Vithal Pawle Vs The State of Maharashtra 
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Tuesday, 1 September 2020

Whether the court must frame an issue and record evidence if the defendant takes plea of Benami joint owner of the property?

Reliance was also placed on behalf of the respondents on the verdict of this Court in Bhavna Khanna Vs. Subir Tara Singh decided on 01.02.2019 in CS (OS) No. 356/2016 with observations in para 23 thereof wherein it was observed to the effect:

"Be that as it may, the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 which came into force on 5th September, 1988 i.e. much prior to the sale deed dated 16th December 2003, defined a benami transaction as a transaction in which property is transferred to one person for a consideration paid or provided by another persons. Section 3 thereof barred all persons from entering into benami transaction. Section 4 of the Act barred any defence in any suit, claim or action based on any right in respect of any property held benami, whether against the person in whose name the property is held or against any other person. The claim of the defendant that out of total sale consideration of Rs. 55 Lacs, Rs. 39.5 was contributed by him but the sale deed of the property obtained in the exclusive name of his wife Dr. Rachana Khanna falls within the definition of benami transaction and which transaction was barred on the date of sale deed and the defendant is also barred from defending this suit on the plea of being the benami joint owner of the property. The said Act was, vide amendment of the year 2016, renamed as Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act,1988 and through there has been an overhaul of all the provisions of the earlier statute but the effect remains the same. Section 4 bars a defence in respect of any property held benami. The defence of the defendant in the present suit is thus barred by the said law and once the defence is barred, again permitted evidence to be led would be only at the cost of the valuable time of this Court and the Court ultimately after recording of evidence also will be bound to decide in accordance with law. It is for this reason that I say that the defence of the defendant of joint ownership does not raise any material proposition of fact or law for an issue to have been framed thereon."

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

RSA No. 23/2019 and CM No. 4782/2019

Decided On: 21.07.2020

JAGRITI@GAYATRI Vs VIKAS SHARMA

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Anu Malhotra, J.

Citation: MANU/DE/1402/2020
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